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1
Introduction
 
On October 1, 1992, Harold Werner, owner of the Potter Clothing
Company of Newport, Rhode Island, received the first workers’ com-
pensation insurance policy issued by the Beacon Mutual Insurance
Company.  Beacon Mutual had been established as a publicly owned
workers’ compensation carrier by the Rhode Island state legislature
two years earlier—using $5 million in seed money borrowed from the
state pension fund—as a means of coping with a workers’ compensa-
tion insurance system that seemed to be out of control in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.
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Indeed, it was exceedingly difficult to find anyone who was happy
with Rhode Island’s program in that period.  Insurers were rapidly
abandoning the Rhode Island market, claiming that premium rates,
which were regulated by the state Department of Business Regulation,
were inadequate.  In 1988, the incurred losses were in excess of reve-
nues by $56.2 million, and Peter Burton, a director of the National
Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), declared that “[t]he
Rhode Island workers’ compensation program is probably the most
out-of-balance system in the United States.”
Private carriers were not the only discontented participants in the
Rhode Island workers’ compensation program.  Rhode Island employ-
ers, 90 percent of whom had been forced into the state’s assigned-risk
pool, were dissatisfied with the high costs of workers’ compensation
insurance.  Skyrocketing compensation costs had been held responsible
for some highly publicized departures of business from the state,
including a 90-year-old truck body manufacturer that expected to save
$500,000 in compensation costs by moving to Pennsylvania.  This dis-
satisfaction led to a protest march on the statehouse reminiscent of civil
rights demonstrations from a bygone era.  The march was organized by
the Rhode Island Chamber of Commerce and featured businessmen
and businesswomen carrying banners and wearing buttons that read,
“Everybody out of the [assigned-risk] pool.”  
When the state legislature responded to the crisis initially by trim-
ming benefits to workers with permanent partial disabilities, organized
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labor responded with its own brand of hyperbole.  “We are adamantly
opposed to any reductions in benefits.  We do not see the benefits being
received as the problem in this system,” stated George Nee, secretary-
treasurer of the state AFL-CIO.  Rather, Nee saw the insurance industry
as “the root of problem,” claiming that insurers were “making money
off the backs of employers and employees in this state.”
In 1989, the insurance industry sought a 139 percent increase in
rates for the state’s assigned-risk pool.  At the time of the increase, over
90 percent of Rhode Island employers were in the pool.  The Depart-
ment of Business Regulation approved an increase of 32 percent.  Not
surprisingly, insurers were back within six months, asking for a 129
percent increase.  The department delayed action on this request while
state policymakers scrambled.  Two legislative initiatives were enacted:
creation of Beacon Mutual as a means for beleaguered employers to
escape the dreaded assigned-risk pool, and a reduction of benefits paid
to injured workers with a permanent partial disability.
In September 1991, nearly two years after the initial request, the
Department of Business Regulation recommended that insurers receive
a 55 percent rate increase.  However, that next February, the increase
was overturned by Rhode Island’s Democratic governor, Bruce Sund-
lun, who accused insurers of collusion in the rate-setting process and
expressed skepticism about industry claims that rates were inadequate.
At the same time that he froze rates, the governor proposed legislation
intended to reduce program costs and obviate the need for a rate
increase.  Perhaps even more significantly, Sundlun also administra-
tively streamlined the appeals process of the Workers’ Compensation
Court.
Among other things, the governor’s proposed legislation called for
a further reduction of benefits for permanently and partially disabled
workers, establishment of a fraud prevention unit, and restrictions on
medical expenditures.  Labor received a guarantee that employers must
rehire injured workers whose benefits had expired, as well as provide
greater dependency benefits for totally disabled workers and the fami-
lies of fatally injured workers.  Finally, the legislation offered incen-
tives to insurers to remain in or return to the state’s insurance market in
the form of a “Fresh Start” provision, which required employers to
assume 90 percent of the losses sustained by insurers in 1992 and 75
percent of the losses sustained in 1993.
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While carefully crafted to offer something to everyone—except,
perhaps, claimant attorneys, who were all but driven out of the system
by the changes to the Workers’ Compensation Court—these reforms
seemed to have been surprisingly successful.  Within two years, injury
rates and severity dropped dramatically, which resulted in the NCCI
requesting a 7 percent rate decrease in 1996.  By that time, several
large insurers, including Liberty Mutual and ITT Hartford, had
returned to the state after leaving it during the fiscal crisis of 1989–
1990.  In 1998, Rhode Island experienced its third straight rate reduc-
tion.
Yet not all Rhode Islanders were rejoicing.  Although it had sup-
ported the overall goals of the process and ultimately the final package,
organized labor had reluctantly acquiesced to some of the reforms of
1990 and 1992.  By 1998, labor began to argue that it was time to
return some of the cost savings to injured workers.  A spokesman was
quoted as saying that the labor movement would like to “begin a new
dialogue” on workers’ compensation and that “[u]p until now, the dia-
logue has been very much one-sided.  It’s been very much about cut-
ting costs.” 
__________________
While it remains to be seen whether labor’s dissatisfaction will
eventually lead to future reforms that restore benefits and thus increase
costs once again, the Rhode Island experience illustrates the tensions
that exist among the interests of different stakeholders in the workers’
compensation program.  It also shows how these various interests,
which are translated into program objectives by policymakers, are rec-
onciled in the legislative process. Finally, Rhode Island serves a micro-
cosm illustrating the confluence of forces that have buffeted
compensation programs nationwide in recent decades.
As we shall describe in this volume, the workers’ compensation
program has undergone significant changes in recent decades.  Benefits
paid to workers and the costs of the program to employers were signif-
icantly higher in the early 1990s than at any other time during the last
40 years, although both have declined during the 1990s.  These
changes in benefit payments and costs were accompanied by funda-
mental alterations in the insurance arrangements used to finance work-
ers’ compensation programs.  Most of the 45 jurisdictions (including
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the District of Columbia) that allow private carriers to sell workers’
compensation insurance deregulated the workers’ compensation insur-
ance market in the last 20 years.  Furthermore, several states estab-
lished public insurance funds to compete with private insurers, while a
few states passed laws expanding the role of private insurers by elimi-
nating state funds or making them compete with private carriers.
These changes in public policy may have a direct bearing on
important aspects of the workers’ compensation system, including the
adequacy of workers’ compensation benefits, the affordability of work-
ers’ compensation insurance, the efficiency of the workers’ compensa-
tion benefits delivery system, and the prevention of workplace injuries
and diseases.  Clearly, workers, employers, insurance carriers, state
officials, and other parties to workers’ compensation want to know the
impact of such statutory revisions.
Remarkably, researchers have paid little attention to the effects of
deregulation and other changes in workers’ compensation insurance
pricing arrangements.  In this volume, we address this deficiency
through various empirical analyses that use state-specific cost, benefit,
and injury data from 48 states for 1975 to 1995.  We examine these
developments over recent decades in terms of four objectives.  First,
are the benefits provided by the state workers’ compensation programs
adequate?  Second, are the costs of the program to employers afford-
able?  Third, do the insurance arrangements used to provide the bene-
fits help achieve delivery system efficiency?  Fourth, do the insurance
arrangements encourage prevention of work-place injuries and dis-
eases?   While these are not the only objectives for a workers’ compen-
sation program, they are fairly comprehensive and also are particularly
relevant for the developments examined in this study.
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We will discuss these objectives in greater detail after providing
some background information on the workers’ compensation system.
We will also describe several federal and state policies that have been
proposed to achieve these objectives and that will be examined in this
study. 
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AN OVERVIEW OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
 
Workers’ compensation statutes in every state require employers to
provide cash benefits, medical care, and rehabilitation services to
workers who experience work-related injuries and diseases.  In this
section, we provide a brief overview of the history of workers’ com-
pensation in this country.  We also highlight salient features of work-
ers’ compensation programs.
 
Historical Origins
 
Prior to the passage of workers’ compensation laws, injured
employees’ only recourse was to sue their employer for negligence
when disabled by work-related injuries or diseases.  However, workers
seldom won these lawsuits because of the legal doctrines that were
prevalent in the 19th and early 20th centuries.  On those infrequent
occasions when employees did win these lawsuits, employers some-
times had to pay substantial cash awards.  The result was unsatisfactory
for everyone: employers confronted potentially large and uncertain
financial risks, while, at the same time, many workers faced destitution
as a result of occupational injuries.  
State governments established workers’ compensation programs to
overcome these deficiencies of the common law.  The programs were
based on two principles that continue to the present day.  First, benefits
are provided to injured workers without regard to fault.  To qualify for
benefits under this no-fault approach, the worker only has to show that
the injury is work-related, not that the employer was negligent.  Sec-
ond, the program provides limited liability for employers.  Employers
are required to pay for the benefits prescribed by the workers’ compen-
sation statute, but they are insulated from negligence suits.  Further-
more, workers’ compensation systems were also intended to make
employers’ costs of providing benefits predictable, manageable, and
insurable and to curtail the delays and expenses of lawsuits. 
Workers’ compensation laws were established early in the 20th
century by state governments rather than by the federal government,
because at that time the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution precluded broad federal legislation for private-sector
workers.  Most states established workers’ compensation programs in
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the decade after Wisconsin’s workers’ compensation program went
into effect in 1911.  This pattern of state control has persisted, with
minor exceptions, to the present day.  Employees throughout the
United States are, for the most part, covered by a state workers’ com-
pensation program; federal government involvement is limited to a few
programs pertaining to federal employees and longshore workers.
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Coverage
 
Today, most workers—about 97 percent of all workers covered by
the state unemployment insurance programs (Mont, Burton, and Reno
2000, pp. 14–15)—are covered by workers’ compensation programs.
 
4
 
However, even when employed in industries or occupations covered by
workers’ compensation statutes, workers in most states must also meet
four legal tests in order to receive benefits: 1) there must be a personal
injury, which in some jurisdictions is interpreted to exclude mental dis-
orders; 2) that results from an accident, which historically was inter-
preted by many states to exclude injuries that develop over a long
period of time, as opposed to injuries resulting from a single traumatic
incident; 3) that must arise out of employment, which means that the
source of the injury must be related to the job (if you have a personal
quarrel with a neighbor who stalks you to the job and shoots you there,
this is unlikely to meet the “arising out of employment” test); and 4)
that must occur during the course of employment, which normally
requires that the injury occur on the employer’s premises and during
working hours.  Most work-related injuries can meet these four tests,
although there are numerous exceptions.
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Benefits 
 
Injured workers who meet the four-part legal test will receive
workers’ compensation benefits prescribed by state law.  State work-
ers’ compensation programs provide three types of benefits to injured
workers.  First, medical benefits, including medical rehabilitation, are
provided for all injured workers, and in most states there are no statu-
tory limits (such as deductibles or co-payments) on appropriate medi-
cal care.  Second, some states provide vocational rehabilitation
services that must be provided to an injured worker seeking reemploy-
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ment.  Third, cash benefits must be paid to disabled workers who sat-
isfy certain criteria, or to their survivors if the worker was fatally
injured. 
The statutorily prescribed cash benefits for disabled workers vary
by the extent of disability (that is, whether the worker is totally or par-
tially disabled) and by the duration of the disability (whether the conse-
quences of the injury are temporary or permanent).  The most common
type is temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, which are paid to
someone who is completely unable to work but whose injury is of a
temporary nature.  The weekly TTD benefit is two-thirds of the pre-
injury wage in most states, subject to maximum and minimum amounts
that vary considerably among states.  
Permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits account for the greatest
share of benefits payments in states’ workers’ compensation programs
(based on the cost of awards).  PPD benefits are paid to injured workers
who have permanent consequences of their work-related injury or dis-
ease.  There are two general approaches to PPD benefits: scheduled
benefits (paid for injuries listed in the workers’ compensation statute,
such as loss of an arm) and nonscheduled benefits (paid for permanent
injuries that are not on the schedule, such as a back injury).  The
method of determining weekly benefits for a PPD case is less uniform
and more complicated than that for TTD cases.
Permanent total disability (PTD) benefits are paid to an injured
worker who is completely unable to work for an indefinite period; PTD
cases are not very common.  Finally, death benefits are paid to the sur-
vivor(s) of a worker killed on the job; these types of workers’ compen-
sation cases are also not very common.
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Financing of Benefits
 
Workers’ compensation laws assign the responsibility for provid-
ing the benefits to employers, who in turn can provide the benefits by
one of three mechanisms (depending on the state in which they are
located): 1) by purchasing insurance from a private insurance carrier;
2) by purchasing insurance from a state workers’ compensation fund;
or 3) by qualifying to be a self-insured employer and paying the
employees directly.  
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Some states, such as New York, have a three-way system in which
all three insurance options are available to employers; the state work-
ers’ compensation insurance fund in jurisdictions that permit private
carriers are referred to as “competitive” state funds.  A few states, such
as Ohio, restrict insurance coverage options to self-insurance or the
state workers’ compensation fund.  Jurisdictions that do not permit pri-
vate carriers to provide coverage are referred to as “exclusive” or
“monopolistic” state funds.
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   Still other states, such as New Jersey and
Wisconsin, restrict the employers’ choices to private insurance carriers
or self-insurance.  In Chapter 2, we discuss in greater detail these
workers’ compensation insurance coverage options for employers.
Specifically, we trace the changes in the relative importance of the
three types of insurance (as measured by the relative distribution of
benefit payments) and also discuss in detail the deregulation of the
insurance provision by private carriers.
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS
 
In this section, we describe four objectives of workers’ compensa-
tion programs that guided our research design and some public policies
that may help meet these objectives.  One of the themes of this study is
that achieving these objectives is complex and, in some cases, counter-
productive: achieving one objective often interferes with reaching one
or more of the remaining goals.  Because the various parties to work-
ers’ compensation—including, but not limited to injured workers,
employers, state officials, insurers, and the medical community—place
different emphasis on the relative worth of each objective, conflicts
among these parties often arise with respect to what is the “best” public
policy for a state’s workers’ compensation program.  
 
Adequacy
 
The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation
Laws (National Commission 1972, pp. 36–37) included adequacy of
cash benefits as one of its five objectives for a modern workers’ com-
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pensation program.
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  The general objective, that “workers’ compensa-
tion should provide substantial protection against interruption of
income,” was translated by the National Commission into 27 specific
recommendations.
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  One use of the specific recommendations was to
provide a basis for assessing the adequacy of state workers’ compensa-
tion benefits as of 1972.  For example, recommendation R3.8 stated
that the maximum weekly benefits for temporary total disability bene-
fits should be at least 66.67 percent of the state’s average weekly wage
by 1973 and at least 100 percent of the state’s average weekly wage by
1975.  
At the time of the National Commission’s report in 1972, only 10
of the 50 states had weekly maximums for temporary total disability
that were greater than 66.67 percent of the state’s average weekly
wage.  The National Commission characterized as “substandard” the
TTD maximums in 32 states that were less than 60 percent of the
state’s average weekly wage.  The National Commission thus con-
cluded “a majority of States have maximum weekly benefits which are
inadequate” and added this observation (National Commission 1972,
p. 61):
 
Our judgment that the maximum weekly benefit levels are gener-
ally inadequate is reinforced by comparing the maximum weekly
benefit in each State as of January 1, 1972, with the 1971 poverty
level for a non-farm family of four persons, which is $79.56 a
week.  It is distressing that as of January 1, 1972, the maximum
weekly benefit for temporary total benefits in more than half the
states did not reach this poverty level.
 
The National Commission standards also allow an ongoing assess-
ment of state workers’ compensation programs.  The National Com-
mission made 84 recommendations, designating 19 of them as
“essential,” and recommended that, if necessary, Congress should guar-
antee compliance with these 19 essential recommendations by federal
legislation.  Although Congress has never enacted such legislation, the
U.S. Department of Labor has monitored the progress of the states in
complying with the 19 essential recommendations on a continuing
basis.  
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Nine of these 19 provide quantifiable measures of the adequacy of
cash benefits that we rely on in this study.  The recommendations can
be summarized under three types of benefits:
• Temporary Total Disability Benefits:  A worker’s weekly benefit
should be at least 66.67 percent of the worker’s preinjury wage,
subject to a maximum of 100 percent of the state’s average
weekly wage.  There should be no limit on the duration or dollar
amount of these benefits while the worker is disabled.
• Permanent Total Disability Benefits:  A worker’s weekly benefit
should be at least 66.67 percent of the worker’s preinjury wage,
subject to a maximum of 100 percent of the state’s average
weekly wage.  There should be no limit on the duration or dollar
amount of these benefits while the worker is disabled.  These ben-
efits should not be paid to workers who retain substantial earning
capacity.
• Death Benefits:  A survivor’s weekly benefit should be at least
66.67 percent of the worker’s preinjury wage, subject to a maxi-
mum of 100 percent of the state’s average weekly wage.  There
should be no limit on the duration or dollar amount of these bene-
fits during the statutory period of dependency, which, for exam-
ple, is for the life of the widow or widower or until remarriage.
There is one major category of cash benefits for which the National
Commission was unable to reach a consensus and make recommenda-
tions, namely, permanent partial disability benefits.  Fortunately, an
alternative source that provides an operational measure of adequacy for
evaluating permanent partial disability benefits exists in the Workmen’s
Compensation and Rehabilitation Law, generally known as the “Model
Act,” published by the Council of State Governments.  
The Model Act was originally published in the 1960s and then was
revised in 1974 to make the proposed statutory language consistent
with the recommendations of the National Commission.  The Model
Act (revised)
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 will be used in Chapter 4 as the standard of adequacy
against which state workers’ compensation laws will be evaluated in
this study for the period since 1975.
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  We will also examine whether
the policy prescription of the National Commission—the enactment of
federal standards to ensure compliance with the 19 essential recom-
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mendations—is still warranted on the basis of the progress that states
have made to improve the adequacy of the cash benefits in their work-
ers’ compensation programs.  
 
Affordability
 
Fulfillment of the adequacy objective may sometimes jeopardize
another objective of modern workers’ compensation programs,
namely, affordability.  Affordability is concerned with designing a
workers’ compensation program that employers, workers, and the pub-
lic can afford without serious adverse consequences, such as loss of
jobs.  Although affordability was not specified as one of the objectives
of a modern workers’ compensation program by the National Commis-
sion, the importance of affordability was implicitly recognized in the
Commission’s report (pp. 124–125):
 
The economic system of the United States encourages the forces
of efficiency and mobility.  These forces tend to drive employers
to locate where the environment offers the best prospect for profit
. . . Any State which seeks to regulate the by-product of industrial-
ization, such as work accidents, invariably must tax or charge
employers to cover the expenses of such regulation.  The combi-
nation of mobility and regulation poses a dilemma for policymak-
ers in State governments.  Each State is forced to consider
carefully how it regulates its domestic enterprises because rela-
tively restrictive or costly regulation may precipitate the departure
of the employers to be regulated or deter the entry of new enter-
prises.
 
When it prepared its report, the National Commission did not feel
that the interstate differences in workers’ compensation costs were suf-
ficient to induce any rational employer to move to another state in order
to reduce costs.  The National Commission reached this conclusion
because, at the time (1972), interstate differences in workers’ compen-
sation costs rarely exceeded 1 percent of payroll, and such differences
were relatively insignificant compared to interstate variation in other
costs such as wage levels.  Despite this reassurance about the implausi-
bility that employers would make relocation decisions based on work-
ers’ compensation costs, the National Commission (1972, p. 125) went
on to provide a warning:
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While the facts dictate that no State should hesitate to improve its
workers’ compensation program for fear of losing employers,
unfortunately this appears to be an area where emotion too often
triumphs over fact . . . whenever a State legislature contemplates
an improvement in workers’ compensation which will increase
insurance costs, the legislators will hear claims from some
employers that the increase in costs will force a business exodus.
It will be virtually impossible for the legislators to know how gen-
uine are these claims . . . 
When the sum of these inhibiting factors is considered, it seems
likely that many States have been dissuaded from reform of their
workers’ compensation statutes because of the specter of the van-
ishing employer, even if that apparition is a product of fancy not
fact.  A few States have achieved genuine reform, but most suffer
with inadequate laws because of the drag of laws of competing
states.
 
In this study, we will examine whether the average cost of workers’
compensation insurance in the United States has increased and, in par-
ticular, whether the differences among states in the costs of workers’
compensation insurance have widened since the National Commis-
sion’s report in 1972.  Such developments would mean that the specter
of the vanishing employer is more credible now than it was when the
National Commission characterized the threat as “a product of fancy
not fact.”  
There is anecdotal evidence that by the early 1990s, workers’ com-
pensation costs had become a serious threat to employer viability.  A
1992 cover story in 
 
Nation’s Business
 
 was entitled “Workers’ Comp
Costs: Out of Control.”  Thompson (1992, p. 22) documented the finan-
cial ruin that almost befell a California company run by Robert
Boucher, who stated (perhaps with some hyperbole), “This cancer
[workers’ compensation] is killing thousands and thousands of honest
companies.”  Thompson also reported that the estimated costs of work-
ers’ compensation were $62 billion in 1991, nearly triple the amount
spent in 1980, and postulated that “[a]t the present growth rate, costs
will nearly triple again by the year 2000.”  In retrospect, the concerns
about costs appear exaggerated: we now know that total costs of the
workers’ compensation programs were $55.2 billion in 1991 and $52.1
billion in 1998.
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  However, the article was indicative of the general
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attitude among employers towards workers’ compensation costs in the
early 1990s, which, in turn, resulted in statutory benefit reductions and
other consequences that will be examined in Chapter 2.
If, as we now know to be the case, average workers’ compensation
costs have increased since the 1970s, and especially if—as we will
attempt to demonstrate in this study—interstate cost differences have
widened, there is a strong argument for invoking the policy prescrip-
tion that the National Commission made in light of fears regarding
interstate cost differences.  The National Commission (1972, p. 27)
called for federal standards for workers’ compensation programs, using
this rationale:
 
We believe that the threat of or, if necessary, the enactment of
Federal mandates will remove from each state the main barrier to
effective workers’ compensation reform: the fear that compensa-
tion costs may drive employers to move away to markets where
protection for disabled workers is inadequate but less expensive.
 
This rationale is unassailable—or so it would seem.  If there are
differences among states in workers’ compensation costs as well as in
the adequacy of the cash benefits in their workers’ compensation stat-
utes, then forcing laggard states to improve their benefits should result
in less interstate variation in costs.  However, earlier research by Krue-
ger and Burton (1990) raised serious doubts about the assertion that
federal standards would reduce the disparity among states in workers’
compensation costs.  We will revisit this issue in our empirical analysis
in Chapter 4.
 
Delivery System Efficiency
 
A third objective of a modern workers’ compensation program that
was articulated by the National Commission (1972, p. 99) was an
effective delivery system.  This was necessary to ensure that the “other
program objectives are met efficiently and comprehensively” (National
Commission 1972, p. 39).  Responsibility for an effective delivery sys-
tem lay with a variety of private and public organizations (including
insurance carriers, workers’ compensation agencies, and courts) and
with various individuals who are also involved (including employees,
attorneys, physicians, employees, and employers).  We translate the
effective delivery system objective into an objective of delivery system
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efficiency, by which we mean that workers’ compensation benefits of a
particular quality should be provided at the least possible administra-
tive cost.  
One of our principal goals in this volume is to evaluate the effect of
different insurance arrangements on the employers’ costs of workers’
compensation insurance.  We will thus examine whether, after control-
ling for factors such as injury rates and benefits levels, particular insur-
ance arrangements are associated with lower workers’ compensation
insurance rates.  If, for example, we find that, after controlling for ben-
efits and other factors, provision of insurance by exclusive state work-
ers’ compensation funds is associated with lower workers’ com-
pensation insurance rates, then we could conclude that the presence of
such a state fund helps achieve delivery system efficiency.  Likewise, if
strict regulation of rates charged by private carriers results in lower
rates than would be achieved with deregulation, then the regulation of
rates helps achieve delivery system efficiency.
Determining the net impact of various insurance arrangements on
the costs of workers’ compensation insurance is a complicated
endeavor.  There are a variety of factors affecting insurance rates, such
as the levels of cash and medical benefits, that must be measured and
taken into consideration.  Furthermore, there are subtle interrelations
between the insurance cycle and the effects of deregulation of private
carriers that must also be addressed before any conclusions about
delivery system efficiency can be made.  Moreover, there are a wide
variety of forms of workers’ compensation insurance market deregula-
tion that have been adopted by states in recent decades.  These permu-
tations must also be taken into consideration when evaluating the
delivery system efficiency of state workers’ compensation programs.
All of these are examined in Chapters 5 to 7.
 
Prevention
 
The National Commission (1972, p. 87) also postulated that the
encouragement of safety is one of the basic objectives of a modern
workers’ compensation program.  The National Commission noted that
the workers’ compensation program operates in at least two ways to
reduce the frequency and severity of work-related injuries and dis-
eases.  First, state agencies and private and public carriers provide
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employers with preventive services, including safety engineering.  Sec-
ond, the program provides a monetary incentive to employers to
improve their safety records.
The monetary (financial) incentive occurs because workers’ com-
pensation insurance is experience-rated, which means that the premium
charged depends on the level of benefit payments.  There are two steps
in the experience-rating process, beginning with industry-level (or
occupational-level) experience rating.
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  Every employer who pur-
chases insurance is assigned to a particular insurance classification, for
which the initial insurance rate can be determined by looking in an
insurance manual.  In addition, medium or large employers are eligible
for firm-level experience rating, which means they pay more or less
than the initial rates depending on their own experience relative to
other firms in the same insurance classification.  
The traditional rationale for experience rating is that it provides an
incentive for employers to improve their safety records in order to
reduce their insurance premiums.  Empirical evidence regarding the
success of experience rating as a prevention tool is mixed: some studies
suggest that experience rating promotes safety, but others do not.
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Our study is concerned with another dimension of the relationship
between workers’ compensation and safety: namely, the effect of dif-
ferent insurance arrangements on improving workplace safety.  One
issue is whether competitive and exclusive state funds are more or less
likely to promote safety and health than are private insurance carriers.
Some have argued, for example, that private carriers are likely to
emphasize profits over safety, and therefore that state funds are more
likely to be concerned with worker safety and health.  Another work-
place safety issue is whether the type of regulation of private carriers
affects safety incentives.  One argument is that administered pricing or
other forms of price regulation will distort the financial incentives to
improve workplace safety and, therefore, that deregulation is likely to
improve workplace safety.
We examine these various possible relationships among workplace
safety and insurance arrangements in workers’ compensation in Chap-
ter 8.  There are obvious policy implications of any finding that the pre-
vention objective is furthered by a state’s choices about whether to rely
on a state fund or private carriers for workers’ compensation coverage,
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and, if private carriers are allowed, whether the insurance rates charged
by those carriers should be regulated.
 
Relationships among Objectives
 
We have discussed four objectives for a workers’ compensation
program that provide the conceptual framework for our study: ade-
quacy of benefits, affordability, delivery system efficiency, and injury
prevention.  In this volume, we will examine various public policies
that states or the federal government could adopt to achieve these
objectives.  Ideally, policies that help achieve one objective will also
facilitate reaching another objective.  Thus, if regulation of private car-
riers both lowers workers’ compensation insurance rates and improves
workplace safety, a state that uses this approach will foster both the
delivery system efficiency and prevention objectives.
Candor compels us to admit, at this point, that some policies that
help achieve one objective may actually impede the realization of
another objective.  Thus, for example, higher levels of benefits may
help improve benefit adequacy but may also undermine affordability
and contribute to job losses.  One contribution we make in this study is
to help quantify the tradeoffs between adequacy and affordability that
would result from a federal statute requiring adequate benefits.  This is
one of our tasks in Chapter 4.
Another contribution we make is our analysis of the possible
tradeoffs in using different public policies regarding insurance arrange-
ments.  We will quantify, for example, the possible savings to employ-
ers from deregulation of private insurance carriers.  We will then be
able to compare these possible savings with the added costs of achiev-
ing adequate cash benefits resulting from federal standards.  These are
some of our tasks in Chapter 9.
The conclusions we reach at this book’s end are, of course, the
result of the requisite groundwork that we have prepared for the reader
as well as for ourselves.  The remainder of this volume begins in the
next chapter with an overview of salient developments in workers’
compensation developments since 1960.  We then (in Chapter 3) cri-
tique various ways of measuring employers’ costs of workers’ compen-
sation and explain the relative advantages of our cost methodology.  In
Chapter 4, we present our basic model for determining costs and 
 
inter
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 use it to examine the possible effects of federal workers’ compen-
sation standards on adequacy of benefits and affordability.  Chapter 5
compares the costs of workers’ compensation insurance provided by
state versus private carriers.  In the succeeding two chapters, we review
economic theory and our empirical findings about the effects of insur-
ance regulation on workers’ compensation costs and market structure.
The impact on workplace safety of different workers’ compensation
arrangements is investigated in Chapter 8.  Chapter 9 contains our con-
clusions about the public policy implications of our empirical research,
including policy prescriptions.
 
Notes
 
1. Information about the recent history of Rhode Island workers’ compensation
reform came from various issues of the 
 
Providence Journal
 
.  Citations are avail-
able from Terry Thomason on request.  We are indebted to Matthew Bodah for his
assistance in compiling this history.
2. For an alternative version of the objectives of workers’ compensation programs,
see the National Commission (1972).  “Equity” is often used as an additional
objective or criterion for the workers’ compensation program.  The National
Commission (p. 137) defined an “equitable” workers’ compensation program as
one that delivered “benefits and services fairly as judged by the program’s consis-
tency in providing equal benefits or services to workers in identical circumstances
and its rationality in providing benefits and services in proportion to the impair-
ment or disability for those with different degrees of loss.”  For an example of the
use of the equity criterion to evaluate permanent partial disability benefits in the
workers’ compensation program, see Berkowitz and Burton (1987).
3. The decentralized nature of workers’ compensation in the United States has
advantages and disadvantages for researchers.  One advantage is that variation
among states provides a natural laboratory for evaluating the impact of different
public policies.  There are considerable variations among the states in many
aspects of their workers’ compensation programs, with various combinations of
the features we are examining.  For example, some states that rely solely on pri-
vate carriers and self-insuring employers to provide workers’ compensation cov-
erage have low statutory benefits, while other states with identical insurance
arrangements have generous statutory benefits.  This interstate variability in com-
binations of attributes makes it easier to determine the net effect on costs of differ-
ent insurance pricing arrangements.  However, the decentralized nature of
workers’ compensation in the United States and the lack of a federal presence is
also disadvantageous, because it results in a paucity of comparable data.  Most of
our research effort for this book was devoted to constructing a comparable data set
for the 48 jurisdictions in our study.
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4. There is less than 100 percent coverage because of exemptions that are permitted
by state workers’ compensation statutes.  These exemptions include 1) employers
with few employees (e.g., three or less); 2) exempted industries, such as state and
local governments and agriculture; 3) occupational exemptions, such as house-
hold workers; and 4) a Texas law that allows employers in the state to elect not to
provide coverage.  Certain employees—those who are “casual” workers or work-
ers not engaged in the normal trade or business of the employer—may not be pro-
tected by a state workers’ compensation law, even when their employer is
otherwise within the scope of the mandatory coverage specified by the statute.  In
addition, independent contractors normally are not covered by workers’ compen-
sation.
5. The coverage of work-related diseases by workers’ compensation has been more
problematic, as discussed by Spieler and Burton (1998).
6. Additional information on workers’ compensation cash benefits is included in
Appendix D.
7. As of 1999, Ohio, Nevada, Washington state, and West Virginia had exclusive
state funds and permitted self-insurance; North Dakota and Wyoming had exclu-
sive state funds and did not permit self-insurance.
8. The term 
 
workmen’s compensation
 
 was generally used to describe the program as
late as 1972, when the National Commission submitted its report.  Shortly there-
after, most jurisdictions and commentators adopted 
 
workers’ compensation
 
 as the
preferred term.  We have retained 
 
workmen’s compensation
 
 when referring to the
name of the National Commission, but have used 
 
workers’ compensation
 
 in all
references to the contents of the National Commission’s report.
9. The National Commission made 84 recommendations in total covering all aspects
of workers’ compensation programs and designated 19 of them as “essential.”
10. The Model Act (revised) is reprinted as Appendix A of Larson and Larson (1999).
11. The procedure used to make the Model Act (revised) an adequacy standard is dis-
cussed in Thomason and Burton (2000a).
12. The principle of full disclosure requires an admission: the source of the $62.0 bil-
lion estimate for the costs of the workers’ compensation program in 1992 cited in
Thompson (1992, p. 23) was Burton (1992).
13. Some writers define what we term “industry-level (or occupational-level) experi-
ence rating” as 
 
class rating
 
 and would confine the term
 
 experience rating
 
 to what
we refer to as “firm-level experience rating.”  Regardless of differences in termi-
nology, economic theory posits that both levels of what we call “experience rat-
ing” promote workplace safety and health.
14. After reviewing all of the available (and conflicting) empirical evidence, Burton
and Chelius (1997, p. 266) endorsed a view that experience rating “has had at
least some role in improving safety for large firms.”
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2
Developments in Workers’ 
Compensation since 1960
 
As the Chapter 1 tale of workers’ compensation woes in Rhode
Island illustrated, achieving workers’ compensation program objec-
tives can sometimes result in sharp conflicts among the various stake-
holders.  This chapter provides a more general historical perspective of
developments in workers’ compensation as well as a context for our
modeling and empirical analysis in later chapters.
Our historical overview of workers’ compensation developments
begins with the 1960s, which was a relatively tranquil period in work-
ers’ compensation, at least for employers and carriers.  However, criti-
cisms of the coverage and benefits of the workers’ compensation
program were building in the 1960s and early 1970s, culminating in
the indictment of the state programs as “in general . . . inadequate and
inequitable” by the National Commission on State Workmen’s Com-
pensation Laws in 1972.  One result was a flurry of activity by the
states to update their laws, which resulted in higher benefits (improved
adequacy) but also led to higher costs.  Workers’ compensation costs
also increased after the mid 1980s because of the rapid escalation of
payments for medical benefits.  By the early 1990s, an almost inevita-
ble backlash against higher costs of the program occurred, which
resulted in “reforms” that have affected workers’ compensation
throughout the 1990s.
To be sure, the overview in the preceding paragraph is simplistic,
because it ignores such important factors as the role of high interest
rates in temporarily suppressing the employers’ costs of the program in
the early 1980s and the role of private carriers in spearheading the cost-
cutting reforms of the early 1990s.  That brief history also ignores the
changes in workers’ compensation insurance arrangements, which
were arguably both a cause and a consequence of the changes in work-
ers’ compensation costs in recent decades.  We attempt to tell the more
complex, more accurate—and, we trust, more compelling—story in
this chapter.
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BENEFITS AND COSTS
 
The costs to employers and the benefits paid to workers as a per-
centage of payroll, which are two measures of interest to all aficiona-
dos of workers’ compensation, fluctuated significantly from 1960 to
1998 (Figure 2.1).
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   Employers’ costs as a percentage of payroll
ranged from a low of 0.93 percent in 1960 to a high of 2.17 percent in
1993, followed by a decline to 1.35 percent in 1998.  Over the same
period, benefits as a percentage of payroll started at 0.59 percent in
1960, climbed to 1.66 percent in 1992, and then dropped to 1.08 per-
cent in 1998.
There were significant variations in the rates of increase or
decrease of workers’ compensation costs between 1960 and 1996.  We
have divided the post-1960 experience into subperiods, defined by
whether total costs of the program were increasing relatively slowly
(defined by those years in which costs increased on average by less
than 10 percent a year) or relatively rapidly (defined by those years in
which costs increased on average by 10 percent or more a year).  Anal-
ysis of these subperiods allows us to identify the dynamics of the last
40 years that have affected the benefits, costs, and insurance arrange-
ments in the program. 
 
The Era of Tranquillity: 1960–1971
 
The era from 1960 through 1971 was relatively tranquil for work-
ers’ compensation, at least for employers and insurance carriers.
Employers’ costs increased from $2.1 billion in 1960 to $5.2 billion in
1971, an 8.8 percent annual rate of increase (Figure 2.2).
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   The costs
grew more rapidly than wages, and thus workers’ compensation costs
increased from 0.93 percent of payroll in 1960 to 1.11 percent in 1971
(see Figure 2.1).  Benefits paid to workers increased from $1.3 billion
in 1960 to $3.2 billion in 1971, which represented an annual rate of
increase of 8.5 percent (Figure 2.3).  Benefits as a percentage of payroll
increased from 0.59 percent in 1960 to 0.67 percent in 1971 (see Figure
2.1).
Despite the increase in benefits paid relative to payroll during this
period, workers’ compensation programs were increasingly criticized
for failing to provide adequate benefits and coverage.  The statutory
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Figure 2.1 Costs and Benefits of Workers’ Compensation, 1960–98
 
SOURCE: Table A.1, columns 1 and 2.
Note: The apparent drop between 1988 and 1989 is due to a change in methodology
described in Table A.1, note a.
 
Figure 2.2 Annual increase in Workers’ Compensation Costs, 1960–98
 
SOURCE: Table A.2.
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benefits had not been improved since the beginning of World War II to
keep up with increases in the average wage level, and in most jurisdic-
tions the maximum weekly benefits were lower relative to wages in the
1960s than they had been in 1940.
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   Indeed, as of 1972, the maximum
weekly benefit for temporary total disability in more than half the
states was less than $79.56, the national poverty level for a nonfarm
family of four (National Commission 1972, p. 61).  Moreover, the
extent of coverage of workers by workers’ compensation did not match
the extent of coverage by other social insurance programs, such as the
Social Security (OASDHI) and unemployment insurance programs.  
Other related developments in this era provided the impetus for
subsequent changes in state workers’ compensation programs.  The
number of disabling work injuries increased in the 1960s, resulting in
more deaths, permanent disabilities, and temporary total disabilities
(Williams and Barth 1973, p. 3).  A 1968 explosion in a West Virginia
coal mine served as the catalyst for the enactment of the federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, which 
 
inter alia
 
 provided benefits
to disabled coal miners and their survivors (Barth 1987, p. 12–13).
Many viewed this law both as an indicator of increased federal concern
regarding the inadequacy of state compensation for occupational dis-
 
Figure 2.3 Annual Percentage Increase in Workers’ Compensation 
Benefits, 1960–98
 
SOURCE: Table A.3.
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eases and as a harbinger of increased federal involvement in the work-
ers’ compensation arena. 
 
The Era of Reform: 1972–1979
 
Concern about deteriorating workplace safety and the increasing
criticisms of the workers’ compensation program prompted Congress
to create the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation
Laws as part of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.  The
National Commission conducted a series of hearings, sponsored exten-
sive research, and intensively deliberated over a 15-month period.  The
result was a 1972 report that was critical of the state workers’ compen-
sation programs and concluded that state laws “in general are inade-
quate and inequitable” (National Commission, 1972, p. 119).  The
Commission made its recommendations for state workers’ compensa-
tion programs and urged Congress to enact federal minimum standards
incorporating its “essential” recommendations if the states did not
improve their laws by 1975.
Congress did not enact federal standards.  One reason was that
state laws were significantly improved in the 1970s in response to the
threat of federal intrusion into the traditional domain of the states.  One
way of measuring improvements in states’ workers’ compensation
laws is the extent to which they complied with the Council of State
Government’s Model Act, which incorporated the recommendations of
the National Commission.  The cash benefits provided by the state stat-
utes increased on average between 1972 and 1979, from 39.6 percent
to 50.4 percent of the benefits prescribed by the Model Act (Figure
2.4).
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   Another example of the rapid improvements in state laws after
the submission of the National Commission report is that one of the
Commission’s recommendations—the maximum weekly benefit for
temporary total disability benefits be at least 100 percent of the state’s
average weekly wage—was complied with by one state in 1972; by
1979, 28 states had complied. 
The changes in statutory benefits translated into higher benefit pay-
ments to workers.
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  Benefits as a percentage of payroll rose from 0.67
percent to 1.01 percent between 1971 and 1979 (see Figure 2.1); the
costs to employers increased from 1.11 percent of payroll in 1971 to
1.95 percent in 1979.  
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Although costs and benefits grew rapidly during this period, pri-
vate carriers were generally able to increase premiums fast enough to
cover the higher benefit payments.  Three measures of underwriting
experience—the pure loss ratio, the combined ratio, and the overall
operating ratio—are shown in Table 2.1 and are explained in Appendix
B.  Lower levels of each of these measures are preferable for the insur-
ance industry and represent higher profits (or lower losses).  The over-
all operating ratio is the most comprehensive measure of profitability
because it includes both underwriting experience and investment
income.  An overall operating ratio in excess of 100 indicates that the
insurance industry is experiencing a net loss on operations.  
Underwriting experience in the workers’ compensation line from
1973 to 1997 is depicted in Figure 2.5.  The data indicate that under-
writing experience deteriorated from 1973 to 1976 but then improved
from 1976 to 1979.  The insurance industry by the end of the 1970s had
accommodated to the higher benefit payments of the decade by
increasing workers’ compensation premiums at a sufficient rate to
achieve satisfactory underwriting results.
 
Figure 2.4 Statutory Cash Benefits Relative to Model Act 
Benefits, 1974–96
 
SOURCE: Table A.1, column 3.
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Table 2.1 Workers’ Compensation Underwriting Experience, 1999
 
a
 
Figure 2.5 Workers’ Compensation Insurance Underwriting Experience, 
1973–99
 
SOURCE: Table A.4.
Line 1 Pure loss ratio (incurred losses)
 
b
 
65.9
2 Loss adjustment expenses
 
b
 
+ 15.8
3 Losses and adjustment expenses incurred (lines 1 + 2)
 
b
 
81.7
4 Underwriting expenses incurred
 
c
 
+ 28.0
5 Dividends to policyholders
 
b
 
+ 5.6
6 Combined ratio after dividends (lines 3 + 4 + 5) 115.3
7 Net investment gain loss and other income
 
b
 
– 20.5
8 Overall operating ratio (lines 6 – 7) 94.8
SOURCE: From 
 
Best’s Aggregates and Averages, Property/Casualty
 
, 2000 edition and
prior editions,© A.M. Best Company, used with permission.
 
a
 
Terms are explained in Appendix B.
 
b
 
Expressed as a percentage of net premiums earned.
 
c
 
Expressed as a percentage of net premiums written.
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The Squeeze of Benefits and Costs: 1980–1984
 
The growth in workers’ compensation benefit payments deceler-
ated in the early 1980s, dropping to 11.8 percent a year from the 15.8
percent annual rate of increase in the 1972–1979 period (see Figure
2.3).  The slowdown in part reflected the slower pace of state reform as
the threat of federal standards for state workers’ compensation pro-
grams vanished in wake of the 1980 election of President Reagan.
Between 1980 and 1984, the expected cash benefits provided by state
statutes on average only increased from 50.3 to 50.5 percent of the ben-
efits prescribed by the Model Act (see Figure 2.4).  Actual benefits paid
as a percentage of payroll nonetheless increased from 1.01 to 1.21 per-
cent of payroll between 1979 and 1984 (see Figure 2.1).  
Workers’ compensation costs grew at a modest annual rate of 4.3
percent from 1980 to 1984 (see Figure 2.2), not even matching total
payroll growth.  As a result, costs as a percentage of payroll plummeted
from 1.95 percent in 1979 to 1.66 percent in 1984 (see Figure 2.1).  
The squeeze between costs and benefits can be explained by mac-
roeconomic developments.  Rapid inflation of the late 1970s and early
1980s led to high interest rates and bond yields (Figure 2.6), which
resulted in favorable investment opportunities for workers’ compensa-
 
Figure 2.6 Nominal and Real Interest Rates, 1960–99
 
SOURCE: Table A.5.
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tion carriers and substantial improvements in net investment income.
Investment income increased from 9.2 percent of premiums in 1979 to
16.7 percent in 1984, which is reflected in the increasing spread in Fig-
ure 2.5 between the combined ratio (which measures underwriting
experience) and the overall operating ratio (which measures overall
profitability, including investment income).  The higher investment
income allowed carriers to compete for business by reducing insurance
rates, despite increasing benefit payments.  For most of the period, this
strategy worked: from 1979 to 1983, the overall operating ratio in
workers’ compensation insurance ranged from 96.3 to 88.9, indicating
industry profitability.  However, the loss ratio deteriorated rapidly after
1982, and by 1984 the overall operating ratio exceeded 100 (see Figure
2.5).
 
Seeds of Neo-Reform: 1985–1991
 
The falling workers’ compensation costs that characterized the
early 1980s did not persist through the balance of the decade.  There
was a rapid escalation in the employers’ costs of workers’ compensa-
tion, increasing from $25.1 billion in 1984 to $55.2 billion in 1991, an
average of 11.9 percent a year (see Figure 2.2), which far outpaced
payroll growth.  As a result, workers’ compensation costs as a percent-
age of payroll increased rapidly, rising from 1.66 percent in 1984 to
2.16 percent in 1991 (see Figure 2.1). 
Workers’ compensation benefits also increased during this period,
from $18.0 billion in 1984 to $40.8 billion in 1991, an average annual
increase of 12.4 percent (see Figure 2.3).  Payroll grew at a slower rate
than benefits, so benefits increased from 1.21 percent of payroll in
1984 to 1.64 percent in 1991 (see Figure 2.1).  Medical benefits
increased by 14.9 percent per year between 1985 and 1991, more rap-
idly than both the annual increase of 10.8 percent in cash benefits
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(Figure 2.7) and the high rate inflation for general health care costs.
The sources of the rapid escalation in medical costs in the workers’
compensation program included the rapid spread of managed care
through the health care system used for non-occupational medical con-
ditions and the resulting cost shifting to the workers’ compensation
health care system.
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Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, many employers
became concerned, if not alarmed, about the increasing costs of the
workers’ compensation program.
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  In addition to cost increases result-
ing from higher statutory cash benefits and escalating medical benefits,
employers were also concerned about what they perceived to be wide-
spread fraud and rampant litigation, especially involving conditions
such as workplace stress, which employers felt were outside the proper
domain of the program.
The workers’ compensation insurance industry was particularly
agitated by the developments concerning the relationships between
benefits and costs.  Several factors contributed to the industry’s prob-
lems.  Benefit payments reaccelerated during this period, but in many
states, carriers were unable to gain approval from regulators for the sig-
nificant premium increases the industry believed were actuarially justi-
fied.  As a result, loss ratios, which were always below 71 from 1979 to
1983, were always above 80 from 1984 to 1991 (see Figure 2.5).  Fur-
thermore, even though net investment income remained relatively high
from 1984 to 1991 (always exceeding 12 percent of premiums), under-
writing losses were so substantial that the overall operating ratio was
103.8 or higher in every year between 1984 and 1991.  In other words,
 
Figure 2.7 Annual Percentage Increase by Type of Workers’ 
Compensation Benefit, 1960–98
 
SOURCE: Table A.3.
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the workers’ compensation insurance industry lost money in every year
during this period, even after taking into consideration returns on
investments.  
The major legacy of the period from 1985 to 1991 was the planting
of the seeds for reform that bloomed in the 1990s.  Employers were
concerned about the increases in the costs of workers’ compensation,
which (as a percentage of payroll) had more than doubled from the
1960s by 1991 (see Figure 2.1), with much of that increase having
occurred since 1984.  At the same time, private carriers experienced
serious financial difficulties as the workers’ compensation line was
unprofitable every year between 1984 and 1991.
 
The Neo-Reform Era: 1992–1998 
 
Escalating costs from 1985 to 1991 galvanized political opposition
by employers and insurers to workers’ compensation programs that
had been liberalized in the wake of the National Commission’s report.
Opposition to growth in workers’ compensation costs led to significant
changes in many state programs.  Over half of the state legislatures
passed major amendments to workers’ compensation laws between
1989 and 1996, generally reducing benefits and attempting to contain
health care costs.
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  There were five significant developments in work-
ers’ compensation related to these efforts, as identified by Spieler and
Burton (1998). 
First, the statutory level of cash benefits was reduced in a number
of jurisdictions, particularly with regard to benefits paid for permanent
disabilities.  Second, eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits
was narrowed due to changes in compensability rules.  From the per-
spective of employers and carriers, much of the narrowing of eligibility
was justified in order to eliminate fraud and marginally work-related
conditions from the program.  
Third, the health care delivery system in workers’ compensation
was transformed, most notably by the introduction of managed care.
The fourth development was the rise of disability management by
employers and carriers, largely due to unilateral actions by these par-
ties in response to the higher costs of the workers’ compensation pro-
gram, but also in part as a result of inducements provided by state
legislation.  Finally, in a development that ultimately could result in
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higher employers’ costs outside the workers’ compensation program,
the exclusive remedy doctrine was challenged by several court deci-
sions, due in part to judicial reactions to the increasing limitations on
the availability of workers’ compensation benefits.  
In addition to these five developments, another factor that may help
explain the decline in cash and medical benefits during the 1990s is the
apparent drop in the work-related injury rate in the decade
 
10
 
 (Figure
2.8).  This decline in the injury rate may be due to more effective
enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), or to
the increased effect of the experience rating of workers’ compensation
premiums as the costs of workplace injuries increased, or to greater
accident prevention efforts by employers for reasons other than experi-
ence rating, or to a shift in the national economy towards employment
in safer industries and occupations.
 
11
 
   
Favorable conditions in the labor market are another likely reason
for the reductions in workers’ compensation benefits paid during the
1990s.  The sustained economic expansion during the 1990s produced
national unemployment rates that dropped every year between 1993
and 1997, a five-year achievement that had not occurred since the
1960s (Figure 2.9).  The duration of workers’ compensation benefits
paid to injured workers typically declines when unemployment rates
are low, because employers are more willing to accommodate disabled
workers when workers are generally unavailable and because injured
employees are more likely to be recalled to work or find alternative
jobs in tight labor markets.
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As a result of these various factors, workers’ compensation bene-
fits increased modestly or even declined in the 1990s, depending on the
measure used.  Benefits paid to workers increased from $40.8 billion in
1991 to $40.7 billion in 1998, which represented a very small (less than
0.1 percent) annual rate of increase (see Figure 2.3).  Benefits as a per-
centage of payroll peaked at 1.66 percent of payroll in 1992 and then
declined to a low of 1.08 percent of payroll in 1998 (see Figure 2.1).
The multiyear decline in benefits paid relative to payroll is unprece-
dented in duration and magnitude since at least 1948, when the annual
data were first published for successive years (Burton and Schmidle
1995, p. III-28).
Cash benefits paid to injured workers increased from $24.1 billion
in 1991 to $24.9 billion in 1996, which represented a modest 0.5 per-
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Figure 2.8 Work-Related Injury and Illness Rates, 1972–98
 
SOURCE: Table A.6.
 
Figure 2.9 Unemployment Rates, 1960–99
 
SOURCE: Council of Economic Advisers (2000), Table B-42, “Unemployment Rate
for All Civilian Workers,” p. 330.
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cent annual growth rate (see Figure 2.7).  Part of the slowdown in cash
benefits was due to the relative stability in statutory benefits during this
period, with the average state’s benefits increasing from 49.9 percent of
the Model Act in 1991 to 50.1 percent in 1996 (see Figure 2.4).  Medi-
cal benefits actually declined from $16.7 billion in 1991 to $15.8 bil-
lion in 1998, which is a drop of 0.8 percent per year.  
As a result of the reduced payments of benefits to workers, the
employers’ costs of workers’ compensation as a percentage of payroll
(see Figure 2.1) peaked in 1993 and then declined significantly.  Also,
as benefits and costs declined in the 1990s, the profitability of private
carriers quickly improved (see Figure 2.5).  The loss ratio (incurred
losses as a percentage of premium) plummeted from a peak of 87.8 in
1991 to 55.2 in 1995, and then increased only slightly (to 55.6 percent)
in 1997.  Furthermore, the overall operating ratio (which includes net
investment income) fell from a peak of 108.7 in 1991 to a low of 80.2
in 1995, and then increased slightly (up to 80.3 percent) in 1997.  The
four years from 1994 to 1997, when the operating ratio was below 90
in every year, represent the most profitable period in at least 20 years
for workers’ compensation insurance.  The rapid increases in the loss
ratio and the overall operating ratio in 1998 and 1999 (see Figure 2.5)
indicate that profitability of workers’ compensation insurance is still
cyclical and suggest that some of the stresses the system experienced in
the early 1990s may soon reemerge.
 
INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS
 
In this section, we review salient developments since 1960 in the
insurance arrangements in workers’ compensation.
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  We first examine
the relative importance of benefit payments from state funds, private
carriers, and self-insuring employers; developments involving state
funds are discussed in more detail.  We then examine the private insur-
ance market, which evolved from a highly regulated industry in the
1960s and 1970s into a relatively deregulated industry in the 1980s and
1990s.
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  Finally, we review the residual market (also called the
assigned-risk market) for workers’ compensation insurance.
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Shares of Benefits by Type of Insurance Arrangement
 
The share of benefits paid by private carriers, state and federal
funds, and self-insuring employers over the period 1960–1998 is
shown in Figure 2.10.  Private carriers accounted for the predominant
share of benefit payments throughout this period; for example, from
1960 to 1990, private carriers paid for about 60 percent of all benefits.
During the 1990s, however, the private carriers’ share dropped to about
50 percent, reflecting in part their reluctance to provide coverage dur-
ing the unprofitable early years of the 1990s.  
Another significant development in the workers’ compensation
insurance market during recent decades is the increasing share of bene-
fits paid by self-insuring employers.  The share increased from 1990 to
1998 (from 19.7 percent to 25.0 percent of all benefit payments), con-
tinuing a long-term trend (Figure 2.10).  The recent increasing impor-
tance of self-insurance can be explained by three developments.  First,
many carriers decided to leave an unprofitable line of business in the
early 1990s (which is a development that may be reversed with
increased profitability).  Second, many employers paid increasing
 
Figure 2.10 Workers’ Compensation Benefits by Type of Insurer,
 1960–98
 
SOURCE: Table A.7.
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attention to disability management (including prevention) in response
to the higher costs of workers’ compensation, which led some employ-
ers to self-insure in order to assume greater control over their workers’
compensation programs.  Finally, some employers decided to self-
insure in order to avoid assessments on policies sold in the voluntary
market that were used to subsidize losses in the residual market.
The emergence of several new state funds in recent years (dis-
cussed below) helps explain why the share of benefits paid by state and
federal workers’ compensation funds increased from 19.9 percent in
1990 to 22.8 percent in 1998, reversing the downward trend in the
share of benefits provided by government funds that occurred between
1960 and 1990 (Figure 2.10).
 
State Workers’ Compensation Funds
 
From its origin (in most states) between 1910 and 1920, workers’
compensation has relied on a mixture of state funds, private carriers,
and self-insurance, and from the beginning there were arguments con-
cerning the merits of the various arrangements.  State funds were
lauded because of lower overhead (notably the absence of a broker’s
fee) and because proponents thought that profits were inappropriate in
a mandatory social insurance program.  Private carriers were praised
because they promoted efficiency and were considered more compati-
ble with our capitalist society.  The arguments that prevailed varied
from state to state: some jurisdictions created exclusive state funds,
some authorized only private carriers to provide insurance, and some
permitted private carriers to compete with state funds.
As shown in Figure 2.11, as of 1960 there were seven exclusive
state funds, the youngest of which was the North Dakota fund (estab-
lished in 1919).  There were also 11 competitive state funds (those in
competition with private carriers), the youngest of which was the Okla-
homa fund (established in 1933).  The numbers and types of state funds
were relatively constant for half a century.  Oregon converted its exclu-
sive state fund into a competitive state fund that began operation in
1966; this represented the only change in state funds between the early
1930s and the early 1980s.
One of the significant developments in the workers’ compensation
insurance market in the last two decades was the emergence of several
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new competitive state funds.  The pioneer of the modern movement
towards state funds was Minnesota, which established a competitive
state fund in 1984.  Then, in the 1990s, five new competitive state
funds began operation by January 1, 1995, the last date we use in this
study for interstate comparisons of the costs of workers’ compensation
insurance; three more states established state funds by 1998.  However,
in a contrarian move, the long-existing Michigan competitive state
fund was privatized in 1994.
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The state legislators’ motives for establishing the new state funds
were 1) to reduce costs of workers’ compensation in the state and/or 2)
to provide an alternative source of insurance for employers who could
not purchase policies in the voluntary market or who did not like the
surcharges or other conditions imposed on policies purchased in the
residual (assigned-risk) market, which we discuss below.  One of our
research objectives is to determine the effects, if any, of state funds
(new or old) on the costs of workers’ compensation insurance and on
workplace safety.
 
Figure 2.11 Number of State Workers’ Compensation Funds, 1960–98
 
SOURCE: Table A.8.  The numbers are determined as of January 1 of each year.
 36 Chapter 2
 
Regulation of the Workers’ Compensation Insurance Market
Historical origins of regulation in the property/casualty 
insurance line
 
State regulation of insurance pricing in the United States was ini-
tially applied to fire and marine insurance and thus predated the estab-
lishment of workers’ compensation programs.  In the early 19th
century, insurers were free to charge whatever rate they felt was appro-
priate or profitable.  However, because coverage for a particular com-
pany tended to be geographically concentrated due to transportation
and communication limitations, fire insurers were vulnerable to insol-
vency resulting from catastrophic fires.  As noted by Kimball and
Boyce (1958, p. 547): 
 
Historically, fire insurance losses seemed to follow cyclical pat-
terns.  When the loss ratio was low and profits high, the prospect
of large profits attracted newcomers to the insurance business.
Companies were easy to start; neither experience nor elaborate
physical plant were essential . . . Premium volume might be enor-
mous in relation to capital, and a new company might easily enjoy
the illusion of large profits if its accounting practices did not pro-
vide for adequate reinsurance reserves . . . Hence overconfident
underwriting with rates driven down to uneconomic levels by
excessive competition might go undetected until a catastrophic
fire wiped weak companies out of existence with great loss to pol-
icyholders.
 
Insurance companies first attempted to resolve these problems
through self-regulation, i.e., the establishment of rating boards or pro-
fessional associations.  These rating boards attempted to control rates
by providing insurers with better data and underwriting guidance as
well as common pricing agreements.  However, continuing waves of
insolvency among fire insurers demonstrated that these boards, in and
of themselves, were ineffective and led to the call for increased state
regulation of the insurance industry.
As a consequence, state insurance departments were established in
the 1850s.  The initial focus of state regulation was on such matters as
the licensing of insurers and agents, minimum financial and deposit
requirements, reviews of insurance contracts, and reporting require-
ments, rather than on insurance rates.  Licensing and bond deposit
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requirements mandated by the state of Virginia were challenged in
court by New York insurers, but the Supreme Court upheld the regula-
tions in 
 
Paul v. Virginia
 
, 75 U.S. 168 (1869).  The Court concluded that
the issuance of an insurance policy was not a transaction of interstate
commerce, which arguably would have made insurance subject to fed-
eral regulation and thus preempted state regulation. 
In part out of a concern with alleged unfair discrimination in insur-
ance rates, states subsequently enacted rate regulatory laws, beginning
with Kansas in 1909.  New York’s statute, for example, prohibited
unfair discrimination in rates and allowed fire insurance rates to be set
in concert; the rating bureau had to file rates with the state’s insurance
commissioner, whose approval was required before the rates could be
used.  Rating bureaus were viewed as way to develop more accurate
rates (based on insurers’ collective experience rather than on an indi-
vidual insurer’s experience).  Regulators believed that competition
resulted in below-cost pricing since losses were difficult to predict and
tended to be underestimated.
Although the 
 
Paul
 
 decision upheld the general right of states to
regulate the insurance industry in the absence of federal regulation, the
issues of whether the U.S. Congress could also regulate the insurance
industry and, if so, what were the consequences of such federal regula-
tion for state authority, were not clearly resolved until the Supreme
Court’s decision in 
 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Asso-
ciation
 
 
 
(SEUA)
 
, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).  The Court held that the business
of insurance was interstate commerce and, as such, price-fixing agree-
ments for insurance rates (including those involving state rating
bureaus) were subject to prosecution under the federal Sherman Anti-
trust Act.  In addition, under the preemption doctrine of constitutional
law, the presence of a federal statute meant that states were precluded
from also regulating rates.  
As a result of the 
 
SEUA
 
 decision, Congress in 1945 approved the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which declared in part that the federal anti-
trust laws would be applicable to the insurance industry only to the
degree that the industry was not regulated by state law.  Model (or “all-
industry” bills), drafted collectively by state insurance commissioners,
were subsequently adopted by most states, and administered pricing
systems were established for most lines of property/casualty insurance.
However, after the initial enactment of the all-industry bills, the tradi-
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tional administered pricing system for most lines of property/casualty
insurance was modified over time in many states in order to allow
greater competition among insurers.  By the 1970s, a substantial
minority of states had deregulated their property/casualty insurance
lines other than workers’ compensation.
 
Workers’ compensation regulation
 
In contrast to the deregulation movement that generally occurred in
property/casualty insurance in the 1970s, rate setting in workers’ com-
pensation insurance continued to be highly regulated until the 1980s.
The deregulation of workers’ compensation insurance was resisted on
several grounds: the distinctive characteristic of workers’ compensa-
tion as a mandated social insurance program (and the resultant concern
with both rate levels for employers and the solvency of carriers); the
existence of competitive measures other than price competition for
workers’ compensation insurance (primarily through dividends); and
the need for a comprehensive database (with uniform rate classes and
information on the experience of a large number of insurers).  These
arguments helped delay even partial deregulation of workers’ compen-
sation in most states until the 1980s and 1990s, and they still operate to
preserve “pure” administered pricing in a few states and vestiges of
regulation in most states.
The administered-pricing approach to rate setting for workers’
compensation involved several components.  A rating organization was
selected in each state.
 
16
 
  The rating organization prescribed standard-
ized reporting forms and established an elaborate system of industrial
and occupational insurance classifications.  The rating bureau collected
detailed information on benefits paid and premiums collected by all
private carriers providing workers’ compensation insurance in the
state.
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  These data were then used to establish 
 
pure premiums
 
(expected losses) for each insurance classification.  The pure premiums
were then increased by a loading factor, consisting of an allowance for
loss adjustment and other expenses and for profits, to produce 
 
manual
rates
 
 for each insurance classification.
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  Manual rates were stated as
dollars per $100 of payroll (thus bakeries, Class 2003 in a typical state,
might have a manual rate of $2.40 per $100 of payroll).
The rating bureau then filed the manual rates with the state insur-
ance commissioner.  The rates could not be used without prior approval
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of the commissioner, who could reject and/or modify the proposed
rates if they were “excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”
Each carrier was obliged to belong to the rating bureau, to provide data
to the bureau, and to adhere to the manual rates approved by the insur-
ance commissioner.  
Even in administered-pricing states, the premiums paid by many
employers were not simply the product of total payroll times the appli-
cable manual rate, because there were several modifying factors, such
as premium discounts for larger employers and experience-rating mod-
ifications for a medium or large firm based on the firm’s previous expe-
rience.
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  The modifying factors were precisely defined in rules
established by the rating bureau and approved by the insurance com-
missioner, and they had to be closely followed by each workers’ com-
pensation carrier.  One additional feature of the workers’ compensation
insurance market was that most carriers—including mutual and stock
companies—paid dividends to policyholders based on their underwrit-
ing experience.  
In sum, under the administered-pricing approach to workers’ com-
pensation rate setting, all carriers were required to start with the same
manual rates, and the various modifications to those rates involved
either 1) formulae or constants to which all carriers had to adhere and
which modified the manual rates at the beginning of the policy period,
or 2) dividends that were paid only after the policy period ended.  In
short, there was virtually no chance for carriers to compete in terms of
price at the beginning of the policy period with any of these modifica-
tions.
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Deregulation of the Workers’ Compensation Insurance Market
The types of deregulation
 
Administered pricing is no longer the dominant approach to work-
ers’ compensation insurance pricing in the United States.  A fundamen-
tal result of the deregulation of the workers’ compensation insurance
market that has taken place in the last two decades is that private carri-
ers can now compete for business by varying the insurance rates at the
beginning of the policy period.  Most jurisdictions now allow devia-
tions and schedule rating, and a number of jurisdictions have moved to
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more comprehensive forms of deregulation that generally fall under the
rubric “open competition” or “competitive rating.”
If a state allows 
 
deviations
 
, individual carriers may deviate from
the published manual rates and charge lower (or occasionally higher)
rates than those promulgated by the rating organization.  The devia-
tions are generally stated as a percentage discount from the manual
rates.  The magnitude of the deviations will vary among carriers; how-
ever, the deviations offered by a particular carrier are uniform for all
policyholders in the state.  In addition, deviations from bureau rates are
generally subject to the approval of the state insurance commissioner.
 
Schedule rating
 
 plans have also been introduced in most jurisdic-
tions.  Under these plans, insurers can change (usually decrease) the
workers’ compensation insurance rate an individual employer would
otherwise pay.  These changes are made through a system of debits or
credits that are based on a subjective evaluation of factors such as the
employer’s loss control (safety) program.  The plans are created by the
rating organization and are subject to the approval of the insurance
commissioner.  As a result, these plans are uniform for all insurers
operating in a particular state.  However, the application of the plans is
based on judgmental factors, and this allows insurers to vary rates paid
by policyholders, even among employers in the same classification
code.
While deviations and schedule rating constitute widely adopted
forms of partial deregulation, even more comprehensive reforms have
been adopted in a number of states during the last 20 years.  These
reforms involve various combinations of three different changes to the
regulatory environment.  First, some states have dropped the require-
ment that insurers become members of the rating organization or
adhere to bureau rates.  
Second, other jurisdictions no longer require insurers to obtain reg-
ulatory approval prior to using rates.  In place of the prior approval
requirement, states have adopted “file-and-use” or “use-and-file” sys-
tems.  In file-and-use states, insurers must file their rates with the regu-
latory agency prior to or concurrent with their effective date; no
specific approval is required before the rates are used, but the agency
retains the right to disapprove the rates at a later date.  In use-and-file
states, the insurer must still file rates; however, the carrier may use
those rates before they are filed with the regulatory agency.  Use-and-
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file systems are obviously the less restrictive of these two alternatives
to prior approval.  
Third, some states prohibit the rating organization from filing fully
developed rates; instead, these organizations file loss costs or pure pre-
miums.  Each carrier in these states has to decide what loading factor
should be used in conjunction with the pure premiums to produce the
equivalent of manual rates.
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These three approaches to deregulating workers’ compensation
insurance rate setting have been adopted by the states in various combi-
nations.  Arkansas, for example, in 1981 dropped the requirement that
insurers adhere to bureau rates.  However, Arkansas continued to
require that carriers obtain regulatory approval prior to the implemen-
tation of new rates and that the rating bureau file fully developed rates.
The South Carolina rating bureau began to file pure premiums rather
than fully developed rates in 1990, but insurers were required to rely on
bureau estimates of pure premiums in developing their own manual
rates and to obtain prior approval before implementing these manual
rates.  Kentucky, beginning in 1982, dropped prior approval and adher-
ence requirements, and the bureau was prohibited from filing fully
developed rates.  Despite the differences among the three states in their
approach to deregulation, each is described by the National Council on
Compensation Insurance in the 
 
Annual Statistical Bulletin
 
 (NCCI
2000) as having adopted “competitive rating” legislation.  While the
NCCI categorization is sufficient for certain purposes, in this study we
use a far more complex classification scheme for deregulation, which
also allows us to capture the effects of changes in the various
approaches to deregulation.
 
The initial phase of deregulation
 
Deregulation of the workers’ compensation insurance market
began in the early 1980s.  One type of deregulation—i.e., “competitive
rating,” also referred to as “open competition”—was introduced in nine
states between 1981 and 1984, according to the NCCI (Figure 2.12).
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Several factors help explain the onset of deregulation.  First, the
overall political climate became more hostile to the notion that “big
government” could do a better job than competitive forces in determin-
ing prices and allocations of resources, and one consequence was a
general move towards deregulation involving industries such as airlines
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and trucking, as well as the insurance industry.  A second factor, partic-
ularly relevant for workers’ compensation, was the increasing cost of
the program during the 1970s, which concerned employers and state
legislators.  They hoped that deregulation would reduce the costs of
workers’ compensation insurance by, for example, promoting effi-
ciency.  A third factor was a perception among some legislators,
unions, and employers that profits in the workers’ compensation insur-
ance line were excessive.  Again, the hope was that deregulation would
help reduce costs by squeezing out excess profits.  Not surprisingly,
most workers’ compensation insurers resisted deregulation during this
period.
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Deregulation in the 1990s
 
After the initial moves to deregulation in the early 1980s, the intro-
duction of open competition slowed in the balance of the 1980s.  The
reduced pace can perhaps be explained by the general unprofitability of
workers’ compensation insurance in this period: legislators saw little
chance to reduce workers’ compensation costs by deregulating an
industry in financial distress.  However, one consequence of the
unprofitability of workers’ compensation insurance was the beginning
 
Figure 2.12 Number of States Enacting Open-Competition Statutes, 
1981–99
 
SOURCE: Table A.9.
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of a change in attitude towards deregulation by many in the insurance
industry.  Deregulation was now seen as a way to escape from the
“onerous” decisions of insurance regulators and to establish rates that
would allow carrier profitability.  Thus, some of the seven states that
adopted open competition between 1985 and 1990 did so with at least
the tacit support of the insurance industry.
Deregulation reemerged with vigor during the 1990s: open compe-
tition statutes became effective in 16 states between 1991 and January
1, 1995,
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 and in an additional 5 states after that date (Figure 2.12).
Deregulation in some of these states—especially those that adopted
open competition in the early 1990s when the industry was still experi-
encing losses—reflected support from the insurance industry, but
deregulation in other states (most notably California, where rate filings
had generally been approved by the insurance commissioner) was gen-
erally resisted by the industry.
While deregulation has been proceeding in recent decades, signifi-
cant developments that could also affect the employers’ workers’ com-
pensation premiums were occurring in the assigned-risk (residual)
markets for workers’ compensation insurance.
 
Assigned-Risk Markets
 
Workers’ compensation is a mandatory program for employers
(with the limited exceptions noted in Chapter 1).  A minority of
employers (typically large and financially sound) self-insure their
workers’ compensation obligations with approval of the state.  Those
employers who do not qualify to self-insure must purchase workers’
compensation insurance.
The six exclusive state workers’ compensation funds must accept
all applicants for insurance, as must most competitive state funds.  Pri-
vate insurers and some competitive state funds, on the other hand, can
reject applicants who are considered undesirable.  Because the employ-
ers whose applications are rejected must have workers’ compensation
insurance in order to comply with their state’s statutory requirements,
states that do not have a state fund obligated to accept all employers
have established assigned-risk plans.
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There are two categories of assigned-risk programs (Williams
1969, pp. 48–49).  Under the first approach, applicants who have been
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unable to secure insurance in the voluntary market are assigned to indi-
vidual carriers in proportion to the carriers’ market shares in the state.
Under the second approach, an assigned-risk pool underwrites the
insurance.  Employers insured by the pool are assigned to one of a lim-
ited number of carriers that administer claims on behalf of the pool.
All carriers insure the policies written by the pool in proportion to their
voluntary market shares.
The traditional reasons why employers were unable to obtain
workers’ compensation policies in the voluntary market were that the
applicant was engaged in some activity that was unusually hazardous
relative to the experience of other firms in the appropriate insurance
classification, or had a poor loss record, or was so small that the pre-
mium did not adequately compensate the insurer for its expenses (Wil-
liams 1969, p. 48).  In the 1960s, most assigned-risk programs
provided for a standard 8 percent surcharge, and the premium was ade-
quate to cover losses and loss adjustment expenses.
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  The assigned-
risk market accounted for no more than 3.2 percent of all premiums
nationally between 1960 and 1965 (Williams 1969, p. 52).
The assigned-risk share of all premiums accounted for only 4.6
percent of all premiums nationally in 1975, the first year of our study
of the determinants of workers’ compensation insurance rates (Figure
2.13).  However, as the cost of workers’ compensation insurance
increased after 1975, the assigned-risk market share almost tripled by
1978–1979, when these premiums accounted for 12.7 percent of all
premiums nationally.  The share then dropped back to 5.5 percent in
1984, reflecting the generally profitable conditions in the workers’
compensation insurance market and the declining cost of workers’
compensation insurance.
The fiscal stress that the workers’ compensation insurance market
was under during the years from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s is
clearly evident in the explosion of the assigned-risk market share from
5.5 percent of all premiums nationally in 1984 to a peak of 28.5 percent
in 1992.  In addition to the traditional reasons for applicants being
forced to purchase in the assigned-risk market (basically the unattrac-
tiveness of individual risks), the dominant factor contributing to
assigned-risk market growth in the 1985–1992 period was the general
inadequacy of workers’ compensation insurance rates because of the
reluctance of insurance regulators in many states to approve rate filings
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with substantial rate increases for the voluntary market.  Carriers in
such jurisdictions became unwilling to write policies in the voluntary
market because they could not make an adequate (or in many cases,
any) profit.
Several states were particularly noteworthy for the share of work-
ers’ compensation insurance provided through the residual market:
79.9 percent of total premiums in 1991 in Louisiana, 88.6 percent of
total premiums in 1992 in Rhode Island, and 90.6 percent of 1989 total
premiums in Maine.  A vicious cycle ensued in some of these states: 
• rates were held down in the voluntary market by regulators; 
• carriers were unwilling to write policies in the voluntary market
at the approved rates, which forced some employers into the
assigned-risk market; in addition, regulators sometimes re-
sponded to political pressures and held insurance rates in the
assigned-risk market well below the levels that were warranted,
inducing some employers who were able to purchase policies in
the voluntary market to obtain policies in the assigned-risk resid-
ual market because the rates were so low; 
• the assigned-risk markets ran substantial deficits because of inad-
equate rates; 
 
Figure 2.13 Assigned-Risk Market Share, 1975–98
 
SOURCE: Table A.10.
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• the carriers in the voluntary market were assessed substantial
sums to cover the assigned-risk market deficits; and 
• when the carriers tried to pass on these assessments to policy-
holders still in the voluntary market, many employers shifted to
the assigned-risk market in order to obtain coverage at the sup-
pressed rates, which only increased the size of the aggregate
losses in the assigned-risk market and increased assessments in
the voluntary market.
The rapid decline in the national share of total premium accounted
for by the assigned-risk market that occurred after 1994 (Figure 2.13)
is due to three major factors.  First, the overall profitability of the work-
ers’ compensation insurance line quickly improved after 1992 (see Fig-
ure 2.5).  Second, several states established competitive state funds or
other special public or quasi-public funds to provide policies to
employers who could not find policies in the voluntary market.  For
example, the Louisiana competitive state fund became operative in
1992; the Maine competitive state fund began payments in 1993; the
Kentucky state fund specifically created for assigned-risk policies
started operations in 1995; and the Rhode Island competitive state fund
became operative in 1996.
Third, a series of changes were made in assigned-risk policies dur-
ing the last 15 years that made these policies more expensive and
reduced the subsidy from the voluntary market.  For example, many
states introduced separate manual rates for the assigned-risk market
that were substantially higher than the rates for the voluntary market.
In addition, many states either eliminated premium discounts or intro-
duced special experience-rating plans that tied premiums more closely
to each firm’s own benefit payments in the assigned-risk markets.  We
provide more details on these changes in Appendix C. 
 
CONCLUSIONS
 
Workers’ compensation benefit payments increased substantially
from the 1970s until the early 1990s, when benefits began to decline.
Costs to employers of the program had a more complex history and
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went through two cycles, increasing from the 1970s until about 1980,
then declining for a few years, followed by significant increases until
the early 1990s, when costs started to drop rapidly.  These benefit and
cost developments provide the backdrop for significant changes in the
insurance arrangements in workers’ compensation, with a number of
new state funds emerging in the 1990s and with partial deregulation of
private carriers spreading throughout the country beginning in the early
1980s.  One of our major tasks in subsequent chapters is to more pre-
cisely measure these costs and the various factors that affect costs, such
as the level of cash and medical benefits and the nature of the insurance
arrangements, in order to allow us to test a model of the determinants
of the interstate differences in the employers’ costs of workers’ com-
pensation insurance.
 
Notes
 
1. The data pertain to all states and all types of insurance arrangements, including
self-insuring employers.
2. Within the 1960s, there was a subperiod (1965–1969) when costs increased 11.3
percent a year.  In order to simplify our analysis, we are including this subperiod
with the rest of the years from 1960–1971.
3. In 1940, the maximum weekly benefit for temporary total disability benefits was at
least 66.7 percent of the state’s average weekly wage in 38 jurisdictions.  In 1966,
only three jurisdictions met this standard (National Commission 1972, p. 61).
4. The Model Act, which is officially known as the Workmen’s Compensation and
Rehabilitation Law (Revised), was published by the Council of State Govern-
ments in 1972.  The Model Act and the methodology we used to measure state
workers’ compensation statutory provisions relative to the Model Act are dis-
cussed in Thomason and Burton (2000a).
5. The change in statutory benefit levels resulted in higher benefit payments in part
because of the utilization effect: workers were encouraged to file for benefits and
to extend their periods of disability.  The utilization effect is further discussed in
Chapter 9.
6. Between 1985 and 1991, the cash benefits provided by the average state statute
declined slightly from 50.5 to 49.9 percent of the benefits prescribed by the Model
Act (see Figure 2.4).
7. Conflicting evidence on the cost-shifting hypothesis and other explanations for
the rapid increase in health care costs in the workers’ compensation program dur-
ing the 1985–1991 period are examined in Burton (1997) and Spieler and Burton
(1998).
8. Typical employer reactions to the spiraling costs of workers’ compensation were
provided in Chapter 1.
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9. This examination of developments in the 1990s is based in part on Tinsley (1990,
1991), Berreth (1992, 1994, 1996, 1997), and Brown (1993, 1995).
10. Some of the decline in reported injury rates may be due to the indirect conse-
quences of tightened eligibility rules for workers’ compensation, which means the
apparent decline may exaggerate the actual decline.
11. A more comprehensive examination of the possible explanations of declining
injury and fatality rates is provided in Durbin and Butler (1998).  They indicate,
for example, that the threshold level of premium to qualify for experience rating
has increased (which would tend to reduce the impact of experience rating on
safety), and that there has been an increasing use of deductibles in workers’ com-
pensation policies (which would tend to increase safety incentives for employers).
12. Another factor that may have reduced the costs of workers’ compensation insur-
ance in the 1990s was the residual market reforms discussed in the next section.
13. The definitive treatment of insurance arrangements in workers’ compensation
through the 1960s is Williams (1969).
14. The workers’ compensation insurance market has become relatively deregulated
in the 1990s compared with its status prior to 1980.  We examine the significant
movement towards deregulation in this section of Chapter 2 and also in Chapters
5 and 6.  Despite this deregulation, the workers’ compensation insurance market
remains the most heavily regulated commercial insurance line in terms of prices,
policy forms, data reporting requirements, and market conduct.  Regulators still
retain the authority and responsibility to ensure that rates are not excessive, inade-
quate, or unfairly discriminatory.  
15. Other changes in state funds shown in Appendix A, Table A.8, were not effective
by 1998.
16. Most states relied on the National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI) as
the rating organization.  Several states instead established “independent” rating
bureaus, including California, Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
17. In some of the states with competitive state workers’ compensation funds, the
state fund also provided data to the rating bureau.
18. The loading factor was a uniform percentage for all classifications.
19. These and other modifying factors are examined in considerable detail in Chapter
3 and Appendix C.
20. A few states did permit deviations or schedule rating prior to the 1980s, but their
use was limited even in these states.  These competitive devices are explained in
the next section of the text.
21. This three-way characterization of reform is a simplification because there are
substantial variations in the configurations of regulation and deregulation.  For
example, some states permit the rating bureau to file both pure premiums and
fully developed rates, and they have one set of rules that apply to the pure pre-
mium filing and a different set of rules for the manual rates.  Missouri allows
downward deviations from bureau rates but not upward deviations.  Oklahoma
allows insurers to use rates without prior approval as long as the rate increase is
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less than 15 percent, but the Insurance Commission must approve higher rate
increases.
22. As indicated in the preceding paragraph in the text, the NCCI’s “competitive rat-
ing” categorization encompasses a variety of forms of deregulation.  In Chapter 7,
we provide our own historical record of deregulation using a more refined set of
categories of deregulation.
23. The states that adopted open competition in the 1980s were rather eclectic (geo-
graphically, economically, and politically), and empirical efforts at modeling the
determinants of the adoption of open competition have been rather unavailing;
see, for example, Schmidle (1994).
24. January 1, 1995, is significant because that is the last comparison date for the
insurance rates we analyze in this study.
25. At one time, the competitive state fund in Idaho was not obligated to accept all
applicants, but in practice it almost always did so (Williams 1969, p. 48).
26. According to Williams (1969, p. 49), “Losses and loss adjustment expenses have
amounted to about 82 percent of the premiums earned during the 11 policy years
[from 1955 to 1965].  Since 1961, the trend in the loss and loss adjustment ratio
has been downward, and in 1965 was .774.”
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3
Measuring Employers’ Costs
 
Several significant recent developments in workers’ compensation
programs were described in Chapter 2.  Benefits paid to injured work-
ers relative to payroll increased from the 1970s until the early 1990s
and then declined for several years.  The employers’ costs of workers’
compensation had a somewhat more complex history: costs increased
in the 1970s, then declined in the early 1980s, only to resume an
upward trend in the mid 1980s that peaked in the early 1990s, followed
by a period of decline.  Workers’ compensation insurance arrange-
ments also changed over recent decades: several states established new
competitive state insurance funds, and most states with private carriers
deregulated their workers’ compensation insurance markets.
Our task in this study is to attempt to disentangle these develop-
ments in the workers’ compensation program.  For example, to what
extent were the increases in workers’ compensation costs due to
increased cash benefits as prescribed by state statutes, as opposed to
other factors such as changing injury rates and higher payments for
medical benefits?  One question of particular interest to us is the extent
to which the changes in the insurance arrangements affected workers’
compensation costs.  In order to successfully isolate the effects of the
various developments in benefits and insurance arrangements on work-
ers’ compensation costs, we must first develop an appropriate measure
of these costs.
In this chapter, we discuss several approaches that have been used
to measure the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation.  We ini-
tially summarize and critique cost measures that are frequently used by
practitioners for interstate comparisons or that have been used by aca-
demics in empirical studies: these include benefits paid per worker,
loss ratios, losses per employee or injury, and average losses per $100
of payroll.  We then describe our two measures of employers’ costs,
namely, premiums paid per $100 of payroll and weekly premiums per
worker, as well as our rationale for these measures.  
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ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF EMPLOYERS’ COSTS
Benefits Paid per Worker
 
Data on workers’ compensation benefits paid per worker and on
benefits as a percentage of payroll are reported in a widely cited data
series published by The National Foundation for Unemployment Com-
pensation and Workers’ Compensation, an affiliate of UWC, Inc.
 
1
 
  The
National Foundation uses 1) data on total workers’ compensation bene-
fits paid in each state, which are published by the Social Security
Administration (SSA) and the National Academy of Social Insurance
(NASI); 2) SSA data on the percentage of the workforce covered by the
workers’ compensation program in each state; and 3) data from state
unemployment insurance programs, to produce the estimates of work-
ers’ compensation benefit payments per worker and as a percentage of
payroll.  The most recent version of the report provides data for every
state for the period 1986–1995 (National Foundation 1997). 
For the 50 states plus the District of Columbia, average benefits
paid per covered employee in 1995 ranged from $145 in North Caro-
lina (35.1 percent of the national average, which was $413) to $734 in
Hawaii (177.7 percent of the national average).  Benefits as a percent-
age of payroll in 1995 ranged from 0.60 percent (in North Carolina) to
3.87 percent (in West Virginia); the national average was 1.51 percent.
The National Foundation data, and the SSA/NASI data on which
the National Foundation figures are largely based, are of considerable
value because they represent the only comprehensive data on workers’
compensation benefits that apply to all states and to all types of insur-
ance arrangements.  There are, however, several limitations that restrict
their usefulness.  For example, the data are based on current benefits
payments (i.e., benefits paid to all claims active during the current cal-
endar year, regardless of the year of injury) rather than on incurred
losses (the estimates of benefits that must eventually be paid for inju-
ries occurring during that calendar year).  Since workers’ compensa-
tion benefits are often paid over a period of several years, current
benefit payments do not provide an accurate measure of losses for inju-
ries occurring in particular years.
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In addition, the National Foundation data are necessarily imprecise
in other respects.  The SSA data on the extent of each state’s workforce
covered by the workers’ compensation program are only available for a
few, nonconsecutive years.  As a result, the National Foundation has
decided to use changes in the number of workers covered by a state’s
unemployment insurance program to estimate changes in a state’s
workers’ compensation coverage.
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  The resulting estimates of the pro-
portion of the workforce covered by the workers’ compensation pro-
gram are then used to estimate the proportion of payroll in each state
covered by the workers’ compensation program.  The National Foun-
dation also assumes that the average wage of workers covered by a
state’s workers’ compensation program is the same as that of workers
covered by the state’s unemployment insurance program.  These
assumptions are unlikely to hold true for all states and all years, intro-
ducing further error into the National Foundation estimates.  
Another problem with the National Foundation’s benefits data is
that they do not control for differences in states’ industrial composi-
tion.  A state with a relatively heavy concentration of industries with
inherently dangerous occupations will have higher workers’ compensa-
tion benefit payments than a state with safer industries, even if the stat-
utory benefit levels and administrative costs are identical in both
jurisdictions and even if the benefits per worker in comparable indus-
tries are the same.  For example, suppose State A has 80 percent of its
workforce in coal mining and 20 percent in the financial sector, while
State B has 20 percent of its workforce in coal mining and 80 percent
in finance.  Also assume that in both states, workers’ compensation
benefits per $100 of payroll are $12.00 for coal mining and $1.00 for
finance.  This means that the overall average of benefits per $100 of
payroll is $9.80 per $100 of payroll in State A and $3.20 in State B,
solely because of differences in the industrial composition of the two
states.
A final limitation of the National Foundation data as a basis for
interstate cost comparisons is that they only measure benefits paid to
workers, not the costs of the program to employers, which includes
administrative expenses among other things.  Because of these limita-
tions, the Foundation’s data do not provide an appropriate measure of
interstate differences in employers’ costs of workers’ compensation.
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Loss Ratios
 
The 
 
loss ratio
 
 is the employers’ cost measure most frequently uti-
lized in empirical analyses of the impact of insurance regulation.
Unfortunately, that term has several alternative definitions.  A general
guide to workers’ compensation underwriting experience is provided in
Table 3.1.  (An extended discussion of insurance terminology and
sources of data is included in Appendix B.)
Table 3.1 is general because it starts with “premium” (although
there are actually three different measures of premium defined in
Appendix B) and because the table does not specify the method of
reporting data (Appendix B provides four methods).  Also, Table 3.1
does not specify whether the losses are paid or incurred.
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The alternatives in the measure of premiums, in the method of
reporting data, and between paid and incurred benefits can be signifi-
cant, and some will be discussed below.  However, knowledge of all
these alternatives is not critical to gaining a basic understanding of the
 
Table 3.1 Workers’ Compensation Underwriting Experience: 
A General Guide
 
1. Premium
2. – Losses
3. – Loss adjustment expenses
4. – Underwriting expenses (commissions and brokerage expenses; state and local 
insurance taxes; department taxes, licenses, and fees; guarantee association 
assessments; general expenses; and other underwriting expenses)
5. – Dividends
6. = Underwriting results
7. +/– Net investment gain/loss and other income
8. = Overall operating results prior to state and federal income taxes
 
Ratios Used to Evaluate Underwriting Expenses
 
Loss (or pure loss) ratio = line 2 
 
÷
 
 line 1
Loss plus loss adjustment expenses ratio = (line 2 + line 3) 
 
÷ 
 
line 1
 
 
 
  
Combined ratio = line 6 
 
÷
 
 line 1
Overall operating ratio = line 8 
 
÷
 
 line 1
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ratios used to analyze underwriting results in workers’ compensation
insurance, which is a requisite for our critique of loss ratios as a mea-
sure of employers’ costs.
Four ratios are used to evaluate underwriting experience listed in
Table 3.1.
• The 
 
pure loss ratio
 
 is line 2, losses, divided by line 1, premium.
The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) and
A.M. Best refers to this measure as the
 
 loss ratio
 
.
• The 
 
loss plus loss adjustment expenses ratio
 
 is the sum of line 2,
losses, and line 3, loss adjustment expenses, divided by line 1,
premium.  Neither the NCCI nor Best uses this measure.  How-
ever, some research studies describe this concept as the “loss
ratio,” which is obviously inconsistent with the NCCI and Best
definitions.
• The 
 
combined ratio after dividends
 
, the term used by Best, is line
6, underwriting results, divided by line 1, premium.  The NCCI
refers to this as “underwriting results.”
• The 
 
overall operating ratio
 
 is line 8, overall operating results,
divided by line 1, premium; this term is used by Best.
The workers’ compensation underwriting experience published by
A.M. Best shown in Table 2.1 (p. 25) calculates the loss ratio by divid-
ing incurred losses by earned premiums on a calendar-year basis.  Cal-
endar-year incurred losses include incurred benefits for accidents that
occurred in the calendar year plus changes in reserves for accidents
from prior years.  However, due to the long-tailed nature of workers’
compensation claims, we believe the most appropriate loss ratio for
analyzing public policy is the ratio of incurred losses to earned premi-
ums on an accident-year basis, because this ratio accounts for paid ben-
efits plus future losses on claims resulting solely from accidents in a
particular year.
Because losses usually are the largest cost component of net premi-
ums (see Table 2.1), the loss ratio is sometimes used as a crude proxy
for the inverse of insurer profits; that is, the higher the loss ratio, the
smaller the portion of premium that is left for other expenses and prof-
its.  Furthermore, the inverse of the loss ratio is sometimes used as a
measure of workers’ compensation costs in a state.  If losses per $100
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of payroll are the same in two states, then a relatively higher inverse
loss ratio in one state means that premiums per $100 of payroll (which
are costs to employers) are also higher in that state.
Using the inverse of the loss ratio on a calendar-year basis as a
measure of workers’ compensation costs is suspect on two grounds,
according to Carroll and Kaestner (1995).  First, as we noted above,
incurred losses on a calendar-year basis include changes in reserves on
prior-year injuries, and insurer reserving practices are subject to ran-
dom and systematic error.  Second, because cash benefits for more-
severe work-related injuries are paid out over many years (that is,
workers’ compensation claims have a long “tail” before they close), the
premium component of the loss ratio largely reflects reserves for future
payments, while the loss component is largely based on payments
made for past claims.  If, as can be expected, the premium and loss
components vary markedly from one another over time because one is
prospective and the other is retrospective, inverse loss ratios derived
from calendar year data are measured with error.
In addition to the criticisms of Carroll and Kaestner, there is
another flaw in using the inverse of the loss ratio as a proxy for the
employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insurance; this deficiency
exists irrespective of whether the loss ratio is based on calendar-year,
policy-year, or accident-year data.  The inverse loss ratio expresses pre-
miums relative to loss payments, and thus essentially only measures
the “loading” that policyholders pay; it does not measure the benefit
portion of the premium.  Thus, a state could have very high losses per
$100 of payroll in conjunction with a high loss ratio.  The low inverse
loss ratio under these circumstances would indicate that the insurance
carriers’ profitability in that jurisdiction was low, even though workers’
compensation insurance costs paid by employers were high.
 
Losses per Employee/Injury
 
Because of the limitations of the inverse loss ratio as a measure of
the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insurance, Carroll and
Kaestner (1995) constructed two alternative cost measures: 1) premi-
ums earned (minus policyholder dividends) relative to the total number
of work-related injuries, and 2) premiums earned (minus policyholder
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dividends) relative to total private, nonagricultural employment.
Unfortunately, these measures are also deficient for several reasons.
First, the numerators and denominators of each measure are incon-
sistent: the premium data in the numerators pertain solely to policies
underwritten by private insurance carriers and state insurance funds,
but the denominators also include data pertaining to self-insured firms.
Because the proportion of self-insured employment varies both over
time and among states, these two cost variables are measured with
error.  In their first cost measure (premiums per employee), Carroll and
Kaestner attempt to correct for this problem by using SSA data on the
proportion of total workers’ compensation benefits paid by self-insured
employers in order to adjust the employment data in the denominator.
However, this attempted solution is itself flawed, because the SSA esti-
mates of self-insured benefit payments are suspect.  Also, because self-
insured employers are typically larger than employers that purchase
insurance, and because larger firms generally have better safety records
than smaller firms, injured employees of self-insured firms will, on
average, receive fewer benefits than do injured workers in firms cov-
ered by private carriers or state funds.  
Another problem with the Carroll and Kaestner cost measures is
their failure to adequately address the fact that per-employee costs of
workers’ compensation insurance will differ among jurisdictions solely
because of variations in states’ industrial composition.
 
4
 
  We discuss, in
the next section of this chapter, an alternative approach to estimating
costs that provides a more refined method for adjusting for the inter-
state variations in industrial mixes. 
 
Average Losses per $100 of Payroll
 
In their empirical analysis, Danzon and Harrington (1998) used
average losses per $100 of payroll and its growth over time as workers’
compensation cost measures.  These data are based on NCCI estimates
of incurred losses (cash, medical, and total benefits).  That is, they are
projections of the ultimate cost of claims with accident dates in a pol-
icy year, using data from the “first report” of loss experience that, in
turn, are extrapolated using historical trends to the “ultimate report”
basis.  As such, the data that form the basis of Danzon and Harrington’s
cost measures are subject to error.  Projections of the eventual (ulti-
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mate) cost of a claim will change as more up-to-date loss data become
available.  In addition, these data do not include all of the costs of
workers’ compensation insurance to employers, such as underwriting
expenses and carrier profits.  Further, as was the case with the cost
measures used by Carroll and Kaestner, interstate cost variations may
actually be due to differences in industry mix among states and over
time; for this reason, interstate cost comparisons may be biased.
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We have reviewed four alternative ways of measuring employers’
costs: benefits paid per worker, losses per employee (or injury), aver-
age losses per $100 of payroll, and loss ratios.  There are three princi-
pal problems with these measures.  First, the first three measures do not
reflect all of the costs of employers’ workers’ compensation insurance;
in particular, they do not include the profit and expense loadings
charged by insurers.  Second, while the loss ratios reflect the loadings
charged by insurers (because they are part of premiums), they do not
provide an unambiguous measure of employer costs.  A high loss ratio
could, for example, be due to a relatively small markup by the carrier
coupled with very high losses; this combination will result in a low
inverse loss ratio but also high costs to employers.  Third, these mea-
sures ignore or inadequately control for interstate variations in indus-
trial composition, which affect statewide averages of workers’
compensation insurance costs for employers.  The importance of these
variations in industrial composition is discussed in the next section,
which provides yet another way—and in our view, a superior way—of
measuring the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation. 
 
COST METHODOLOGY
 
In the remainder of this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the
methodology we used to measure the employers’ costs of workers’
compensation; a detailed discussion of this methodology is presented
in Appendix C.  We also indicate why, in our view, this cost measure is
better than those critiqued in the preceding section.
The cost methodology used in this volume stems from refinements
to the methodology developed by Burton (1965), which was designed
to evaluate how plant location decisions are influenced by interstate
 Measuring Employers’ Costs 59
 
differences in the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insur-
ance.  Interstate differences in the average costs of workers’ compensa-
tion insurance for all employers in each state might appear, on first
impression, to be relevant for assessing a state’s competitive environ-
ment.  However, such information on average costs should be irrelevant
to rational employers.  Employers who are considering relocating facil-
ities to other states should be concerned solely with the insurance rates
pertaining to them, rather than with the average costs for all employers
in a state.
This point can be illustrated by the following example.  Assume
that there are only two insurance classifications in states A and B—
class 1 and class 2—and that a particular employer would be placed in
class 1 in both states.  The insurance rates per $100 of payroll for each
classification are identical in both states (e.g., class 1 is $0.10 and class
2 is $1.00).  Also assume that all employers in states A and B pay their
employees $300 per week.
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  Obviously, there is no economic incentive
for the employer to move from state A to state B because its insurance
costs will be unaffected by the move.  However, the average premium
as a percentage of payroll for all employers will vary considerably
between the two states if the workforce composition differs sharply.  If,
for example, in state A, 90 percent of the payroll of all employers is in
class 2 and 10 percent in class 1, while in State B, 90 percent is in class
1 and 10 percent in class 2, the average premium as a percentage of
payroll will be much different in the two states.  Specifically, in this
example, the average premium in state A will be $0.91 per $100 of
payroll (that is, premiums will be 0.91 percent of payroll), and the
average premium in state B will be $0.19 per $100 of payroll (that is,
premiums will be 0.19 percent of payroll).  Nonetheless, there is no
incentive in this example for our employer—or any employer—to relo-
cate to state B so long as the employer’s workers’ compensation insur-
ance classification is not affected by the interstate move.
The purpose of this example is not to argue that a state’s competi-
tive environment with respect to workers’ compensation insurance
costs cannot be assessed.  Indeed, the example can be adapted to pro-
vide a valid approach to determine interstate variations in employers’
workers’ compensation costs for purposes of assessing a state’s com-
petitive environment.  The approach involves using the same distribu-
tion of payroll among the various classification codes in both states in
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order to demonstrate the extent of an employer’s incentive to relocate
from state A to state B.
For example, the distribution of payroll among workers’ compen-
sation insurance classes in state A can be used in conjunction with state
B’s insurance rates to generate a new average premium as a percentage
of payroll for state A’s employers; this new premium would be applica-
ble if these employers moved to state B.  Obviously, because in this
example insurance rates for comparable classifications are identical
between states, employers initially located in state A would pay 0.91
percent of their payroll as workers’ compensation premium irrespec-
tive of whether they remained in state A or moved to state B.  Thus,
there would be no incentive to change plant locations in order to lower
workers’ compensation costs.
This two-state example illustrates why using a constant distribu-
tion of payroll among the same set of insurance classifications for all
states is the most valid approach to comparing employers’ costs of
workers’ compensation insurance among jurisdictions.  However, this
approach has to be refined.  The first step is to increase the number of
classifications used to calculate a jurisdiction’s average costs of work-
ers’ compensation insurance.
 
Classification Codes
 
As we indicated in Chapter 2, most employers purchase workers’
compensation insurance from private companies or from state insur-
ance funds.
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  The initial step in our methodology for computing the
employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insurance is the assign-
ment of an employer to one or more industrial or occupational catego-
ries.
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   In about 40 states where private insurance is available, these
categories are prescribed by the classifications published by the
National Council on Compensation Insurance.  Classification codes
currently in use range from 0005 (Nursery Employees) to 9985
(Atomic Energy: Radiation Exposure NOC [not otherwise classi-
fied]).  Between these two extremities in classification numbers are
several thousand other classifications, at least 500 of which are in com-
mon use.  
Seventy-one employer classes were used for the employers’ costs
computations in this study, as shown in Appendix Table C.1.  We chose
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these classification codes because of their prevalence throughout many
states, their relative importance in terms of the percentage of total pay-
roll they include (they account for over 73 percent of the national pay-
roll covered by workers’ compensation insurance), and their
representative character in the five industry groups used for workers’
compensation insurance classifications: manufacturing; contracting;
office and clerical; goods and services; and miscellaneous.
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  The
national distribution of payroll among these 71 classes was used to cal-
culate the average cost of workers’ compensation insurance in each
state, which ensures that our measures of interstate cost differences
pertain to a comparable set of employers and are not due to interstate
variations in industry mix.
 
Manual Rates or Pure Premiums
 
After the carrier assigns the employer to the appropriate insurance
classification, the carrier determines an appropriate initial insurance
rate.
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  Depending on the regulatory environment of the state, the initial
rate may be a manual rate or may be a pure premium.  Also, again
depending on the regulatory environment, the carrier may be required
to use the rates promulgated by the rating bureau or may have discre-
tion in determining the initial insurance rate.
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In some states, the rating bureau develops and promulgates loss
cost or pure premium rates for each category, which cover payments
for cash benefits, medical care, and (in most jurisdictions) loss-adjust-
ment expenses.  In these states, the individual carrier will add a 
 
loading
factor
 
, which includes an allowance for other carrier expenses (such as
underwriting expenses and commissions) plus an allowance for profits.
In other states, the rating bureau prepares fully developed manual rates,
which are equal to the sum of the loading factor and the pure premium.
Manual rates or pure premiums are specified as a certain number of
dollars per $100 of weekly earnings for each employee.
 
Adjusted Manual Rates
 
Manual rates or pure premiums do not provide the proper basis for
making interstate comparisons that accurately reflect employers’ actual
costs of workers’ compensation insurance.  The weekly workers’ com-
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pensation premium for most employers is not simply the product of
their manual rates (or pure premiums) and their weekly payrolls.
Rather, their insurance costs are affected by a myriad of modifying fac-
tors, including premium discounts for quantity purchases, carrier devi-
ations from the manual rates promulgated by the advisory organization,
dividends received from insurance companies, experience-rating modi-
fications due to the employer’s own compensable experience compared
with that of comparable firms, and other factors.  When these modify-
ing factors are taken into consideration, the result is a more accurate
measure of the employers’ actual costs of workers’ compensation
insurance.  The end result of applying a series of modifying factors to
manual rates or pure premiums is what we term 
 
adjusted manual rates
 
.
Adjusted manual rates are measured as a certain number of dollars per
$100 of weekly earnings, which represents the percentage of payroll
expended by an employer on workers’ compensation insurance.
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In this study, we use five different models to calculate adjusted
manual rates.  Though only one model is used to compute the rates in a
jurisdiction in a particular year, the model used for each jurisdiction
may vary over time, depending upon the changes (if any) that occur in
the state’s regulatory environment for workers’ compensation insur-
ance pricing.  The models are mutually exclusive: as of our comparison
dates—namely, January 1 for each year between 1975 and 1995—only
one of the five models is applicable for a particular state for each date. 
The choice of which model to use to compute employers’ costs for
a particular state and a particular comparison date depends upon the
nature of the workers’ compensation insurance market at the time.
More specifically, it depends upon whether, as of a particular state and
date, 1) the state rating bureau publishes manual rates or pure premi-
ums, and 2) the rates in the assigned-risk market differ from those in
the voluntary market.
A brief summary of the five models is presented here; a more
detailed discussion of each of these models (including the specific
steps used in computing adjusted manual rates and an example of the
calculations for each model) is presented in Appendix C.
 
Model I: Voluntary market only with manual rates.
 
  This model
was used when 1) the rates for the voluntary market contained
expense loadings (and thus were manual rates), and 2) there were
 Measuring Employers’ Costs 63
 
no separate rates or calculations for the assigned-risk market.  The
manual rates for the voluntary market may be either mandatory or
advisory.
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Model II: Voluntary market only with pure premiums.
 
  This
model was used when 1) the rates for the voluntary market were
pure premiums (also known as loss costs), and 2) there were no
separate rates or calculations for the assigned-risk market.
 
Model III: Voluntary market with manual rates and assigned-
risk market with identical manual rates
 
.  This model was used
when 1) the rates for the voluntary market included expense load-
ings (and thus were manual rates), and 2) there were manual rates
for the assigned-risk market that were identical to voluntary market
rates.  Manual rates for the voluntary market may be mandatory or
advisory.  
 
Model IV: Voluntary market with manual rates and assigned-
risk market with different manual rates
 
.  This model was used
when 1) the rates for the voluntary market included expense load-
ings (and thus were manual rates), and 2) there were manual rates
for the assigned-risk market that differed from voluntary market
rates.  Manual rates for the voluntary market may be mandatory or
advisory.  
 
Model V: Voluntary market with pure premiums and assigned-
risk market with manual rates
 
.  This model was used when 1)
the rates for the voluntary market were pure premiums (also known
as loss costs), and 2) there were separate manual rates for the
assigned-risk market.  
 
Weekly Insurance Premiums
 
In addition to adjusted manual rates, we also estimated another
measure of employers’ workers’ compensation costs in each state.
 
Weekly insurance premiums
 
 (net weekly costs) were calculated by mul-
tiplying a state’s adjusted manual rate by the corresponding average
weekly wage for that state.  The weekly wage was computed for the
period 1965–1975 by multiplying a) a state-specific and year-specific
earnings index number that adjusts for interstate variation in wages due
to industrial composition by b) a national wage figure (the annual aver-
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age weekly wage in employment covered by unemployment insur-
ance).
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We computed weekly insurance premiums, an additional employ-
ers’ cost measure, because interstate variations in employee earnings
may also influence the relative costs of workers’ compensation.  Thus,
weekly insurance premiums overcome a limitation of adjusted manual
rates as a measure of interstate differences in workers’ compensation
costs.
This point can be illustrated by the use of a hypothetical example.
Assume that the adjusted manual rates for an employer’s classification
in states A and B are identical, e.g., $1.00 per $100 of payroll.  Further
assume that state A is a northern, industrial, and heavily unionized
jurisdiction in which the average weekly earnings of the employer’s
workforce is $500, and that state B lacks these attributes and has a cor-
responding earnings figure of $250.  As a result, even if adjusted man-
ual rates were equal in states A and B, the weekly insurance premiums
(net costs) would be different.  The firm’s workers’ compensation bill
is a product of the relevant adjusted manual rate and the employer’s
payroll.  In this example, the employer’s insurance cost would be $5.00
per employee per week in state A and $2.50 in state B.
Interstate variations in employee earnings levels can thus influence
the relative costs of workers’ compensation.  Unfortunately, using an
unadjusted statewide average wage to compute weekly insurance pre-
miums would introduce a bias to our cost estimates due to interstate
variation in the industrial composition of employment.  Since there are
substantial differences among industries with respect to wage rates, an
unadjusted statewide average wage will reflect differences among
states in industry mix.  States with a high proportion of employment in
high-wage sectors will have higher net weekly costs than otherwise,
even if underlying insurance costs per $100 of payroll for a particular
type of employer are identical among states.  We therefore calculated a
weekly wage variable for each state and year in our sample that con-
trols for interstate differences in the industrial composition of employ-
ment. 
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COST DATA
Adjusted Manual Rates
 
Appendix Table C.17 provides the adjusted manual rates averaged
over 71 insurance classifications for each of 48 jurisdictions (47 states
plus the District of Columbia) in our study
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 for each year with avail-
able data during the period 1975–1995.  We use a subset of these data
(adjusted manual rates for 1995) to rank the states (Figure 3.1).
Among the 47 jurisdictions with data in 1995, Montana had the highest
adjusted manual rate ($4.94 per $100 of payroll) and Indiana had the
lowest ($1.40).  Figure 3.1 depicts the substantial variation in adjusted
manual rates among states.  (As we previously indicated, these results
do not stem from differences in the industrial composition of states’
economies, but rather reflect a threefold difference in costs for compa-
rable employers in these states.)
More comprehensive—and perhaps, more comprehensible—data
(based on the weighted observations in Appendix Table C.18) are pre-
sented in Figure 3.2.  Here, the average adjusted manual rates for all
states with data for each year, as well as the rates that are one standard
deviation above or below the national average, are reported for the
period 1975–1995.
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  The national average for adjusted manual rates
was $0.95 per $100 of payroll in 1975; it then rose to $1.65 in 1980,
declined during the early 1980s (for reasons explained in Chapter 2),
and reached a trough of $1.47 in 1984.  After 1984, the average rate
increased sharply, peaking at $3.48 per $100 of payroll in 1993.  Rates
then declined sharply during the last two years in our study period
(1994 and 1995); the national average was $2.97 per $100 of payroll in
1995.  The data in Figure 3.2 also indicate that interstate variations in
adjusted manual rates increased considerably between 1985 and 1990;
thereafter, the variation generally declined.
 
Weekly Insurance Premiums
 
Weekly insurance premiums (which are calculated by multiplying
a state’s adjusted manual rate by the corresponding average weekly
wage for that state) constitute another measure of employers’ costs
used in our study.  These costs of workers’ compensation insurance
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Figure 3.1 Adjusted Manual Rates in 1995, by State
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Figure 3.2 National Average Adjusted Manual Rates (± 1 S.D.), 1975–95
 
premiums per employee for each of the 48 jurisdictions in our study,
for each year over the period 1975–1995 where data are available, are
reported in Appendix Table C.21.  A ranking by state of net costs (as of
1995) is provided in Figure 3.3.  These findings roughly mirror those of
adjusted manual rates for 1995: among these 47 jurisdictions with 1995
data, Montana had the highest net weekly costs ($28.59) and Indiana
had the lowest ($7.76), once again showing the substantial variation in
the cost of workers’ compensation insurance among states.  However,
the findings with respect to net costs in 1995 differ in some instances
from those for adjusted manual rates (compare Figures 3.1 and 3.3).
Ohio, for example, ranked 14th on the basis of adjusted manual rates,
but was the 8th most expensive state using net weekly costs, reflecting
the state’s relatively high wages.
Figure 3.4 reports the average net weekly costs per employee for
all states with data available for each year during the 1975–1995
period, as well as the net costs that are one standard deviation above or
below the national average.
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   (The data are from the weighted obser-
vations of Appendix Table C.22.)  Not surprisingly, the general trend of
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Figure 3.3 Net Weekly Costs in 1995, by State
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Figure 3.4 National Average Net Weekly Costs (± 1 S.D.), 1975–95
 
net costs over the period 1975–1995 is similar to the pattern for
adjusted manual rates.  The national average for net costs was $5.03
per employee per week in 1975.  It rose to $8.41 in 1980 and then
declined throughout the early 1980s until 1984 (when it was $7.50).
Net costs then increased sharply, peaking at $18.40 in 1993, but then
fell during the next two years of our study period, reaching $15.69 in
1995 .
The data in Figure 3.4 also show that interstate variability in net
weekly costs fluctuated between 1975 and 1995, as it increased in the
late seventies and declined in the early eighties.  From 1985 though
1990, interstate variations in net weekly costs increased substantially,
but they then declined significantly during the 1990s.
 
CONCLUSIONS
 
In this chapter, we critiqued various workers’ compensation cost
measures that have been used by practitioners and academics to make
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interstate comparisons, and we presented what we regard as a more
valid approach to computing employers’ costs.  We also presented
state-specific findings and national averages for two cost measures
(adjusted manual rates and net weekly costs) for the period 1975–1995.
These costs varied significantly over time and also, in any particular
year, varied sharply among states.
The essential purposes of the rest of this study are to develop a
model to explain the determinants of the intertemporal and interstate
variations in these employers’ costs and to subject this model to an
empirical analysis.  We examine, 
 
inter alia
 
, the impact of deregulation
of insurance pricing and the relative generosity of state statutory provi-
sions regarding workers’ compensation benefits on the employers’
costs of workers’ compensation insurance.  
 
Notes
 
1. UBA, Inc., established the National Foundation in 1984.  UBA, Inc. has recently
changed its name to UWC, Inc.—Strategic Services for Unemployment and
Workers’ Compensation.
2. “The Social Security Administration has provided a state-by-state estimate of
workers covered by workers’ compensation for 1997, 1981, 1984, and 1988.
Changes in unemployment compensation coverage are used to develop estimates
for other years.” (National Foundation 1997, footnote 5, no page number).  
3. As further explained in Appendix B, 
 
paid losses
 
 are the benefits that have already
been paid for a particular set of injuries as of the evaluation date.  
 
Incurred losses
 
are the benefits that have been paid for a particular set of injuries as of the evalua-
tion date plus the estimated value of the future benefits for those injuries as of that
evaluation date.
4. Carroll and Kaestner (1995) attempt to control for these effects by using state-
and industry-mix dummy variables in their statistical analysis.  However, these
dummy variables measure industry mix at a fairly aggregated level, without rec-
ognizing the differences in workers’ compensation costs that can occur within
industrial categories.
5. Danzon and Harrington’s cost growth measure is not subject to these problems to
the extent that industry mix remains constant over time within a particular state.
Danzon and Harrington also do empirical analyses using loss data for individual
rating classification codes; unlike their state-level loss ratio data, these cost mea-
sures are not subject to the industry composition problem.
6. This example assumes that the employer’s entire payroll is used to calculate pre-
miums.  The topic of payroll limitations is discussed in Appendix C.
7. Our discussion of cost methodology does not pertain to the third source of insur-
ance coverage (self-insurance), for which we do not have any cost data.
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8. Some of the discussion in this section draws upon Burton and Schmidle (1991,
1992) and Schmidle (1994).  See also Kallop (1976); Williams (1986); NCCI
(1981); Appel and Borba (1988, pp. 5–9); Webb et al. (1984, pp. 106–112); and
Huebner, Black, and Cline (1982, pp. 575–592).
9. The NCCI’s 
 
Classification Codes and Statistical Codes for Workers Compensa-
tion and Employers Liability Insurance
 
 manual for selected years was the source
of the 71 employer categories.  Insurance categories in states using other classifi-
cation systems were “converted” by selecting the classification in that state that
was most nearly analogous to the corresponding code among the 71 NCCI
employer classes.
10. A particular employer may be assigned to two or more insurance classifications,
depending on the industrial or occupational mix of the employer’s workforce.
11. When the state regulations allow carriers discretion in determining the initial rates
that are used to help determine the premiums actually paid by employers, all car-
riers are required to report their experience using a set of specified rates for the
insurance classifications used by the carrier.  These specified rates are known as
the “Designated Statistical Reporting (DSR) Level.”  For example, the policy year
1996 experience in Michigan was reported using the January 1, 1996, pure premi-
ums as the DSR Level.
12. The methodology to compute these “adjusted” manual rates was developed
almost 35 years ago by Burton and has been subsequently refined and modified.
Substantial refinements and modifications in this methodology were used for this
study in order to capture, in a comprehensive manner, all pertinent recent develop-
ments affecting workers’ compensation insurance pricing.  See Burton (1965,
1979); Elson and Burton (1981); Burton, Hunt, and Krueger (1985); and Burton
and Schmidle (1992).
13. The distinctions between mandatory and advisory rates were discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
14. A description of the state-specific wage index is provided in Appendix D.
15. The words 
 
state(s)
 
 or 
 
jurisdiction(s)
 
 should be taken as synonyms referring to this
study set.  Data limitations precluded us from computing employers’ costs in
three of the six jurisdictions having exclusive state funds (Nevada, North Dakota,
and Wyoming).  
16. Due to data availability problems, the number of states used to compute these
averages is not constant across the entire period from 1975 to 1995.  However, as
indicated in the discussion of Appendix Table C.18, the results over time are not
particularly sensitive to the changing number of observations over time.
17. As was the case with adjusted manual rates, the number of states used to compute
these data varies over the period from 1975 to 1995.  As was also the case with
adjusted manual rates (and once again, as indicated by the discussion of Appendix
Table C.22), the results are not particularly sensitive to the changing number of
observations over time.
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4
Benefit Adequacy 
versus Affordability
 
In the previous chapter, we presented data showing the substantial
variations in workers’ compensation costs both over time and across
states.  We now begin a quest to explain these variations.  Are they due
to differences with respect to the level of benefits provided to injured
workers, which may be expected to be a significant driver of compen-
sation costs, or are they due to differences in administrative efficiency
or other factors?  The answer has obvious implications for public pol-
icy issues concerning the efficacy of different insurance arrangements
addressed in subsequent chapters.  While the affordability criterion
suggests that low-cost programs are in some sense superior to high-
cost ones, it is important to determine whether low program costs were
attained by sacrificing benefit adequacy.  Among other things, this sug-
gests that to properly assess the relative efficiency of different insur-
ance arrangements, it is important to control for other variables that
affect employer costs.
In this chapter, we explore the relationship between workers’ com-
pensation costs and factors such as benefit generosity and the underly-
ing risk of workplace injury or disease.  We initially describe an
accounting model of insurance prices that is the foundation for our
empirical investigation of employers’ costs.  We then provide a detailed
account of the variables and data set used in the cost models, including
identification of the data sources and methodology used to construct
variables for the analyses.  In the third section, we report the results of
regression analyses in which the dependent variables are adjusted man-
ual rates and net weekly costs.  We then present the results of simula-
tions in which we estimate the cost increase that would result if all
states were to adopt workers’ compensation statutes that meet alterna-
tive definitions of benefit adequacy.  
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AN ACCOUNTING MODEL OF EMPLOYER COSTS
 
A simple accounting model of workers’ compensation insurance
costs indicates that insurer profits are equal to the premiums collected
from policyholders plus earnings on reserves minus losses paid, divi-
dends to policyholders, and administrative expenses, which include
marketing, underwriting, and claims adjustment costs.  If we initially
ignore administrative expenses, we can represent expected per-claim
insurer profits as follows:
 
Eq. 4.1
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] = (1 – 
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 – 
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),
where 
 
Π
 
 is insurer profits, 
 
p
 
 is the probability of injury per covered
worker, 
 
C
 
 is insurer premiums, and 
 
B
 
 is the average benefit payment
per claim.  If insurance is actuarially fair, then 
 
C
 
 = 
 
pB
 
.
Administrative expenses and profits may be incorporated into the
model by allowing for a loading factor that is proportional to premi-
ums, so that 
 
C
 
 = 
 
φ
 
C
 
 + 
 
pB
 
 where 
 
φ
 
 is the loading factor.  This implies
that 
 
C
 
 = 
 
pB
 
/(1 – 
 
φ
 
).  Taking the natural logarithm of this cost function,
we find that
 
Eq. 4.
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ln 
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 = –ln(1 – 
 
φ
 
) + ln 
 
p
 
 + ln 
 
B
 
 .
This result suggests that a regression specification that estimates the
employers’ cost of workers compensation insurance should 1) include
measures of the probability of injury and the average benefits paid to
compensation claimants and 2) assume a log-log form.  Also, note that
the relationship between the expense loading (a component of 
 
φ
 
) and
insurance premiums (or loss costs) may be nonlinear.  This is evident
from the existence of fixed expense components built into insurer rate
filings, such as expense or loss constants or premium discounts.
This result also suggests that interstate differences with respect to
the effect of insurance arrangements—including the regulatory
regime—will be included in the intercept of the regression model (or
–ln(1 – 
 
φ
 
) of Eq. 4.2), as will temporal variation in rates attributable
to the insurance cycle.  In other words, holding pure premiums or loss
costs constant, the effects of insurance arrangements will manifest
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themselves through a change in the loading factor and will appear as
a lower or higher intercept in an estimated regression equation.  We
discuss the details of the regression specifications used to estimate
costs in the following section.
 
COST REGRESSION MODEL
 
As indicated, this simple accounting model suggests that employer
costs are a function of the average benefit paid to compensation claim-
ants and the claim rate.  Consequently, our empirical specification
includes both variables.  Unfortunately, these measures are imperfect in
that they do not control for interstate differences in administration.
There are also other variables included as explanatory factors in our
regression model that control for administrative and other differences.
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The full set of regressors includes estimates of the number of permanent
partial disability claims as a proportion of total indemnity claims, the
unionization rate, and the extent of workers’ compensation coverage.
Many of our analyses also include time and state dummies to capture
the influence of unobserved, time- and state-specific effects.  In partic-
ular, we use year dummies in order to control for insurance cycle effects
that could influence costs.  In the rest of this section, we discuss in detail
each of the variables in our regression model, as well as our hypothesis
concerning the relationships of these variables to employer costs.
 
Benefits
 
As we indicated in Chapter 1, workers who suffer disability or
death as the result of a work-related injury or disease are eligible to
receive two types of benefits: medical treatment and, if their disabilities
are severe enough, cash benefits.  Our regression analyses utilize three
variables to capture the effect of the relative benefit generosity of each
state’s workers’ compensation law: expected cash benefits, a variable
estimating the relative cost of medical and rehabilitation expenses, and
a combined (or total) benefit measure.  In most of our model specifica-
tions, cash and medical benefit variables are entered as separate regres-
sors.  However, Eq. 4.2 in the previous section suggests that the
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coefficient of the logarithm of this combined benefit measure will pro-
vide a useful estimate of the cost-benefit elasticity.  
Elasticity estimates are interesting in their own right.  While our
simple accounting model predicts a one-to-one relationship between
benefits and costs—that is, a cost-benefit elasticity of 1—economic
theory hypothesizes that because benefits affect employer and worker
behavior, the value of this elasticity may be more or less than 1.  To
examine this issue, we estimate a subset of cost regressions using the
total benefit variable.
 
Cash benefits
 
National trend data on average per claim cash benefits in constant
1995 dollars for our study period (1975–1995) are shown in Figure 4.1.
These data depict our estimates of the expected cash benefits that the
average compensation claimant will receive during this period,
 
2
 
 plus or
minus one standard deviation.  As is evident from this figure, the gener-
osity of workers’ compensation benefits did not fluctuate much over
the period 1975–1995; however, interstate variability in the generosity
of statutory benefits (as measured by the standard deviation) declined
over this period.
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Figure 4.1 Real Per-Claim Expected Cash Benefits, 1975–95 
(1995 $; mean ± 1 S.D.) 
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The expected cash benefit from workers’ compensation in each of
the 48 jurisdictions in our study is shown for 1995 in Figure 4.2.  There
was substantial variation among the states in benefit levels: the average
cash benefit payment was almost $23,000 in the District of Columbia,
but little more than $4,300 in Louisiana.  
The data in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are based on an index of cash bene-
fit generosity of each state’s workers’ compensation statute that we
constructed for each jurisdiction and each year in our sample.  For a
 
Figure 4.2 Expected Cash Benefits by State, 1995
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comprehensive discussion of the methodology, see Appendix D.  A
brief summary of this methodology follows. 
The method recognizes that benefit levels are set by each state’s
workers’ compensation statute and depend on factors specific to each
claim, including the type and severity of the claimant’s injury as well
as the claimant’s pre-injury wage, age, and, family status.
 
4
 
  More spe-
cifically, a weekly benefit, which typically varies according to the
claimant’s wage, is paid to claimants over a time period that varies
depending on the severity of the claimant’s injury.  We generated the
benefit index by estimating the weekly benefit and the duration of pay-
ments separately for each of four categories of injury—temporary total
disability, permanent total disability, permanent partial disability, and
fatalities—for claimants with various characteristics, e.g., wage, age,
and family status.  The index for each of these disability categories is
equal to the product of the duration and weekly benefits.  To obtain an
index of total cash benefit generosity, we combined benefit measures
for each of these four injury categories using the relative national fre-
quency of injury type as weights.
 
Weekly benefits.
 
  To compute the weekly benefit for the average
compensation claimant for a particular state and year, we constructed a
wage distribution specific to that state and year.  The distribution was
based on a national wage distribution centered on an “adjusted” aver-
age weekly wage for each state and year.
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  Weekly benefits were then
computed for each claimant in the distribution, based on statutory ben-
efit parameters.
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Average benefit duration.
 
  The average benefit duration for each
injury type was calculated using the relevant national distributions for
each claim type: a disability duration distribution for temporary total
claims, a distribution of permanent partial disability claims by nature
of injury and severity,
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 an age distribution for permanent total claims,
and a distribution of dependent survivors, by age and family status, for
fatalities.  Since states limit the duration of benefits in different ways,
the actual duration of benefit payments was calculated by applying
these statutory limits to the appropriate distribution.  In the case of per-
manent disability or fatality benefits, which are paid out over a lengthy
period, benefits were calculated on a present-value basis that accounted
for the probability of death or, in the case of survivor benefits, remar-
riage.
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Medical benefits
 
Although most workers’ compensation claimants have relatively
minor injuries and thus do not qualify for cash benefits, nearly all
claimants receive some sort of medical care.  Unlike cash benefits,
there is no easy way to construct an index of expected medical costs; as
a result, we were forced to rely on measures of actual benefits paid.
The average cost of medical benefits for all claims in each jurisdiction
was used as the basic measure of medical benefits.  
National trend data on per claim medical benefits payments in con-
stant 1995 dollars for our study period (1975–1995) are shown in Fig-
ure 4.3.
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  As is evident, there was considerable variation over time in
the average real cost of medical benefits.  This pattern is also markedly
different from that in Figure 4.1, which showed that cash benefits did
not change much over the 1975–1995 period.  Specifically, the data in
Figure 4.3 show that the average real cost of medical benefits more
than tripled over this period, from $698 in 1975 to $2,528 in 1995.
Average medical benefits grew consistently between 1975 and 1994
and then fell by about 10 percent in 1995.
 
Figure 4.3 Real Per-Claim Medical Benefits, 1975–95 (mean ± 1 S.D.)
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Furthermore, interstate variability in medical benefits also
increased substantially between 1975 and 1995.  There was more than
a fourfold increase in the dollar amount of one standard deviation
between 1975 and 1994, from $214 to $882, although the standard
deviation then declined to $673 in 1995.
The considerable variability in medical expenses among states is
illustrated by the 1995 medical benefits cost data (Figure 4.4).
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  The
average workers’ compensation medical expenses ranged from a high
 
Figure 4.4 Average Medical Benefits for 1995 (for those jurisdictions 
having data for 1995)
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of $3,673 in the District of Columbia to a low of $1,598 in Idaho, a
spread of more than $2,000. 
During our study period, most state workers’ compensation pro-
grams paid 100 percent of the claimant’s medical expenses.  Conse-
quently, the variation in medical benefit costs was primarily
attributable to differences in the cost of health care services, the utiliza-
tion of medical services, or both.  The dramatic rise in medical benefit
payments evident in Figure 4.3 corresponds with a more general rise in
health care costs in the United States during this period.  However, the
increasing variability suggests that interstate differences in charges for
health care or in the utilization of services were widening among states
during the study period.
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Total benefits
 
The coefficient on a measure of total benefits may provide impor-
tant information about the relationship between benefits and costs (see
Eq. 4.2, p. 62).  A coefficient of 1 for the “total benefit” variable
implies that a 10 percent increase in benefits paid per claim results in a
10 percent increase in employer compensation costs: either the behav-
ior of the parties to the workers’ compensation claim (the worker,
employer, and insurer) is unaffected by changes in benefit levels or the
parties’ responses to an increase in benefits offset one another.  
However, the coefficient will be greater than 1 if higher benefit lev-
els lead to increased benefit utilization by workers, induce riskier
behavior on the part of workers, increase the frequency of claims
reporting or claims duration, or any combination of the above.  On the
other hand, we would expect the coefficient on the total benefit variable
to be less than 1 if higher benefit levels cause experience-rated employ-
ers to improve workplace health and safety or to manage claims more
intensively.
Krueger and Burton (1990) used a data set and methodology similar
to our own and found a cost-benefit elasticity of 1 for most of their model
specifications.  However, their study differed from ours in two important
ways.  First, their data set contained substantially fewer observations—
109, compared with over 900 in the current study—using data from 29
states for four nonconsecutive years (1972, 1975, 1978, and 1983).  Sec-
ond, their model specifications included separate cash and medical ben-
efit variables as regressors rather than a total benefit measure.  They
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interpreted the coefficient on the cash benefit variable as being equiva-
lent to the cost-benefit elasticity.  However, since the logarithm of a sum
is not equal to the sum of two logarithms, their specification may not
provide an appropriate estimate of this elasticity.
 
11
 
  
In the later section on regression results, we estimate cost–benefit
elasticities using a data set that includes more states and a substantially
longer period than did the Krueger and Burton study.  Even more
importantly, our estimates are based on a measure of total expected
benefits, including both medical and cash benefits, paid to the average
compensation claim in each state.  To compute this measure, we
inflated the expected cash benefit variable (described previously) by a
factor equal to the state-specific and year-specific ratio of the total
(cash plus medical) benefits paid to cash benefits paid.
 
12
 
  Data for this
inflation factor were taken from the NCCI “first-to-ultimate” report
exhibits described in note 10.
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This expected total benefit measure (in 1995 dollars) for the period
1975–1995 is shown in Figure 4.5.  There has been considerable
growth in total benefits over this period: the national average increased
by nearly 60 percent, from $12,450 in 1975 to $19,612 in 1995.  The
expected total benefit costs for individual states in 1995 are presented
 
Figure 4.5 Per-Claim Expected Total Benefits, 1975–95 (mean ± 1 S.D.) 
 Benefit Adequacy versus Affordability 83
 
in Figure 4.6.  The relative position of states with respect to this total
benefit measure is remarkably similar to their position vis-à-vis
expected cash benefits.  The District of Columbia continues to be the
most generous jurisdiction in the nation, paying an average total benefit
in excess of $41,500, while Louisiana is the most penurious, averaging
less than $9,100 per claimant in total compensation benefit payments.
 
Figure 4.6 Expected Total Benefits, 1995 (for those jurisdictions having 
data for 1995)
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Injury Rate
 
We also use an injury rate measure as an explanatory variable in
our employer costs model.  We expect that higher injury rates will, in
general, lead to higher benefit payments and to higher insurance costs.
Injury rates vary systematically among industries, and so states in
which the dominant industry is coal mining will have an higher injury
rate for all workers than a state where most workers are in the service
sector.  Interstate variations in costs solely due to differences in indus-
trial mix among states are accounted for through our construction of
the cost variable.  As we noted in Chapter 2, the cost variable is based
on a homogeneous set of manual rate classification codes, so we statis-
tically control for interstate differences in insurance costs that are due
to variations in industrial composition. 
However, while our construction of the dependent variable controls
for interindustry differences in the probability of injury, there are other
potential sources of variation in injury rates.  Specifically, there are
variations in the injury rate within rate classes, both over time and
among jurisdictions.  To control for these variations, we included a spe-
cial measure of the statewide injury rate in our regression analyses.
The special statewide injury rates were calculated using unpub-
lished data obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor.  Since the cost
variables are based on a homogeneous set of rate groups, our injury
rate measure also had to be independent of interstate differences in
industrial composition.  Consequently, we computed weighted average
injury rates for each state and year in our sample by combining injury
rate data for the major industrial divisions with national employment
by industry division as the weights.
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  That is, injury rates for each
major industry division were first collected for each state and year in
our sample.  These state- and year-specific, major division rates were
then aggregated into a state/year average by using a national distribu-
tion of employment by industry division.  Missing data were imputed
in a manner identical to that which we described for missing medical
benefits data (see note 10).
The trend in annual occupational injuries per 100 workers in the
United States (1975–1995) is shown in Figure 4.7.
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  Overall, these
data suggest that there has been a long-term decline in the injury rate.
The average annual injury rate dropped from about 8.7 injuries per 100
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workers in the 1970s to less than 8 injuries per 100 workers by 1995.  A
cyclical relationship for work injury rates has been reported by a num-
ber of studies, including Chelius (1977), Smith (1992), Thomason and
Hyatt (1997), and Durbin and Butler (1998).  We also find some evi-
dence of this, as the data exhibit a relatively strong cyclical pattern that
is consistent with the business cycle, at least during the early part of
this period.  
The injury rate declined sharply during the recessionary period of
the early 1980s, only to rise steadily for the remainder of that decade,
when there was relatively strong economic growth.  A slight decline in
the injury rate occurred in 1991, contemporaneous with another reces-
sion.  However, since 1992, the injury rate has declined steadily despite
a relatively robust economy.  
Interstate variations in the annual injury rate per 100 workers for
1995 are shown in Figure 4.8 for the last year in our study.  Injury rates
range from a high of some 11 injuries per 100 workers in Montana to a
low of slightly more than 5 injuries per 100 workers in New York.
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Figure 4.7 Injury Rate, 1975–95 (mean ± 1 S.D.)
 86 Chapter 4
 
Figure 4.8 Injury Rate, 1995 (for states with no missing data for 1995)
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Permanent Partial Disability Claims as a Proportion 
of Total Claims 
 
A permanent partial disability (PPD) claims measure is another
explanatory variable in our employer costs model.  The expected cash
benefit index described previously measures benefit generosity as
determined by a state’s workers’ compensation statutory parameters.
However, actual benefit payments are also affected by the nature of
program administration.  States with identical statutory parameters
may pay benefits that are substantially different due to interstate varia-
tions in administrative rules.  This is particularly true for permanent
partial disability awards, where there are substantial variations in the
methods and criteria used to determine compensation (Berkowitz and
Burton 1987).  
For example, in some states, compensation for PPD claims is based
on the extent of the claimant’s impairment, while in others, benefits
depend on the extent of the claimant’s lost wage-earning capacity.
Adjudicators are called upon to make decisions that often involve a
substantial element of subjective judgment.  The distinction between a
claimant who is suffering a 50 percent loss of use of an arm and a
claimant who is “merely” suffering a 40 percent loss lacks the kind of
clear distinction that is easily incorporated into statutory language or
administrative regulations.  Since benefits paid to PPD claims account
for over 70 percent of total indemnity benefit costs nationwide, inter-
state differences in PPD claims administration could significantly
affect the level of claim benefits.
 
17
 
  
To account for interstate variation in claims administration, we
include in our empirical specification a variable measuring the propor-
tion of total workers’ compensation indemnity claims that involve per-
manent partial disability benefits.  These data were taken from the
NCCI’s 
 
Countrywide Workers Compensation Exhibits
 
 for various
years.  These exhibits do not include data for all NCCI jurisdictions for
some years and do not include data for exclusive-state-fund jurisdic-
tions in any year.  We assigned values for missing data from the NCCI
states and for Washington state using a procedure identical to the one
we used for medical benefits payments.  We assigned the other two
exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions in our study (West Virginia and Ohio)
the national average for the PPD proportion variable.  
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National data on PPD cases as a proportion of total indemnity
claims for the period 1975–1995 are shown in Figure 4.9.
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  This pro-
portion was relatively stable at about 23 percent of total claims from
1975 to 1984, rose to a little more than 35 percent in 1992, and then
declined slightly to about 32.5 percent by 1995, the last year of our
study.  There is considerable interstate variation in the PPD proportion,
as illustrated by the 1995 data in Figure 4.10.  The PPD proportion
ranged from about 10 percent in Maine to nearly 50 percent of total
claims in Montana.
Previous studies of compensation costs have found that the PPD
proportion is strongly and positively related to compensation costs
(Krueger and Burton 1990; Schmidle 1994).  We similarly expect a
positive relationship between the PPD proportion and employer costs.
 
Union Density
 
Union membership also appears to affect the compensation claim
process.  Hirsch, Macpherson, and Dumond (1997) found that union-
ized workers are more likely to receive workers’ compensation benefits
 
Figure 4.9 PPD Cases as Share of Total Indemnity Claims 
(mean ± 1 S.D.)
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than are comparable nonunion workers.  There are at least two possible
explanations for this.  First, unionized employees may have more infor-
mation about their rights to workers’ compensation benefits.  Second,
because of due process guarantees contained in collective bargaining
agreements, union members may have less reason to fear employer
reprisals as a result of filing workers’ compensation claims.  
 
Figure 4.10 PPD Claims as a Share of Total Claims by State, 1995
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In either event, we expect that the extent of union membership in a
state is positively related to employer costs; i.e., it will be associated
with a greater probability of filing a workers’ compensation claim and,
possibly, higher benefits per claim.  Of course, while unions may in-
crease the probability of a workers’ compensation claim being filed,
unions are also likely to improve the conditions affecting workplace
safety.  Weil (1991) found that labor unions aid the implementation of
Occupational Safety and Health Act regulations in the workplace,
while Thomason and Pozzebon (1999) found that unions have a direct
impact on firm safety practices.  Nonetheless, to date the evidence indi-
cates that the impact of unions on increasing the likelihood of a work-
ers’ compensation claim is greater than their effect on reducing the
probability of injury.  
To measure the impact of unions, we use the proportion of workers
who are union members in a state—that is, union density—as an
explanatory variable.  Three sources, all of which derive estimates from
the Current Population Survey (CPS), were used for our union density
measure.  Data for the period between 1975 and 1982 (inclusive) were
taken from Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985), and estimates from Hir-
sch and Macpherson (1996) were used for 1994 and 1995.  We esti-
mated union density data for the remaining years (1983–1993) using
CPS data files.  Missing values for particular states and years were
imputed using the same procedure we employed for the medical benefit
variable.
Average union density throughout the United States in the 1975–
1995 period is presented in Figure 4.11.  These data show the well-
known decline in unionization that occurred during this period.  In
1975, almost one-quarter of the workforce were union members.  By
1995, the proportion had dropped to close to 15 percent.  The distribu-
tion of union density by state for 1995 is shown in Figure 4.12.  Union
density ranged from a low of 3.3 percent in South Carolina to a high of
27.7 percent in New York.
 
Covered Employment
 
Workers’ compensation programs do not cover all workers.  His-
torically, state workers’ compensation statutes have exempted from
coverage such occupational groups as farmworkers and household
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workers.  In addition, these statutes often excluded small firms with
fewer than a specified number of workers.  In a few states, workers’
compensation insurance is not compulsory, so individual employers
may opt out of the compensation program.
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The extent of workers’ compensation coverage may affect
employer costs, although the nature of its influence is uncertain and
depends on the occupational groups that are included or excluded as
coverage expands or shrinks.  If statutory coverage provisions tend to
exempt high-risk employment, then the extent of workers’ compensa-
tion coverage will be negatively related to employers’ workers’ com-
pensation insurance costs; the opposite result is expected if low-risk
groups are exempt.  Thus, in order to predict, 
 
a priori
 
, the relationship
between coverage and costs, it is necessary to examine changes in
employment composition that accompany changes in covered employ-
ment.
Unfortunately, there are no state-level data on workers’ compensa-
tion coverage by occupational or industrial class.  However, many of
the principal statutory changes in coverage that occurred between 1975
and 1995 are reflected in the recommendations of the National Com-
mission of State Workmen’s Compensation Laws (National Commis-
 
Figure 4.11 Union Density, 1975–95 (mean ± 1 S.D.)
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sion 1972).  These recommendations addressed major gaps in workers’
compensation coverage that existed in the early 1970s, and the U.S.
Department of Labor has tracked compliance with 19 of the recom-
mendations that the National Commission designated as “essential” in
subsequent years.
 
Figure 4.12 Union Density by State, 1995
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The National Commission made six essential recommendations
relating to coverage of workers or employers.  Three recommendations
involved specific employment classes not covered by many compensa-
tion statutes (farmworkers, household and casual workers, and govern-
ment employees).  In addition, the National Commission recom-
mended that workers’ compensation be compulsory for private
employment, that no waivers be permitted, and that there be no exemp-
tion for any class of employee, such as professional athletes or the
employees of charitable organizations.  Since many states exempted
from coverage those employers with few employees, the National
Commission also recommended that employers not be exempted
because of their size.  
We have no 
 
a priori
 
 expectations about the relationship among the
general recommendations and employer costs.  Unless there are sub-
stantial cross-subsidies between occupational classes, the employment-
specific recommendations should not have any impact on our measures
of employer compensation costs, since exempted groups are not among
the 71 occupational classification codes used to compute our employer
cost measures.
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  The mandatory inclusion of small employers may
increase workers’ compensation costs.  Small employers generally
have higher injury rates relative to large employers due to economies of
scale in the development of workplace safety programs and due to dif-
ferences in the extent to which small and large firms are experience-
rated.  
U.S. Department of Labor data on the number of states in compli-
ance with the various National Commission recommendations related
to covered employment for the 48 jurisdictions in our sample during
the 1975–1995 period are shown in Figure 4.13.  For the most part,
these data indicate that state compliance with these recommendations
did not change substantially.  
We have empirically tested whether there is any correlation
between covered employment and the National Commission’s recom-
mendations.  These results are presented in Table 4.1, which reports
Pearson correlation coefficients for covered employment and for
dummy variables representing the National Commission recommenda-
tions.
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  Data in parentheses show the 
 
p
 
-value for each correlation.  The
results reported in the “Covered employment” row indicate that, as
expected, all National Commission recommendations are positively
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related to covered employment.  In particular, the recommendation
concerning small employers had a relatively strong relationship with
coverage, as indicated by a statistically significant correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.2003.  This finding provides further support for a hypothe-
sized positive relationship between coverage and costs, since small
employers may be expected to have higher costs than larger firms.
However, this is only one recommendation, and it is possible that
changes in other rules affecting coverage, such as the prohibition of
waivers, have the opposite effect, increasing average compensation
costs.  Thus, it is difficult to make 
 
a priori
 
 predictions concerning the
relationship between covered employment and costs.
Nonetheless, it is possible that the extent of covered employment
could affect workers’ compensation costs for the average employer.
Consequently, we include estimates of the statewide proportion of
employment covered by workers’ compensation as a control variable in
our model specifications.  This variable was computed by dividing esti-
mates of the average number of workers covered by workers’ compen-
sation programs (as reported in various issues of the 
 
Social Security
 
Figure 4.13 Compliance with Coverage Recommendations
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Table 4.1 Pearson Correlation Matrix—National Commission Recommendations and Covered Employment
 
Variable
Compulsory 
coverage
No waivers 
permitted
Small 
employers
Farm
workers Domestics
Government 
employees
No class 
exempt.
Covered 
employment 
Compulsory coverage 1.0000
No waivers permitted –0.0701
(0.02)
 
a
 
1.0000
Small employers 0.0182
(0.53)
0.2293
(0.00)
1.0000
Farm workers –0.0336
(0.25)
0.0491
(0.09)
0.3309
(0.00)
1.0000
Domestics 0.0370
(0.21)
0.1280
(0.00)
0.0918
(0.00)
0.2427
(0.00)
1.0000
Government 0.1359
(0.00)
0.0434
(0.14)
0.1544
(0.00)
0.2314
(0.00)
0.1194
(0.00)
1.0000
No class exemption –0.0003
(0.99)
0.0736
(0.01)
–0.1033
(0.00)
0.0088
(0.76)
0.2112
(0.00)
0.2189
(0.00)
1.0000
Covered employment 0.1323
(0.02)
0.1139
(0.05)
0.2003
(0.00)
0.1202
(0.04)
0.1089
(0.06)
0.3831
(0.00)
0.2647
(0.00)
1.0000
 
a
 
p
 
-values in parentheses.
 96 Chapter 4
 
Bulletin
 
 [Price 1979, 1983; Nelson 1988, 1992a]) by total employment
in the state.
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Unfortunately, the accuracy of these data is suspect.  Schmulowitz
(1997) concluded that Social Security Administration data on workers’
compensation coverage substantially underestimate the extent of cov-
erage.  His conclusion is based on a review of recently collected estab-
lishment survey data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which
revealed that 98.6 percent of private-sector employees and 99.8 percent
of state and local government employees are covered by workers’ com-
pensation programs.  These BLS figures are approximately 10 percent
higher than the previous Social Security estimates that we rely upon.
Furthermore, the Social Security Administration only estimated
workers’ compensation coverage for a few years (1973, 1976, 1977,
1980, 1981, 1984, and 1988), so we had to impute workers’ compensa-
tion coverage values for other years.  This was done by means of
regression equations that predicted coverage as a function of state com-
pliance with the National Commission recommendations.
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Figure 4.14 depicts the proportion of employment covered by
workers’ compensation insurance nationwide for the 1975–1995
 
Figure 4.14 Share of the Workforce Covered by Workers’ 
Compensation Insurance, 1975–95 (mean ± 1 S.D.)
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period.  The figure shows that coverage remained relatively stable dur-
ing the period; it rose slightly at the beginning of the period followed
by a similarly slight decline, so that coverage in 1995 was approxi-
mately equal to that in 1975.  There is little interstate variation in the
proportion of workers covered by state workers’ compensation pro-
grams, even among the states in which coverage is not mandatory (Fig-
ure 4.15).  In 1988, this proportion varied from a low of 80 percent of
 
Figure 4.15 Covered Employment by State, 1988
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total employment in South Carolina to a high of 97 percent in New
Hampshire.
 
Summary of the Cost Regression Model
 
The means and standard deviations of the two dependent variables,
as well as the regressors, are reported in Table 4.2.  This table also pro-
vides a summary of the hypothesized relationship between the regres-
sors and our dependent cost measures.
 
REGRESSION RESULTS
 
The results of our regressions estimating the employers’ cost of
workers’ compensation insurance for our entire study period are pre-
sented in Table 4.3.  These equations include the natural log of the
“total benefit” measure (the ln[Benefits] row in Table 4.3) as a regres-
 
Table 4.2 Means, Standard Deviations, and Hypotheses—Cost 
Regression Models
 
Variable Mean
Standard
 deviation
Hypothesized 
relationship
 to costs
Cost measures
Adjusted manual rates ($) 2.25 1.12
Net weekly costs ($) 11.87 6.16
Control variables
Expected cash benefits ($) 10,354.23 9,502.29 +
Average medical benefits ($) 1,587.09 857.78 +
Expected total benefits ($) 16,140.31 6,780.70 +
Injury rate (per 100 workers) 8.26 1.32 +
Proportion of PPD claims (%) 27.72 10.23 +
Union density (%) 18.09 7.86 +
Covered employment (%) 89.65 3.88 +
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Table 4.3 Regression Equations Predicting Employer Costs, Weighted Least Squares Estimates
 
a
 
Variable Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Adjusted manual rates
ln(Benefits) 0.3981***
(8.87)
0.4007***
(9.00)
1.3383***
(24.25)
0.0754*
(1.64)
0.5588***
(13.88)
0.4794***
(9.19)
0.0499
(1.15)
ln(Injury) —
 
b
 
0.3878***
(3.82)
0.3915***
(3.14)
0.6124***
(6.60)
0.4958***
(4.78)
0.3620***
(3.91)
0.6830***
(7.61)
PPD percentage — — — — 0.0222***
(14.96)
0.0282***
(17.79)
0.0132***
(8.44)
Union density — — — — –0.0106***
(5.17)
–0.0517***
(14.92)
0.0049
(1.22)
Covered 
employment
— — — — 0.0130***
(2.77)
0.0218**
(2.56)
0.0200***
(3.13)
State dummies No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year dummies No No No Yes No No Yes
Adjusted 
 
R
 
2
 
0.0765 0.0904 0.6815 0.8972 0.3030 0.8268 0.9079
 
(continued)
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Table 4.3 (continued)
 
Variable Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Net weekly costs
ln(Benefits) 0.4305***
(9.14)
0.4334***
(9.27)
1.3558***
(24.48)
0.1006**
(2.14)
0.5919***
(14.02)
0.5026***
(9.60)
0.0731*
(1.65)
ln(Injury) — 0.4259***
(4.00)
0.4400***
(3.52)
0.5424***
(5.70)
0.5446***
(5.01)
0.3993***
(4.29)
0.6234***
(6.82)
PPD percentage — — — — 0.0244***
(15.66)
0.0289***
(18.11)
0.0134***
(8.44)
Union density — — — — –0.0032
(1.47)
–0.0501***
(14.41)
0.0079*
(1.94)
Covered 
employment
— — — — 0.0185***
(3.75)
0.0278***
(3.26)
0.0249***
(3.82)
State dummies No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year dummies No No No Yes No No Yes
Adjusted 
 
R
 
2
 
0.0808 0.0960 0.7104 0.9022 0.3074 0.8422 0.9136
 
a
 
Values in parentheses are absolute value t-ratios.  *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the
10% level.
b A dash (—) = coefficient not estimated.
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sor.  Several sets of estimates are reported, each of which includes a
different set of independent variables (such as ln[Injury] and state and
year dummies).  Given are the results of equations predicting adjusted
manual rates, and those predicting net weekly costs.24   Because Cook-
Weisberg tests indicated that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates
suffered from heteroscedastic error variance, the regression equations
reported in this table were estimated using weighted least squares;
average nonfarm employment, by state and year, served as weights.25
All regressions were based on the full data set of 953 observations,
including observations from exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions.
The results presented in Table 4.3 provide substantial support for
the accounting model of employer costs described on pp. 62–63.  The
statutory benefits index is positively and significantly related to
employer compensation costs in all specifications except that using the
full set of control variables, including year dummies (specification 7).26
The coefficient for the injury rate variable (ln[Injury]) is positive and is
statistically significant in all models.  The percentage of benefits paid
for permanent partial disability (PPD) claims is also directly related to
compensation costs, indicating that there is a positive relationship
between “liberal” claims administration—particularly as it relates to
PPD claims—and employer costs.  The results indicate that these vari-
ables in combination are relatively good predictors of employer costs. 
Further confirmation for these results is provided by the fact that
our findings are similar to those found by most previous studies.  Krue-
ger and Burton (1990) and Schmidle (1994) also found that expected
cash benefit levels, the injury rate, and the proportion of PPD claims
were positively related to both adjusted manual rates and net weekly
costs.  Positive and statistically significant relationships between
adjusted manual rates and the proportion of PPD cases were also
reported by Appel, McMurray, and Mulvaney (1992).  Likewise, Dan-
zon and Harrington (1998) found that expected growth in statutory
benefit levels was positively related to cost growth.  On the other hand,
Carroll and Kaestner (1995) reported mixed results for several benefit
proxies: as expected, the benefit maximum was positively related and
the waiting period was negatively related to the price of compensation
per injury and per employee.  However, they also found a negative and
statistically significant relationship between these price measures and
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two other regressors: the ratio of the benefit maximum to the state aver-
age weekly wage and a measure of scheduled benefit generosity.
Our empirical results for the union density variable are mixed.
Union density is negatively related to costs and rates in four out of six
equations, and this relationship is statistically significant at the 5 per-
cent level in three of these four models.  Only in the model that
includes the full set of regressors—specification 7—does the union
variable have the expected positive sign, although it is only statistically
significant in the net weekly cost equation.  These results suggest that,
with the exception of the full model, the union density variable is pick-
ing up the effects of other, unobserved variables that affect employer
costs.  Union density has a relatively consistent downward trend for all
states during our study period.  This variable may be picking up unob-
served trends in the injury distribution or some other time-related,
unmeasured factor that drives up costs in equations that do not include
year dummies.  These mixed results for the union variable are similar
to those of Krueger and Burton (1990) and Schmidle (1994), who
found a negative relationship between union density and costs in equa-
tions that included state dummies and a positive relationship between
these two variables in equations that did not.
Lastly, our results in Table 4.3 indicate that a higher proportion of
covered employment during our study period is associated with higher
compensation costs.  We did not have strong prior expectations for this
variable, since its impact on compensation costs depends on whether
coverage is, on balance, extended to relatively high- or relatively low-
risk occupations.  Examining one set of changes in covered employ-
ment during this period—i.e., compliance with the recommendations
of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation
Laws—we hypothesized that increased coverage of small employers,
who generally have inferior safety records relative to larger firms, may
increase costs.  Our conclusion was tempered by the realization that
there were several other, concurrent changes in workers’ compensation
coverage that could have unpredictable effects on costs.  Nevertheless,
our results provide some tenuous support for this hypothesis.  In previ-
ous research, both Krueger and Burton (1990) and Schmidle (1994)
obtained mixed results for covered employment; while these studies
found that the relationship was positive in most equations, it was sig-
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nificantly different from zero at conventional levels in only a few
regressions.
F-tests reveal that the state dummies, considered collectively, are
significant, suggesting that these variables, which are used in specifica-
tions 6 and 7 in Table 4.3, account for unobserved, state-specific varia-
tion in employer costs.  Similarly, F-tests reveal statistically significant
year effects, suggesting that costs are subject to unobserved, time-
dependent effects.  
Cost–Benefit Elasticity
As we indicated on p. 64, the coefficient associated with the natural
log of the benefit variable provides a measure of cost–benefit elasticity.
As such, we expect that this coefficient will be positively signed and
will have a value close to 1.  However, the data in Table 4.3 indicate
that the size of these estimates vary considerably depending on model
specification, although in each model the coefficient is positively
signed and (in all but one) it is significantly different from zero.  These
results differ from those obtained by Krueger and Burton (1990), who
used a similar methodology with a much smaller data set.27  Save for
specifications 4 and 7 in Table 4.3, Krueger and Burton estimated equa-
tions identical to ours and reported cost–benefit elasticity estimates that
ranged from 0.954 to 1.083 in their adjusted manual rate regressions
and from 0.812 to 1.218 in their net weekly cost regressions.
Our results in Table 4.3 present coefficients for the benefits vari-
able that, in general, are significantly less than 1.0, which suggests that
our benefit coefficient estimates may be subject to two forms of bias.
Comparing the results from specifications 1 and 2 with those for speci-
fication 3 implies that the first two equations suffer from omitted-vari-
able bias.  Specifically, the results suggest that models using
specifications 1 and 2 fail to capture variations among states in benefit
administration that affect employer costs, and that this omitted “benefit
administration” variable is negatively correlated with our total benefit
measure, resulting in a reduction in coefficient values from their true
levels.  Comparing results from specification 3 with those from specifi-
cations 4 through 7 further suggests that the benefit variable is subject
to measurement error, which results in an attenuation in the coefficient
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estimates, as other control variables and the year dummies absorb some
variation in “true” benefits.  
To examine potential effects of measurement error, we reestimated
the equations reported in Table 4.3 after instrumenting the benefit vari-
able.  Similar to the approach used by Krueger and Burton, our instru-
ments included the statutory maximum benefit for TTD claims, the
minimum benefit for TTD, the waiting period, and the retroactive
period.28  The results of these regression analyses are reported in Table
4.4.
The instrumental variable regression equations reported in Table
4.4 are closer to our a priori expectations.  They confirm our hypothe-
sis that error in the benefit variable led to an attenuation of the benefit
coefficients (as reported in Table 4.3).  Additionally, the Table 4.4
results are much closer to the estimates reported by Krueger and Bur-
ton.  This can be seen most clearly in Table 4.5, which compares our
results with those of Krueger and Burton for the four regression models
that are common to both studies.  (The top row of Table 4.5 lists the
particular specification per the numbered regression equations from
Tables 4.3 and 4.4.)  However, as is evident in Table 4.5, some discrep-
ancies remain, even after we control for measurement error.  Overall,
the results indicate that our regressions are more susceptible to this
measurement error problem than were those of Krueger and Burton.
There are two possible explanations for this.  
First, the expected cash benefit measures in both studies were
based on an injury distribution taken from a single point in time.  How-
ever, some workers’ compensation experts believe that the underlying
injury distribution has changed—that, for example, the average dura-
tion of temporary total disabilities (TTDs) has increased (Butler 1994).
In addition, data in Figure 4.9 show that the number of PPD claims has
increased as a proportion of total indemnity claims over the 1975–1995
period.  Neither our study nor Krueger and Burton’s fully accounted
for possible temporal shifts in the injury distribution.29  However, the
Krueger and Burton data came from a much shorter period (1972–
1983) than the data used in our analyses (1975–1995), during which
time the injury distribution—at least as measured by PPD claims as a
proportion of total claims (see Figure 4.9)—appear to have changed
very little.  For these reasons, it is likely that our benefit measure is
subject to greater error.  
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Table 4.4 Employer Costs Regression using Combined Benefit Measures,  Instrumental Variable Estimatesa
Variable Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Adjusted manual rates
ln(Benefits) 1.1779***
(12.43)
1.1880***
(12.59)
2.4824***
(25.21)
0.2634
(1.32)
1.0161***
(14.09)
1.9240***
(10.70)
0.4315**
(2.27)
ln(Injury) — 0.4157***
(3.55)
0.4034***
(2.66)
0.5507***
(4.86)
0.4862***
(4.40)
0.3515***
(2.79)
0.5541***
(4.93)
PPD percentage — — — — 0.0251***
(15.47)
0.0166***
(6.56)
0.0125***
(7.52)
Covered 
employment
— — — — –0.0133***
(6.00)
–0.0072
(1.04)
0.0045
(1.09)
Union density — — — — 0.0185***
(3.66)
0.0089
(0.77)
0.0193***
(2.89)
State dummies No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year dummies No No No Yes No No Yes
(continued)
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Variable Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Net weekly costs
ln(Benefits) 1.2726***
(12.70)
1.2827***
(12.86)
2.4855***
(25.29)
0.2324
(1.14)
1.1079***
(14.51)
1.9203***
(10.74)
0.4068**
(2.12)
ln(Injury) — 0.4560***
(3.69)
0.4518***
(2.99)
0.4992***
(4.31)
0.5338***
(4.56)
0.3891***
(3.10)
0.5107***
(4.50)
PPD percentage — — — — 0.0277***
(16.10)
0.0175***
(6.96)
0.0128***
(7.66)
Covered 
employment
— — — — –0.0062***
(2.63)
–0.0065
(0.94)
0.0076*
(1.81)
Union density — — — — 0.0247***
(4.61)
0.0152
(1.31)
0.0242***
(3.60)
State dummies No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year dummies No No No Yes No No Yes
a Values in parentheses are absolute value t-ratios.  *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the
10% level.
.
bA dash (—) = coefficient not estimated.
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Second, in recent years, several states have sought to reduce com-
pensation costs not by reducing the statutory generosity of cash bene-
fits, but through statutory changes in eligibility requirements or in the
method of assessing permanent partial disability.30  These changes are
not reflected in our statutory benefit index.  Since we include data from
this period while Krueger and Burton do not, our benefit variable is
likely to be subject to greater measurement error.
After we correct for potential measurement error, substantial dif-
ferences still remain among the estimates produced by the different
model specifications reported in Table 4.4.  For example, the cost–ben-
efit elasticity is about 1.92 in model 6 but shrinks to between 0.41 and
0.43 when year dummies are added in model 7.  The difference
between these estimates is likely due to a combination of omitted vari-
able bias and measurement error.  Model 7 is our preferred specifica-
Table 4.5 Comparisons of Estimates in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 with Krueger 
and Burton Estimates
Estimate Spec. 1a 2 5 6
Adjusted manual rates
Ordinary least squares
Table 4.3 0.398 0.401 0.559 0.479
Krueger & Burton 1.083 1.023 1.000 0.954
Instrumental variables
Table 4.4 1.178 1.119 1.061 1.924
Krueger & Burton 1.303 —b 1.445 1.087
Net weekly costs
Ordinary least squares
Table 4.3 0.431 0.433 0.592 0.503
Krueger & Burton 1.218 1.105 1.050 0.831
Instrumental variables
Table 4.4 1.273 1.283 1.108 1.920
Krueger & Burton 1.345 — 1.375 0.905
a The specification numbers in the column headings match those used in Tables 4.3 and
4.4.
b A dash (—) = did not estimate.
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tion, suggesting that the cost–benefit elasticity is less than 1.  An F-test
rejects the null hypothesis—that the benefit coefficient is equal to 1—
at the 0.05 significance level for the model 7 adjusted manual rate
equation, but fails to reject this hypothesis for the comparable net
weekly cost regression.
This result suggests that a 10 percent increase in benefits results in
a 4 percent increase in costs, a surprising finding that is inconsistent
with a large number of previous empirical studies that concluded that
higher benefits are associated with disproportionately higher claim
rates and benefit payments.  For these reasons, we are hesitant to accept
our cost–benefit elasticity at face value, and we are inclined to believe
that the variables used to instrument benefits in the instrumental vari-
able regressions are imperfect.  Specifically, these instruments are lim-
ited to parameters affecting benefit generosity for TTD claims only,
and they would therefore fail to account for measurement error in the
other components of the benefit index, such as PPD benefits, or for
changes in the injury distribution.
Separate Medical and Cash Benefit Regressors
Table 4.6 reports the result of regression analyses estimating
employer costs as a function of separate medical and cash benefit vari-
ables.  Similar to the regressions reported in Table 4.4, the cash benefit
measure was instrumented using the TTD minimum and maximum
weekly benefits as well as the waiting and retrospective periods for
benefit eligibility.  
From Table 4.6, it is apparent that the coefficient estimates for the
cash benefit variable are highly sensitive to specification.  The cash
benefit coefficient in the adjusted manual rate varies from a low of
0.0844 in specification 4 to a high of 0.5983 in specification 6; in the
net weekly cost regressions, the cash benefit coefficient ranges from
0.0546 to 0.4922.  The coefficient for the medical benefit measure also
varies substantially across specifications, although not quite as dramat-
ically as cash benefits.  Once again, the year dummies seem to substan-
tially reduce the magnitude of both benefit coefficients.
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Table 4.6 Employer Costs Regression using Separate Benefit Measures, Instrumental Variable Estimatesa
Variable Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Adjusted manual rates
ln(Cash benefits) 0.1955***
(4.99)
0.2051***
(5.26)
0.4842***
(2.58)
0.0844
(0.48)
0.1016**
(2.19)
0.5983***
(3.23)
0.2746*
(1.69)
ln(Medical benefits) 0.8678***
(55.40)
0.8638***
(55.57)
0.7808***
(38.27)
0.4880***
(10.82)
0.9126***
(46.93)
0.6974***
(22.33)
0.3607***
(7.38)
ln(Injury) — 0.2044***
(4.01)
0.5674***
(6.55)
0.6939***
(6.79)
0.4120***
(7.24)
0.5135***
(5.84)
0.6508***
(6.38)
PPD percentage — — — — 0.0026***
(2.59)
0.0053***
(3.16)
0.0077***
(4.39)
Union density — — — — 0.0132***
(8.02)
–0.0048
(1.33)
0.0024
(0.61)
Covered 
employment
— — — — –0.0163***
(5.27)
–0.0051
(0.70)
0.0092
(1.43)
State dummies No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year dummies No No No Yes No No Yes
(continued)
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Variable Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Net weekly costs
ln(Cash benefits) 0.2994***
(6.79)
0.3141***
(7.16)
0.3465*
(1.93)
0.0546
(0.31)
0.1575***
(3.30)
0.4922***
(2.78)
0.2537
(1.56)
ln(Medical benefits) 0.8894***
(50.40)
0.8845***
(50.52)
0.8022***
(41.08)
0.5492***
(12.03)
0.9527***
(47.53)
0.7300***
(24.47)
0.4111***
(8.37)
ln(Injury) — 0.2546***
(4.43)
0.6498***
(7.84)
0.6516***
(6.30)
0.4516***
(7.70)
0.5834***
(6.94)
0.6116***
(5.97)
PPD percentage — — — — 0.0042***
(4.12)
0.0054***
(3.35)
0.0075***
(4.24)
Union density — — — — 0.0208***
(12.20)
–0.0019
(0.56)
0.0052
(1.31)
Covered 
employment
— — — — –0.0107***
(3.34)
–0.0002
(0.03)
0.0126*
(1.94)
State dummies No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year dummies No No No Yes No No Yes
a Values in parentheses are absolute value t-ratios.  *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the
10% level.
b A dash (—) = coefficient not estimated.
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BENEFIT ADEQUACY VERSUS AFFORDABILITY
The empirical results discussed in the previous section document a
positive relationship between workers’ compensation benefits and the
cost of the program to employers.  In all of the regressions reported
there, higher cash or medical benefits are associated with higher costs
of workers’ compensation insurance.  These results illustrate a poten-
tial tradeoff between the benefit adequacy and affordability objectives
discussed in Chapter 1.  The purpose of this section is to provide a
more refined analysis of the conflict between these objectives, which
must first be operationally defined.  We begin by identifying two stan-
dards against which we may evaluate benefit adequacy: the National
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation laws and the Model
Act promulgated by the Council of State Governments.
The National Commission on State Workmen’s 
Compensation Laws 
The Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Com-
pensation Laws (1972) was discussed in Chapter 1.  One of the funda-
mental features of the report was support for federal standards for
workers’ compensation programs if states did not voluntarily improve
their laws by 1975.  An implicit assumption underlying the recommen-
dation for federal standards was that states with low levels of statutory
benefits also had low compensation costs.  The assumption was chal-
lenged shortly after the National Commission issued its report by skep-
tics who argued that some high-cost states had statutes that provided
relatively low benefits.  In the 1970s, Michigan was often cited as an
example of such a state, in which low statutory benefits in conjunction
with liberal rules for determining compensability and awarding perma-
nent disability benefits resulted in high insurance costs.  The skeptics
argued that imposing benefit standards on states like Michigan would
only further widen the differences in workers’ compensation costs
among the states.
Federal standards for the state workers’ compensation programs
have never been enacted, and so we have no direct evidence about the
effect of such standards on program costs.  However, as a “second-
best” approximation, Krueger and Burton (1990) simulated the effects
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on the costs of workers’ compensation insurance of federal standards.31
Specifically, they first estimated regressions predicting actual statewide
average employer costs as a function of expected cash benefits under
existing state statutory provision.32  (Similar to our analyses, Krueger
and Burton estimated several different model specifications, which
yielded somewhat different results.)  They then derived estimates of
expected benefits for each state, assuming that the state had adopted
these essential recommendations of the National Commission.33  Next,
these “expected benefits under the federal standards” estimates were
used in combination with the coefficient on the expected cash benefit
variable from the regression equation to forecast employer costs, which
were then compared with actual costs to determine the impact of fed-
eral standards.
The mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation for the
simulated and actual costs are presented in Table 4.7 (which was Table
5 in Krueger and Burton 1990).  The simulated costs were estimated
under two extreme assumptions, which were represented by models 1
and 6 of the Krueger and Burton study.
The 1972 entry for adjusted manual rates can be used to illustrate
the findings of the simulation.  The average (mean) actual costs of
workers’ compensation insurance for the 29 states in the study was
0.699 percent of payroll in 1972.  The actual dispersion of costs among
these 29 states, as measured by the standard deviation, was 0.270 per-
cent of payroll.  The coefficient of variation, which is an alternative
measure of dispersion calculated by dividing the standard deviation by
the mean, was 0.386 for the actual adjusted manual rates in 1972.
The model 1 and model 6 results for 1972 provide alternative esti-
mates of the effects of enforcing national standards that overrode inad-
equate state statutory provisions: compared with the actual costs, the
average (mean) costs nationally increased to 0.971 percent or 0.932
percent of payroll, and the standard deviation increased to 0.343 or
0.329 percent of payroll.  However, the coefficient of variation declined
to 0.353 for both models.
Based on the results in Table 4.7, Krueger and Burton (1990, p. 239)
concluded:
Finally, our simulations indicate that the federal minimum stan-
dards proposed by the National Commission on State Workmen’s
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Table 4.7 Simulation for National Standards and Actual Workers' 
Compensation Costs, Summary Statistics by Yeara
Year Mean
Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
Adjusted manual rates
1972, Actual 0.699 0.270 0.386
Model 1 0.971 0.343 0.353
Model 6 0.932 0.329 0.353
1975, Actual 0.935 0.436 0.466
Model 1 1.078 0.456 0.423
Model 6 1.059 0.451 0.426
1978, Actual 1.232 0.560 0.455
Model 1 1.322 0.579 0.438
Model 6 1.310 0.574 0.438
1983, Actual 1.194 0.621 0.520
Model 1 1.345 0.607 0.451
Model 6 1.325 0.608 0.459
All, Actual 1.015 0.530 0.522
Model 1 1.179 0.525 0.445
Model 6 1.157 0.524 0.453
Net costsb
1972, Actual 2.287 1.001 0.438
Model 1 3.296 1.282 0.389
Model 6 2.926 1.157 0.395
1975, Actual 2.929 1.534 0.524
Model 1 3.429 1.606 0.468
Model 6 3.254 1.563 0.480
1978, Actual 3.679 1.919 0.522
Model 1 3.989 2.013 0.505
Model 6 3.875 1.966 0.507
(continued)
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Table 4.7 (continued)
Year Mean
Standard 
deviation
Coefficient of 
variation
1983, Actual 3.429 1.865 0.544
Model 1 3.914 1.818 0.464
Model 6 3.746 1.831 0.489
All, Actual 3.081 1.688 0.548
Model 1 3.655 1.705 0.466
Model 6 3.450 1.681 0.487
SOURCE: This table is a reprint of Table 5 from Krueger and Burton (1990).
a Sample size is 29 states each year.  Estimates for model 1 assume the cost-benefit
elasticities estimated in the first column of Tables 3 and 4 in Krueger and Burton
(1990), and estimates for model 6 assume the elasticity estimated in column 6 of
Tables 3 and 4 from the same article.
b In 1983 dollars.
Compensation Laws would increase the average cost of workers’
compensation insurance, and decrease the coefficient of variation
among the states in all time periods.  The impact of the minimum
standard on the standard deviation of costs is mixed; for 1983 and
for the four years combined the standard deviation for either cost
measure would be decreased by the standards, but in the three
other years studied the standard deviations would increase.  As a
result, the success or failure of the National Commission’s pre-
scription to narrow the dispersion in workers’ compensation costs
among the states by requiring minimum federal standards appears
dependent on the time period of interest and on the measure of
dispersion used.
This passage provides inter alia three measures of affordability
that we will also use: 1) the national average of workers’ compensation
insurance costs; 2) the dispersion of insurance costs among states as
measured by the standard deviation; and 3) the dispersion of insurance
costs among states as measured by the coefficient of determination,
which is the standard deviation divided by the average.  
These measures represent alternative views about which measure
of input costs is relevant for an employer.  If all of a firm’s competitors
pay the same rate for an input (such as wages or any element of remu-
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neration for workers), then the average cost of that input does not affect
the firm’s competitive position and the firm is relatively unconcerned
about the average level of the costs.34  This is consistent with the tradi-
tional trade union goal of “taking wages out of competition”; by forc-
ing all the employers in the relevant product market to pay the same
wage, the union is able to raise wages without substantially affecting
employment for union members.  Of course, as U.S. employers
increasingly compete in a global economy, identical workers’ compen-
sation costs within the United States may be little comfort if overseas
employers have lower workers’ compensation costs.
The standard deviation measures the dispersion among states in
workers’ compensation costs measured in dollars per $100 of payroll:
statistically, two-thirds of the states fall in the range of the mean plus or
minus one standard deviation.  If the standard deviation increases due
to the enactment of federal standards, then the spread between low- and
high-cost states increases.  In 1972, imposition of federal standards
would have increased the spread (measured by the standard deviation)
from an actual dispersion of $0.270 per $100 of payroll to a maximum
dispersion (in model 1) of $0.343 per $100 of payroll.  If employers
within the United States react to the absolute differences among states
in the costs of workers’ compensation insurance, imposition of federal
standards in 1972 would have increased competitive pressures among
states.
The coefficient of variation measures the dispersion of workers’
compensation costs among states relative to the average cost of the pro-
gram.  In 1972, imposition of federal standards would have increased
the spread in employer costs among states (as measured by the stan-
dard deviation, as described in the preceding paragraph) but would
have increased average costs at a faster rate, so that the ratio of the
standard deviation to the mean (i.e., the coefficient of variation) would
have declined.  Do employers care less about a standard deviation of
$0.30 per $100 of payroll when the mean cost of workers’ compensa-
tion insurance for the United States is $2.00 per $100 of payroll (a
coefficient of variation of 0.15) than when the standard deviation is
$0.30 per $100 of payroll and the mean cost is $1.00 per $100 of pay-
roll (a coefficient of variation of 0.30)?  If employers care less about
the absolute value of the spread among states as the average costs in all
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states increase, then the standard of deviation is the better measure of
dispersion.
We do not think that there is a clear advantage to using any of these
three measures of affordability.  However, since the United States is
still largely a domestic economy, we are less concerned about the aver-
age level of workers’ compensation costs than about the dispersion
among states in these costs.  Among the competing definitions of dis-
persion, we prefer the standard deviation as the most relevant for
assessing competitive conditions, because employer location decisions
are likely to be based on absolute (as opposed to relative) costs.  If a
firm can save $2.00 per $100 of payroll by moving from Indiana to
California, that savings is important whether the average costs of work-
ers’ compensation nationally is $1.00 per $100 of payroll or $3.00 per
$100 of payroll. 
Our conclusions with respect to the relationship between benefit
adequacy and affordability are subject to two important qualifications.
First, thus far we have focused on employer costs and have assumed
that employers’ actual costs are equivalent to the premium charged by
the insurance carrier.  In fact, while the employer may initially pay the
insurance premium and bear the costs of workers’ compensation in the
short run, in the long run these costs are shared three ways: by the
employer, the worker, and the consumer (Spieler and Burton 1998).
That is, part of the costs of workers’ compensation is ultimately borne
by the consumer in the form of higher prices for goods and services
and by the worker in the form of lower wages.  Most of the empirical
evidence suggests that workers bear the largest share of the costs of
workers’ compensation (Chelius and Burton 1994) and that workers
pay for higher benefit levels with reduced wage rates.  To the extent
that this is true, there is no trade-off between benefit adequacy and
affordability; adequate benefits are no less affordable (at least for
employers) than inadequate benefits.
Second, while our discussion of interstate cost differences has been
in terms of statewide averages, it is important to recognize that there
are vast differences in rates among different employer classes within a
particular jurisdiction.  A particular percentage cost difference between
states will have greater impact on employers in relatively more hazard-
ous classes than on employers in safer classes.  For example, assume
that the average cost of workers’ compensation paid by employers in
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state A is $2 per $100 of payroll while the average rate for employers
in neighboring state B is $2.20, a 10 percent differential.  Yet, employ-
ers in some high-risk industries in state B may be paying as much as $2
per $100 of payroll more than their counterparts in state A.  Critics
may argue that the plant location decisions of these high-risk employ-
ers are affected by such differences in compensation costs.  
Does this example eviscerate our analysis?  The National Commis-
sion (1972, pp. 124–125) suggested a response to this criticism:
There are, to be sure, a small minority of employers for whom
workers’ compensation costs are significant because of their
adverse loss experience, but it seems folly for a State to contrive a
cheap workers’ compensation program in order to keep these
employers from moving elsewhere.  In any event, the incentive to
relocate is dampened because the Federal corporate profits tax
would substantially reduce the benefit an employer would gain by
moving to a State with low workers’ compensation costs.
In addition, it is worth also noting that many employers have costs
that are less than the state’s average, and for these employers the inter-
state differences are of even less importance in determining location
decisions than for an employer with average workers’ compensation
costs.
Using the essential recommendations of the National Commission
on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws as an operational definition
of benefit adequacy, the simulation results for 1983 in Table 4.7 indi-
cate that federal standards mandating this level of adequacy would
have these consequences for the three measures of affordability: 1) the
national average of adjusted manual rates would increase by 11.0–12.6
percent, and the national average of net weekly costs of workers’ com-
pensation would increase by 9.2–14.1 percent; 2) the dispersion of
costs among states as measured by the standard deviation would
decrease by 0.9–1.1 percent for adjusted manual rates and by 1.8–2.5
percent for the net weekly costs; and 3) the dispersion of costs among
states as measured by the coefficient of variation would decrease by
13.2–14.7 percent for adjusted manual rates and by 10.5–14.7 percent
for the net costs of insurance.
We focus on 1983 because that is the latest year included in the
Krueger and Burton study.  However, the results for all years shown in
Table 4.7 are similar: 1) average workers’ compensation costs
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increased (by 11.8–18.6 percent, depending on the measure used); 2) in
most years, dispersion as measured by the standard deviation declined;
and 3) in every year, dispersion as measured by the coefficient of varia-
tion declined.  Since the all-years results include 1972 and 1975, before
the point at which the states had responded to the National Commis-
sion’s recommendations by raising benefit levels,35 we believe the 1983
results concerning the impact of federal standards on the average costs
of workers’ compensation insurance are more indicative of the conse-
quences if the 19 essential recommendations had been imposed on the
states during our study period.
The Model Act
In this section, we further examine the relationship between ade-
quate workers’ compensation benefits and affordable employer costs
by exploring the cost impact resulting from the adoption of the Model
Act promulgated by the Council of State Governments.  The Model Act
was revised in 1974 to incorporate the National Commission’s 84 rec-
ommendations, some of which were more generous than the benefits
provided by the National Commission’s 19 essential recommenda-
tions.36  One important difference between the Model Act and the
National Commission’s recommendations was that the National Com-
mission made no recommendations concerning the adequacy of perma-
nent partial disability (PPD) benefits, while the Model Act contains
detailed statutory provisions pertaining to both the durations and the
weekly benefit amounts for PPD benefits.  
Table 4.8 presents data on the average expected cash benefits paid
to injured workers in the United States due to actual statutory provi-
sions as well as the average cash benefits that would be paid to those
workers if all states adopted the Model Act.  Actual average cash bene-
Table 4.8 Actual and Simulated Cash Benefits, Means and 
Standard Deviations
Actual Model Act
Mean ($) 9,502.29 20,856.08
Standard deviation ($) 4,771.61 1,949.91
% difference from actual 119.48
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fits are based on the actuarial assessments of the actual statutes in
effect in each state as of January 1 of each year, as described in the cost
regression model description (pp. 75–98) and Appendix D.  Simulated
Model Act benefits were calculated using the same actuarial procedure,
except that rather than using the actual statutory parameters—for
example, the weekly benefit maximum and minimum, the waiting
period, and the PPD schedule—in effect in a particular state during a
particular year, we substituted the recommended statutory parameters
contained in the Model Act.  In some instances, simulated benefits
under the Model Act were actually lower than the actual benefits speci-
fied by the state workers’ compensation statute.
Adoption of the Model Act by all states would have resulted in a
substantial increase in statutory workers’ compensation benefits, as
shown by Table 4.9.  In 1975, our estimate of the average benefits paid
to workers’ compensation claimants under actual state laws was
$8,794, while the Model Act statutory language would have provided
$21,039 in benefits, an amount that is almost 140 percent higher than
actual expected benefits.  Since adopting the Model Act means that
states pay similar benefits—the benefits would vary among jurisdic-
tions primarily because of interstate differences in average wages—the
variance in simulated benefits ($2,205) is quite a bit less in 1975 than
the variance in actual benefits ($5,614).37   
The data in Table 4.9 indicate that differences in average benefits
between actual and simulated cash benefits vary over time.  Thus,
while the ratio of mean actual benefits to mean Model Act benefits was
about 0.42 in 1975, the ratio climbed substantially over the next 10
years, reaching 0.48 in 1985.  Since that time, the ratio has dropped
back to about 0.45.  Similarly, there is some intertemporal variation in
the difference in the standard deviation between actual and simulated
benefits.  In 1975, the standard deviation for Model Act benefits was
nearly 60 percent less than the standard deviation for actual benefits.  
Adjusted manual rates and net weekly costs resulting from the
adoption of the Model Act were simulated by multiplying the cash ben-
efit coefficient from the instrumental variable regressions (depicted in
Table 4.6) by the change in benefit levels due to the adoption of the
Model Act for each state and year in our data set.  This product was
then added to the actual adjusted manual rate for that state and year to
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Table 4.9 Actual and Simulated Cash Benefits by Year, 1975–95:
Means and Standard Deviations
Actual Model Act Actual mean  
as a % of 
Model Act 
meanYear
Mean
($)
Std. dev.
($)
Mean
($)
Std. dev.
($)
1975 8,794 5,614 21,039 2,205 41.80
1976 9,506 5,736 21,261 2,340 44.71
1977 9,593 5,860 21,318 2,383 45.00
1978 9,741 5,901 21,116 2,278 46.13
1979 9,682 5,832 20,650 2,141 46.89
1980 9,302 5,599 20,027 1,909 46.45
1981 8,942 5,343 19,734 1,873 45.31
1982 9,195 5,497 19,882 1,903 46.25
1983 9,354 5,239 20,296 1,942 46.09
1984 9,429 5,364 20,274 1,914 46.51
1985 9,680 5,596 20,346 1,899 47.58
1986 9,692 4,500 21,200 1,889 45.72
1987 9,765 4,474 21,406 1,784 45.62
1988 9,711 4,345 21,506 1,833 45.15
1989 9,577 4,250 20,973 1,745 45.67
1990 9,448 4,198 20,840 1,757 45.33
1991 9,582 4,256 20,854 1,694 45.95
1992 9,540 4,041 21,333 1,732 44.72
1993 9,454 3,954 21,035 1,741 44.94
1994 9,510 3,810 20,877 1,730 45.55
1995 9,580 3,790 21,103 1,929 45.40
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arrive at the simulated adjusted manual rate.  The actual calculations
may be represented as follows:
Eq. 4.3 RSit  =  exp{ln(RAit) + β[ln(BSit) – ln(BAit)]},
where RSit is the simulated adjusted manual rate (or net weekly cost)
for the ith state and tth year, RAit is the actual rate (or net weekly cost),
BAit is the actual expected benefit, BSit is the Model Act benefit, and β is
the coefficient on the cash benefits variable from the instrumental vari-
able equation.38 
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 4.10, which pre-
sents the average actual and expected adjusted manual rates and net
weekly costs, as well as the associated standard deviation and coeffi-
cient of variation for each regression equation reported in Table 4.6.
The row labeled “Diff. from actual (%)” in Table 4.10 shows the differ-
ence in means, in percentage terms, between the actual and predicted
costs using the various models.  As expected, there is considerable vari-
ation in the impact of the change in benefits on costs, depending on the
specification.  For reasons explained in the previous section, model 6 is
our preferred specification.  Predictions based on this model indicate
that the Model Act would have increased adjusted manual rates by
nearly 75 percent and weekly costs by nearly 60 percent.
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 present the means, standard deviations, and
coefficients of variation for a) actual and predicted adjusted manual
rates and b) actual and predicted net weekly costs, respectively, using
the regression coefficient for our preferred specification, model 6.  The
right-most columns of these tables show the differentials for the means
between predicted and actual costs.
Adoption of the Model Act would have increased adjusted manual
rates by 57 to 75 percent and net costs of workers’ compensation by 45
to 57 percent depending on the years used for the comparisons.
Replacing actual statutes with the Model Act would also have
increased the standard deviations for adjusted manual rates for every
year and the coefficient of variation for most years (Table 4.11).  Simi-
larly, replacing actual statutes with the Model Act would have
increased the standard deviations for net weekly costs for every year
and the coefficient of variation for most years (Table 4.12).
122Table 4.10 Actual and Predicted Employer Costs
Actual Spec. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Adjusted manual rates
Mean ($) 2.249 2.676 2.700 3.501 2.422 2.460 3.907 2.877
Diff. from actual (%) 19.02 20.06 55.69 7.72 9.39 73.75 27.94
Std. dev ($) 1.114 1.389 1.405 2.031 1.220 1.244 2.387 1.533
Coeff. var. 0.495 0.519 0.520 0.580 0.504 0.506 0.611 0.533
Net weekly costs
Mean ($) 11.89 15.57 15.79 16.27 12.47 13.68 18.68 14.93
Diff. from actual (%) 31.02 32.81 36.89 4.94 15.06 57.13 25.60
Std. dev ($) 6.14 8.75 8.92 9.31 6.51 7.33 11.38 8.25
Coeff. var. 0.517 0.562 0.565 0.572 0.522 0.536 0.609 0.553
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Table 4.11 Actual and Predicted Adjusted Manual Rates, 1975–95
Actual Predicted
Year
Mean
($)
Std. dev.
($)
Coeff. 
var.
Mean
($)
Std. dev.
($)
Coeff. 
var. % changea
1975 0.949 0.387 0.408 1.648 0.789 0.479 73.69
1976 1.130 0.441 0.390 1.889 0.900 0.477 67.16
1977 1.294 0.528 0.408 2.153 1.024 0.476 66.36
1978 1.466 0.608 0.415 2.396 1.122 0.468 63.44
1979 1.582 0.628 0.397 2.525 1.038 0.411 59.60
1980 1.645 0.640 0.389 2.627 1.012 0.385 59.65
1981 1.613 0.584 0.362 2.586 0.908 0.351 60.30
1982 1.511 0.511 0.338 2.398 0.785 0.327 58.76
1983 1.490 0.510 0.342 2.358 0.795 0.337 58.26
1984 1.504 0.521 0.347 2.383 0.831 0.349 58.48
1985 1.599 0.529 0.331 2.498 0.819 0.328 56.27
1986 2.014 0.685 0.340 3.342 1.574 0.471 65.96
1987 2.189 0.756 0.346 3.655 1.810 0.495 66.99
1988 2.420 0.901 0.372 4.075 2.110 0.518 68.37
1989 2.653 0.997 0.376 4.424 2.235 0.505 66.75
1990 2.951 1.181 0.400 4.914 2.445 0.497 66.54
1991 3.096 1.054 0.340 5.098 2.266 0.445 64.66
1992 3.267 1.091 0.334 5.542 2.779 0.502 69.63
1993 3.478 1.166 0.335 5.865 2.953 0.503 68.65
1994 3.188 0.791 0.248 5.220 1.901 0.364 63.75
1995 2.973 0.747 0.251 4.843 1.680 0.347 62.91
a Percentage change between actual and predicted means.  The “% change” values
shown may not be exact due to rounding error.
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Table 4.12 Actual and Predicted Net Weekly Costs, 1975–95
Actual Predicted
Year
Mean
($)
Std. dev.
($)
Coeff. 
var.
Mean
($)
Std. dev.
($)
Coeff. 
var. % changea
1975 5.029 2.079 0.413 7.883 3.513 0.446 56.76
1976 6.073 2.484 0.409 9.226 4.118 0.446 51.92
1977 6.986 3.006 0.430 10.578 4.796 0.453 51.42
1978 7.875 3.618 0.459 11.758 5.505 0.468 49.31
1979 8.306 3.782 0.455 12.180 5.160 0.424 46.64
1980 8.409 3.898 0.464 12.335 5.177 0.420 46.69
1981 8.109 3.562 0.439 11.936 4.752 0.398 47.19
1982 7.631 3.076 0.403 11.153 4.090 0.367 46.15
1983 7.634 2.789 0.365 11.152 3.906 0.350 46.08
1984 7.701 2.799 0.363 11.256 3.990 0.354 46.16
1985 8.222 2.880 0.350 11.872 3.916 0.330 44.39
1986 10.866 4.156 0.382 16.507 8.081 0.490 51.91
1987 11.901 4.590 0.386 18.134 9.153 0.505 52.38
1988 13.184 5.265 0.399 20.184 10.456 0.518 53.10
1989 14.058 5.527 0.393 21.362 10.694 0.501 51.95
1990 15.500 6.230 0.402 23.512 11.331 0.482 51.69
1991 16.339 5.956 0.365 24.517 10.682 0.436 50.05
1992 17.602 6.259 0.356 27.028 12.846 0.475 53.54
1993 18.401 6.328 0.344 28.113 12.991 0.462 52.78
1994 16.741 4.502 0.269 25.054 8.770 0.350 49.66
1995 15.691 3.980 0.254 23.347 7.210 0.309 48.79
a Percentage change between actual and predicted means.  The “% change” values
shown may not be exact due to rounding error.
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The finding that substituting the Model Act provisions for cash
benefits for the actual benefits provided by state workers’ compensa-
tion statutes would lead to a general widening of interstate differences
in the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insurance seems
anomalous.  It is perplexing because—as shown in Table 4.9—replac-
ing actual workers’ compensation provisions with the Model Act
reduces interstate variation in statutory cash benefits (as measured by
the standard deviation).
Table 4.13 illustrates how this can happen, i.e., how reducing the
disparity in the statutory level of benefits among states can lead to
greater variation in employer costs.  In this table, states are rank-
ordered by level of actual adjusted manual rates in 1995 (as shown in
the first data column), ranging from 4.937 percent of payroll in Mon-
tana to 1.397 percent of payroll in Indiana.  Estimates of the benefits
that would be paid by states if they adopted the Model Act provisions
are shown in the second data column and range from $30,177 in Alaska
to $16,821 in Arkansas.  As indicated, since the statutory provisions are
identical—with the exception of the weekly benefit minimums and
maximums, which are tied to the state average weekly wage under the
Model Act—cost differences are due to interstate variation in wages.
Estimates of actual benefits provided by the states in 1995 accord-
ing to existing statutory law range from $22,941 in the District of
Columbia to $4,310 in Louisiana.  The differences between the benefits
required by the Model Act and the actual benefit required by the state’s
workers’ compensation statute in 1995 are also shown.  For example,
in Montana, the Model Act would have resulted in average benefits of
$22,983, while the actual 1995 statute in Montana only provided
$5,522 of benefits, a difference of $17,461.  The range in the differ-
ences was from $19,233 in Alaska to $2,517 in Pennsylvania.  
The predicted adjusted manual rates (Table 4.13, right-most col-
umn) were calculated by use of Eq. 4.3, which
a) begins with the actual rates in Table 4.13; 
b) adds the product of (the differences between the Model Act and
actual benefits from the “Difference” column of Table 4.13 × the
benefits coefficient for adjusted manual rates from model 6 of
Table 4.6); resulting in 
c) the predicted adjusted manual rates.
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Table 4.13 1995 Actual and Predicted Adjusted Manual Rates, and 
Model and Actual Benefits, by State ($)
Statea
Actual 
rates
Model Act 
benefits
Actual 
benefits Differenceb
Predicted 
rates
Montana 4.937 22,983 5,522 17,461 10.819
Hawaii 4.867 20,932 13,912 7,020 6.093
Florida 4.366 18,301 5,323 12,978 8.612
Louisiana 4.059 20,162 4,310 15,853 9.486
New York 3.883 22,277 13,923 8,354 5.029
New Hampshire 3.757 20,086 11,919 8,167 5.006
New Mexico 3.713 17,835 11,925 5,910 4.634
Kentucky 3.650 20,323 8,708 11,615 5.819
Alabama 3.585 19,129 6,728 12,401 6.371
Oklahoma 3.456 19,359 6,532 12,827 6.283
Rhode Island 3.448 18,945 9,536 9,408 5.030
Maine 3.373 19,589 12,492 7,097 4.320
Georgia 3.370 18,518 8,266 10,251 5.252
Ohio 3.358 22,946 9,988 12,958 5.307
District of 
Columbia
3.341 26,275 22,941 3,334 3.600
Pennsylvania 3.340 21,642 19,125 2,517 3.575
Massachusetts 3.207 20,839 12,234 8,605 4.299
Vermont 3.171 19,098 13,205 5,892 3.884
Connecticut 3.167 21,185 9,762 11,423 4.850
California 3.150 22,880 5,573 17,307 6.851
Tennessee 3.071 19,254 7,434 11,820 5.183
Arkansas 2.993 16,821 6,512 10,309 5.045
Illinois 2.803 22,824 10,547 12,277 4.286
Colorado 2.788 20,786 7,374 13,412 4.931
Minnesota 2.782 21,600 10,580 11,019 4.120
Mississippi 2.750 17,049 8,742 8,307 3.971
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Statea
Actual 
rates
Model Act 
benefits
Actual 
benefits Differenceb
Predicted 
rates
Michigan 2.689 23,806 9,694 14,112 4.408
Kansas 2.673 19,497 11,828 7,670 3.519
Arizona 2.630 20,408 13,401 7,007 3.315
West Virginia 2.540 19,185 8,085 11,100 4.086
Missouri 2.463 21,170 8,137 13,033 4.168
South Carolina 2.445 17,773 7,854 9,919 3.832
South Dakota 2.425 17,155 7,446 9,709 3.838
Alaska 2.400 30,177 10,944 19,233 4.193
Idaho 2.394 19,928 9,121 10,807 3.680
Nebraska 2.338 19,616 9,918 9,697 3.403
North Carolina 2.316 17,997 5,907 12,090 4.276
Delaware 2.288 20,680 12,024 8,656 3.083
Oregon 2.275 20,857 7,505 13,353 3.992
Utah 2.186 19,279 7,339 11,940 3.719
Wisconsin 2.044 21,934 9,754 12,180 3.193
Washington 1.981 22,432 12,195 10,237 2.771
Iowa 1.946 21,508 18,230 3,278 2.131
Virginia 1.907 19,295 12,554 6,741 2.415
Maryland 1.891 21,394 8,573 12,821 3.128
New Jersey 1.777 22,286 7,999 14,286 3.123
Indiana 1.397 22,022 6,367 15,655 2.766
Mean 2.973 21,103 9,580 11,522 4.869
Standard 
deviation
0.747 1,929 3,790 3,794 1.698
a States ordered from highest actual rate to lowest.
b Difference = “Model Act benefits” value minus “Actual benefits” value.
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Consider the calculations for Montana as a clue to the solution to
our anomaly of widening interstate cost differences as the result of the
imposition of federal standards.  Montana had adjusted manual rates in
1995 that were 4.937 percent of payroll, well above the national aver-
age of 2.973 for adjusted manual rates.  At the same time, Montana had
a workers’ compensation statute that provided limited workers’ com-
pensation cash benefits; indeed, the difference between the actual statu-
tory benefits and the benefits prescribed by the Model Act in Montana
in 1995 was $17,461, which was second only to Alaska in the gap
between the Model Act and the actual statutory provisions.  Multiply-
ing our estimates for the relationship between statutory benefits and
insurance costs (shown in model 6 in Table 4.6) times the difference in
the log value of the Montana adequate benefits and the log value of the
Montana actual benefits results in a predicted adjusted manual rate of
10.891 percent of payroll devoted to workers’ compensation premiums
by Montana employers if only the state had the Model Act provisions.
This result for Montana is interesting and instructive.  The actual
adjusted manual rate in 1995 of 4.937 percent of payroll was 67 per-
cent above the national average of adjusted manual rates of 2.973 per-
cent of payroll.  If Montana had substituted the Model Act for its actual
workers’ compensation statute, we estimate that adjusted manual rates
would have been 10.819 percent of payroll, or 222 percent above the
national average of 4.869 percent of payroll if all states had adopted the
Model Act.  In short, the Model Act would have widened the difference
in workers’ compensation costs between Montana and the national
average.
The combination of high actual workers’ compensation rates and
substandard workers’ compensation statutory provisions, which
explains the Montana results, is not unique to that state.  Indeed, 6 of
the 10 most expensive states for workers’ compensation insurance
shown in Table 4.13—Montana, Florida, Louisiana, Kentucky, Ala-
bama, and Oklahoma—had adequacy gaps in their workers’ compensa-
tion statutes that exceeded the national average of $11,522 for the
difference between the Model Act and actual benefits.  For each of
these states, we estimate that substituting the Model Act for the state’s
actual workers’ compensation statute would have increased the gap
between their costs and the national average, while at the same time it
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would have reduced the gap between national average benefits and
benefits paid by the state.39 
What accounts for these results? The likely explanation is that
other factors are driving up costs in these low-benefit states.  For exam-
ple, medical costs may be substantially higher, or the administration of
the program—e.g., the determination of which claimants are eligible
for PPD benefits—may be more liberal in these high-cost, low-benefit
states.  
In this regard, we note that Durbin and Kish (1998), using individ-
ual workers’ compensation claim data, found that weekly PPD benefit
levels were negatively related to the adjudicator’s assessment of the
extent of the claimant’s disability.  They interpreted this result as evi-
dence that adjudicators “redistribute” income to “poorer” workers, i.e.,
workers whose compensation benefits are relatively low.40  It is possi-
ble that in some states with low statutory benefit levels, the claims
administration process has been liberalized to “compensate” for less
generous benefits, and vice versa (i.e., high-benefit states have stricter
administration).  
Our results suggest that superimposing the Model Act on states
without regard to these other factors will not only lead to a substantial
increase in the average costs of workers’ compensation insurance (in
the range of 60–75 percent of actual costs), but will also widen the gap
among states in the costs of workers’ compensation insurance.  How-
ever, it is important to note that our simulation holds constant the other
factors in our equation, including those unobserved variables such as
the liberality of the claims administration process.  If Durbin and Kish
are correct, high-cost, low-benefit states like Montana may more
strictly administer the workers’ compensation claims process following
the imposition of federal standards in an effort to control costs.  Never-
theless, the results provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that the
imposition of federal standards incorporating the Model Act would
adversely affect affordability by increasing differences in employer
costs among states.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have explored the relationship between
employer costs and several variables thought to influence costs.  We
were particularly interested in the relationship between cash benefit
generosity and two conflicting objectives of workers’ compensation
programs: benefit adequacy and affordability.  Among other things, our
investigation involved estimating regression equations to measure the
effect of benefits and other variables on our cost measure.  We
described the data set, variables, and statistical methods used to esti-
mate these relationships.  The regression equation described in this
chapter is the basic model employed to determine the impact of insur-
ance arrangements on employer costs discussed in Chapters 5 and 8.
To examine the relationship between the adequacy and affordabil-
ity objectives, it was first necessary to choose standards by which we
could evaluate system performance toward these objectives.  Two oper-
ational standards were used to evaluate cash benefit adequacy: the rec-
ommendations of the National Commission on State Workmen’s
Compensation Laws and the Model Act promulgated by the Council of
State Governments as revised in 1974.  Both standards represent a con-
sensus among policymakers and experts in the field of workers’ com-
pensation.  
Three measures of affordability were used in this chapter: the aver-
age cost of workers’ compensation insurance nationally, and two mea-
sures of dispersion among states in workers’ compensation costs, the
standard deviation and the coefficient of variation.  Because workers’
compensation costs are tied to payroll, as these costs rise, so does the
price of labor.  Thus, the primary danger of high workers’ compensa-
tion benefits is the loss of employment.  Employment loss can occur
for two reasons.  First, economic theory tells us that as the price of an
input to the production process rises, employers use less of that input,
substituting other factors of production such as machinery and other
capital equipment for labor.  Second, to the extent there is variation in
costs among different jurisdictions, then employers will move from
high-cost jurisdictions to low-cost ones.
Two of our affordability measures—the standard deviation and
coefficient of variation—are meant to address the latter problem, i.e.,
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the effect of workers’ compensation costs on employer decisions about
plant location.  Both provide a sense of the degree to which there is sig-
nificant interstate variation in costs among states.  Increased cost dis-
persion signifies a growing gap between high- and low-cost states, as
well as greater problems with respect to firm relocation decisions
adversely affecting employment.  Both measures assume that reloca-
tion to foreign soil, where workers’ compensation costs may be lower,
is not a significant problem.  This would appear to be a valid assump-
tion given that the United States continues to be largely a domestic
economy.  
The national average of workers’ compensation costs provides a
measure of the first problem, the potential impact of a general rise in
workers’ compensation costs on employment due to the substitution of
capital and other inputs for labor.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to iden-
tify a standard of affordability based on any of our measures that is
similar to the adequacy standards based on the National Commission
recommendations or the Model Act.  There is no level of national aver-
age costs or coefficient of variation that marks the dividing point
between “affordable” and “not affordable.”  However, we are able to
observe the effect of changes in program parameters on our operational
measures of adequacy so that we can judge whether the change has
made the program more or less affordable.  
Specifically, we used the results of regressions predicting the costs
of workers’ compensation insurance as a function of cash benefits and
other variables to simulate the effect of benefit adequacy on affordabil-
ity.  The adequacy standard used in these simulations is that defined by
the Model Act.  These simulation estimates are compared with similar
ones derived by Krueger and Burton (1990), who used the National
Commission recommendations as an adequacy benchmark.  
We find that adoption of the Model Act substantially increased
both the average national cost of workers’ compensation as well as cost
dispersion among states.  In contrast, the Krueger and Burton results
indicated that federal standards incorporating the essential recommen-
dations of the National Commission would have had a modest impact
on average costs and, based on the 1983 and overall results, would have
narrowed the cost dispersion.  The difference between our results with
respect to dispersion and those of Krueger and Burton is probably due
to the fact that the Model Act is more comprehensive than the essential
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recommendations and thus had a greater effect on costs overall.  Spe-
cifically, unlike the essential recommendations of the National Com-
mission, the Model Act included specific recommendations for PPD
benefits, which account for a substantial proportion of total cash bene-
fits paid to injured workers.  Among other things, this means that the
Model Act had a greater impact on the cost of low-benefit, high-cost
states than the essential recommendations.
Two potential policy implications flow from our analysis.  First, we
may conclude that less federal intervention (rather than more) is desir-
able in terms of reducing dispersion in costs among states, assuming
that states retain basic control over workers’ compensation.  Alterna-
tively, if adequacy is the primary objective (but if policymakers are also
concerned with affordability and the potential adverse effects of plant
relocation), then a federal program—as opposed to federal standards—
is the logical policy prescription.  Of course, the savings from proper
policies for the insurance arrangements in workers’ compensation may
produce savings that will make adequate benefits in conjunction with
affordable insurance rates feasible in the context of the present system
of state-run workers’ compensation programs.  We return to this issue
in Chapter 9.
A final word of caution: our conclusions and policy prescriptions
assume that the measured costs of workers’ compensation are identical
to the employer’s actual costs.  However, there is substantial evidence
that employees pay for the cost of increased workers’ compensation
benefits through a reduction in their wage rates.  To the extent that this
is true, then the supposed conflict between adequacy and affordability
is a chimera, and policymakers need not be concerned with raising ben-
efits to adequate levels. 
Notes
1. There may also be uncontrolled differences in eligibility criteria or program
administration, so that identical injuries are compensable in one jurisdiction but
not in another.  These differences may be controlled using state dummies, presum-
ing that this variation is time-invariant.
2. All of the national averages reported in this chapter are weighted averages; each
state’s nonfarm employment is used as the weight.  
3. Specifically, the data in Figure 4.1 show that, in real terms, average expected cash
benefits remained relatively static over the 1975–1995 period: they increased
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slightly from 1975 to 1976, declined somewhat between 1978 and 1981, and then
increased to pre-1978 levels in the rest of the study period.  Interstate variability in
benefit generosity first increased slightly, rising from $5,300 to $5,800 between
1975 and 1978, remained relatively static between 1979 and 1985, and then
declined, first sharply and then steadily, from about $5,500 in 1985 to approxi-
mately $3,700 in 1995.
4. Type of injury refers to whether the injury resulted in a fatality or disability and, if
the latter, whether the disability is temporary or permanent and total or partial.
Family status refers to whether the claimant is married or single and whether the
claimant has dependent minor children.
5. The wage distribution we used did not vary across time, although the state average
weekly wage did.
6. In some instances, weekly benefits were adjusted to account for Social Security
offsets or for the fact that benefits are computed on the basis of spendable (i.e.,
after-tax) rather than gross earnings.  For further details, see Appendix D.
7. The nature of injury refers to the body part injured; whether the injury involved
amputation or loss of use; and the extent of the loss of functional impairment.
8. Unfortunately, our measure of medical benefits does not account for changes in
the injury distribution, since it is a measure of benefits paid for all claims.  In
other regressions (not reported here), we attempted to control for injury distribu-
tion by using, as a measure of medical benefits, the average medical costs of tem-
porary total disabilities. We obtained essentially identical results. (We did not
have data on average TTD medical costs for exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions,
which led us to use average total medical costs.) 
9. The data in Figure 4.3 include imputations where data were missing for individual
states.  Figure 4.4 only includes states with data for 1995.
10. Data for states with private carriers were obtained from the National Council on
Compensation Insurance’s Countrywide Workers’ Compensation Experience
exhibit for the years 1979–1998.  These data were reported on a “fifth report”
basis in the 1979–1983 exhibits and on an “ultimate” report basis for the years
1984–1998.  It was necessary to obtain benefit data on both cash and medical ben-
efits for our regression analysis, as explained in the next section.  Data for exclu-
sive state fund states (other than Washington) were obtained from the “Workers’
Compensation Agency Information” exhibit contained in various issues of State
Workers’ Compensation Administrative Profiles published by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor.  There was one exception: data for Washington state were obtained
from actuaries at Washington’s Department of Labor and Industries; these data are
comparable to the data provided by the NCCI.  
Neither data source had comprehensive information for all years in our study;
missing data were particularly a problem in the latter years of our study when a
larger number of states no longer used the NCCI to set rates.  Consequently, we
imputed values for these missing observations.  If data were missing between two
years for which data were available, then missing values were imputed using
interpolation.  For other years, an index was constructed by taking the ratio of the
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state benefit to the average national benefit.  Missing values were imputed as
equal to the product of this index and the national average benefit for the missing
year.
Unfortunately, the NCCI data and the U.S. Department of Labor data series are
not equivalent.  The NCCI data are “first report” estimates of incurred benefits
that have been developed to “ultimate.”  This means that the NCCI data are based
on insurers’ reports of the number and cost of claims that occurred during the pol-
icy period as evaluated at a point 18 months after the beginning of each policy
period.  The NCCI “developed” these reported claims and costs on the basis of
past trends to estimate the “ultimate” frequency and dollar amount of claims for
each policy period.  These claim costs are reported on an incurred basis; that is,
reported costs include an actuarial estimate of future payments that the insurer
expects as well as the benefits actually paid by the date of the first report.  It is not
possible to determine whether the U.S. Department of Labor costs were reported
on an incurred or paid basis, at what point claim costs were evaluated, or whether
these costs were developed to the “ultimate” basis.  Because of possible discrep-
ancies in the two medical benefits data series, we use multiple model specifica-
tions in the exclusive-state-fund regressions that include and exclude the medical
benefits variable.
11. However, we note that the Krueger and Burton data pertain to a time during which
there was less or limited variability (either over time or among jurisdictions), in
the medical benefit payments measure, so their cash benefit variable may have
explained all of the associated variation in costs.  See Figure 4.3.
12. We begin with the assumption that the expected total benefit is equal to the
expected cash benefit multiplied by an adjustment factor:
E[ct]  =  E[cc] × X,
where E[ct] is the expected total benefit, X is the inflation factor, and E[cc] is the
expected per-claim cash benefit.  We then assume that the actual per-claim bene-
fits paid are an unbiased estimate of expected benefits, so that
ct  =  cc  × X 
where ct is equal to the average per-claim benefit paid for all claims and cc is the
average actual cash benefit paid in lost time claims.  Rearranging terms, we have
X  =  ct ÷ cc .
This inflation factor is described in the main body of the text of this chapter.
13. An illustration of our computation of the “total benefits” figure is as follows.
Using data from the NCCI Countrywide Workers’ Compensation Experience
exhibit dated March 1997, we determined that in the 1995 policy period, the total
and cash benefits actually paid by Alabama insurers was $311,258,996 and
$129,973,586, respectively.  The expected cash benefit to Alabama workers’ com-
pensation claimants in 1995, per our estimates of the generosity of Alabama’s
workers’ compensation statute that year, was $6,728.  To obtain expected total
benefits, we multiplied expected cash benefits ($6,728) by the ratio of actual total
benefits paid ($311,250,996) to cash benefits paid ($129,973,586).  This calcula-
tion yields a total expected benefit per claimant of $16,113 for Alabama in 1995.
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14. We used the following industry divisions: agriculture, forestry, and fishing; min-
ing; manufacturing; construction; transportation and public utilities; wholesale
and retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; and services.
15. The data in this figure are adjusted for industrial composition, as described in the
previous paragraph.
16. The national averages in Figure 4.7 were calculated using imputed values for
states with missing data.  However, only states with no missing data are reported
in Figure 4.8.
17. Durbin and Kish (1998) provided evidence that there is substantial interstate vari-
ation with respect to average impairment ratings, the final disability rating, and
the difference between the two.  The 70 percent figure cited in the text is from this
data source as well.
18. These data include imputed values for missing data.
19. Although workers’ compensation coverage is not mandatory in three states (New
Jersey, South Carolina, and Texas), employer opt-outs are widespread in Texas
and rare in the other two jurisdictions.
20. However, regulatory agencies sometime revise the relativities (cost differences)
between rate groups established by rating bureaus.  This suggests that cross-subsi-
dies may exist, so that differences in coverage may affect costs.  On the other
hand, insurers try to circumvent this problem by targeting rate groups or by nego-
tiating rates with individual employers.
21. Data on state compliance with National Commission recommendations were
obtained from various issues of a biannual report by the U.S. Department of
Labor.
22. Employment data were obtained from various issues of Employment and Wages,
Annual Averages (U.S.  Department of Labor).
23. We used in these regressions not only compliance with the National Commission
recommendation regarding covered employment, but also compliance with two
other coverage recommendations not specifically relating to employment cover-
age.  These are the recommendation that workers be given a choice of filing a
claim either in the jurisdiction in which they were injured or in the state in which
the employee was hired and the recommendation that occupational disease be
fully covered by a state’s workers’ compensation statute.  In addition, because the
Department of Labor publishes separate compliance scores for 1) states that have
compulsory workers’ compensation and 2) states that do not permit waivers from
coverage, we treated this recommendation as two separate variables.
24. As we noted in Chapter 3, our adjusted manual rates measure is computed by
modifying manual rates or pure premiums by a variety of factors (including pre-
mium discounts for quantity purchases, dividends received from insurance com-
panies, manual rate modifications due to the employer’s own compensable
experience, and other variables).   The resultant adjusted manual rate, which con-
stitutes an accurate measure of employers’ actual costs of workers’ compensation
insurance, represents the percentage of payroll expended by an employer on
workers’ compensation insurance.  Net weekly costs (or net weekly insurance
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premiums) were calculated by multiplying a state’s adjusted manual rate by the
corresponding average weekly wage for that state.
25. Cook-Weisberg tests revealed that these weighted least squares estimates did not
suffer from heteroscedasticity.
26. Krueger and Burton (1990) did not include year dummies in their regression equa-
tions.
27. As we indicated in the previous chapter, the Krueger and Burton benefit variable
only measured the variation in expected cash benefits, although in some specifica-
tions they included a separate medical benefit payments variable.  In contrast, the
benefit variable we used in Table 4.1 combines both medical and cash benefits.
We also estimated models with separate cash and medical benefit measures.  The
results using separate measures do not explain the discrepancy between our find-
ings in Table 4.1 and those of Krueger and Burton.  
28. Minimum and maximum here refer to the weekly benefit payment.  In most states,
an injured worker may not begin to collect disability benefits immediately upon
the onset of disability, but must wait a minimum period (typically three or seven
days) before he or she becomes eligible for indemnity benefits; this is known as
the waiting period.  Claimants who are disabled for a certain period—typically 14
or 21 days—following the waiting period may receive, retroactively, cash benefits
for the waiting period; this is known as the retroactive period.
29. PPD claims as a proportion of total lost-time claims partially account for this
change in injury distribution.  However, it does not, for example, account for
changes in severity among PPD claims or changes in the duration of TTD claims.
30. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.
31. Krueger and Burton (1990) did not attempt to quantify recommendation R3.11 of
the National Commission, which states 
We recommend that the definition of permanent total disability used in
most states be retained.  However, in those few States which permit the
payment of permanent total disability benefits to workers who retain sub-
stantial earning capacity, we recommend that our benefit proposals be
applicable only to those cases which meet the test of permanent total dis-
ability used in most States.
32. The Krueger and Burton model of the determinants of the costs of workers’ com-
pensation insurance was similar to the one that we used, which is discussed in the
“Cost Regression Model” section of this chapter.  They estimated this model
using data on adjusted manual rates and net weekly costs of workers’ compensa-
tion insurance from 29 states for four years (1972, 1975, 1978, and 1983).
Adjusted manual rates and net weekly costs were calculated using methodology
similar to that used in the present study, which is described in Chapter 3 and
Appendix C.  One difference is that the Krueger and Burton used only 45 insur-
ance classifications, while the present study relied on 71 classifications.  In addi-
tion, our study used more state-specific data for the adjustment factors than did
Krueger and Burton to calculate adjusted manual rates; those state-specific adjust-
ment factors reflect increasing variation among states in the pricing arrangements
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permitted or required in the voluntary market in recent years.  We also calculated,
for many states and years, separate adjusted manual rates for the voluntary and
residual markets, and then blended these rates to obtain a state-wide average;
Krueger and Burton only calculated adjusted manual rates for the voluntary mar-
ket.  As a result, our measures of employers costs are not directly comparable with
those of Krueger and Burton. 
33. This hypothetical variable was an actuarial measure that replaced the state’s actual
level of benefits with any higher level of benefits included in the essential recom-
mendations of the National Commission for each state in each year in their sam-
ple.  Thus, if the actual state law had a maximum weekly benefit that was only 82
percent of the state’s average weekly wage, Krueger and Burton calculated the
benefits that would be paid after substituting a maximum weekly benefit of 100
percent of the state’s average weekly wage as prescribed by the National Commis-
sion.  If a provision of the state’s actual workers’ compensation law prescribed
more generous compensation benefits than the recommendations of the National
Commission, the state’s benefit was not changed.  Thus, if a state had a maximum
weekly benefit for temporary total disability benefits that was 130 percent of the
state’s average weekly wage, that provision was not changed in calculating the
hypothetical measure of adequate benefits.
34. However, such a cost increase would likely result in a reduction in consumer
demand and thus employment.
35. The only year between 1975 and 1995 in which our actuarial assessment of actual
cash benefits in 1995 dollars was below $9,000 was 1975, as shown in Table 4.9.
The 1972 actual levels of benefits were probably below those in 1975 since they
predated by seven months the submission of The Report of the National Commis-
sion on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws (National Commission 1972),
which triggered a period of rapid improvements in state workers’ compensation
laws.
36. One of the 19 essential recommendations of the National Commission was that
each state’s maximum weekly benefit for temporary total disability should be at
least 100 percent of the state’s average weekly wage.  One of the 84 recommenda-
tions of the National Commission was that each state’s maximum weekly benefit
for temporary total disability should be at least 200 percent of the state’s average
weekly wage.
37. Under the Model Act, the weekly maximum and minimum benefits are equal to
200 percent and 20 percent of the state’s average weekly wage, so that the dollar
values of these limits on benefits will vary among states.
38. We relied on basically the same formula and procedure as Krueger and Burton
(1990) to derive the simulated adjusted manual rates.
39. There are also states with low workers’ compensation costs for which the use of
our simulation procedure for the effect of substituting the Model Act for the
state’s actual workers’ compensation provisions increases the cost dispersion
among states.  Iowa, as shown in column 1 of Table 4.13, had actual adjusted
manual rates that were 1.946 percent of payroll, which was 35 percent below the
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national average of adjusted manual rates of 2.973 percent of payroll in 1995.
Iowa also had a statute with relatively generous statutory benefits, so that the dif-
ference between the benefits required by the Model Act and the actual Iowa stat-
ute was only $3,278.  As a result, following the imposition of the Model Act, Iowa
has a predicted adjusted manual rate of 2.131 percent of payroll, which is 56 per-
cent below the national average of 4.869 percent.  Thus, imposition of the Model
Act would have widened the cost difference between Iowa and the national aver-
age.  Four of the 10 least costly workers’ compensation programs states—namely,
Delaware, Washington, Iowa, and Virginia—had adequacy gaps that were less
than the national average.  For each of these states, we estimate that substituting
the Model Act for the state’s actual workers’ compensation statute would have
increased interstate cost variation.
40. An alternative explanation of these results offered by Thomason, Hyatt, and Rob-
erts (1998, note 23) is that higher weekly benefits may lead claimants to pursue
marginal claims.
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5
Employer Costs
 
Public versus Private Provision of Insurance
 
As indicated in Chapters 1 and 2, three fundamentally different
approaches are used to finance workers’ compensation benefits in the
United States.  In some states, workers’ compensation insurance is
only offered by a state agency, typically called a state insurance fund.
In other states, workers’ compensation insurance is only available from
private insurance companies.  In the third group of states, employers
may purchase insurance from private carriers or a state insurance fund.
 
1
 
 
The decisions concerning which of these three approaches would
be adopted were, in general, made at the time that workers’ compensa-
tion laws were first enacted.  Fishback and Kantor (1996) argued that
these decisions were the outcome of a political process in which agri-
cultural interests and the insurance industry were aligned against a coa-
lition of labor unions and social reformers.
 
2
 
  The insurance industry
feared losing a potentially lucrative market, while farmers, who had
successfully exempted themselves from coverage by workers’ compen-
sation laws, were concerned that they would be forced to help bail out
an under-reserved state fund.
 
3
 
  On the other hand, adverse experience
under the negligence system that preceded workers’ compensation
caused unions to be leery of insurance companies, and both unions and
social reformers believed that state insurance could reduce workers’
compensation costs by eliminating insurer profit and overhead.  As his-
tory has shown, agricultural interests and insurers were triumphant in
all but a handful of states, although a few jurisdictions established
competitive state funds as a compromise.
 
4
 
   
These divergent approaches to insurance arrangements invite eval-
uation using the delivery system efficiency objective of workers’ com-
pensation programs.  Is workers’ compensation in exclusive-state-fund
jurisdictions more or less costly than in states that permit private insur-
ers to provide compensation insurance?  That is, do private systems
deliver benefits to injured workers more or less efficiently than public
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ones?  Are competitive state funds more or less costly than monopolis-
tic funds, and do they affect overall market costs in states where they
operate?
In this chapter, we address these questions by first considering rel-
evant economic theory and the empirical literature.  We then estimate
cost differentials among these different insurance arrangements using
the data set described in Chapter 4. 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
 
As previously indicated, workers’ compensation programs fall into
one of three categories: exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions (type E);
states where only private companies provide insurance coverage (type
P); and states where private insurers compete with state funds (type C).
In this study, we examine market outcomes under all three types of
insurance arrangements.  Among other things, we are interested in the
relative performance of public versus private provision of compensa-
tion insurance.  However, it is recognized that the effect of public pro-
vision may be very different with an exclusive, as opposed to a com-
petitive, state fund.
There are many reasons to believe that a monopolistic state insur-
ance fund should be able to deliver workers’ compensation insurance
coverage to employers at a lower cost than private-sector insurance car-
riers.  Private-sector insurance rates incorporate both marketing
expenses and profit loadings, which are not included in monopolistic
state funds’ rates.  In addition, exclusive state funds may be able to
capture economies of scale that are not available in a competitive, pri-
vate-sector insurance market.
On the other hand, the lack of a profit motive means that both
exclusive and competitive state funds could be subject to administra-
tive and allocative inefficiencies.  Arguably, since public-sector manag-
ers do not face competitive market pressures, they lack incentives to
adopt cost-efficient technologies, policies, and practices.  This is espe-
cially true for monopolistic state funds; because competitive funds
must contend for business with private carriers, they are not completely
insulated from market forces.  In general, we expect that decision mak-
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ing in state funds is more influenced by political considerations, which
may further distort incentives for efficiency.  
Additionally, due to the taxing power of the state, both types of
state funds have less to fear from insolvency than do their private-sec-
tor counterparts;
 
5
 
 as such, they have a weaker incentive to maintain suf-
ficient reserves.  Combined with a decision-making process guided by
political rather than economic considerations, state funds may be sub-
ject to under-reserving problems that could lead to inequitable and
inefficient transfers, either among industrial sectors or between differ-
ent generations of employers.
 
Economies of Scale in Insurance Markets
 
Unfortunately, there is little research examining most of these
issues.  A number of studies have addressed one issue: whether there
are economies of scale in workers’ compensation or other property/
casualty lines; that is, whether there is evidence that the insurer’s cost
of underwriting additional compensation coverage declines as the
amount of coverage that the insurer writes increases.  For the most part,
this research uses data limited to the insurance costs for private carriers
and does not compare private and public insurers.
 
6 
 
  Overall, it has pro-
duced conflicting results.  Some studies have found that costs are lower
as size increases, using various measures of scale (Doherty 1981; Ham-
mond, Melander, and Shilling 1971; Skogh 1982; and Cho 1988).
Other studies have found either significant diseconomies (Allen
1974)—that is, that costs are greater for larger insurers—or mixed
results (Johnson, Flanigan, and Weisbart 1981).  More recently,
researchers have found economies of scale for small firms (Cummins
and Weiss 1993; Hanweck and Hogan 1996) but significant disecono-
mies for large firms (Hanweck and Hogan 1996).
While recent research is divided on the question of whether there
are significant economies of scale in property/liability insurance, the
reality is that insurers of various sizes seem to prosper in this market
generally and in the workers’ compensation market in particular.  One
reason may be that in certain commercial lines, such as workers’ com-
pensation, insurers are able to pursue a “niche marketing” strategy.
That is, by concentrating on the risk characteristics and needs of a par-
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ticular type of employer, small insurers are able to gain a significant
informational and service advantage.
Butler and Worrall (1986) argued that there is little evidence of
economies of scale in the workers’ compensation insurance market.
More specifically, they claimed that if there were such economies in this
market, “then a large private carrier ought to be able to drive other car-
riers out of the market . . . but we do not see this happening” (p. 331).
As noted by Klein, Nordman, and Fritz (1993), under guidelines estab-
lished by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to evaluate
the competitive effects of a proposed merger, workers’ compensation
insurance markets in most states would be considered relatively com-
petitive.
 
7
 
  However, these data come from a period during which the
industry was highly regulated (or had only recently deregulated) in
many states, so that market structure may reflect the effects of rate reg-
ulation.
Butler and Worrall (1986) explored the issue of the relative effi-
ciency of public or private provision of compensation insurance by
estimating separate regression equations that predict insurer costs as a
function of premiums charged by private insurers and competitive state
funds, respectively.  They estimated “total cost” equations as well as
equations estimating separate cost components, such as incurred loss
adjustment expenses, general expenses, commissions and brokerage
fees expenses, other acquisition expenses, and incurred taxes, licenses,
and fees expenditures.  Their observations consisted of statewide
aggregates for private insurers as well as financial data for individual
state funds.
Butler and Worrall argued there are potentially three factors that
could account for cost differences between private insurers and com-
petitive funds.  First, because state funds are typically much larger than
private insurers, they may enjoy economies of scale.  Second, some
costs incurred by private insurers, such as taxes and marketing
expenses, are “hidden” in state funds because they are not reflected in
state fund accounts; that is, state funds either do not pay these costs
(taxes) or do not fully record them as operating costs.  Finally, there
may be differences in the efficiency of private versus public sector pro-
viders irrespective of their size.  
Their regression estimates for the total cost equations suggest that
private insurers enjoy some economies of scale: that is, total costs
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increase more slowly than premiums in regression equations that use
only private insurance carrier data.  However, their statistical results in
the state fund regressions indicate constant returns to scale.  Thus,
taken together, these data fail to clearly support the hypothesis that
there are economies of scale in the property/casualty insurance indus-
try.
Furthermore, when examining the private/state fund differential in
scale effects, they found that state funds enjoy a cost advantage vis-à-
vis private carriers, although they were unable to determine from these
estimates whether this advantage is due to hidden costs or greater effi-
ciency.  However, after isolating the scale effects for the various sub-
components of total costs, they found that this cost advantage is
primarily attributable to components in which the problem of hidden
costs in state funds is most likely to be significant: incurred taxes and
licensing fees and brokerage fees and commissions.  On balance, they
concluded that, “[a]t this point, it seems premature to claim (and cer-
tainly unwarranted by our study) that the state or private carriers are
more efficient” (Butler and Worrall 1986, p. 345).
While there is no clear evidence of economies of scale in workers’
compensation, it is also possible that there are economies of scope.
Economies of scope occur where a cost advantage is realized when the
producer markets more than one product.  In the insurance industry,
these economies may be realized where insurers sell a package of cov-
erage: for example, health insurance, general liability, and workers’
compensation coverage.  To the extent that economies of scope exist in
the insurance industry, state funds would be at a relative disadvantage.  
To date there is little empirical research examining this issue.
While economies of scope have been found in other financial service
industries—and, in particular, banking—one study of the property/
casualty insurance industry concluded that “economies of scope do not
appear to be important” (Hanweck and Hogan 1996, p. 141).
 
Costs and Competitive State Funds
 
Two studies (Krueger and Burton 1990; Schmidle 1994) have
investigated the effect of competitive state funds on statewide estimates
of the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insurance.  Their
“adjusted manual rates” and “net weekly cost” measures of employer
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costs were constructed using a methodology similar to that described in
Chapter 3.  The impact of competitive funds was measured by the coef-
ficient on the state fund dummy variable.  The dependent variables
were state averages of workers’ compensation costs.  The Krueger/Bur-
ton and Schmidle studies found that the presence of a competitive state
fund was, per the coefficient on a state fund dummy variable, associ-
ated with higher employer costs for workers’ compensation insurance. 
The Krueger/Burton and Schmidle results suggest that the public
provision of workers’ compensation insurance is less efficient and
therefore more costly than the private provision of insurance.  How-
ever, there are deficiencies in these analyses, and thus any generaliza-
tions about the relative merits of public provision have to be
accompanied by several caveats.  Both studies only examined competi-
tive state funds.  A market in which a competitive state fund competes
with private insurers is likely to be very different than one in which an
exclusive state fund is the sole provider of compensation insurance; for
example, a competitive state fund is unable to take full advantage of
economies of scale.
There is an additional reason for caution in using the Krueger/Bur-
ton and Schmidle findings to draw conclusions about the relative cost
of the public provision of workers’ compensation insurance: there was
no variation in the value of the state fund variable during the Krueger/
Burton study period, making it difficult to disentangle the effects of
competitive state funds from unobserved variables that are associated
with these funds.  Although the Schmidle study used data from a period
in which there was some intrastate variation in the state fund variable,
the change only applied to two states.
 
8
 
 
The Krueger/Burton and Schmidle findings were contradicted by
Klein, Nordman, and Fritz (1993), who found that compensation costs
may be lower in states with a competitive fund.  They investigated the
impact of different insurance arrangements, including the presence or
absence of a competitive state fund, on loss ratios of private insurance
carriers for the period 1986–1991.
 
9
 
  The impact of competitive state
funds on loss ratios depended upon the specification of their regression
models.  In their regressions that included a measure of the relative size
of the residual market, the loss ratio was negatively related to the state
fund dummy and this relationship was statistically significant.  In equa-
tions that did not include this variable, coefficients for the state fund
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dummy were positive but not statistically significant.  Taken together,
these results reflect a negative correlation between the size of the resid-
ual market and the presence of a competitive state fund, which possibly
reflects the state fund’s role as an insurer of last resort.  The Krueger/
Burton and Schmidle studies had not controlled for the size of the
residual market, which may explain differences in results.
 
Costs and Exclusive State Funds
 
In one of the few studies that include exclusive-state-fund jurisdic-
tions in employer costs analyses, Thomason and Burton (2000a) com-
pared compensation costs for employers in Canada and the United
States for the period 1975–1995.
 
10
 
  Unlike in the United States, work-
ers’ compensation benefits in all Canadian provinces are financed by
exclusive provincial funds.  Thomason and Burton used cost data from
two Canadian provinces (Ontario and British Columbia) and data from
the 45 jurisdictions in the United States that permit private insurance.
After controlling for a number of factors that could influence costs,
Thomason and Burton found that compensation costs were lower in
both Canadian provinces than in the average private insurance jurisdic-
tion in the United States, although the results for Ontario were not sta-
tistically significant.  While these results suggest that the public
provision of workers’ compensation insurance is less costly than pri-
vate provision, the authors were nonetheless cautious in their interpre-
tation of these findings.  They noted that their analyses employed only
a small number of exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions and that there
were other data comparability problems between U.S. and Canadian
jurisdictions that could affect the results.  
Thus, theoretical arguments may be marshaled on both sides of the
issue of the relative costs of private versus public insurance.  Theory is
also inconclusive about the relative merits of competitive versus exclu-
sive state funds.  Furthermore, the limited empirical research directly
examining either issue is inconclusive.  One study provides some evi-
dence that two Canadian publicly funded programs enjoy a cost advan-
tage relative to insurance offered through private markets in the United
States.  On the other hand, previous research investigating compensa-
tion costs has found that costs were significantly higher in competitive-
fund states than in purely private markets.
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REGRESSION ANALYSES
 
In this section, we examine the issue of the relative efficiency of
public versus private workers’ compensation insurance providers
through two comparisons: 1) the cost of workers’ compensation insur-
ance in three exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions (Washington, West Vir-
ginia, and Ohio) relative to the cost in jurisdictions in which private
carriers offer insurance coverage, and 2) the cost of compensation
insurance in states with a state insurance fund that competes with pri-
vate carriers relative to insurance costs in private-carrier states that do
not have a competitive state fund.
 
Model Specification
 
We estimated regression equations predicting two annual, state-
specific measures of the employers’ cost of workers’ compensation—
adjusted manual rates and net weekly costs—as a function of a set of
control variables including state and year dummies.  This general
regression model may be represented as follows:
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In these equations, control variables are designed to capture varia-
tion in insurance costs due to underlying differences in losses.  We use
two dummy variables to test the cost impact of public provision of
workers’ compensation insurance.  One dummy denotes whether com-
pensation insurance is provided solely by an exclusive state insurance
fund (that is, either of three jurisdictions in our data where private
insurers are not permitted to offer workers’ compensation insurance).
The other dummy variable indicates whether the state has a state fund
that competes with private insurers.  The set of regressions with the
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exclusive-state-fund variable includes states that permit private insur-
ance carriers for workers’ compensation; exclusive-state-fund jurisdic-
tions are excluded from the set of regressions that include the com-
petitive state fund.
 
Results: Exclusive State Funds
 
Weighted means and standard deviations of employer costs in pri-
vate-carrier and exclusive-fund states are presented in Table 5.1.  The
data in the table suggest that, for the entire period of our study, com-
pensation insurance offered by an exclusive state fund is somewhat
more expensive than the insurance sold in states that allow private car-
riers.  However, this simple comparison is misleading, because cost
data for two of the three exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions in our data
set—Washington state and Ohio—are not available for the early (and
less costly) years in the study period.  
The difference in relative costs between privately and publicly pro-
vided workers’ compensation insurance is further illustrated in Figures
5.1 and 5.2, which depict the annual, weighted means of adjusted man-
ual rates and net weekly costs, respectively, for 1975–1995.  These data
show that, except for 1983–1986, employers in exclusive-state-fund
jurisdictions experienced costs that, on average, were noticeably lower
than those of employers in private-carrier states.  This was particularly
true for years prior to 1983.  Interestingly, the data in the figures also
show that workers’ compensation costs in exclusive-state-fund juris-
dictions do not exhibit the same degree of cyclicality found in non-
exclusive fund states.  This suggests that exclusive-state-fund insurance
 
Table 5.1 Mean Adjusted Manual Rates and Net Weekly Costs: Private 
Insurance versus Exclusive State Funds
 
a
 
Variable Private insurance Exclusive state fund
Adjusted manual rate ($) 2.24
(1.13)
2.43
(0.81)
Net weekly costs ($) 11.81
(6.21)
13.25
(4.45)
Number of observations 908 45
 
a
 
Means are followed by standard deviations in parentheses.
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Figure 5.1 Adjusted Manual Rates, Private Insurance and Exclusive 
State Funds, 1975–95
Figure 5.2 Net Weekly Costs, Private Insurance and Exclusive State 
Funds, 1975–95
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prices are not as responsive to changes in the real interest rate or what-
ever factors are inducing the cost cycle.
Of course, such comparisons of summary data are problematic for
two reasons.  First, they do not account for interstate variability
within these two broad categories of jurisdictions.  Second and more
importantly, they do not control for other factors (such as benefit gen-
erosity) that affect employer costs.  To overcome these limitations, we
used multiple regression analysis, a statistical procedure that allows
us to empirically control for the influence of various factors on inter-
state variation in workers’ compensation costs.  Specifically, a dummy
variable indicating whether the data come from an exclusive-state-
fund jurisdiction is added to our basic regression model of employ-
ers’ cost.  
Because no state either adopted or abandoned an exclusive state
fund during our study period and because there is an insurmountable
statistical problem (namely, it is impossible to identify the state-fund
variable when state dummies are included as regressors), we did not
include state dummies in any regressions in which the exclusive-state-
fund dummy was a regressor (explanatory variable).  In addition, since
data for the permanent partial disability (PPD) and medical benefit
variables for the exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions come from different
sources and may not be comparable with those for private insurers, we
estimated two specifications, one that included the PPD and medical
variables and one that did not.  Finally, the data set includes all states,
so that the sample size is 953 observations.
The results of the cost models that include the exclusive-state-fund
dummy variable are presented in Table 5.2.  Findings from equations
predicting adjusted manual rates are displayed in columns 1 and 2,
while equations predicting net weekly costs are shown in columns 3
and 4.  Columns 1 and 3 contain the results of equations that include
the medical benefit and PPD share variables, while the equations in
columns 2 and 4 exclude these variables.  These equations were esti-
mated using weighted least squares to control for potential effects of
heteroscedasticity.  Finally, the values of the coefficients on the exclu-
sive state fund dummy have been transformed into their elasticity
equivalents.
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Table 5.2 Regression Equation Coefficients Predicting Employer Costs: 
Private Insurance versus Exclusive State Funds
 
a
 
These regression results indicate that after controlling for other
factors that influence employer costs, there are no apparent, reliable
differences in the price of workers’ compensation insurance between
exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions and states that allow private carriers.
The elasticity for the exclusive-state-fund dummy variable is negative
in equations that do not include the medical benefit and PPD propor-
tion variables and is positive in equations that include the full set of
regressors.  However, these coefficients are not statistically different
from zero at conventional levels in any equation.
 
Adjusted manual rates Net weekly costs
Variable Col. 1
 
b
 
2
 
c
 
3
 
b
 
4
 
c
 
ln(Cash benefits) 0.2994***
(12.39)
0.1332***
(4.09)
0.3136***
(12.31)
0.1333***
(3.88)
Medical benefits 0.0005***
(28.38)
— 0.0005***
(28.05)
—
ln(Injury) 0.5440***
(8.10)
0.2648***
(2.91)
0.5865***
(8.28)
0.2747***
(2.86)
PPD percentage 0.0067***
(6.74)
— 0.0080***
(7.68)
—
Union density 0.0090***
(6.20)
0.0010
(0.50)
0.0177***
(11.51)
0.0093***
(4.40)
Covered employment –0.0141***
(4.67)
–0.0011
(0.26)
–0.0101***
(3.18)
0.0037
(0.82)
Exclusive state fund 0.0678
(1.63)
–0.0633
(1.16)
0.0541
(1.24)
–0.0823
(1.44)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No No No
Adjusted 
 
R
 
2
 
0.7627 0.5244 0.7612 0.5209
 
a
 
Coefficients are followed by 
 
t
 
-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level.
 
b
 
Equations include medical benefit and PPD share variables.
 
c
 
Equations exclude medical benefit and PPD share variables.
 
d
 
A dash (—) means the variable is not included in the specification.
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Overall, these results are inconclusive concerning the relative cost-
liness of public versus private provision of workers’ compensation
insurance.  However, it is important to remember that at least two of the
exclusive state funds in our database, West Virginia and Ohio, experi-
enced substantial and persistent deficits during much of the study
period.  Since private insurers are unable to sustain such deficits in the
long run, this suggests that our measures of compensation cost may
underestimate the “true” employers’ costs for these exclusive state
fund jurisdictions.  If so, average compensation costs for these three
exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions are probably either equal to or
greater than average costs in states that permit private carriers to under-
write workers’ compensation insurance.
In some ways, this is a surprising result.  Our cost measure controls
for interstate variation in the loss component of costs, so that the state
fund dummy is a measure of the profit and expense loading described
in Chapter 4 (pp. 74–75).  As we indicated previously, exclusive state
funds—unlike private carriers—do not incur marketing expenses, and
there is no allowance for profits.  This implies that administrative inef-
ficiencies must increase the costs of compensation policies provided by
exclusive state funds relative to insurance provided by private carriers.
That is, lacking a profit motive, state fund managers are less aggressive
than their private sector counterparts in rooting out inefficient policies
and practices.  Rather, state fund decisions may be based in part on a
political calculus that is only tangentially related to cost consider-
ations.
Three further caveats with respect to our exclusive-state-fund find-
ings are in order.  First, the results for exclusive state funds are based
on a small number of observations that come from only three states.
Furthermore, for two of those jurisdictions, we lack data for the entire
study period (the Ohio data only include observations going back to
1983, while the earliest Washington data are from 1985).  As a result, it
is possible that these results are peculiar to our sample or to a subset
thereof.  Simply put, one state fund outlier—a data point where costs
are extraordinarily high relative to the rest of the data set—could bias
our results substantially.  
Second, since no state either abandoned or adopted the exclusive
state fund model during the study period, we are unable to control for
unobservable state-specific effects that could bias estimates of costs for
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exclusive state funds.  In other words, these results may be peculiar to
the characteristics of the particular state-fund jurisdictions used in the
analysis.
Third, these results contradict those of Thomason and Burton
(2000a), who found that two monopolistic-state-fund jurisdictions in
Canada (British Columbia and Ontario) experienced lower costs than
did U.S. states that permit private insurance.
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  Importantly, the exclu-
sive-state-fund cost estimates reported by the authors of this earlier
study were adjusted for state fund deficits, so that they represent a
more comparable cost comparison.  The Thomason and Burton results
further suggest that our analyses are sensitive to the particular jurisdic-
tions used for comparison and to possible problems regarding data
comparability.  In this context, it is important to recognize that state
funds may be administered either well or poorly, and that the quality of
administration will obviously affect performance.
 
Results: Competitive State Funds
 
Weighted means and standard deviations of employer costs in pri-
vate-carrier and competitive-state-fund jurisdictions are presented in
Table 5.3.  (These data exclude jurisdictions with exclusive state
funds.)  As can be seen, competitive-state-fund jurisdictions have sub-
stantially higher costs with respect to both adjusted manual rates and
net weekly costs.  This difference is also found when average costs for
individual years are considered.  
 
Table 5.3 Mean Adjusted Manual Rates and Net Weekly Costs: Private 
Insurance versus Competitive State Funds
 
a
 
Variable Private insurance Competitive state fund
 
Adjusted manual rate ($) 2.01
(1.11)
2.65
(1.04)
Net weekly costs ($) 10.19
(5.67)
14.77
(6.08)
Number of observations 655 253
 
a
 
Means are followed by standard deviations in parentheses.
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Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show that compensation premiums were
greater in states with competitive state funds.  It is also notable that
costs in competitive-state-fund jurisdictions exhibit greater cyclicality
than costs in private-carrier states that do not have competitive state
funds.  Thus, the cost gap between private-carrier states with and with-
out competitive funds widens and narrows as the market for compensa-
tion insurance hardens and softens, respectively.
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It should be recalled that, in many states, the competitive fund is
the insurer of last resort, so that as the market hardens, it is likely that
private carriers are increasingly reluctant to insure high-risk employ-
ers, who are then required to turn to the competitive fund.  Thus, the
market share of the competitive fund increases during a hard market.  If
competitive funds incur higher costs than private carriers, we would
expect to see greater cost swings in competitive-fund states relative to
states where only private carriers underwrite insurance.
To control for other factors that might influence employer costs, we
estimated regression equations using a dummy variable to indicate
whether a state had a competitive fund.  Unlike exclusive-state-fund
jurisdictions, five states either adopted or abandoned state funds during
our study period; because of these changes, we were thus able to
include state dummies in our regression model when the competitive
state fund was included as a regressor.
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  The regressions only use
observations from states where private insurers operate, so that the
sample size is 908 observations.  The regression results are reported in
Table 5.4.
The empirical results in Table 5.4 suggest that states with competi-
tive funds have higher costs than private-carrier jurisdictions without
competitive state funds.  Specifically, the elasticity estimates for the
competitive-state-fund variable indicate that adjusted manual rates are
nearly 18 percent higher in competitive-fund jurisdictions than in states
without state funds, while net weekly costs are nearly 19 percent
higher.  Although these results are consistent with prior research (see
Krueger and Burton 1990; Schmidle 1994), they are nevertheless sur-
prising, since a primary impetus for creating these funds was to reduce
employer costs by providing competition for private carriers.  
At face value, these results suggest that public programs are less
efficient than private carriers.  The fact that the cost differential for
competitive state funds is much larger than the differential for exclu-
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Figure 5.3 Adjusted Manual Rates, Private Insurance and Competitive 
State Funds, 1975–95
Figure 5.4 Net Weekly Costs, Private Insurance and Competitive State 
Funds, 1975–95
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sive funds is also noteworthy.  A possible explanation is that, unlike
monopolistic state funds, the competitive state funds incur marketing
expenses in addition to bearing higher administrative costs resulting
from inefficient public administration.
While these results provide some evidence that public provision of
insurance is less efficient than private provision, there are at least two
or three reasonable alternative explanations.  First, it is possible that the
causal arrow is reversed: high costs are causing states to create compet-
itive funds rather than competitive funds leading to high costs.  Unfor-
tunately, we are unable to identify a system of equations to control for
this possibility.  However, it is important to note that Krueger and Bur-
ton’s (1990) analysis produced a nearly identical result even though
their data set was less likely to suffer from endogeneity problems.  Spe-
 
Table 5.4 Regression Equations Predicting Employer Costs, Competitive 
State Funds
 
a
 
Variable Adjusted manual rates Net weekly costs
 
ln(Cash benefits)
 
0.1163***
(2.75)
0.1478***
(3.44)
 
Medical benefits
 
0.0001***
(4.66)
0.0001***
(5.03)
 
ln(Injury)
 
0.8832***
(9.34)
0.8367***
(8.74)
 
Union density
 
0.0105***
(6.40)
0.0104***
(6.26)
 
PPD percentage
 
0.0017
(0.42)
0.0046
(1.08)
 
Covered employment
 
0.0193***
(2.96)
0.0237***
(3.59)
 
Competitive state fund
 
0.1780***
(3.34)
0.1870***
(3.44)
 
State dummies
 
Yes Yes
 
Year dummies
 
Yes Yes
 
Adjusted 
 
R
 
2
 
0.9135 0.9197
 
a
 
Coefficients are followed by 
 
t
 
-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
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cifically, their data came from a period that had not seen the creation of
a competitive state fund for several decades, so that it is unlikely that
many factors that possibly led to the creation of the existing state funds
were still in effect during their study period. 
Finally, higher employers’ costs in competitive-state-fund jurisdic-
tions may be attributable to the competitive state fund’s role as the
insurer of last resort.  In many states with a competitive state fund, a
firm that is unable to obtain insurance from a private carrier will be
assigned to the state fund.  In states without a competitive state fund,
these employers are placed in an assigned-risk pool in which each car-
rier shares a part of the cost of providing coverage to these firms.
Before an employer may be assigned to an assigned-risk market pool in
a state without a competitive fund, the employer must show that it has
been denied coverage in the private market.  However, employers may
typically apply to the competitive fund directly without evidence of
refusal by private insurers.  For these reasons, a high-risk employer
may find it easier to get a subsidized market rate in states with state
funds than in states without them.  As Danzon and Harrington (1998)
argued, the incentive effects of this cross-subsidization eventually
results in higher costs for the market as a whole.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, one objective of the workers’ compensa-
tion program is delivery system efficiency, i.e., the extent to which a
program is able to minimize administrative costs associated with the
delivery of benefits.  In this chapter, we have examined the relative
costs of public versus private provision of compensation insurance and
have obtained decidedly mixed results.  It is unclear whether exclusive
state funds are more or less costly than the average jurisdiction in
which private carriers provide insurance.  On the other hand, states
with competitive funds apparently experience costs that are signifi-
cantly greater than jurisdictions in which only private insurers offer
workers’ compensation insurance.  As measured by the delivery effi-
ciency criterion, exclusive state funds and private-carrier-only systems
would seem to be superior to “blended” systems.
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However, it is important to note that these analyses suffer from
methodological problems that must temper our conclusions.  We have
only a handful of observations involving three states on exclusive state-
fund costs, and we are unable to control for potential endogeneity in
the competitive fund equations. 
 
Notes
 
1. In most states, regardless of approach, employers also have the option of self-
insuring.
2. Fishback and Kantor (1996) provided evidence indicating that employers were
generally split over this issue.  Some were convinced by the arguments of social
reformers who believed that employer costs would be lower with a monopolistic
state fund.  Others saw the state fund as the thin end of the wedge of creeping
socialism.
3. Williams (1969) argued that, due to the small size of the market and its hazardous
nature, the insurance industry was simply not interested in underwriting workers’
compensation insurance in some states that established an exclusive state fund.
4. Of interest, at about the same point in time, Canadian jurisdictions uniformly
established monopolistic provincial funds.  
5. The term 
 
taxing power
 
 refers to the fact that the state insurance fund is free to
establish assessment rates that are necessary to cover deficits and that employers
can be required to purchase insurance that includes assessments to cover prior
deficits.  It does not mean that states will use general revenues to bail out insol-
vent state funds.
6. An exception is Butler and Worrall (1986), which is discussed in the text below.
7. The Department of Justice guidelines specify that a market is considered to be
highly concentrated if it has a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in excess of
1,800; moderately concentrated if it has an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800; and
unconcentrated if the index if less than 1,000.  (The HHI is the sum of the squares
of the percentage market shares of each firm in the market.)  Klein, Nordman, and
Fritz (1993) reported that in 1991 there were only four states whose compensation
insurance markets had an HHI in excess of 1000.
8. The Krueger and Burton study used data from 1972, 1975, 1978, and 1983; the
Schmidle study used data from 1975, 1978, 1983, and 1986–1989.
9. Loss ratios can be considered as either a measure of insurance price or as an
inverse measure of insurer profitability.  Their use for either purpose was critiqued
in Chapter 3.
10. We are unaware of any study other than Burton (1965) that examines the employ-
ers’ cost of workers’ compensation insurance for exclusive-state-fund jurisdic-
tions relative to jurisdictions in which private insurance carriers offer
compensation insurance. 
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11. This was done using the equation: 
 
η
 
  =  exp(
 
β
 
) – 1, where 
 
β
 
 is the coefficient on
the exclusive-state-fund dummy.
12. However, Canadian workers’ compensation programs differ from their U.S. coun-
terparts in several respects, so that a simple comparison, without further analysis,
may not be appropriate.
13. A 
 
soft market
 
 is one in which market supply is greater than demand, so that prices
are declining.  A 
 
hard market
 
 is the opposite: demand exceeds supply and prices
rise.
14. Four states (Maine, Minnesota, Louisiana, and Texas) introduced a competitive
state fund during this period, while one (Michigan) privatized its fund.
15. See Chapter 8 for a more extensive discussion of the Danzon and Harrington
hypothesis.
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6
The Effect of 
Workers’ Compensation 
Insurance Regulation
 
Theory and Prior Research
 
As indicated in Chapter 2, the market for compensation in those
states that permit private workers’ compensation insurance has tradi-
tionally been highly regulated.  Prices have been largely administered
by a state agency rather than determined by competitive forces.  How-
ever, since the 1980s, state workers’ compensation markets have been
deregulated to varying degrees.  In the political debate surrounding
these efforts, contradictory claims are made regarding the effect of
deregulation on employer costs and other market outcomes.  In this
chapter and the next two, we will address two questions relevant to this
debate: 
Does the regulation of the insurance market raise or lower the costs
of workers’ compensation insurance for employers?  
Is the quality of the product offered by compensation insurers
affected by regulation?  
This chapter examines the economic theory of rate regulation as
well as previous empirical research addressing this issue.  In the fol-
lowing chapter, we present the results of regression analyses predicting
employer costs and the extent of concentration in the workers’ com-
pensation insurance market.
 
ECONOMIC THEORY OF RATE REGULATION
 
In this section, we discuss economic theory concerning the effect
of insurance regulation on market outcomes.  Specifically, we summa-
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rize economic theory relating to the effect of regulation on the price
and availability of compensation insurance.
 
Theoretical Considerations: Costs and Availability
 
According to economic theory, two factors determine the effect of
rate regulation (or deregulation) on the workers’ compensation insur-
ance market: 1) the goals and strategy of the regulatory agency and 2)
the structure of the unregulated market.  In this context, the terms 
 
regu-
lated
 
 and 
 
unregulated
 
 refer to price regulation and not other forms of
regulation, such as minimal capital requirements or exit barriers
(including advance notice provisions).  
 
Market structure
 
 refers to the
characteristics of the organization of the market, such as the relations
of the present sellers to each other and to potential sellers.  The element
of market structure most commonly emphasized is the degree of con-
centration, which measures the number and size distribution of sellers
in the market.
 
1
 
  Other elements of market structure include the degree
of product differentiation among the outputs of firms in the industry
and the relative ease or difficulty that new firms have trying to enter the
market.
 
Market structure
 
The structural characteristics of the workers’ compensation insur-
ance market suggest a competitive market.  There are a large number of
firms that sell a homogeneous product.  Capital requirements are rela-
tively modest (even including legislatively imposed requirements) and
there are no significant technological barriers to entry.  Using U.S.
Department of Justice criteria, the workers’ compensation insurance
market in most states would be judged competitive as of the early
1990s.
 
2
 
  Nonetheless, it is possible that in the absence of regulation,
large firms could take advantage of economies of scale to set prices at
levels that drive smaller carriers out of the market, i.e., rates that are
below the firms’ short-run average costs.  After purging small competi-
tors from the market, these large firms could then raise rates to supra-
competitive levels—rates at which the large firm is able to earn excess
profits, but not so high as to attract new entrants, who would be at a
disadvantage due to their smaller size.
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  Furthermore, other aspects of
the rate-setting process, such as possible collusion between insurers
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and the rating organization, may enable these large carriers to effec-
tively “cartelize” the industry.
In the next sections, we discuss economic theory regarding various
aspects of market structure, including price setting in unregulated com-
petitive or monopolistic markets and the impact of rate regulation in
competitive or monopolistic markets.
 
Price setting in an unregulated, competitive market.
 
  In a com-
petitive market, insurance rates are determined by the levels of supply
and demand in the market.  The relationships among supply, demand,
and rates are illustrated in Figure 6.1; the insurance rate (or price) is
measured on the vertical axis, while the quantity of insurance offered
by carriers or demanded by employers at various rates is measured on
the horizontal axis.  
Figure 6.1 shows that at higher rates, more insurance coverage is
offered to employers by carriers.
 
4
 
  At the same time, however,
employer demand for coverage declines as the price increases.  In the
context of mandatory workers’ compensation insurance, insurance
demand may vary in three ways.  First, employers who are sufficiently
large may choose to self-insure as prices rise.  Alternatively, employers
facing higher labor costs due to higher insurance prices will substitute
 
Figure 6.1 Price Setting in a Competitive Insurance Market
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capital and other inputs to the production process, including employ-
ment in low-risk occupations, for high-risk labor.
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  This reduces the
payroll covered by workers’ compensation insurance or the average
rate at which payroll is taxed.  Finally, firms may choose to terminate
or restrict operations.
The lines labeled “Supply” and “Demand” in Figure 6.1 represent
levels of potential supply and demand at different price levels.  The
actual price and quantity of insurance sold in the market is determined
by the intersection of supply and demand, which occurs at point C.
This is the point at which demand is equal to supply, so that at price P
 
c
 
,
employers are willing buy and insurers are willing to provide coverage
equal to Q
 
c
 
. 
The competitive market price is significant for policymakers
because, under standard economic assumptions, it represents the point
at which there is an efficient allocation of resources.  That is, at com-
petitive rates, insurers will offer and employers will purchase a socially
optimal amount of insurance coverage.
Individual insurance carriers determine the extent of insurance
coverage that they are willing to offer based on reviews of market price
and the firms’ cost structure.  Specifically, insurers will underwrite
additional coverage up to the point where the marginal cost of includ-
ing an additional insurance policy is equal to the additional revenue
that the policy generates. 
In a competitive market, the individual carrier faces a level of
demand that is perfectly elastic with respect to price; that is, the indi-
vidual insurer may expect to be able to sell an unlimited amount of
coverage at this price.  However, the individual carrier is unable to raise
rates above this level, as it will lose business to competitors.  Impor-
tantly, since demand is perfectly elastic, the insurer’s marginal revenue
in a competitive market is equal to the competitive price, P
 
c
 
.  In other
words, the additional revenue generated by underwriting an additional
policy is the same as the revenue generated by all other policies sold.
Under these circumstances, the level of coverage that maximizes prof-
its occurs at the point where the insurer’s marginal cost (i.e., the cost of
offering an additional unit of coverage) is equal to the price of that
additional coverage.
 
Price setting in an unregulated, monopolistic market.
 
  If we
assume that the unregulated insurance market is not competitive, then
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different results are reached in the market.  For convenient exposition,
the following analysis assumes that the unregulated insurance market is
a monopoly.  While this is unlikely for the insurance industry, the
results from this analysis approximate those for an oligopoly, a more
realistic possibility.
 
6
 
Demand for a monopolistic firm is identical to market demand.  As
a result, the monopolist faces a demand curve that is downwardly slop-
ing.  Furthermore, the slope of the marginal revenue curve (MR) is also
downwardly sloping and is steeper than the slope of the demand curve,
because the firm may only increase coverage by reducing price.  That
is, unless the insurer can price-discriminate, it must reduce the rate for
all policies in order to sell an additional policy.  This means that the
added revenue from each additional policy sold is not only less than the
revenue added from the sale of the previous policy, but it is also less
than the price of the additional policy.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the monopoly insurer’s decision-making pro-
cess about price setting, assuming that there are constant returns to
scale (that is, that costs do not increase or decrease with additional
sales), so that the marginal cost curve (MC) is horizontal.  The profit-
maximizing monopolist will select a level of coverage that equates the
marginal cost and marginal revenue curves, which occurs at the inter-
section of these two curves (point A).  As a result, the insurance carrier
will offer coverage equal to Q
 
m
 
 at price P
 
m
 
.  Note that this price is
higher than the competitive rate, which is equal to the firm’s long-run
average (or marginal) cost curve.  At price P
 
m
 
, the quantity of coverage
purchased in the market is less than that which would be purchased in a
competitive market.
 
Effect of rate regulation on a competitive market.
 
  If the regula-
tory agency sets prices above the competitive level and forces all trans-
actions to take place at this price, then the amount of coverage will
shrink relative to its preregulatory level.  Figure 6.3 illustrates this
point.  The unregulated supply curve is depicted as the line S
 
2
 
S
 
1
 
,
while, presuming that the regulated price is set at P
 
r 
 
, the line P
 
r
 
BS
 
1
 
depicts the regulated supply curve.  The demand curve is represented
by the line D
 
2
 
D
 
1
 
.  
As can be seen, the regulated supply curve intersects demand at
point A.  As a result, coverage falls from Q
 
c
 
 (the quantity of coverage
underwritten in an unregulated market, determined by the intersection
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Figure 6.2 Price Setting in a Monopoly Market
Figure 6.3 Price Setting above P
 
c
 
 
 
in a Regulated Competitive 
Insurance Market
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of demand and supply at point C) to Q
 
r
 
.  Importantly, this level of cov-
erage is suboptimal, since there are consumers who are willing to pay
for coverage at the competitive market rate but not at the regulated
price.  If the insurance market is deregulated at some later point, then
rates will decline to competitive levels and coverage will increase.
On the other hand, if the regulatory agency sets rates below the
competitive price P
 
c
 
, the market will collapse in the long run, because
insurers, who are unable to recoup their costs, will be unwilling to offer
coverage at the regulated rate.  However, insurers may remain in the
market as long as the regulated rate covers the carriers’ short-term vari-
able costs.  They do so because they are reluctant to abandon their pre-
vious investments in marketing, underwriting, and claims adjustment
infrastructure, because they anticipate a return to more profitable rates,
and because of fears associated with the cessation of writing multistate
and multiline accounts.
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  Insurance industry analysts often point to
experience in Maine in the 1980s, where insurers remained in the mar-
ket despite an inability to earn what they considered to be a fair return
on investment.
Figure 6.4 depicts the unregulated supply curve as S
 
2
 
S
 
1
 
 and the
regulated supply curve as the line S
 
2
 
A.  This figure shows that, at best,
 
Figure 6.4 Price Setting below P
 
c
 
 in a Regulated Competitive 
Insurance Market
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insurance carriers will be willing to offer coverage equal to Q
 
R
 
, so that
once again rate regulation results in reduced coverage, and demand
greatly exceeds supply.  The amount of coverage underwritten by
insurers falls in the short run from Q
 
c
 
 to Q
 
R
 
.  If insureds are heteroge-
neous with respect to underlying risk, insurers will refuse to extend
coverage to high-risk employers, forcing them into the residual mar-
ket.
 
8
 
 
In addition, in the face of below-market rates due to regulatory rate
suppression, less efficient firms will exit the market and the market will
thus become increasingly concentrated.  If the market is deregulated at
some later point, then we would find that coverage increases concur-
rently with rising prices.  In addition, new carriers would enter an
increasingly less concentrated market.  
 
Effect of rate regulation on a monopolistic market.
 
  As we pre-
viously indicated, the monopolistic insurance carrier will set rates
above competitive levels.  As a result, if the regulatory agency sets
rates below the market rate but equal to or above the competitive mar-
ket rate, the firm will underwrite a greater level of insurance coverage
at this lower price.  This is illustrated in Figure 6.5.
 
Figure 6.5 Price Setting in a Regulated Monopoly Market
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As was the case in an unregulated market, the carrier will select a
level of coverage, Q
 
m
 
, at which marginal costs equal marginal benefits;
this occurs at point A.  However, assuming that the regulated price is
set at P
 
r 
 
, the marginal revenue curve is now depicted by the lines, P
 
r
 
C
and EF.  The firm’s marginal revenue is now perfectly elastic up to the
point where P
 
r
 
 intersects the demand curve.  As can be seen, the mar-
ginal revenue curve now intersects marginal costs (MC) at point D, so
that coverage will increase to Q
 
r 
 
.  In other words, rate regulation in this
instance results in a reduction in price and in greater coverage. Note
that this is the opposite effect from that in a competitive market.  Of
course, if the regulatory agency were to set a price below the competi-
tive level, then a market failure similar to that depicted in Figure 6.4
will result.
 
Behavior of the regulatory agency 
 
As indicated by the preceding discussion, the price-setting strategy
of the regulatory agency has a bearing on the actual effect of insurance
pricing deregulation.  Unfortunately, economic theories of rate regula-
tion are not well developed; due to a lack of agreement concerning the
nature of the regulatory process, economic theory about the impact of
deregulation is inconclusive.  At one time, economists assumed that
regulatory bodies acted solely in the public interest.  According to this
view, regulation was a response by legislators to citizen demands for a
political solution to a specific problem.  This response typically
included the formation of a government agency with a mandate to
address legislative will and citizens’ concerns.  According to this view
of the regulatory process, we would generally expect that state insur-
ance commissions would thus be expected to set rates at competitive
levels.
Of course, the economic effect of any regulatory strategy depends
on the structure of the market in the absence of regulation.  Assuming
that the state insurance commission is able to accurately determine the
competitive rate, then we would expect that a regulatory agency that
implements a public interest strategy would not affect prices or cover-
age in a competitive market, but would reduce prices and increase cov-
erage if the market was oligopolistic.  However, this outcome is
critically dependent on the regulatory agency’s ability to accurately
determine the competitive rate.
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Stigler (1971) challenged the long-standing assumption that regu-
latory agencies act in the public interest.  He noted that regulation
affects firms in the regulated industry and that these corporate interests
are particularly well-placed to influence legislative and regulatory pro-
cesses.  Relative to consumers (or even small firms in the industry),
large corporations have greater incentives to influence the political pro-
cess because their financial stake is large and because they can exert
greater political pressure on legislators (or regulators).  In addition,
because large corporations are fewer in number, more homogeneous,
and more likely to already be organized, organizational costs for lobby-
ing purposes are less significant, as are potential free-riding problems.
As a result, “regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and
operated, primarily for its benefit” (Stigler 1971, p. 3).  In Stigler’s
view, corporate interests, after “capturing” the regulatory process, pro-
mote industry interests in two ways: through direct money subsidies
and through the control of entry of new firms.  
Presumably, with respect to insurance rate regulation, Stigler
would argue that since insurance carriers are fewer in number and more
homogeneous than policyholders, and since their benefits (or costs) of
regulation are potentially greater, insurers have greater incentives to
influence the regulatory process.  If this is true, these insurers’ efforts
will lead to a cartelization of the insurance markets, and, presumably,
rate regulation will produce supracompetitive rates (i.e., rates that are
higher than the competitive market rate and that therefore yield excess
or above-normal profits) and a restriction of coverage through carrier-
imposed barriers to market entry.  
Peltzman (1976) both formalized and modified Stigler’s model.
Specifically, he hypothesized that legislative regulators (i.e., legisla-
tures that regulate the market or delegate that responsibility to a gov-
ernment agency) seek to maximize a net vote margin or majority in
their favor.  In other words, the regulator’s problem is to maximize the
following objective function (in which the net vote margin is repre-
sented as 
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where 
 
N
 
 is the total number of voters, 
 
n
 
 is the number who benefit from
the proposed regulation, 
 
f
 
 is the probability that these beneficiaries will
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provide political and financial support to the regulator, and 
 
h
 
 is the
probability that nonbeneficiaries will oppose the regulator.
The probability that beneficiaries will provide financial or political
support for regulation is a function of the per-capita net benefit
received by those interest groups.  This benefit is equivalent to the
wealth that is transferred to beneficiaries as a result of the regulatory
process less the dollar amount spent in efforts to support legislators and
less the costs associated with organizing and delivering support
(including the costs of overcoming free-rider problems).  Monies spent
to support legislators include, for example, mass media advertising,
direct mail campaigns, or other “voter education” efforts.  The proba-
bility of political opposition is positively related to the net tax imposed
on nonbeneficiary groups to pay for the wealth transfer to beneficiaries
and is negatively related to voter education expenditures by regulation
supporters.
Importantly, Peltzman departs from Stigler by acknowledging that
consumers as well as producer interests may affect the legislative regu-
latory process.  As we have indicated, the relative influence of interest
groups that support or oppose regulation depends on the relative size of
the affected groups, the per-capita costs and benefits of wealth transfer,
the cost of organizing for the purpose of delivering political support,
and the cost and effectiveness of voter education efforts.  
With respect to  insurance regulation,  it is difficult to determine
 
a priori
 
 whether consumers or producers have the advantage vis-à-vis
political influence.  On the one hand, the probability of insurance
industry support for favorable rate regulation likely exceeds the proba-
bility of consumer (i.e., employer or worker) opposition for at least two
reasons.  First, organizing costs for insurers are relatively low, and, sec-
ond, their financial stakes are relatively great.  On the other hand, con-
sumers of workers’ compensation insurance are much more numerous
than producers (insurance carriers), and workers’ compensation policy-
holders are sophisticated consumers who are also easily organized.
Thus, it is possible that consumer groups (or trade associations of
employers) could capture the regulatory process, which would result in
regulatory rate suppression relative to the unregulated market.
 
9
 
  Under
this scenario, consumer groups will pressure regulators to set prices
below market levels.  If they succeed, then the extent of coverage will
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decline, and subsequent deregulation will result in both higher prices
and increased coverage.
However, this possibility raises the issue of whether, even if possi-
ble, rational employers would want to suppress insurance rates, since
in the long run, rate suppression results in the unavailability of insur-
ance, as insurers who are unable to earn normal profits abandon the
market.  This hypothesis assumes that employers are unable to foresee
the inevitable consequences of such a strategy.  If employers do not
suffer from this form of myopia, then we could predict that rate regula-
tion will either result in competitive prices or a cartelization of the
industry and supranormal prices.
 
Regulatory lag
 
If the regulatory agency lacks accurate and timely information on
market conditions or if the agency is unable to react quickly to chang-
ing market conditions, a different result occurs.  For example, assume
that the insurers’ cost structure fluctuates over time, so the regulatory
agency in a regulated market and/or the carrier in an unregulated mar-
ket must periodically adjust rates.  In general, rate adjustments in reac-
tion to changing market conditions will probably occur more slowly in
regulated environments than in unregulated ones.  There is an obvious
delay in the receipt of market information, since the agency receives its
information from insurers.  In addition, the regulatory process of filing
and review itself imposes a delay.  The lag between changing market
conditions and rate adjustment implies that, at times, the regulated rate
will be above or below the competitive level.  Specifically, we expect
that under conditions of declining costs (due, for example, to rising
interest rates), the regulated rate will be higher than the competitive
one.  The opposite will be true during a period of rising costs.
 
Expected Results of Deregulation
 
Economic theory provides ambiguous predictions concerning the
effect of deregulation, because the effect differs depending on the
nature of the unregulated market and on the behavior of the regulatory
agency.  Our predictions, which are based on the preceding analysis,
are presented in Table 6.1.  We make predictions about three market
outcomes upon deregulation from different scenarios: the cost of work-
ers’ compensation insurance (“Rates”), the extent of coverage in the
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voluntary market (“Availability”), and market concentration.  A “+”
indicates that there is a positive relationship between deregulation and
the outcome variable; a “–”, a negative relationship; a “0”, no relation-
ship; and a “?”, an ambiguous relationship.
For example, assume that we have a competitive market and the
regulatory agency has been captured by insurers.  In this situation, we
would expect that the regulatory agency, responding to the wishes of
the insurance industry, would have increased workers’ compensation
rates above the competitive market level; some employers would no
longer be able to afford the premiums, so coverage would have
decreased.  Increased prices under regulation would attract marginal
insurers into the market, reducing market concentration.  If the market
were then deregulated, insurance prices would return to competitive
levels (i.e., rates would decline) and more employers would be able to
afford a workers’ compensation policy, increasing levels of coverage.
Finally, market structure will become more concentrated as marginal
insurers leave the market 
Predictions as to whether the regulatory agency will represent the
public interest or become captured by the insurance industry or
 
Table 6.1 Predictions of the Impact of Deregulation on Market 
Outcomes
 
a
 
 
 
Scenario Rates Availability
 Market 
concentration
Competitive market
Public interest regulation
 
0 0 0
 
Regulator captured by insurers
 
– + +
 
Regulator captured by employers
 
+ + –
 
Oligopoly
Public interest regulation
 
+ – +
 
Regulator captured by insurers
 
0 0 0
 
Regulator captured by employers
 
+ ? ?
 
a
 
+ = positive relationship.
– = negative relationship.
0 = no relationship.
? = ambiguous relationship.
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employer groups require the analysis of a number of factors, including
the concentration of economic interests, transaction costs, information,
ideology, and the saliency and complexity of regulatory issues (see
Meier 1988; Klein 1995).  Unfortunately, we lack good information on
these variables.  In addition, the predictions reported in Table 6.1
assume that regulatory agencies are able to respond instantaneously to
changing market conditions.  However, due to delays inherent in the
regulatory process as well as the fact the agency is one step removed
from market information, it is likely that there is a lag between a mar-
ket change and the regulatory response (Klein 1995; White 1996).  As a
result, an agency that pursues a public interest strategy is likely to sup-
press rates when costs are increasing and to set rates above market lev-
els in periods of falling costs.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON RATE REGULATION
 
10
 
 
 
Most empirical research on the impact of the regulatory environ-
ment on market outcomes in the property/casualty insurance industry
has ignored workers’ compensation.  We will initially summarize
research on the regulatory environment and outcomes for property and
casualty insurance lines, principally, automobile insurance, the line
most often studied because it is believed that the politically sensitive
nature of automobile insurance pricing leads regulators to set prices
below competitive rates.  We then summarize studies assessing the
impact of the regulatory environment on market outcomes for workers’
compensation insurance.
 
Evidence from Other Property/Casualty Insurance Lines
 
Early studies investigated whether and to what extent regulatory
legislation affects insurers’ propensity to deviate from bureau rates.
These studies typically found that deregulation was associated with
increased rate variation among insurers relative to the regulated mar-
ket, which implies that the deregulated insurance market is competi-
tive.
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For example, Joskow (1973) found that the proportion of premi-
ums written at rates different from those promulgated by the rating
bureau (off-bureau rates) was much larger in an “open competition”
state that did not require prior approval (California) than in a state that
did (New York).
 
11
 
  In addition, his comparison of New York rates
before and after enactment of open competition legislation revealed
that the proportion of premiums sold at off-bureau rates increased fol-
lowing enactment.
 
12
 
  Williams and Whitman (1973) examined variation
in automobile insurance and homeowners’ insurance rates in Minne-
sota and found that rate variation in both lines increased following the
adoption of open competiton.
 
13
 
  Finally, assessing experience in three
insurance lines, the Virginia Bureau of Insurance (1978) found that the
number of carriers that charged bureau rates and the relative market
share of these companies fell sharply after the competitive rating law
went into effect.
 
14
 
   
 
Rate levels
 
More recently, investigators have attempted to determine the
impact of rate regulation on insurance prices.  Since price data were
not readily available, these studies almost uniformly examined loss
ratios as the dependent variable.
 
15
 
  Most found that, contrary to predic-
tions, deregulation is associated with lower loss ratios and thus, infer-
entially, with higher rates (although there are exceptions).  Studies
finding a negative relationship between loss ratios and deregulation
include Smallwood (1975),
 
16
 
 Witt and Miller (1981),
 
17
 
 Cummins and
Harrington (1987),
 
18
 
 Harrington (1984, 1987),
 
19
 
 Pauly, Kunreuther, and
Kleindorfer (1986),
 
20
 
 and Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans (1989).
 
21
 
  A
handful of studies support the opposite point of view (Samprone
1979;
 
22
 
 Chidambaran, Pugel, and Saunders 1997)
 
23
 
 or fail to find a sta-
tistically significant relationship between the loss ratio and the regula-
tory environment (Witt and Miller 1980; GAO 1986).
 
24
 
  However, most
research suggests that deregulation is associated with higher insurance
rates, implying that regulatory agencies suppress rates.
These results are troubling to students of insurance markets for two
reasons.  First, assuming a competitive market, as indicated by the
research on rate deviations, economic theory predicts that rates should
in the long run be higher in a regulated market than in an unregulated
one.  This is because price distortions create cost-increasing inefficien-
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cies in the long run, including a reduction in insurers’ incentives to
enhance operational efficiency, and because the cost of compliance and
the regulatory bureaucracy is inevitably reflected in market prices.
Second, casual observation suggests that insurance premiums are often
higher in states that stringently regulate rates.
The anomalous results from these studies may be due to deficien-
cies in the dependent variables examined.  As we pointed out in Chap-
ter 3, the loss ratio is a measure of one component of insurer costs (i.e.,
losses) to revenue (or premiums written).  As such, it is as much a mea-
sure of profitability as price.  Loss ratios are a reasonable price mea-
sure only to the extent that the loading factor is invariant, a condition
that may be expected in a competitive market.  However, if markets are
not competitive or if for institutional reasons insurers are willing to
remain in a market where they receive less than a normal return on
investment, then the loading factor can vary while price remains con-
stant, and vice versa. 
A recent study provides some evidence for this hypothesis.  Using
auto insurance data, Tennyson (1997) examined the relationship
between expense ratios (the ratio of underwriting expenses to premi-
ums written) and rate regulation, and she found that this ratio was posi-
tively related to the regulatory stringency.
 
25
 
  She attributed this result to
reduced market shares for large cost-efficient carriers in stringently
regulated markets.
 
26
 
  Interestingly, Tennyson also found that stringent
rate regulation reduced the market share of national firms, and espe-
cially of those that specialize in auto insurance, more than that of other
types of insurance carriers.  Since these types of insurers (national
firms and auto specialists) tend to be more cost-efficient, Tennyson
argued that rate regulation increases consumer costs through a change
in market structure, i.e., more efficient insurers leave the market. 
 
Availability of coverage
 
As we previously indicated, economic theory suggests that rate
regulation may also affect the availability of coverage underwritten by
insurance carriers.  There are a number of studies examining the rela-
tionship between rate regulation and the size of the residual market.  If
regulatory agencies suppress rates, then we would expect to find a pos-
itive relationship between the size of the residual market and the degree
of rate regulation.
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Several studies have found such a positive relationship.
Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans (1989) found that prior approval laws
were associated with an increase in the size of the involuntary automo-
bile insurance market and that there was a positive relationship
between regulatory stringency and residual market size.  Similar results
were obtained by Suponcic and Tennyson (1995)
 
27
 
 and Bouzouita and
Bajtelsmit (1997).
 
28
 
  Blackmon and Zeckhauser (1991) noted that over
two-thirds of the drivers in Massachusetts, a jurisdiction with stringent
rate regulation, were in the involuntary market.  Rates did not differ
between involuntary and voluntary markets for drivers in the same rat-
ing category.  As a result, eight insurers who provided some 25 percent
of the automobile insurance coverage in the state had stopped or were
attempting to stop writing policies in the state, despite the imposition
of high exit fees by the state’s insurance commissioner.
The results from these studies suggest that rate regulation reduces
profit margins, forcing insurers out of the market.  As such, they are
inconsistent with most research examining loss ratios, which has found
a positive relationship between deregulation and loss ratios, indicating
that deregulation reduces insurer profits. 
 
Rate variability over time
 
Advocates of rate regulation in insurance markets assert that such
regulation results in lower price variability.  They claim that price coor-
dination under regulation reduces or eliminates cutthroat pricing in a
soft market, contributing to greater price stability in insurance markets.
In hard markets, regulation limits the size of the price increase.  In
addition, regulation proponents maintain that cyclical price fluctuations
are due to insurer error in loss forecasts and that rate regulation pre-
cludes any price variation resulting from these errors.  In marked con-
trast, opponents of rate regulation assert that regulation actually leads
to greater price volatility in insurance markets.  Tennyson (1991, p. 34)
noted that, according to this view, critics allege that “rate regulation
restricts adjustment of the industry to changing market conditions, and
thereby exacerbates underwriting volatility.”  This is at least partially
due to lags inherent in the regulatory process.  In other words, insurers
incur additional costs because they are unable to make immediate
adjustments in insurance prices.  This is essentially a restatement of the
regulatory-lag hypothesis that we described earlier in this chapter.
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Tennyson (1991) found no evidence that rate regulation influenced
the amplitude of the insurance cycle as measured by the absolute dif-
ference in loss ratios between the peak and the trough of the insurance
cycle.  She found, however, that rate regulation was associated with
greater variance in loss ratios for automobile liability insurance for
some carrier types, although this relationship was only statistically sig-
nificant for national and regional agency companies.
 
29
 
  While loss ratio
variability was also positively associated with rate regulation for the
homeowners multiple-peril line, which is less sensitive to political
pressures, this relationship was not statistically significant.  Impor-
tantly, these results suggest that rate regulation increases carriers’
underwriting risk, a result that could partly explain why the residual
market is larger under rate regulation.
Overall, these studies suggest that rate regulation has a number of
deleterious effects for property/casualty insurance markets.  Regulated
markets appear to be characterized by rate suppression, which
increases the size of the residual market and may increase insurance
costs in the long run, and by increased price volatility, increasing
underwriting risk and possibly further discouraging competition.
However, this research is plagued by methodological problems, leading
to inconsistent results and tempering the definitiveness of conclusions
that can be drawn.
 
Research into Workers’ Compensation Rate Regulation
 
In recent years, as a rapidly increasing number of states have
deregulated workers’ compensation insurance market pricing, a few
studies have investigated the impact of this deregulation.  Unlike most
research examining the impact of regulation on other property/casualty
lines, the studies have used dependent variables other than the loss
ratio.  There remains, however, a paucity of research compared with
other property/casualty insurance lines.
 
Klein, Nordman, and Fritz (1993)
 
These researchers estimated ordinary least squares regression
equations predicting statewide average loss ratios and residual market
shares as function of regulatory environment dummy variables indicat-
ing whether 1) the state regulatory agency required that insurers obtain
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prior approval before implementing rates; 2) the agency required
adherence to bureau rates; and 3) the rating organization filed fully
developed manual rates as opposed to loss costs.
 
30
  A fourth variable,
regulatory stringency, attempted to gauge the extent to which the state
insurance commission suppressed rates.31  All four regulatory environ-
ment variables were lagged one year.
They found mixed evidence concerning the effect of rate regulation
on insurance pricing.  Consistent with the rate suppression hypothesis,
regulatory stringency was positively related to the loss ratio, implying
that stringent regulation reduced prices in regulated markets and led to
higher workers’ compensation insurance rates.  However, the prior-
approval dummy was negatively related to the loss ratio, suggesting the
opposite, i.e. that prices are higher when insurance carriers must obtain
prior approval of rate increases.32  
Results for the residual market equations were similarly inconsis-
tent.  On one hand, the prior-approval dummy and the regulatory strin-
gency ratio were positively related to residual market share, indicating
that the residual market shrinks following the elimination of prior
approval and that stringent regulation is associated with larger residual
markets.  On the other hand, the loss-cost coefficient was also posi-
tively related to residual market share, suggesting that the residual mar-
ket increases following the adoption of a loss-cost system. 
Klein, Nordman, and Fritz concluded that rate regulation has a sig-
nificant impact on both profitability and the size of the residual market,
although they cautioned that the coefficients on their regulatory envi-
ronment variables were not robust and were subject to specification
error.  Interestingly, they also concluded that the effects of regulation
vary substantially among states, depending on how statutory provisions
regarding insurance rates were actually applied by the regulatory
agency. 
Carroll and Kaestner (1995)
As in the Klein, Nordman, and Fritz study, Carroll and Kaestner
examined the impact of rate regulation on costs and market share for a
cross section of states, using two binary measures of the regulatory
environment: a “competitive-rating” dummy indicating that the state
had adopted an advisory rating or loss cost system and a “partial-com-
petition” dummy indicating whether the state insurance commission
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permitted deviations from the bureau rates.33  Two-stage, least-squares
regression models were specified, because several variables determin-
ing the dependent price measure (including the regulatory environment
variable and residual market share) were considered to be endogenous.  
The competitive-rating variable was negatively and significantly
related to both cost measures (price-per-injury and price-per-
employee) compared with states having strict prior approval legisla-
tion.34  The partial-competition variable was also negatively related to
costs, but it was only statistically significant in the price-per-employee
equation in which the regulatory environment was treated as exoge-
nous.35  In the residual market share equation, the competitive-rating
and deviations variables were statistically significant only when the
regulatory environment was treated as exogenous; both variables are
inversely related to the size of the residual market.  Deregulation (com-
petitive rating) was thus perceived as more closely aligning rates in the
voluntary and residual markets.  
In sum, as Carroll and Kaestner noted, their results are most
straightforward with respect to the competitive-rating variable.  The
partial-competition variable, on the other hand, was rarely statistically
significant.  They concluded that insurance regulators “have in the past
been more responsive to industry needs, either by tacitly encouraging
collusion in the industry or by directly keeping insurance rates high.”
They also concluded that allowing deviations from bureau rates was an
ineffective method for deregulating the insurance market.
Appel, McMurray, and Mulvaney (1992)
Two studies have examined cost measures similar to those used in
this book, i.e., adjusted manual rates and weekly insurance premiums.
In one, Appel, McMurray, and Mulvaney estimated 12 regression spec-
ifications as a function of a competitive-rating dummy variable and a
variety of controls.  They found that costs were positively related to a
competitive-rating dummy in all but one equation, although these rela-
tionships were statistically significant at conventional levels in only
three of these equations.36   They concluded (p. 16) that “[w]hile there
are indications that the adjusted manual rates are higher in competitive
rating states, the evidence is not overwhelming.”  They also estimated
regression models with more refined measures of the regulatory envi-
ronment, i.e., dummy variables that classified states as falling into one
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regressions produced no clear pattern of results vis-à-vis the impact of
rate regulation.37 
Schmidle (1994)
This study used data from 47 states for 1975, 1978, 1983, and 1986
to predict employers’ costs and market structure.  Importantly, Schmi-
dle also attempted to control for the endogeneity of competitive-rating
statutes.  His regulatory environment variables included binary vari-
ables indicating that the state had a competitive rating law (open com-
petition) or that the states had partially deregulated insurance pricing
by permitting deviations or scheduled rating (partial competition).38  
Schmidle’s regression models estimated manual rates, adjusted
manual rates, weekly insurance premiums, and a “spread” measure to
ascertain the impact of deregulation on employers’ costs.  The spread
measure, which attempted to gauge the extent of workers’ compensa-
tion price discounting (and competitiveness) in a state, was computed
by dividing the adjusted manual rates average by the corresponding
manual rates average; this quotient was then subtracted from 1.
Overall, these analyses produced mixed results.  In many regres-
sion equations, particularly those that employed the full set of explana-
tory variables, the coefficients for the two regulatory environment
variables were not different from zero at conventional levels of statisti-
cal significance.  As a result, Schmidle concluded that most of the evi-
dence from these analyses suggested that deregulation had no effect on
the price of workers’ compensation insurance, but there was some sup-
port for the hypothesis that deregulation increased insurance prices.
However, results for the regulatory environment variables that
were statistically significant indicated that open competition was asso-
ciated with higher adjusted manual rates, higher manual rates
(although manual rates typically increased more than adjusted manual
rates with the introduction of open competition), and higher weekly
insurance premiums.  Several regressions also suggested that open
competition was associated with greater price discounting (as repre-
sented by the spread between manual rates and adjusted manual rates).
None of these regressions supported the hypothesis that deregulation
(open competition or partial competition) was associated with lower
manual rates, lower adjusted manual rates, or a decline in the spread
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between manual rates and adjusted manual rates.  All of this evidence
is indicative of rate suppression in administered-pricing states prior to
the adoption of open competition laws.  
Schmidle also attempted to examine the impact of insurance pric-
ing deregulation on market structure, a topic that has not received
much attention in the research literature.  His dependent measures were
concentration ratios (top four and top eight firms) and proxy measures
for exit/entry patterns (number of direct writers, state agency compa-
nies, national agency companies, and all workers’ compensation pri-
vate insurance carriers).  He found some evidence that open
competition influenced market structure, but his conclusions were cir-
cumscribed due to the paucity of control variables with available data.  
Schmidle’s model of the factors contributing to enactment of open
competition statutes had little explanatory power.  Most notably, nei-
ther cost measures (adjusted manual rates) nor insurers’ previous loss
experience (loss ratios) were associated with passage of open competi-
tion legislation and thus apparently were not an impetus to adopting
such legislation. 
Summary
In summary, the research examining the impact of rate regulation
on various outcomes for the workers’ compensation line has produced
mixed results.  In particular, research investigating the impact of regu-
lation on insurance pricing has produced very inconsistent results;
some of these studies have found that regulation is associated with
lower prices, while other studies have found the opposite.  While the
topic of rate variability has received less attention, research on this
topic has likewise failed to produce uniform findings.  On the other
hand, existing research tends to show that rate regulation is associated
with a reduction in insurance availability and less competitive markets,
i.e., a less concentrated market with fewer insurance providers.  
There are at least two possible explanations for the lack of consis-
tent results.  First, in the absence of effective measures of regulatory
behavior, these results may reflect variation in regulatory strategy
among states and over time.  In other words, insurance regulators may
be suppressing rates in a particular jurisdiction at a particular point in
time while they set prices above competitive market levels at other
times or in other jurisdictions.  Second, these studies suffer from meth-
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odological problems that potentially affect the results.  Most cost stud-
ies fail to utilize direct measures of costs, relying primarily on loss
ratios (which, as discussed in Chapter 3, are questionable measures of
costs).  In addition, there is a conspicuous lack of agreement among
studies, particularly those examining workers’ compensation insurance
markets, on the definition and measurement of the regulatory environ-
ment variables.
CONCLUSIONS
Economic theory fails to offer unambiguous predictions with
respect to the impact of the regulation of rates in private insurance mar-
kets.  Instead, theory holds that the effect of rate regulation depends on
the underlying market structure in the absence of regulation and on the
behavior of the regulatory agency.  Existing evidence suggests that, in
the absence of regulation, the workers’ compensation market is com-
petitive; thus, the impact of deregulation depends primarily on the reg-
ulatory agency’s behavior (or strategy).  Agency strategy depends on
the relative political influence of the various actors in the workers’
compensation system.  If employers have more political power and
thus greater influence over the agency’s decisions, deregulation should
result in rate hikes; if insurers have more political power, deregulation
should result in a rate reduction; and if neither group predominates,
then there should be no systematic effect.  Consequently, regulation (or
deregulation) could have different effects in different jurisdictions and
at different periods in time, depending on which group has the greater
political influence.  
Empirical research on the effects of rate regulation supplies some
support for the latter “contingency” view, in that, in general, there is a
lack of consistent results across studies.  That is, the effect of rate regu-
lation (or deregulation) depends on the interaction of the statutory
framework, regulatory behavior, insurer behavior, and market condi-
tions.  However, it is also possible that these divergent results are due
to methodological inconsistencies.  Most previous research has relied
on proxy measures of insurance costs—typically, loss ratios—that are
only indirectly related to the underlying variable that they seek to mea-
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sure.  Many fail to control for important variables that influence costs
(or other market outcomes)—aside from some rudimentary measures
of the regulatory environment—and often use a relatively short time
series that fails to span the insurance cycle.  Finally, this research has
typically employed relatively simple constructions of the insurance
regulatory environment.
Notes
1. Market concentration is usually measured in terms of the value of sales in a partic-
ular industry accounted for by the four largest or the eight largest companies.
2. See Klein, Nordman, and Fritz (1993).  For additional evidence indicating that the
workers’ compensation insurance market is competitive, see Schmidle (1994) and
Appel and Gerofsky (1985).
3. Importantly, if there are economies of scale in workers’ compensation insurance,
then large size provides firms with market power due to their size.  This topic is
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
4. Increased coverage is made possible in two ways.  Either more carriers are willing
to offer coverage or each carrier is willing to offer additional coverage.  The
former implies variation in cost structure among insurers (so that some carriers
are able to offer coverage at lower rates than others).  It should be recalled that
while the law mandates that employers purchase compensation insurance (or
demonstrate that they have sufficient financial resources to self-insure), there is no
requirement that insurers offer coverage to employers in the voluntary market;
thus, it is possible that the extent of coverage offered by private carriers will, in
fact, vary depending on the state of the market.
5. For example, the employer could choose to automate production lines substituting
a programmable robot (operated by a computer technician) for one or more semi-
skilled machine operators.
6. An oligopoly is a market in which there are only a small number of sellers who
are able to collude in setting prices and are thus, in effect, able to act like a
monopolist.
7. Insurers may also be reluctant to abandon a market because of state regulations
that increase the cost of exit.
8. However, it is important to note that unless regulators establish differential rates
for the voluntary and residual markets, expansion of the residual market will lead
to higher rates in the voluntary segment, as employers purchasing policies in the
voluntary market are taxed to pay for shortfalls in the residual market.  (Recall
that residual market losses are tied to the insurer’s share of the voluntary market.)
This will, in turn, cause insurers to further reduce available voluntary market cov-
erage, which will cause the residual market to expand further, leading to even
greater costs.  The insurance literature refers to this process as the “death spiral.”
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9. Peltzman’s model did not allow for the regulatory suppression of rates below the
competitive price.  However, both Harrington (1992) and Klein (1995) have
offered reasonable explanations for why this might occur in insurance rate regula-
tion.
10. The discussion in this section draws upon and updates the literature review in
Schmidle (1994).  
11. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Justice (1977) compared automobile insurance
prices as of January 1, 1976, under regulatory regimes that required prior approval
of rates (Pennsylvania and New Jersey) with those in California.  The Department
found that a larger proportion of the insurance market in California used off-
bureau rates and that these rates tended to be 10 percent or more below bureau
rates.  In a critique of this research, Danzon (1983) noted that the percentage of
deviations above bureau rates was greater in the prior-approval states than in Cali-
fornia.  She hypothesized that “prior approval regulation may be used to hold
down [bureau] rates below the level desired by the bureau and possibly below the
competitive level” (p. 379; emphasis in the original.)  She also noted that average
loss ratios tended to be higher in prior-approval states, indicating that insurers in
these states were less profitable.
12. New York adopted an “open competition” law for various property/casualty insur-
ance lines that went into effect on January 1, 1970.  This law was modeled on Cal-
ifornia’s open competition law, which had been in effect since 1947.
13. Williams and Whitman (1973) attributed the greater variation to a “greater will-
ingness of insurers to compete on price following the enactment of the new law,”
although they also counseled that “if the variation persists, it may indicate inade-
quate consumer knowledge and hence ineffective competition” (p. 490).
14. These lines were homeowners, private passenger physical damage, and private
passenger auto liability.
15. See Chapter 3 for a critique of these measures.  However, an earlier exception to
this generalization was a study by the Virginia Bureau of Insurance (1978), which
examined statewide average rates.  This study found that prior to competitive rat-
ing, the average statewide rate increase closely mirrored several large increases in
bureau rates; afterwards, the average statewide rate increases were considerably
lower than rate increases promulgated by the rating bureau.
16. Smallwood predicted average loss ratios (private passenger and commercial auto-
mobile insurance) of the top 36 firms as a function of five dummy variables repre-
senting the regulatory environment.  These variables placed states into one of five
categories: open competition, file and use, prior approval, mandatory bureau rates,
or “regulatory stringency.”  The last are states in which the insurance commis-
sioner “had disapproved a rate filing as excessive or had otherwise intervened in a
case significant enough to generate prominent discussion in the trade press” (p.
271).  He estimated separate regressions for each of five classes of carriers (all
insurance carriers, direct writers, national agency companies, liability insurance
line, and physical damage insurance line).  Of the regulatory environment vari-
ables, only the regulatory stringency measure was statistically significant; it was
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positively associated with loss ratios in all regressions and had the largest coeffi-
cient in the liability insurance model, suggesting that prices are lower in regulated
environments.  With respect to the result regarding the magnitude of the coeffi-
cient, Smallwood concluded that because automobile liability insurance was com-
pulsory (or essentially compulsory), regulators felt obliged to keep prices low.
17. They examined disaggregated loss ratios by insurer type (direct writers, national
agency companies, and regional specialty companies) and found statistically sig-
nificant and lower average loss ratios for national agency companies and regional
companies in competitive rating states, suggesting that deregulation increased
consumer costs and insurer profits for those companies.
18. Cummins and Harrington found that loss ratios for private passenger automobile,
commercial automobile, and homeowners’ lines were lower in competitive states
than in noncompetitive ones.  They used two competitive-rating dummy variables
(one indicating that the state had a file-and-use law, the other indicating a no-file
or a use-and-file state) in multiple regression analyses predicting average loss
ratios for each of four insurance lines.  
19. Harrington found that the regression coefficient for the prior-approval dummy
variable (states with mandatory bureau rates, state-made rates, or prior-approval
laws) was statistically significant and positively associated with average loss
ratios for private passenger automobile liability for the 1976–1981 period.  When
significant, the coefficient was also positively associated with average loss ratios
in the regressions for individual years.
20. They estimated three-year moving averages of statewide loss ratios for private
passenger collision and liability insurance coverage by insurer type (direct writers
and independent agency firms).  The coefficient for their prior-approval dummy
variable was statistically significant and positively associated with loss ratios in
all of the agency firms regressions and in most of the direct writers regressions.
They concluded that rate regulation increased loss ratios and therefore reduced
insurance prices.
21. Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans found that rate regulation reduced automobile
insurance rates, particularly in states with stringent regulation, and increased the
size of the involuntary market (assigned-risk pool).  Their dependent variable was
the inverse of the loss ratio for automobile liability (bodily injury) and property
insurance in the 30 largest states for the period 1974–1981.  They used two mea-
sures of the regulatory environment: 1) a prior-approval dummy variable and 2) a
dummy variable that identified three states with particularly stringent regulatory
environments.  The prior-approval regression coefficient was statistically signifi-
cant in all the automobile liability insurance regressions (direct writers; agency
companies; and both insurers combined) and negatively associated with unit
prices.  The stringent-regulation coefficient was significant in two of the liability
regressions (agency companies and the combination of insurer types), had a nega-
tive sign, and suggested “an impact on prices more than twice that in other regu-
lated states” (p. 284). 
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22. Samprone found that the inverse of the loss ratio automobile liability insurance,
averaged over a three-year period (1973–1975), was higher in regulated states,
suggesting that rates were also higher.  However, he failed to find a similar rela-
tionship for another auto insurance line, physical damage.  He concluded that
higher rates in regulated states did not result in higher profits.  He noted that if
above-normal profits were present in the regulated sector, there should be a
greater influx of new firms into that sector than into the competitive sector, assum-
ing no barriers to entry.  The absence of an influx suggested that excess profits
were not being realized in regulated states.  In his view, insurers in states with rate
regulation incurred additional expenses because they were engaged in “nonprice”
competition (by offering more services than they otherwise would have).  In a
later study, Frech and Samprone (1980) hypothesized that independent agents,
who provide more services than direct writers, should, in regulated states, have a
higher average market share than that of direct writers.  They found this to be the
case for two lines of automobile insurance, thus supporting Samprone’s hypothe-
sis.
23. Chidambaran, Pugel, and Saunders used data from 18 property/liability insurance
lines for 1984–1993 to assess the determinants of an economic loss ratio equal to
the sum of the present value of expected losses on insurance policies in year t,
divided by the sum of premiums in year t, less costs and expenses.  Their “regula-
tory scrutiny” measure was a binary variable indicating whether the loss ratio was
for the automobile or workers’ compensation insurance lines (the authors asserted
that these two lines were subject to more intense regulatory attention than were
others).  They found that loss ratios were negatively related to both the extent of
regulatory scrutiny and the degree of industry concentration.  They attributed the
latter result to a reduction in price rivalry.  The authors claimed that this reduction
resulted from historical cooperation in price setting among insurers, coupled with
broad exemptions from antitrust legislation. 
24. The GAO classified prior-approval states and used data from 44 states for a period
(1975–1982) that overlapped most of the years used by Pauly, Kunreuther, and
Kleindorfer (1986).  Unlike in the latter study, the GAO regression coefficient for
the prior-approval dummy variable was not statistically significant in the model
estimating the determinants of the inverse loss ratio of automobile liability insur-
ance.  
25. Tennyson used 1992 data from all 50 states to investigate the impact of rate regu-
lation on expense ratios and state-specific 1992 data from 64 national insurance
groups to examine its effect on market share.  As a measure of regulation, she
used a dummy variable that indicated whether states had prior-approval regula-
tion, state-made rates, or mandatory bureau rates; she also used three dummies
that identified subsets of states with particularly stringent regulatory environ-
ments.  The regulatory-environment dummy variable was not statistically signifi-
cant in the regression models estimating either liability or physical damage
expense ratios for private passenger automobile insurance; however the stringency
variable was significant and positively related to the expense ratio.
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26. A potential explanation for these findings is that stringent rate regulation allowed
more inefficient carriers to survive in a less competitive market.
27. Suponcic and Tennyson (1995) investigated the relationship between rate regula-
tion and the market structure for automobile insurance markets, using state-level
data for the period 1987–1992.  Regression analyses estimated two dependent
variables: the total number of insurers in each jurisdiction and in various sub-
groups (direct writers, national direct writers, national auto specialists, national
firms in total, and auto producers), and the market share.  Three variables were
used to measure the impact of the regulatory environment: a dummy for states
with prior-approval regulation, state-made rates, or mandatory bureau rates for
automobile insurance; a stringent-regulation dummy, which indicated that the
state’s residual market accounted for more than 20 percent of the total insurance
market; and a regulatory stringency index based on the results of a survey of
insurance industry executives, who were asked to rate the states’ regulatory envi-
ronments.
28. Bouzouita and Bajtelsmit examined the relationship between automobile insur-
ance rate regulation and the size of assigned-risk market using state-specific data
for 1984–1992.  They hypothesized that noncompetitive rating in the voluntary
market would lead, in turn, to inadequate rates, higher loss ratios, restricted avail-
ability, and increases in the percentage of drivers in the assigned-risk market.
Bouzouita and Bajtelsmit categorized states as either noncompetitive (they
required prior approval of rates, modified prior approval, and file-and-use with
bureau adherence) or competitive (they had file-and-use or use-and-file provisions
or did not regulate insurance prices).  They found that rate regulation (that is, non-
competitive rating) was statistically significant and positively associated with the
percentage of drivers in the assigned-risk market.  Interestingly, the coefficient on
the size of the assigned-risk market was statistically significant and inversely
related to market concentration, suggesting that the size of that market increased
as the voluntary market became more concentrated.
29. She estimated regressions predicting the variance in loss ratios (automobile liabil-
ity and homeowners multiple-peril insurance) in 48 states and for three different
types of insurance carriers (direct writers, national agency companies, regional
companies) for the period 1972–1986.
30. They used data from all non-exclusive state fund jurisdictions for the period
1986–1991.
31. This variable was equal to the ratio of the percentage advisory rate change filed by
the rating bureau to the percentage rate change approved by regulators, minus 1.
32. Specifically, Klein, Nordman, and Fritz found that nonstringent prior-approval
regulation (where the regulatory agency approved the full rate request of the rat-
ing bureau) reduces the loss ratio by 13.9 percent, while more stringent prior-
approval regulation (where the agency approves only one-half of the bureau’s rate
request) reduces the loss ratio by 11.3 percent.
33. Specifically, they estimated equations predicting price and residual market share
using a pooled, cross-sectional, fixed-effects model and data from 43 jurisdictions
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for the period 1980–1987.  They used two price measures: 1) the ratio of workers’
compensation premiums earned (adjusted for policyholder dividends) to the total
number of work-related injuries in the state, which they termed average price per
injury, and 2) the ratio of compensation premiums to the total number of private
nonagricultural employees in the states, or the average price per employee.  The
merits of these variables as cost measures were reviewed in Chapter 3.  Competi-
tive-rating states included states that did not require prior approval of rates by the
state insurance commission.
34. In the price-per-injury equations (in which the regulatory environment was treated
as either exogenous or endogenous), the competitive-rating variable was statisti-
cally significant and associated with a 14–29 percent price reduction relative to
states with strict prior approval legislation.  In the price-per-employee equations,
the competitive-rating variable was either statistically significant and associated
with a 25 percent decrease in the average price-per-employee of workers’ com-
pensation, or it was not statistically significant.
35. In that equation, the partial-competition variable was associated with a 13 percent
drop in the price per employee.
36. Using data from 47 jurisdictions for the years 1983 and 1986–1989, Appel,
McMurray, and Mulvaney estimated 12 regression specifications predicting the
natural logarithm of adjusted manual rates.
37. These researchers also compared means of these cost measures for competitive
and noncompetitive jurisdictions for individual years—except, for weekly premi-
ums, 1986 and 1989—and for the entire period.  Adjusted manual rates in compet-
itive-rating states exceeded those in noncompetitive-rating states for all
comparison years except 1983, but the difference in means for adjusted manual
rates was only statistically significant when the individual-year data were aggre-
gated.  The average weekly insurance premium in competitive-rating states was
greater than that in noncompetitive states for three of the four periods examined
(1987, 1988, and all years combined, but not in 1983), but the difference was
never statistically significant.
38. Three basic variants (six permutations) of the open-competition variable were
also used.  These variants were designed to measure time-dependent effects of
competitive rating legislation.  However, regressions using these variables pro-
duced inconclusive results.
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7
The Effect of 
Workers’ Compensation 
Insurance Regulation
 
Evidence
 
Our review of relevant economic theory in the previous chapter
indicated that insurance rate regulation potentially affects workers’
compensation insurance pricing and, consequently, delivery system
efficiency.  However, theory fails to yield unambiguous predictions
about the nature of these effects.  To date, the empirical literature has
similarly failed to yield consistent results, which may be due to meth-
odological problems (including difficulties associated with the depen-
dent measure, the characterization of the regulatory environment, and a
failure to capture insurance cycle effects due to a short time series).
In this chapter, we present the results of regression analyses pre-
dicting the employers’ cost of workers compensation and the extent of
market concentration as a function of the state regulatory environment.
We believe that we are able to overcome many of the methodological
difficulties encountered by prior research.  Specifically, we think that
we have a superior dependent measure, that we capture many of the
complexities in the nature of the regulatory environment, and that our
time series is long enough to control for insurance cycle effects.
 
EMPLOYER COST SPECIFICATION
 
As we indicated in Chapter 4, employers’ workers’ compensation
costs are determined by a number of factors, including statutory benefit
levels, the liberality of claims administration, and the underlying injury
rate, as well as the state regulatory environment.  Thus, the estimating
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equation for predicting employer costs as a function of the regulatory
environment takes the following form: 
 
Eq. 7.1
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associated coefficients; and 
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 is an error term.  More specifically, 
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consists of a set of dummy variables, each of which designates either a
particular regulatory rule or regulatory regime that is in effect in a par-
ticular state and year.  In some analyses, two other variables are
included as supplements to the regulatory regime variables: a “hard-
market” dummy and an estimate of regulatory stringency. In these
equations, the hard-market and regulatory-stringency variables are
interacted with the regulatory-regime dummies.  These variables are
described in greater detail in the following section.
 
Regulatory Environment Variables
 
Insurance rate regulation is a complex phenomenon, not easily
modeled by a single binary variable indicating whether or not the mar-
ket is regulated.  Our analyses use five classification categories or rules
to characterize the regulatory environment for workers’ compensation
insurance pricing in a particular state.  These decision rules are as fol-
lows: 
1)
 
 Prior approval rule
 
:  The insurer may implement a rate adjust-
ment without prior approval from the state insurance commission.
2) 
 
Advisory rate rule
 
:  The insurer may use rates or loss costs differ-
ent from those filed by the rating organization (bureau rates).
Unlike deviations, rates can vary among insureds for a particular
carrier. 
3)
 
 Loss cost rule
 
:  The rating organization files loss costs. 
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4)
 
 Deviations rule
 
:  Deviations from bureau rates are permitted.  For
a particular carrier, deviations must be uniform for all insureds. 
5)
 
 Schedule rating rule
 
:  The insurer may use schedule rating.  
Significantly, the cost impact of these rules may vary depending
upon the particular configuration of rules in a state.  For example, a
market that permits deviations (rule 4) but requires the prior approval
of rates (rule 1 is violated) may be either more or less regulated (i.e.,
may constrain insurer behavior to a greater or lesser extent) than a mar-
ket that does not permit deviations but that also does not require prior
approval (that is, allows insurers to “file and use” rates).  Thus, the par-
ticular configuration of rules may be as important in determining insur-
ance costs as the individual rules themselves.  In our subsequent
analyses, we have attempted to measure not only the effects of the indi-
vidual regulatory rules on costs but also the effects of particular combi-
nations or configurations of those rules, which we term 
 
regulatory
regimes
 
.
As indicated, we measured the effects associated with these rules
or regulatory regimes by using a series of dummy variables.  A value of
1 was assigned to jurisdictions that are less regulated (or more deregu-
lated), according to the rule.  For example, jurisdictions in which the
insurers could either “use and file” or “file and use” rates without first
obtaining the prior approval of the state regulatory agency (rule 1) were
assigned a value of 1 for the without-prior-approval variable.  Jurisdic-
tions in which the insurer was required to first obtain prior approval
before implementing new rates were assigned a value of zero.
Unfortunately, economic theory and the rate regulation literature
offer little guidance as to the appropriate schema for classifying regula-
tory regimes in order to assess their potential effect on insurance market
outcomes.  Consequently, our first step was simply to identify which of
the five rules described in the previous paragraph applied to each of the
states in our study for each year in the study period.  We did this, in part,
through a survey of state insurance commissioners, which is described
in Appendix F.  Commissioners were asked to characterize the actual
practice of the insurance commission relative to these rules, as opposed
to the “letter of the law” contained in the statute.
We then examined the resultant distribution of jurisdictions with
respect to the various configurations of the five regulatory rules (i.e.,
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the regulatory regimes).  Those regimes that included only a small
number of observations were combined into larger categories that
made sense conceptually.  This produced a set of seven regimes that
represent an overwhelming majority of regulatory environments in
effect during the study period.  We term this set our full-set regulatory
environment model, and it includes the following categories: pure
administered pricing, administered pricing with deviations, adminis-
tered pricing with schedule rating, advisory rates with prior approval,
advisory rates without prior approval, loss costs with prior approval,
and loss costs without prior approval.  We then identified six additional
regulatory environment models, which are subsets of the full-set model
and which were created by collapsing categories of the full set.  Some
of these subset models correspond to those used in prior research, and
these are identified in our discussion of the results.  
 
F
 
-tests were used
to select a preferred specification from this group of regulatory envi-
ronment models.
The seven regulatory environment models are shown in Table 7.1,
versus the five regulatory rules.  Model 1 represents the full-set model,
while models 2 through 7 are subsets.  For statistical reasons, one cate-
gory in each regime has to be omitted from our regression analysis;
these omitted categories are identified in Table 7.1 as well.  
For model 1, the table indicates that prior approval of rates is
required in all regimes except advisory rates without prior approval and
loss costs without prior approval.  The table also indicates that states
must adhere to bureau rates under pure administered pricing and in
regimes of administered pricing with deviations or with scheduled rat-
ing; however, rates are advisory in the next two regimes (advisory rates
with prior approval and advisory rates without prior approval).  Under
the two loss-cost regimes, adherence to bureau loss-cost filings may or
may not be required.
The change in the number of jurisdictions for which each of the
five regulatory rules were in effect over the 1975–1995 period is illus-
trated in Figure 7.1.  These data show that workers’ compensation
insurance markets in the United States have become more deregulated
over time, as indicated by the increasing number of states with no prior
approval, advisory rates, loss costs, and schedule rating.  The sole
exception to this deregulatory trend is the decline in the number of
states that permit deviations.  This anomaly can be explained by the
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Table 7.1 Relationship between the Regulatory Environment Models and the Regulatory Rules
 
a
 
 
 
Regulatory Rule:
environment models
Without prior 
approval
Advisory 
rates
Loss 
costs Deviations
Schedule 
rating
Model 1 (omitted category, pure administered pricing) No No No No No
Administered pricing with deviations No No No Yes No
Administered pricing with schedule rating No No No — Yes
Advisory rates with prior approval No Yes No — —
Advisory rates without prior approval Yes Yes No — —
Loss costs with prior approval No — Yes — —
Loss costs without prior approval Yes — Yes — —
Model 2 (omitted category, non–loss cost systems)     — — No — —
Loss costs with prior approval No — Yes — —
Loss costs without prior approval Yes — Yes — —
Model 3 (omitted category, pure administered pricing) No No No No No
Partial competition No — No — —
Open competition Yes — — — —
Model 4 (omitted category, pure administered pricing) No No No No No
Administered pricing with deviations or schedule 
rating
No No No — —
Advisory rates — Yes No — —
Loss costs — — Yes — —
 
(continued)
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Table 7.1 (continued)
 
Regulatory Rule:
environment models
Without prior 
approval
Advisory 
rates
Loss 
costs Deviations
Schedule 
rating
Model 5  (omitted category, pure administered pricing) No No No No No
Variation from bureau rates with prior approval No — No — —
Advisory rates without prior approval — Yes No — —
Loss costs with prior approval No — Yes — —
Loss costs without prior approval Yes — Yes — —
Model 6 (omitted category, pure administered pricing) No No No No No
Administered pricing with deviations or schedule 
rating No No No — —
Advisory rates or loss costs — — — — —
Model 7 (omitted category, pure administered pricing) No No No No No
Administered pricing with deviations No No No Yes No
Administered pricing with schedule rating No No No — Yes
Advisory rates with prior approval — Yes No — —
Loss costs — — Yes — —
 
a
 
A “yes” in a table cell indicates that the rule listed in the table heading applies in the particular regime listed in the left-most column; a
“no” indicates the rule does not apply.  (For example, a “yes” under the “without prior approval” heading indicates that the regime does
not require the prior approval of rates [per rule 1] by the state regulatory agency, while a “no” denotes that it does.)  A dash (—) indi-
cates that either interpretation of the rule may apply; for example, a dash under the “deviations” column indicates that the regime may or
may not permit deviations from bureau rates.
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fact that deviations are superfluous in those states that have adopted
other components of workers’ compensation insurance pricing deregu-
lation. 
The change in the number of jurisdictions for which each of the
seven regulatory regimes in the full-set model were in effect over the
1975–1995 period is illustrated in Figure 7.2.  These data also show
that the workers’ compensation insurance market has become increas-
ingly deregulated.  The number of states with a pure-administered-pric-
ing regime has declined, as has the number of states with an
administered-pricing regime that permits deviations (but requires prior
approval of rates).  On the other hand, the number of states with either
form of loss-cost regulatory regime has increased since the loss-cost
approach was first implemented in the early 1980s.
The effects of rate regulation on employer costs are critically
dependent on the behavior of the agency responsible for regulating the
insurance industry.  As we noted in Table 6.1, deregulation can result in
either higher or lower costs for employers relative to regulated rates,
depending on whether the insurance commission is more responsive to
the concerns of insurance carriers or employers.  Lacking a good the-
ory of regulatory behavior, we are unable to make predictions concern-
ing the relationship between these regulatory rules/regimes and
employer costs.  It is critically important to somehow measure the
extent to which the regulatory agency suppresses insurance rates or, on
the other hand, the extent to which rates may exceed competitive mar-
ket levels due to industry cartelization.
 
Regulatory stringency
 
In some of our regression equations we included a variable mea-
suring the degree to which the regulatory agency suppresses (or ele-
vates) rates.  This variable, which we have termed 
 
regulatory
stringency
 
, is an index that was derived by dividing the lagged loss
ratio for each state by the lagged national average for that year.  State
average loss ratios were obtained from 
 
Best’s DataBase Service,
P/C/State/Line Report
 
 (A.M. Best Company 1997 [and other years]).
Recall that the inverse of the loss ratio is a rough measure of employer
profitability; the higher the loss ratio, the less profitable the insurer.
Lagged values measure profitability in the previous year.  
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Because this index was calculated separately for each year in our
study period and because it compares the loss ratio for each state to the
national average, it is independent of the insurance cycle to the extent
that the insurance cycle is nationally based.  A high value for the regu-
latory stringency variable means that the state’s loss ratio is above the
national average.  The interpretation of this variable differs between
regulated and deregulated markets.  In a regulated market (for example,
an administered pricing environment), the loss ratio is a measure of the
degree of rate suppression: the greater the extent of rate suppression,
the higher the relative loss ratio.  In addition, in the year in which a
market is deregulated, this variable measures the degree of stringency
in the regulated market in the year immediately prior to deregulation.
For both reasons, we expect a negative relationship between regulatory
stringency and employer costs in pure-administered-pricing jurisdic-
tions.
Similar measures have been used in other studies of workers’ com-
pensation insurance rate regulation.  Klein, Nordman, and Fritz (1993)
and Danzon and Harrington (1998) used measures that combine the
rate requested by the rating organization and the rate granted by the
state insurance commission.  Both sets of authors hypothesized that as
the difference between these two rates increased, the more stringently
the insurance commission suppressed rates.  However, as Klein, Nord-
man, and Fritz pointed out, rate filings are often made strategically.  In
other words, the rate request is not necessarily equal to the rate the rat-
ing organization believes will yield the desired level of profitability, but
instead reflects other factors such as the likelihood that the regulatory
agency will grant the request.  The stringency measure used in this
study does not suffer from this weakness.
 
Hard-market dummy
 
In order to examine the relationship between the insurance cycle
and the effect of deregulation on employer costs, we also included a
dummy variable that identifies the existence of a “hard” insurance mar-
ket nationally in our regression equations.  For the purpose of our
regression analyses, a 
 
hard market
 
 is defined as one in which the
national combined ratio for the workers’ compensation insurance line
exceeded 100.
 
1
 
  We thus concluded that the years 1975–1977 (inclu-
sive) and 1984–1992 (inclusive) were hard-market periods.  Our hard-
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market variable was assigned a value of 1 during these years and a
value of 0 for all other years in our study.  
By definition, a hard market is one in which insurers are, on aver-
age, experiencing losses.  Recall from the discussion of the accounting
model in Chapter 4 that, in our regression equations, dummy variables
measure cost differences attributable to differences in profit and
expense loadings.  As such, we expect that the hard-market dummy
variable will be negatively related to employer compensation costs,
reflecting the reduction in insurers’ profits.  If the effects of a hard mar-
ket are somehow exacerbated by rate regulation—if, for example, a
regulatory lag in approving rates retards the insurers’ price adjustments
in response to changing market conditions—then we expect to find that
cost reductions associated with a hard market will be greater in a regu-
lated market than in an unregulated one.
 
EMPLOYER COSTS: REGRESSION RESULTS
 
As indicated, state regulatory environments are multidimensional,
so that it is inappropriate to code regulatory approaches using a single
binary variable to denote the presence or absence of “regulation.”  In
addition, while regulatory rules may have different effects in different
configurations, both economic theory and prior research offer little
guidance concerning the expected impact of regulation or deregulation
on employer costs generally or the relative impact of different regula-
tory regimes specifically.  Consequently, our empirical strategy is to let
the data guide our choice of regulatory model.
 
2
 
 
The means and standard deviations of adjusted manual rates and
net weekly costs in different regulatory environments (using our
detailed rule/regime scheme described earlier) are shown in Table 7.2
for the different regulatory rules and for the full set of regulatory
regimes.  The data for rules suggest that, in general, the greater the
extent of regulation, the lower the employers’ costs.  Specifically, the
means of both adjusted manual rates and net weekly costs are lower
when prior approval is required, when adherence to bureau rates or loss
costs is required, when the bureau files fully developed rates rather
than loss costs, and when schedule rating is not permitted.  The devia-
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Table 7.2 Employer Costs by Regulatory Environment
 
a
 
Rule or regime
 
N
 
Adjusted manual 
rates 
($/$100 payroll)
Net weekly costs
 ($ per employee)
Regulatory rule
Prior approval required 813 2.1893
(1.176)
11.4916
(6.468)
No prior approval required 95 2.5389
(0.703)
13.7519
(3.850)
Adherence to bureau rates 
required
616 2.2061
(1.204)
11.6693
(6.628)
Advisory rates (adherence not 
required)
292 2.3213
(0.906)
12.1710
(5.017)
Bureau submits fully 
developed rates
780 2.1466
(1.150)
11.2816
(6.325)
Bureau submits loss costs 
only
128 2.8572
(0.704)
15.3685
(3.845)
Deviations not permitted 233 2.4475
(1.293)
13.2620
(7.315)
Deviations permitted 675 2.1231
(1.008)
11.0074
(5.348)
Schedule rating not permitted 617 2.1910
(1.206)
11.5459
(6.629)
Schedule rating permitted 291 2.3667
(0.875)
12.5224
(4.877)
Regulatory regime
 
b
 
Pure administered pricing 129 2.4128
(1.393)
13.1340
(7.919)
Administered pricing with 
deviations
364 2.0779
(1.089)
10.7008
(5.600)
Administered pricing with 
schedule rating
116 1.9739
(0.913)
10.5487
(5.275)
Advisory rates with 
prior approval
133 1.6754
(0.777)
8.2456
(4.071)
Advisory rates without
prior approval
38 2.3964
(0.731)
12.5903
(3.680)
 
(continued)
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Table 7.2 (continued)
 
Rule or regime
 
N
 
Adjusted manual 
rates 
($/$100 payroll)
Net weekly costs
 ($ per employee)
Loss costs with prior approval 71 3.1918
(0.636)
16.5239
(3.720)
Loss costs without 
prior approval
57 2.6491
(0.667)
14.6478
(3.769)
 
a
 
Values are means, with standard deviations in parentheses.
 
b
 
The regulatory regimes in this panel are listed from top to bottom in order of our 
 
a
 
 
 
priori
 
expectations regarding the degree to which the statute provides for greater regulatory
control, so that pure administered pricing is the most regulated statutory environment,
while a loss-cost system that does not require prior approval is the most deregulated
environment.
 
tions rule is the sole exception; that is, mean adjusted manual rates and
net weekly costs are slightly lower in states that permit deviations from
bureau rates than in states that do not.
Data for the regulatory regimes are less straightforward.  The low-
est costs are found in states where rating bureaus promulgate advisory
rates and where insurers must obtain approval before implementing
new rates.  In these jurisdictions, the adjusted manual rate averages
$1.68 per $100 of payroll and the net weekly costs are $8.25 per
employee.  The highest costs were found in loss-cost jurisdictions that
require the prior approval of rates; in these states, adjusted manual
rates per $100 of payroll and net weekly costs are $3.19 and $16.52,
respectively.  
It is difficult to draw conclusions from this simple comparison of
means, because the incidence of these different regulatory environments
has varied considerably over time.  Administered pricing was more
prevalent in the early years of our study period, when costs were gener-
ally lower, whereas loss-cost systems are a much more recent phenom-
enon.  Taken at face value, these results imply that the decision making
of state regulatory agencies about rate levels is more likely to be influ-
enced by insurance consumers (i.e., employers) than by providers (i.e.,
insurers), since rates tend to be lower in more regulated environments.
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 display average adjusted manual rates and aver-
age net weekly costs, by year, for different regulatory regimes.  The
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Figure 7.3 Adjusted Manual Rates under Different Regulatory Regimes, 1975–95
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Figure 7.4 Net Weekly Costs under Different Regulatory Regimes, 1975–95
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principal empirical regularity emerging from the data in these figures is
that employers’ relative costs associated with these regimes shift over
time.  For example, while loss-cost systems that do not require prior
approval were relatively costly during the period between 1985 and
1990, costs in these states by 1995 (the end of the study period) were
lower than in all other regulatory regimes as measured by the adjusted
manual rate.  Part of this cost differential is due to changes in the mix
of states that fall into each regulatory regime category in any particular
year.  Due to the small number of observations in each category (partic-
ularly with respect to some categories in more recent years), there is a
great deal of variability in these individual series over time.  For similar
reasons, it is important to be cautious in our interpretation of the rela-
tionship between employers’ costs and the regulatory environment.
The fact that costs in one of the most highly regulated regimes
(administered pricing with deviations) are approximately equal to
those under the least regulated regime (loss-cost systems that do not
require prior approval of rates) suggests that the regulatory environ-
ment does not affect costs or that other variables are equally important
determinants.  To control for the latter possibility, we estimated regres-
sion equations predicting costs as a function of the regulatory environ-
ment.
 
Regulatory Rules
 
As we previously indicated, we use variables representing five
rules to characterize the regulatory environment for workers’ compen-
sation insurance.  Results from eight different models are reported,
each offering a different characterization of the regulatory environ-
ment.  Data with respect to the impact of these rules on employer costs
are presented under the heading “Regulatory Rules” in Tables 7.3 and
7.4.  Table 7.3 reports elasticities and the associated absolute 
 
t
 
-ratios
from equations predicting adjusted manual rates, and Table 7.4 dis-
plays elasticities and 
 
t
 
-ratios from net weekly cost equations.  To sim-
plify the presentation, these tables only report the coefficients and 
 
t
 
-
ratios for the regulatory-environment variables.  (Results for the full set
of regressors are presented in Appendix G, Tables G.1 and G.2.  Unlike
the data reported in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, which are estimated elasticities,
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the data in Tables G.1 and G.2, as well as the other appendix tables, are
the untransformed regression coefficients.)
All models were estimated using data from the 45 jurisdictions that
permit the private provision of compensation insurance, so that the sam-
ple size is 908 observations.  All models were estimated using weighted
least squares to control for problems arising from heteroscedasticity.
Each regulatory rule variable is coded so that the elasticity has a
negative sign if deregulation results in reduced employer costs.  As can
be seen, the results are mixed, although the signs are relatively consis-
tent between Tables 7.3 and 7.4.  
The elasticities for the loss-cost variable in both the adjusted man-
ual rates and net weekly costs equations are negative and statistically
significant.  Together, the loss-cost results in these two tables suggest
that employer costs are around 11 percent lower in a more deregulated
environment where the rating organization files loss costs rather than
fully developed rates.  This result is similar to that reported by Klein,
Nordman, and Fritz (1993), who also found a negative (although statis-
tically insignificant) relationship between loss-cost filing and the state-
wide loss ratio.  On the other hand, Appel, McMurray, and Mulvaney
(1992) found an insignificant positive relationship between loss-cost
filing and adjusted manual rates for their sample.
Likewise, the data indicate that employer costs in jurisdictions that
do not require prior approval of rates are around 5 percent lower than
costs in states that require approval, indicating once again that deregu-
lation reduces costs.  This finding is also similar to the results of Klein,
Nordman, and Fritz (1993), who found a significant negative relation-
ship between prior approval and average loss ratios.  On the other hand,
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show that the elasticities for the schedule-rating
variable are statistically significant and positive, suggesting that
employer costs are higher where insurance carriers are permitted to use
schedule-rating plans for individual carriers.  Specifically, costs are 8–
9 percent higher in those jurisdictions that permit schedule rating.
Finally, the results for deviations and advisory rates are generally unre-
liable (that is, the estimates are not statistically different from zero at
conventional levels), implying that these variables have little effect on
employer costs.  
As we previously indicated, the regulatory rules specification
ignores interaction effects among various combinations of these regu-
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Table 7.3 Regression Coefficients for Adjusted Manual Rates under Different Regulatory Rules and Regimes
 
a
 
Regulatory rules Model 1
 
b
 
Model 2 Model 3
W/o prior approval –0.0521*
(1.71)
Admin. pricing 
w/dev.
0.0608*
(1.90)
Loss costs 
w/prior  appr.
–0.0193
(0.59)
Partial compet. –0.0069
(0.20)
Adv. rates 0.0357
(1.18)
Admin. pricing 
w/sched. rating
0.0826**
(2.05)
Loss costs 
w/o prior appr.
–0.1644***
(5.75)
Open compet. 0.0441
(1.51)
Loss costs –0.1112***
(3.83)
Adv. rates 
w/prior appr.
0.0860**
(2.22)
Deviations –0.002
(0.11)
Adv. rates 
w/o prior appr.
0.1825***
(3.23)
Sched. rating 0.0790***
(2.89)
Loss costs 
w/prior appr.
0.0552
(1.26)
Loss costs 
w/o prior appr.
–0.1041***
(2.82)
 
(continued)
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Table 7.3 (continued)
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Admin. pricing 
w/dev. or sched. 
rating
0.041
(1.38)
Var. from bur.
rates w/prior 
appr.
0.0714**
(2.44)
Admin. pricing 
w/dev. or sched. 
rating
0.043
(1.43)
Admin. pricing 
w/dev.
0.047
(1.48)
Adv. rates 0.1024***
(2.74)
Adv. rates w/o
prior appr.
0.1657***
(3.25)
Adv. rates or
loss costs
0.023
(0.71)
Admin. pricing 
w/sched. rating 
0.010
(0.27)
Loss costs –0.045
(1.32)
Loss costs w/prior 
appr.
0.056
(1.27)
Adv. rates 
w/prior appr.
0.0680*
(1.74)
Loss costs 
w/o prior appr.
–0.1081***
(2.98)
Loss costs w/o 
prior appr.
–0.009
(0.25)
 
a
 
Coefficients are followed by 
 
t
 
-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at
the 10% level.
 
b
 
Model numbers correspond to those in Table 7.1.
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Table 7.4 Regressions Predicting Net Weekly Costs under Different Regulatory Rules and Regimes
 
a
 
Regulatory rules Model 1
 
b
 
Model 2 Model 3
W/o prior appr. –0.0557*
(1.81)
Admin. pricing 
w/dev.
0.0796**
(2.44)
Loss costs 
w/prior appr.
–0.0167
(0.51)
Partial compet. 0.0065
(0.19)
Advisory rates 0.0196
(0.65)
Admin. pricing 
w/sched. rating
0.1165***
(2.81)
Loss costs 
w/o prior appr.
–0.1639***
(5.66)
Open compet. 0.0620**
(2.09)
Loss costs –0.0100***
(3.38)
Adv. rates, 
w/prior appr.
0.0926**
(2.36)
Deviations 0.0093
(0.45)
Adv. rates 
w/o prior appr.
0.1992***
(3.46)
Sched. rating 0.0903***
3.25)
Loss costs 
w/prior appr.
0.0739*
(1.65)
Loss costs 
w/o prior appr.
–0.0942**
(2.51)
 
(continued)
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Table 7.4 (continued)
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Admin. pricing 
w/dev. or sched. 
rating
0.0624**
(2.05)
Var. from bur. rates 
w/prior appr.
0.0899***
(3.01)
Admin. pricing 
w/dev. or sched. 
rating
0.0644**
(2.08)
Admin. pricing 
w/dev.
0.0648**
(1.99)
Adv. rates 0.1082***
(2.85)
Advisory rates 
w/o prior appr.
0.1747***
(3.37)
Adv. rates or loss 
costs
–0.0330
(0.99)
Admin. pricing 
w/sched. rating
0.0413
(1.08)
Loss costs –0.0326
(0.93)
Loss costs 
w/prior appr.
0.0752*
(1.68)
Adv. rates 
w/prior appr.
0.0744*
(1.88)
Loss costs
 w/o prior appr.
–0.0967***
(2.61)
Loss costs w/o 
prior appr.
0.0050
(0.14)
 
a
 
Coefficients are followed by 
 
t
 
-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at
the 10% level.
 
b
 
Model numbers correspond to those in Table 7.1.
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latory rules.  It is likely that these rules have different effects when they
appear in different combinations with other rules.  For instance, requir-
ing an insurer to adhere to fully developed rates may very well have a
different impact on employer costs than requiring adherence to the rat-
ing organization’s loss-cost estimates.  To examine these potential
interaction effects, we estimated additional regression equations, using
dummies to represent various regulatory rule configurations or
regimes.
 
Regulatory Regimes
 
Seven additional specifications (summarized in Table 7.1) were
estimated using different combinations of the regulatory rules, and
these regression results are presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4.  If deregu-
lation is associated with a reduction in employer costs, we would
expect the elasticities associated with each regime to be negatively
signed.  Moreover, the regime categories in these tables are ordered,
according to our 
 
a priori
 
 expectations, from “least deregulated” to
“most deregulated” (from top to bottom), so that we would also expect
to find an ordered relationship for the associated elasticities. 
Cox tests (data not shown) comparing the regulatory-rules specifi-
cations with model 1 in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 reveal that the latter are pre-
ferred for both the net cost and adjusted manual rate regressions
(Greene 1993, pp. 223–225).
 
3
 
   In other words, regression specifica-
tions with the full set of regulatory regime dummies are superior to the
equation including regulatory rule dummies.  This suggests that there
are significant interaction effects among regulatory rules.  This is also
evident from a comparison of coefficients for loss-cost regimes in mod-
els 1 through 7 with the coefficient for the loss costs in the regulatory
rule specification.  As previously noted, costs are negatively related to
the loss-cost rule, while in most of the regulatory regime models,
adjusted manual rates and net weekly costs under loss-cost regimes
that require prior approval are not significantly different from those
under a pure-administered-pricing regime.  
A comparison of the results for the different regulatory regimes
paints a mixed picture of the impact of deregulation on employer costs.
The data indicate that employers in loss-cost-without-prior-approval
jurisdictions experience costs that are 10–16 percent lower than those
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in pure-administered-pricing jurisdictions.  However, other forms of
deregulation apparently either do not affect or actually increase
employer costs. 
Our regression results suggest that inconsistent findings among
studies examining the effects of workers’ compensation insurance
deregulation are, at least partially, due to differences in the character-
ization of the regulatory environment in these studies.  For example,
model 2, which finds that deregulation reduces employer costs, is simi-
lar to that used by Barkume and Ruser (1997) and Carroll and Kaestner
(1995), each of whom also found that deregulation was associated with
lower injury rates and costs.  On the other hand, the regulatory environ-
ment simulated by model 3 is similar to that employed by Schmidle
(1994), who failed to find a consistent, statistically significant relation-
ship between costs and his open competition and partial competition
measures. 
Models 2 through 7 are restricted versions of the more general
model 1.  For example, model 2 assumes that coefficients on the dum-
mies representing the first four regimes of model 1 are equal.  As such,
hypothesis tests of these linear restrictions may be used to select a pre-
ferred model.  These tests reveal that there are no significant differ-
ences between administered-pricing jurisdictions that permit
deviations and administered-pricing regimes that permit schedule rat-
ing.  They further reveal no significant differences between states that
do not permit deviations or schedule rating and states that require prior
approval of advisory rates.  Consequently, model 5 was chosen as the
preferred specification.  Subsequent analyses will examine the effects
of regulation using this model exclusively.
The results for model 5 suggest that there are differences between
the effects of a partial deregulation of the workers’ compensation
insurance market (such as the adoption of deviations or schedule rat-
ing) and more comprehensive reform (such as the adoption of loss-cost
filing).  Specifically, partial deregulation—at least in the form of advi-
sory rates and no prior approval—is apparently associated with higher
employer costs, while the adoption of a loss-cost system that does not
require prior approval of rates substantially reduces employer costs.
This is a puzzling result.  If partial deregulation increases costs relative
to a regulated market, why would more comprehensive deregulation
have the opposite effect?
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As we have seen, these two forms of deregulation (partial and com-
prehensive) were generally adopted at different points in the insurance
cycle.  It is possible that insurance cycle effects may explain these
anomalous results.  Specifically, price deregulation during a hard mar-
ket when rates are likely to be suppressed by the state insurance com-
mission may be associated with higher employer costs, while
deregulation in a soft market may be associated with a cost reduction.
Accordingly, in the next section we examine whether there is variation
in the effects of deregulation on employer costs at different stages of
the insurance cycle.  
 
Employer Costs and the Insurance Cycle
 
We used the national average of a loss ratio measure to examine the
relationship between the insurance cycle and the effect of deregulation
on employer costs, using a dummy variable that is coded as 1 when the
combined ratio for workers’ compensation insurance in the United
States is greater than 100, and as 0 otherwise.  By this definition, the
years 1975–1977 (inclusive) and 1984–1992 (inclusive) were desig-
nated as hard-market periods.  This variable was used as a regressor
and was also interacted with the regulatory regime dummies.  
If rate suppression by regulatory agencies is greater during a hard
market than during a soft one, we expect that when entered separately,
the dummy variable indicating the hard stage of the insurance cycle
will be negatively related to costs.  (The noninteracted dummy captures
the effect of a hard market under a pure-administered-pricing regime.)
In addition, since insurers should be more responsive to market forces
in a deregulated environment and since a hard market is one in which
demand exceeds supply, then we expect that interaction terms repre-
senting various deregulated regimes in a hard market will also be posi-
tively related to employer costs.  
The results of the regression equations that predict costs as a func-
tion of the regulatory environment and of the stage of the insurance
market are presented in Table 7.5.  Because the insurance cycle stage is
defined by time, the hard-market variable is perfectly collinear with the
year dummies; thus, the time dummies had to be dropped from these
regression equations. 
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Table 7.5 Regression Coefficients for Predicting Costs as a Function of 
Regulatory Environment and Stage of the Insurance Cycle
 
a
 
Variable
Adjusted manual 
rates
Net weekly 
costs
ln(Cash benefits) 0.1900***
(4.07)
0.2240***
(4.79)
Medical benefits 0.0003***
(17.56)
0.0003***
(18.62)
ln(Injury) 0.8982***
(11.02)
0.9318***
(11.41)
Union density –0.0425***
(12.94)
–0.0388***
(11.80)
PPD percentage 0.0108***
(6.33)
0.0104***
(6.06)
Covered employment 0.0140*
(1.83)
0.0189**
(2.46)
Competitive state fund 0.2094***
(3.62)
0.2215***
(3.82)
Hard market –0.0597**
(2.33)
–0.0323
(1.26)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 0.1793***
(5.02)
0.1950***
(5.45)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 
 
× 
 
hard market
–0.1365***
(4.43)
–0.1413***
(4.58)
Adv. rates w/o  prior appr. 0.2145***
(3.19)
0.2165***
(3.21)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 
 
× 
 
hard market
0.0602
(0.99)
0.0659
(1.08)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.0549
(0.99)
0.0808
(1.46)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 
 
× 
 
hard market 0.0618
(0.95)
0.0410
(0.63)
Loss costs w/o  prior appr. –0.1482***
(3.02)
–0.1265***
(2.57)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 
 
× 
 
hard market 0.1538***
(2.86)
0.1372**
(2.55)
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Table 7.5 (continued)
 
Variable
Adjusted manual 
rates
Net weekly 
costs
State dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies No No
Adjusted 
 
R
 
2
 
0.8892 0.8993
 
a
 
Coefficients are followed by 
 
t-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
The regression results reported in this table are partially consistent
with our prior expectations.  The hard-market dummy has a negative
sign (which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in the
adjusted manual rate equation), indicating that employer costs are
lower during a hard market.  This may seem to be a surprising result,
since a hard market is characterized by excessive demand relative to
supply, which tends to drive up prices.  However, recall that these
regression estimates control for loss costs, so the hard-market dummy
measures the extent to which the loading factor—which includes the
insurer’s profit margin as well as marketing and underwriting
expenses—is affected by the hard market.  Because expenses are rela-
tively fixed, these results suggest that insurer’s profits shrink during the
hard stage of an insurance cycle, which would occur if regulators sup-
pressed rates below competitive levels.
The results in Table 7.5 show that one of the interaction terms (hard
market in states that allow variations from bureau rates) is significantly
different from zero.  This indicates that the effect of this type of dereg-
ulation partially depends on the stage of the insurance cycle.  Conse-
quently, separate estimates of regulation effects were made for both
hard and soft markets.4  These estimates, which are equivalent to the
cost difference between the associated regulatory regime and pure
administered pricing in a hard versus a soft market, are reported in
Table 7.6.  The results indicate that in a soft market, adjusted manual
rates are 19.64 percent higher under a regime that allows variation from
bureau rates (deviations, schedule rating, or advisory rates) subject to
prior approval than they are under a pure-administered-pricing sys-
tem.  However, in a hard market, rates under this form of deregulation
are not statistically different from rates under pure administered pric-
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Table 7.6 Effects of Regulatory Regimes and the Insurance Cyclea
Regulatory regime
Adjusted 
manual rates
Net weekly
costs
Regulatory regime effects in a hard market
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 0.0437
(1.19)
0.0552
(1.49)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.3161***
(4.82)
0.3263***
(4.94)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.1238*
(1.87)
0.1296*
(1.95)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 0.0056
(0.10)
0.0108
(0.20)
Regulatory regime effects in a soft market
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 0.1964***
(5.02)
0.2153***
(5.45)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.2392***
(3.19)
0.2417***
(3.21)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.0564
(0.99)
0.0842
(1.46)
Loss costs w/o prior appr.
–0.1377***
(3.02)
–0.1188***
(2.57)
Effects of a hard market under different 
regulatory regimes
Pure admin. pricing
–0.0579***
(2.33)
–0.0317
(1.26)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr.
–0.1782***
(11.04)
–0.1593***
(9.75)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.0006
(0.01)
0.0342
(0.60)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.0022
(0.04)
0.0088
(0.15)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 0.0987**
(1.99)
0.1107**
(2.21)
a Coefficients are followed by t-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
216 Chapter 7
ing.  A possible explanation for this difference is that under the varia-
tions-from-bureau rates-without-prior-approval regime, the regulatory
agency continues to hold rates down during a hard market but allows
the insurer to increase rates relative to pure administered pricing during
the soft phase of the cycle.
Similar to our previous results, the data on regime effects show that
more moderate forms of deregulation tend to have a positive impact on
employer costs, suggesting once again that partial deregulation is asso-
ciated with higher insurance prices.  The coefficient on the loss-cost-
with-prior-approval variable indicates that the adoption of this type of
deregulation has little or no effect on employer costs relative to pure-
administered-pricing regimes, while loss-cost systems with prior
approval tend to reduce costs in the soft (but not the hard) phase of the
insurance cycle.  Once again, we are left with the anomalous result that
the most unregulated regime has lower compensation insurance prices
relative to pure administered pricing, while costs are higher under
some milder forms of deregulation.
Table 7.6 also reports estimates of the effect of a hard market on
employer costs under different regulatory regimes, i.e., the cost differ-
ential between a hard and a soft market under each regime (although
the net weekly cost result is not statistically significant).  These data
show that adjusted manual rates and net weekly costs per employee are
5.79 percent and 3.17 percent lower, respectively, during a hard market
than during a soft one under a system of pure administered pricing
(although the net weekly cost result is not statistically significant).
This difference is even more marked for regimes that allow variation
from bureau rates but still require prior approval.  For these regimes,
costs are 16 to 18 percent lower under a hard market than under a soft
one.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that regulatory
agencies are more likely to suppress rates during a hard market, while
during a soft market, regulatory rate suppression is not binding because
insurers are likely to cut rates in the face of reduced demand.  The data
simply indicate that cuts are less dramatic in less-regulated environ-
ments.
In more-deregulated environments (i.e., lost-cost systems without
prior approval), a hard market actually leads to higher rates.  This result
is consistent with the idea that in a deregulated regime, insurers more
readily respond to market forces.  Recall that in a hard market, the
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demand for insurance outstrips the supply, a condition that should be
associated with higher prices.
Nonetheless, this analysis fails to explain why partial deregulation
appears to have a greater impact on insurance prices than more radical
reform; we continue to find this result after controlling for the stage of
the insurance cycle.
Employer Costs and Regulatory Stringency
As we noted in Chapter 6, the impact of deregulation will vary
depending on the behavior of the state agency responsible for regulat-
ing the workers’ compensation insurance market.  If the agency fol-
lows a rate suppression strategy, then deregulation will result in higher
employer costs for workers’ compensation insurance.  On the other
hand, if the agency effectively creates a cartel in which insurers are
permitted to pursue oligopolistic pricing policies, then premium rates
will drop following deregulation.  Thus, differences in regulatory strat-
egies among state insurance commissions may explain the inconsistent
results obtained in our previous analyses.
To control for potential variation in regulatory strategy across juris-
dictions and over time, we reestimated our regression models after
including a measure of rate suppression, a variable we termed regula-
tory stringency.  Recall that this variable is an index of the size of the
state’s lagged loss ratio relative to the national average.  
Under pure administered pricing, the regulatory-stringency variable
measures the extent to which the state insurance commission sup-
presses rates.  As such, higher values of this variable indicate greater
rate suppression, so it should be negatively related to employer costs.
However, in states where the insurance market has been truly deregu-
lated, the regulatory-stringency variable reflects the impact of prior reg-
ulation (since it is lagged one year).  Alternatively, the regulatory-
stringency variable reflects underlying differences in costs among states
that are uncontrolled by other variables in the regression equation and
that are necessarily unrelated to any regulatory rate suppression. 
In other words, the value for the stringency variable for a state in
which the insurance market was deregulated during the previous year
indicates the extent to which insurers suppressed rates prior to deregu-
lation.  The higher the value, the greater the degree of rate suppression,
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and we expect that the greater the extent of rate suppression during the
previous year, the higher that prices will rise following deregulation.
Similarly, if insurer costs are high relative to the national average in an
unregulated market, insurers are expected to raise prices, a response
that is either unavailable or somehow restricted in a regulated environ-
ment.  For both reasons, we hypothesize that costs will be positively
related to the regulatory-stringency variable under deregulated
regimes. 
As was the case for the hard-market dummy, the regulatory-strin-
gency variable entered each equation separately and was also inter-
acted with the regulatory-environment variables.  The results from this
regression are reported in Table 7.7.  The data indicate that regulatory
stringency (as measured by the loss ratio) is negatively related to
employer costs, as predicted.  In addition, stringency appears to have
an important moderating influence on regulatory regime effects.  After
controlling for stringency, the coefficients for all deregulation dummies
are negatively signed and statistically significant, except for “advisory
rates without prior approval,” which is not statistically different from
zero.  In other words, the more stringently regulators suppress rates
during the previous year, the smaller the subsequent cost reduction due
to deregulation.  This latter result suggests that the positive relationship
between partial deregulation and employer costs reported in Tables 7.3
and 7.4 may be due to differences in the extent of pre-deregulation rate
suppression.
Table 7.8 presents estimates of the effects of the different forms of
deregulation on employer costs, relative to pure administered pricing,
under different severities of regulatory stringency.  In other words,
these coefficients measure the cost differential, in percentage terms,
between the corresponding deregulated environments and pure admin-
istered pricing.  Low stringency indicates that the lagged loss ratio
index is one standard deviation below the mean, medium stringency
means that the state-specific lagged loss ratio is equal to the national
average, and high stringency denotes a lagged loss ratio that is one
standard deviation above the mean.  The pattern of these effects is con-
sistent with our expectations: the impact of deregulation depends on
the degree of regulatory stringency.  Several empirical regularities
emerge.  
The Effect of Regulation: Evidence 219
Table 7.7 Regression Coefficients for Costs as a Function of the 
Regulatory Regime and Regulatory Stringencya
Variable
Adjusted manual 
rates
Net weekly
 costst
ln(Cash benefits) 0.1223***
(2.92)
0.1489***
(3.51)
Medical benefits 0.0001***
(5.10)
0.0001***
(5.38)
ln(Injury) 0.9088***
(9.83)
0.8609***
(9.19)
Union density –0.0006
(0.15)
0.0024
(0.58)
PPD percentage 0.0111***
(6.79)
0.0109***
(6.56)
Covered employment 0.0100
(1.51)
0.0132**
(1.96)
Competitive state fund 0.2299***
(4.39)
0.2374***
(4.47)
Regulatory stringency –0.3155***
(3.88)
–0.3079***
(3.74)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.3512***
(3.58)
–0.3333***
(3.35)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr.
× regul. stringency
0.4045***
(4.48)
0.4038***
(4.41)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.0921
(0.41)
–0.0273
(0.12)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr.
× regul. stringency
0.0431
(0.19)
0.1744
(0.76)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.3352**
(2.17)
–0.3337**
(2.13)
Loss costs w/prior appr. × regul. stringency 0.3637***
(2.65)
0.3792***
(2.73)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.5760***
(3.61)
–0.5662***
(3.50)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. × regul. stringency 0.4524***
(2.94)
0.4536***
(2.90)
State dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.9202 0.9258
a Coefficients are followed by t-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
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First, as we found previously, under most regulatory stringency
scenarios, employer costs are lower under pure administered pricing
than under a deregulated regime, suggesting that regulators are prima-
rily influenced by employers rather than carriers and therefore suppress
workers’ compensation insurance rates relative to their competitive
levels.  Second, the impact of deregulation on employer costs is more
positive (or less negative) at higher levels of regulatory stringency,
implying that regulatory agency behavior is an important cost determi-
nant, as expected.  Interestingly, where regulatory stringency is low,
insurance costs are reduced under all deregulated regimes relative to
pure administered pricing (with the exception of systems where rating
bureaus file advisory rates that are not subject to prior approval). 
Finally, there is a rough correspondence between our a priori rank-
ing of the restrictiveness of the statutory regime and the cost differen-
Table 7.8 Effects on Employer Costs of Regulatory Regimes under 
Different Conditions of Regulatory Stringencya
Regulatory stringency
Regulatory regime Low Medium High
Adjusted manual rates
Var. from bureau rates 
w/prior appr.
–0.0272
(0.78)
0.0547*
(1.88)
0.1436***
(4.26)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.1349**
(1.99)
0.1447***
(2.85)
0.1546**
(2.13)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.0433
(0.77)
0.0289
(0.65)
0.1065**
(2.23)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.1927***
(4.32)
–0.1163***
(3.23)
–0.0326
(0.68)
Net weekly costs
Var. from bureau rates
w/prior appr.
–0.0102
(0.28)
0.0731**
(2.45)
0.1633***
(4.74)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.1187*
(1.75)
0.1584***
(3.06)
0.1996***
(2.66)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.0299
(0.52)
0.0466
(1.02)
0.1290***
(2.64)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.1840***
(4.05)
–0.1065***
(2.90)
–0.0216
(0.44)
a Coefficients are followed by t-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level; 
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
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tial under all stringency conditions.  With the exception of the
advisory-rates-without-prior-approval regime, the regulatory cost dif-
ferential shrinks as the statute becomes less restrictive until it becomes
significantly negative for the most deregulated environment.  This sug-
gests that a more restrictive regime can provide the regulatory agency
with more effective tools that can be used to suppress rates.
Our estimates of the effect of regulatory stringency on employer
costs for different regulatory systems are presented in Table 7.9.  The
results in this table are also consistent with our hypotheses.  The rela-
tionship between employer costs and stringency is significantly nega-
tive for pure administered pricing, significantly positive for regimes
that allow variation from bureau rates subject to prior approval, and not
statistically different from zero for other jurisdictions.  These results
imply that under pure administered pricing, regulators are able to sup-
press rates.  However, when the insurance market is less regulated,
insurer pricing is either unaffected by the loss ratio or, in the case of
regimes that allow variation from bureau rates subject to prior
approval, insurers increase rates subsequent to a drop in profit margins
(as measured by the lagged loss ratio). 
Importantly, the results in Tables 7.8 and 7.9 offer an explanation
for the difference between the effects of partial and comprehensive
Table 7.9 Effects of Regulatory Stringency on Employer Costs under 
Different Regulatory Regimesa
Regulatory regime
Adjusted manual 
rates
Net weekly 
costs
Pure admin. pricing –0.3155***
(3.88)
–0.3079***
(3.74)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 0.0889*
(1.65)
0.0959*
(1.75)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. –0.2724
(1.29)
–0.1335
(0.63)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.0482
(0.43)
0.0713
(0.62)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 0.1369
(1.01)
0.1457
(1.06)
a Coefficients are followed by t-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level; 
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
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deregulation on workers’ compensation costs.  Specifically, these
results imply that partial deregulation has asymmetric effects on
employer costs, while the impact of comprehensive deregulation is
more symmetric.  That is, partial deregulation removes price ceilings
imposed by regulatory agencies without substantially affecting down-
ward competitive pressure, so that when regulatory restrictions are
removed under conditions of low stringency, prices do not fall relative
to their levels under pure administered pricing.  A possible explanation
for this asymmetry is that under partial deregulation, the rating bureau
continues to act as a cartelizing force pushing rates up above competi-
tive levels.  On the other hand, insurance prices under a loss-costs-
without-prior-approval system are much more responsive to market
forces.  
Employer Costs, the Insurance Cycle, and Regulatory Stringency
The regression results presented in the previous section suggest
that the effect of deregulation on employer costs is dependent upon the
strategy of the regulatory agency prior to deregulation.  Where insur-
ance commissions suppress rates (resulting in high loss ratios), then
deregulation is associated with higher costs as insurers raise rates to
more profitable levels (or, in the case of loss-cost regimes without prior
approval, deregulation leads to smaller rate reductions).  The opposite
is true if rates are not suppressed under regulation; in this case, insurers
will reduce rates following deregulation—at least in the most deregu-
lated environment.   Results from Tables 7.5 and 7.6 also suggest that
the effect of these regulatory strategies on employer costs may differ
depending on the stage of the insurance cycle.  
In this section, we examine the effect of the interaction of regula-
tory stringency and market conditions (stage of the insurance cycle) on
the relationship between insurance price regulation and employer
costs.  Specifically, we present regression results predicting employer
costs as a function of a series of terms that interact the hard-market
dummy with the regulatory-stringency variable, the hard-market
dummy with the regulatory-environment dummies, and all three vari-
ables together.  These regressions, which are reported in Appendix
Table G.3, include the full set of control variables (with the exception
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of year dummies, which were excluded due to collinearity with the
hard-market dummy).
Table 7.10 presents estimates of the effects of regulatory strin-
gency and of the insurance cycle (“Effect of a Hard Market”) in differ-
ent regulatory environments per these regression models.  The first data
set shows that, in a hard market, the regulatory stringency variable has
a consistent (negative) relationship with employer costs under pure
administered pricing.  There is some suggestion that this reduction in
costs associated with stringency is more marked during the soft phase
of the insurance cycle than during the hard phase.  Interestingly, there
is no apparent relationship between stringency and costs in variations-
from-bureau-rates-with-prior-approval jurisdictions when these addi-
tional controls are introduced, suggesting that the impact of stringency
on costs under this regime (see Table 7.9) is solely attributable to cycle
effects.
The data also indicate that the insurance cycle has different effects
on employer costs under different regulatory regimes.  Similar to our
previous results, costs are lower in a hard market relative to a soft one
in jurisdictions where the statute provides regulators with greater con-
trol over rates.  However, under more comprehensive deregulation,
while these costs appear to be lower in a hard market, the differences
are not statistically significant.  This provides further evidence that reg-
ulatory agencies suppress rates in regulated markets, while prices in a
deregulated market environment are more responsive to market forces.
Our estimates of the effects of deregulation relative to pure admin-
istered pricing under three conditions of regulatory stringency, during
both the hard and soft stages of the insurance cycle, are reported in
Table 7.11.  The values in this table are estimates of the percentage cost
differential between the regulatory regime listed in the row headings
and pure administered pricing (under different conditions of regulatory
stringency and during different stages of the insurance cycle).  For
example, these results show that under conditions of low stringency in
a hard market, adjusted manual rates in loss-cost systems that do not
require prior approval of rates are 31.52 percent lower than adjusted
manual rates in pure-administered-pricing jurisdictions.  
Overall, the results in Table 7.11 are consistent with prior expecta-
tions, as well as with the results of our previous analyses.  Once again,
the estimates suggest that, under most scenarios, costs are higher in
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Table 7.10 Effects of Regulatory Stringency or Hard Markets on 
Employer Costs under Different Regulatory Regimesa
Regulatory regime
Adjusted manual 
rates
Net weekly
costs
Effect of regulatory stringency in a hard market
Pure admin. pricing –0.2621**
(2.51)
–0.2086*
(1.93)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.0377
(0.49)
–0.0157
(0.20)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. –0.4998***
(2.66)
–0.4780**
(2.49)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.1627
(0.80)
–0.1333
(0.64)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 0.0867
(0.38)
0.0190
(0.09)
Effect of regulatory stringency in a soft market
Pure admin. pricing –0.3805***
(3.96)
–0.3785***
(3.92)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.1043
(1.36)
–0.0960
(1.24)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. –0.1055
(0.21)
0.1828
(0.31)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.2150
(1.48)
–0.2127
(1.45)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 0.6500**
(2.33)
0.7199**
(2.52)
Effect of a hard market
Pure admin. pricing –0.0717***
(2.90)
–0.0439*
(1.74)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.3082**
(2.30)
–0.3382***
(2.57)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. –0.1661
(1.08)
–0.2021
(1.33)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.1510
(0.96)
–0.2025
(1.33)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.0394
(0.24)
–0.0903
(0.57)
a Coefficients are followed by t-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
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Table 7.11 Effects of Regulatory Stringency and the Insurance Cycle on 
Employer Costs under Different Regulatory Regimesa
Regulatory stringency
Regulatory regime Low Medium High
Adj. manual rates in a hard market
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 0.0813
(1.55)
0.1641***
(4.13)
0.2532***
(5.41)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.1078
(0.88)
0.1923**
(2.47)
0.2832*
(1.72)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.0180
(0.24)
0.0296
(0.51)
0.0796
(1.24)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.3152***
(5.00)
–0.1670***
(3.67)
0.0134
(0.21)
Adj. manual rates in a soft market
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.0201
(0.45)
0.0333
(0.89)
0.0897*
(1.80)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.3789***
(4.14)
0.2757***
(4.23)
0.1803**
(1.96)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.0937
(0.99)
0.1217*
(1.77)
0.1504*
(1.92)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.0497
(0.73)
0.0268
(0.48)
0.1095
(1.35)
Net weekly costs in a hard market
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 0.0984*
(1.86)
0.1839***
(4.58)
0.2761***
(5.83)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.0656
(0.55)
0.2120***
(2.69)
0.3785**
(2.20)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.0108
(0.14)
0.0597
(1.02)
0.1111*
(1.70)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.3082***
(4.85)
–0.1520***
(3.30)
0.0395
(0.62)
Net weekly costs in a soft market
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.0010
(0.02)
0.0436
(1.15)
0.0901*
(1.80)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.3997***
(4.32)
0.2880***
(4.38)
0.1851**
(2.00)
(continued)
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Table 7.11 (continued)
Regulatory stringency
Regulatory regime Low Medium High
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.1053
(1.10)
0.1256*
(1.82)
0.1462*
(1.87)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.0232
(0.33)
0.0275
(0.49)
0.0808
(1.00)
a Coefficients are followed by t-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
partially deregulated environments than under pure administered pric-
ing.  Similarly, the relationship between regulatory stringency and the
regulated/deregulated cost differential is also consistent with prior
expectations and previous results.  As hypothesized, the cost differen-
tial in most instances becomes more positive (less negative) as regula-
tory stringency increases (as the extent of regulatory rate suppression
increases).
Predicted Employer Costs
Table 7.12 presents cost predictions based on the regression results
reported in Table 7.7.  With the exception of the regulatory regime, all
independent variables retained their actual values; that is, the predic-
tions were made assuming that the values of the control variables were
identical to their estimated sample values.
The first data column in Table 7.12 reports the actual costs for each
regulatory regime listed in the row headings.  The remaining columns
report predicted costs if the state changed regulatory regimes from that
listed in the row heading to that listed in the “New regime” column
headings.  For example, the table shows that employers under pure-
administered-pricing regimes actually paid average adjusted manual
rates equal to $1.46 per $100 of payroll or net weekly costs of $7.68
per employee.  If these pure-administered-pricing states adopted a
regime whereby the regulatory agency permitted variations from
bureau rates but continued to require prior approval, employers would
pay, on average, an adjusted manual rate of $1.57 per $100 of payroll
or net weekly costs equal to $8.25 per employee.  This amounts to a
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Table 7.12 Predicted Costs under Different Assumed Regulatory Regimes
New regime
Current regulatory regime Actual costs
Pure admin. 
pricing
Var. from 
bureau rates 
w/prior appr.
Adv. rates 
w/o prior appr.
Loss costs  
w/prior appr.
Loss costs 
w/o prior appr.
Adjusted manual rates 
($/$100 payroll)
Pure admin. pricing 1.46 1.51 1.57 1.72 1.54 1.32
Var. from bureau rates 
w/prior appr.
1.67 1.57 1.65 1.80 1.61 1.39
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 2.10 2.10 2.20 2.40 2.15 1.84
Loss costs w/prior appr. 3.10 2.98 3.20 3.42 3.12 2.69
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 2.49 2.67 2.87 3.06 2.80 2.41
Net weekly costs ($/employee)
Pure admin. pricing 7.68 7.72 8.25 8.93 8.05 6.86
Var. from bureau rates 
w/prior appr.
8.43 7.88 8.44 9.12 8.23 7.03
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 10.59 9.19 9.85 10.64 9.61 8.20
Loss costs w/prior appr. 15.72 14.81 16.19 17.30 15.77 13.51
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 13.35 14.09 15.46 16.48 15.06 12.91
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six-cent cost increase in the adjusted manual rate over the rate pre-
dicted under pure administered pricing, an increase of approximately 4
percent.  Alternatively, net weekly costs per employee would rise by
$0.53, which amounts to a 5 percent increase over the rate paid under
pure administered pricing.
The data from this table show that moving from the most regulated
regime (pure administered pricing) to the most deregulated (a loss-cost
system that does not require prior approval) results in a predicted 19-
cent rate reduction, from $1.51 to $1.32 per $100 of payroll, equivalent
to a 13 percent drop.  However, the adoption of less comprehensive
forms of deregulation typically results in higher insurance prices.  Pure
administered pricing results in costs that are higher than those found in
all deregulated environments save the loss-cost regimes without prior
approval.  Nonetheless, it is important to recall that, in this table, the
regulatory stringency is held constant at actual levels.
In Tables 7.13 and 7.14 we present cost predictions at different lev-
els of regulatory stringency based on the regression results reported in
Table 7.7.  As before, with the exception of the regulatory regime, these
predictions are based on the actual values of the independent variables
in the equation, including regulatory stringency.  Low-stringency pre-
dictions were made for states in which the value of the stringency vari-
able was less than 0.8 (one standard deviation below the mean),
medium-stringency observations had values between 0.8 and 1.2 (one
standard deviation above the mean), and high-stringency observations
had values over 1.2.
The data in these tables indicate that under low stringency, the pre-
dicted cost of every regulatory regime except advisory rate systems
that require prior approval is less than that predicted for the pure-
administered-pricing system.  Predicted costs for loss-cost regimes that
do not require prior approval are substantially less than the costs for
pure administered pricing.  Under most scenarios, employer costs
under comprehensive deregulation are predicted to be 20–25 percent
less than costs under pure administered pricing.  
Under conditions of average and high stringency, the cost advan-
tage for deregulation (other than loss-cost-without-prior-approval
regimes) is eliminated altogether.  Under high stringency conditions,
moving from a pure-administered-pricing plan to a loss-cost system
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Table 7.13 Predicted Adjusted Manual Rates under Different Assumed Regulatory Regimes and Stringency 
Conditions ($ per $100 of payroll)
New regime
Current regulatory regime Actual costs
Pure admin. 
pricing
Var. from 
bureau rates 
w/prior appr.
Adv. rates 
w/o prior appr.
Loss costs
 w/prior appr.
Loss costs
 w/o prior appr.
Low stringency
Pure admin. pricing 1.81 1.88 1.79 2.13 1.76 1.48
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 2.00 2.04 1.93 2.31 1.91 1.60
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 1.17 3.32 3.06 3.74 3.03 2.52
Loss costs w/prior appr. 3.24 4.00 3.56 4.49 3.53 2.92
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 1.93 2.43 2.31 2.75 2.28 1.91
Medium stringency
Pure admin. pricing 1.29 1.34 1.40 1.53 1.37 1.17
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 1.55 1.47 1.54 1.69 1.51 1.29
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 2.05 2.01 2.10 2.30 2.05 1.75
Loss costs w/prior appr. 3.11 2.94 3.10 3.36 3.03 2.60
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 2.53 2.76 2.92 3.16 2.85 2.45
High stringency
Pure admin. pricing 2.67 2.63 3.11 3.05 3.00 2.64
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 2.25 1.84 2.31 2.14 2.21 1.97
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 3.27 2.72 3.16 3.15 3.05 2.68
Loss costs w/prior appr. 3.00 2.63 3.24 3.06 3.11 2.76
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 2.48 2.32 2.84 2.70 2.73 2.42
230Table 7.14 Predicted Net Weekly Costs under Different Assumed Regulatory Regimes and Stringency Conditions 
($ per employee)
New regime
Current regulatory regime Actual costs
Pure admin. 
pricing
Var. from 
bureau rates 
w/prior appr.
Adv. rates 
w/o prior appr.
Loss costs 
w/prior appr.
Loss costs 
w/o prior appr.
Low stringency
Pure admin. pricing 9.80 9.37 9.06 10.38 8.89 7.44
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 10.92 10.99 10.58 12.15 10.39 8.69
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 5.82 7.28 7.08 8.08 6.95 5.82
Loss costs w/prior appr. 16.26 19.80 17.94 21.32 17.68 14.63
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 10.57 12.84 12.40 14.21 12.17 10.19
Medium stringency
Pure admin. pricing 6.80 6.90 7.35 7.97 7.17 6.11
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 7.73 7.27 7.75 8.40 7.56 6.45
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 10.36 8.99 9.58 10.39 9.35 7.97
Loss costs w/prior appr. 15.97 14.81 15.92 17.17 15.53 13.26
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 13.69 14.70 15.86 17.07 15.46 13.21
High stringency
Pure admin. pricing 13.72 13.55 16.29 16.49 15.78 13.76
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 11.43 9.27 11.85 11.58 11.43 10.08
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 16.69 12.73 15.06 15.38 14.60 12.69
Loss costs w/prior appr. 14.90 12.71 15.91 15.74 15.37 13.51
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 12.75 11.77 14.64 14.53 14.15 12.42
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without prior approval results in a slight increase (about 5 percent) in
employer costs.
Overall, the results in this chapter provide evidence consistent with
the economic theory outlined in the previous chapter; that is, the strat-
egy of the agency responsible for rate regulation largely determines the
effect of deregulation on costs.  To the extent that rates are suppressed
by the regulatory agency, partial deregulation will be associated with
an increase in employer costs.  In general, the results for partial dereg-
ulation also indicate that, while regulatory strategies appear to vary
across state insurance commissions, on average, state commissions are
more likely to suppress rates prior to deregulation than act as a carteliz-
ing force that boosts rates above competitive levels.  Higher costs are
found under all partially deregulated regimes. 
On the other hand, under most scenarios, employer costs in loss-
cost systems that do not require prior approval, the least regulated mar-
ket environment, are substantially lower than costs under pure adminis-
tered pricing.  In other words, more comprehensive deregulation has an
effect on employer costs that is different from the effect of more mod-
erate forms of deregulation.  One possible explanation for these seem-
ingly contradictory results is that partial deregulation has an
asymmetric impact on employer costs, i.e., it leads to increased costs
under stringent regulation but fails to reduce costs under conditions of
low stringency.  The reason for this asymmetry is that, under partial
deregulation, the rating bureau acts as a cartelizing force blunting the
impact of market forces.  In addition (or alternatively), insurers in loss-
cost systems that do not require prior regulatory approval of rates
respond to deregulation by cutting prices in an attempt to gain market
share.
MARKET STRUCTURE AND RATE REGULATION
Insurance rate regulation affects market outcomes other than costs.
If, for example, the workers’ compensation insurance regulatory
agency is “captured” by employers, then we would expect that deregu-
lation will increase the number of insurers willing to underwrite work-
ers’ compensation policies; as a result, the market should become less
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concentrated.  On the other hand, the market could become more con-
centrated after deregulation if insurance industry interests dominate the
regulatory agency, as marginal insurers who had entered the market
attracted by supracompetitive prices are forced to exit following dereg-
ulation and consequent rate reductions.  
As previously indicated, traditional measures of market structure
are four- and eight-firm concentration ratios, which may be defined as
the share of the compensation insurance market (in terms of direct pre-
miums written) that is controlled by the largest four and eight insur-
ance carriers in the market, respectively.  
National data on four- and eight-firm concentration ratios in the
workers’ compensation insurance market for the period 1975–1995 are
depicted in Figures 7.5 and 7.6, respectively.5   These data show cycli-
cal variation that is roughly coextensive with the insurance cycle.  That
is, the average concentration ratio increases during hard market periods
(i.e., between 1975 and 1977 and between 1984 and 1992) and declines
during the soft market phases (i.e., between 1978 and 1983 and
between 1993 and 1995).  Interestingly, the variability in these mea-
sures shows similar cyclical variation, with a three- to four-year lag.
Variability appears to increase from 1988 through 1992 and declines
from 1980 through 1985.
The 1995 interstate variation in the four- and eight-firm concentra-
tion ratios, respectively, are shown in Figures 7.7 and 7.8.  The data in
these figures also exhibit substantial variability.  The four-firm concen-
tration ratio ranges from 0.685 in Maine to 0.237 in Indiana, and the
eight-firm ratio ranges from 0.905 in Maine to 0.393 in Indiana.  That
is, the four largest groups in Maine account for 68.5 percent of the
direct premiums written there, and the eight largest insurer groups
account for 90.5 percent of the market.
To determine the effect of rate regulation on workers’ compensa-
tion market structures, we estimated simple regression equations: four-
and eight-firm concentration ratios are predicted as a function of the
variables used to characterize the regulatory environment in the cost
regression equations, as well as measures of market size and state and
year dummies.  Data in these regressions are limited to those states that
permit private insurance. 
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Figure 7.5 Four-Firm Concentration Ratio, 1975–95 (mean ± S.D.)
Figure 7.6 Eight-Firm Concentration Ratio, 1975–95 (mean ± S.D.)
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Figure 7.7 Four-Firm Concentration Ratios for 1995, by State
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Figure 7.8 Eight-Firm Concentration Ratios for 1995, by State
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MARKET STRUCTURE REGRESSIONS
Assuming that the nearest thing to a competitive market is found in
loss-cost systems that do not require prior approval, then our cost
results suggest that rates in less deregulated regimes are higher than
competitive market levels.  The cost results indicate that either there
are inefficiencies associated with pure administered pricing or that
insurers are able to cartelize the market under administered pricing, at
least in the short run.  As can be seen from Table 6.1, we are unable to
predict the impact of deregulation on market structure if the underlying
market, in the absence of regulation, is competitive.  However, a find-
ing of a negative relationship (or no relationship) between deregulation
and market concentration would provide confirmatory evidence for the
economic theory of rate regulation discussed in Chapter 6.  
To examine this issue, we estimated regression models predicting
statewide four- and eight-firm concentration ratios for the workers’
compensation insurance line in states that permit private insurance car-
riers to offer compensation insurance.6   These regressions included the
regulatory environment variables used in our previous analyses: the
stringency variable, the hard-market dummy, and state and year dum-
mies to control for unobserved variation in other factors that could
influence market concentration.  As controls, we also included the
competitive-state-fund dummy, covered employment, and nonfarm
employment.  These latter variables measure the size of the market and
should be negatively related to market concentration.  Since the range
of the concentration ratio is limited to between zero and one, these
market concentration variables were transformed to log-odds ratios.
Due to the presence of heteroscedasticity for ordinary least squares
regressions, we estimated weighted least squares regressions, using
nonfarm employment as weights.  Our empirical analysis is similar to
that used to estimate the impact of regulation on compensation costs,
except that we limit our investigation to our preferred (for purposes of
analysis) regulatory regime specification.
Market Structure and Statutory Regulatory Regimes
The results of our market structure regression equations are pre-
sented in Table 7.15.  As was the case with our previous analyses, the
The Effect of Regulation: Evidence 237
Table 7.15 Regression Coefficients for Insurance Market Concentration 
as a Function of the Regulatory Environmenta
Variable
4-Firm conc. 
ratio
8-Firm conc. 
ratio
Covered employment –0.0306***
(4.09)
–0.0271***
(3.57)
Nonfarm employment × 1000 –0.0374**
(2.50)
–0.0418***
(2.76)
Competitive state fund 0.0018
(0.04)
0.0199
(0.39)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.1902***
(6.28)
–0.1548***
(4.92)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. –0.0441
(0.89)
–0.0673
(1.36)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.1321***
(2.62)
–0.1010*
(1.94)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.1396***
(3.18)
–0.1231***
(2.73)
State dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies No No
Adjusted R2 0.7165 0.7164
a Coefficients are followed by t-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
reported coefficients measure the effect of the regulatory regime on the
dependent variable relative to pure administered pricing.  These esti-
mates are generally consistent with the idea that market structure
becomes less concentrated following deregulation.  On the other hand,
an examination of the pattern of coefficients shows that the extent of
this reduction in market concentration is apparently unrelated to the
extent that the statutory regulatory regime provides regulators with the
tools to control rates.  In particular, the reduction in market share asso-
ciated with the most deregulated environment (loss costs without prior
approval) is less than the reduction associated with the least deregu-
lated environment (variations from bureau rates with prior approval).
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Nonetheless, markets are less concentrated under the loss-costs-
without-prior-approval regime than under administered pricing, which
is consistent with our cost findings (which were lower also) and with
the hypothesis that regulatory agencies are not captured by the
insureds.  An explanation consistent with both the cost and market con-
centration results is that this more comprehensive form of deregulation
induces smaller insurers to set prices at or below pure premium levels
to gain market share.  While this hypothesis violates assumptions of
economic rationality on the part of insurers, recent anecdotal evidence
from California would tend to support it.
Market Structure, Statutory Regimes, and the Insurance Cycle
To determine the effects of the stage of the insurance cycle on mar-
ket structure, we estimated equations predicting four- and eight-firm
concentration ratios as a function of the regulatory regime and the
hard-market dummy variable.  Regulatory regime/hard market interac-
tion terms were included in these equations, which are reported in
Tables 7.16 and 7.17.  
Results in the previous section indicated that employer costs under
pure administered pricing are lower in a hard market relative to a soft
one.  We interpret these findings as evidence that rate suppression
reduces profit margins in a market where demand outstrips supply.  As
a result, we expect that under pure administered pricing, markets will
be more concentrated in a hard market than in a soft one as marginal
insurers leave the market; that is, the reduction in market concentration
due to deregulation should be greater in a hard market than in a soft
one.  Similarly, we expect that deregulation effects will be greater in
hard markets relative to soft ones.  
The data in Tables 7.16 and 7.17 offer only partial support for this
hypothesis.  These data indicate that under pure administered pricing,
market concentration is reduced during a hard market relative to the
soft phase of the cycle, contrary to predictions.  However, the interac-
tion terms suggest that the effect of deregulation on market concentra-
tion is modified by the phase of the insurance cycle in a way that is
consistent with expectations.  From Table 7.16, we can see that every
regulatory regime dummy is negatively signed, while every interaction
term has a positive relationship with market concentration.  These
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Table 7.16 Regression Coefficients for Insurance Market Concentration 
as a Function of the Regulatory Environment and Stage of 
the Insurance Cyclea
Variable
4-Firm conc. 
ratio
8-Firm conc. 
ratio
Covered employment –0.0127
(1.62)
–0.0098
(1.22)
Nonfarm employment × 1000 0.0266**
(2.32)
0.0564***
(4.82)
Competitive state fund 0.0663
(1.22)
0.0602
(1.07)
Hard market –0.0619**
(2.40)
–0.0568**
(2.15)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.2569***
(7.62)
–0.2158***
6.09)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. × hard market 0.1480***
(4.56)
0.1620***
(4.88)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. –0.1241**
(2.12)
–0.1584***
(2.69)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. × hard market 0.1763***
(2.87)
0.2585***
(4.10)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.1622***
(2.93)
–0.1149**
(1.97)
Loss costs w/prior appr. × hard market 0.3597***
(4.85)
0.4068***
(5.35)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.0844*
(1.68)
–0.0738
(1.43)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. × hard market –0.0008
(0.01)
0.0870
(1.40)
State dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies No No
Adjusted R2 0.6727 0.6672
a Coefficients are followed by t-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
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Table 7.17 Effects of Regulatory Regimes and the Insurance Cycle on 
Market Structurea
Regulatory regime
4-Firm conc. 
ratio
8-Firm conc. 
ratio
Regulatory regime effects in a hard market
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.1384***
(3.80)
–0.0780**
(2.02)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.0447
(0.75)
0.0898
(1.45)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.2004***
(2.63)
0.3295***
(4.00)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.0852
(1.51)
0.0104
(0.17)
Regulatory regime effects in a soft market
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.2569***
(7.62)
–0.2158***
(6.09)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. –0.1241**
(2.12)
–0.1584***
(2.69)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.1622***
(2.93)
–0.1149**
(1.97)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.0844*
(1.68)
–0.0738
(1.43)
Effects of a hard market under different
 regulatory regimes
Pure admin. pricing –0.0600**
(2.40)
–0.0552**
(2.15)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 0.0899***
(4.40)
0.1109***
(5.25)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.1212**
(2.07)
0.2235***
(3.57)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.3468***
(4.27)
0.4192***
(4.90)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.0608
(1.15)
0.0307
(0.54)
a Coefficients are followed by t-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
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results suggest, contrary to predictions, that during the soft phase of the
cycle, market concentration is reduced in all deregulated environments
relative to its level under pure administered pricing; but, this reduction
in the deregulated/administered pricing differential is diminished,
eliminated, or even reversed during a hard market.  This is confirmed in
the bottom data set of Table 7.17, which shows that partially deregu-
lated markets become increasingly concentrated during a hard market
and that the market structure is unaffected by the insurance cycle or
becomes less concentrated during a hard market in states where prices
are administered.
On the other hand, these same data in Table 7.17 also indicate that
the insurance cycle has little, if any effect on market structure in states
with loss-cost systems that do not require prior approval.  Once again,
partial deregulation has an effect on market outcomes that is different
from the effect of more comprehensive deregulation.
Market Structure, Statutory Regimes, and Regulatory Stringency
The economic theory of rate regulation outlined in the previous
chapter predicts that if the underlying market is competitive, markets
will become increasingly concentrated as the degree of rate suppression
increases.  To test this hypothesis, we included the regulatory stringency
measure in the regression equation.  The results of this analysis are
reported in Tables 7.18 and 7.19.
These results substantially support our hypothesis that regulation
increases market concentration.  Regulatory stringency is positively
associated with market concentration in the two most highly regulated
environments: pure administered pricing and variations from bureau
rates that require prior approval.  In addition, this positive relationship
between regulatory stringency and market concentration is substan-
tially attenuated in deregulated environments.  This is to be expected if
the regulatory stringency variable is only meaningful where the statute
provides the insurance commission with significant powers to set rates.
Finally, the data in the first two data sets of Table 7.19 show that the
impact of deregulation on market structure increases as regulators sup-
press rates.  Market concentration ratios under each deregulated regime
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Table 7.18 Regression Coefficients for Insurance Market Concentration 
as a Function of the Regulatory Environment and 
Regulatory Stringencya
Variable
4-Firm conc. 
ratio
8-Firm conc. 
ratio
Covered employment –0.0290***
(3.98)
–0.0260***
(3.56)
Nonfarm employment × 1000 –0.0421***
(2.88)
–0.0477***
(3.25)
Competitive state fund 0.0194
(0.37)
0.0821
(1.56)
Regulatory stringency 0.6006***
(6.59)
0.6473***
(7.08)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 0.2274*
(1.77)
0.2216*
(1.72)
Var. from bureau rates w/o prior appr. × loss ratio –0.3981***
(3.76)
–0.3514***
(3.31)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 1.6508***
(4.38)
1.2379***
(3.57)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. × loss ratio –1.0071***
(4.45)
–0.8575***
(3.73)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.4770**
(2.10)
0.1348
(0.68)
Loss costs w/prior appr. × loss ratio –0.4977***
(3.05)
–0.2222
(1.35)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 0.9930***
(3.59)
1.0055***
(3.61)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. × loss ratio –0.8166***
(4.42)
–0.8136***
(4.39)
State dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.7340 0.7399
a Coefficients are followed by t-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
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Table 7.19 Effects of Regulatory Regimes and Regulatory Stringency on 
Market Structurea
Regulatory stringency
Regulatory regime Low Medium High
Four-firm concentration ratios
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.1023***
(2.57)
–0.1713***
(5.65)
–0.2679***
(7.32)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.2045***
(3.01)
–0.0199
(0.39)
–0.2263***
(3.02)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.0050
(0.07)
–0.0934*
(1.79)
–0.2011***
(3.61)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 0.0446
(0.73)
–0.1119***
(2.58)
–0.2809***
(4.85)
Eight-firm concentration ratios
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.0746*
(1.84)
–0.1373***
(4.42)
–0.2178***
(5.92)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 0.1397**
(2.10)
–0.0433
(0.85)
–0.2192***
(2.89)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.0423
(0.61)
–0.0859
(1.63)
–0.1365**
(2.44)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 0.0524
(0.85)
–0.1051**
(2.40)
–0.2731***
(4.69)
Stringency effects 4-Firm 8-Firm
Pure administered pricing 0.5989***
(6.58)
0.6448***
(7.05)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 0.1990***
(3.13)
0.2940***
(4.60)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. –0.4320**
(2.14)
–0.2302
(1.12)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 0.0839
(0.62)
0.4116***
(3.03)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –0.2124
(1.27)
–0.1656
(0.99)
a Coefficients are followed by t-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
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decline relative to pure administered pricing as the degree of rate regu-
lation intensifies.
The picture that emerges from these data is that deregulation
results in increased competition in the workers’ compensation market.
Furthermore, markets become more concentrated as regulators more
stringently suppress rates in more regulated markets.  However, unlike
the cost analyses, we find only slight evidence that partial deregulation
has a different impact on market structure than does more comprehen-
sive deregulation.  In addition, the results with respect to the insurance
cycle are somewhat difficult to reconcile with similar results from the
cost analyses or with the economic theory of rate regulation more gen-
erally. 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE EFFECT OF DEREGULATION
The important results that emerged from the analyses described in
this chapter are as follows.  Most forms of partial deregulation are, on
average, associated with higher employer costs for workers’ compensa-
tion.  On the other hand, more comprehensive deregulation (e.g., loss-
cost systems that do not require prior approval) is, on average, associ-
ated with lower employer costs.  In addition, the impact of deregulation
on costs depends not only on the statutory form of deregulation, but on
the behavior of the regulatory agency prior to deregulation; where the
regulatory agency has suppressed rates, deregulation is more likely to
lead to increased costs.  The behavior of the regulatory agency is
apparently related to the state of the insurance market; regulatory agen-
cies are more likely to suppress rates during a hard market, when
demand exceeds supply, than during a soft one.  Consequently, the
impact of deregulation varies over the insurance cycle.  Finally, all
forms of deregulation are likely to lead to an increase in competitive-
ness, while rate suppression is likely to reduce market competitiveness.
What may we conclude from these results?  Given the contradic-
tory findings for partial and comprehensive deregulation, it is difficult
to draw clear inferences concerning the nature of regulation (i.e.,
whether regulatory agencies are more likely to respond to employers
and suppress rates or whether they are more likely to help the insurance
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industry cartelize the market).  Our inability to do so leads us to con-
clude that regulators do neither, at least not consistently.  Lags inherent
in the regulatory process may be responsible for this inconsistency.
However, it may also be due to the ebb and flow of political pressures
over the course of the insurance cycle.  As the market hardens, political
pressures from employers may force regulators to become more con-
cerned with the impact of insurance rates on the state’s business cli-
mate.  As a result, rates are suppressed.  When the market softens once
again, the political pressures ease and, concomitantly, regulators’ con-
cerns over the effect of workers’ compensation rates vanish and rates
are allowed to rise to competitive (and, perhaps, supracompetitive) lev-
els.
Insurers respond to this pattern of regulatory behavior by increas-
ing prices during the soft phase of the insurance cycle or by not reduc-
ing prices as much as would be expected in an unregulated market.
This is easier to accomplish where the market has been partially dereg-
ulated.  Anticipating rate suppression when the market hardens again,
insurers in partially deregulated systems are likely to keep market rates
higher than the competitive level during the soft phase of the cycle.  In
a partially deregulated environment, this is facilitated by the rating
organization, which promulgates rates that serve as a pricing point for
insurance carriers.  This accounts for the asymmetry between compre-
hensive and partial deregulation.  Comprehensive deregulation results
in lower prices during both phases of the insurance cycle, while insur-
ers take advantage of regulatory indifference to higher rates during the
soft phase, in anticipation of the coming crunch when the market hard-
ens once again.
A regulated market is a more risky environment for insurers.  Thus,
insurers will be attracted to a market that has deregulated, resulting in a
less concentrated insurance market.  It also seems possible, if not
likely, that the influx of insurers into a completely (or near completely)
deregulated market results in a price war, as insurers cut rates to gain or
maintain market share.
This interpretation of our results leads us to conclude that a com-
pletely deregulated market is a more efficient delivery system and is,
therefore, preferable to either partial deregulation or administered pric-
ing.  The latter two alternatives seem to be associated with inefficien-
cies resulting from insurer uncertainty over their ability to respond to
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market changes.  Further, anecdotal evidence from states such as
Rhode Island (as we described at the beginning of this book) suggest
that insurance rate regulation can sometimes have near catastrophic
consequences for all of the stakeholders in the workers’ compensation
program.  
Nonetheless, we are cautious in our conclusions for a couple of
reasons.  First, while we have a relatively long data series spanning at
least one complete insurance cycle, most deregulation—and, in partic-
ular, most comprehensive deregulation—occurred at the end of study
period, so that we were only able to observe the effects of such deregu-
lation for a few years.  The evidence suggests that comprehensive
deregulation has led to a price war in the workers’ compensation insur-
ance market in some states.  If so, it is possible that the substantial rate
reductions found in those states will be short-lived; as the war for mar-
ket share is resolved, prices may rise once again.  In addition, the latter
period (when states moved to open competition) appears to have been a
soft phase of the insurance cycle.  Despite our best efforts, we may not
have adequately controlled for this effect.
Second, while comprehensively deregulated programs seem to per-
form well relative to the delivery system efficiency objective, their per-
formance on other criteria may be less admirable.  As noted in Chapter
2, regulation was first introduced to the insurance industry as a means
of preventing insurer insolvency and the concomitant availability prob-
lems.  In addition, various groups have expressed concerns over qual-
ity-of-service problems associated with different insurance arrange-
ments.   It is possible that while comprehensive deregulation improves
system performance relative to the delivery system efficiency criterion,
it diminishes performance relative to other objectives.  We are particu-
larly interested in one aspect of service quality as it relates to the injury
prevention objective of workers’ compensation: workplace health and
safety as measured by the lost-time injury rate.  We examine this aspect
in the next chapter.
Notes
1. We used the combined ratio to distinguish between hard and soft markets because
we are interested in the effects of insurance cycles on costs regardless of cause,
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that is, whether the cycle is caused by changes in investment returns or other fac-
tors. 
2. Specifically, a Cox hypothesis test was used to determine whether the regulatory
rules model was superior to the full set regulatory regime model.  Then, F-tests
were used to determine whether the various regimes in the full set regulatory envi-
ronment model had effects on employer costs that were significantly different
from one another.
3. The Cox statistic has a standard normal distribution.  Tests comparing the regula-
tory rules specification predicting adjusted manual rates and net weekly costs with
the model 1 regulatory regime specification yielded absolute Cox statistics greater
than 6.
4. These values were estimated by adding the coefficient values for the regulatory
regime dummy and the associated interaction term.
5. The data in Figures 7.5 and 7.6 are state averages.
6. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of squares of percent-
age market shares of each firm, is a superior measure of market concentration
since it reflects the entire distribution of firms rather than only the largest four or
eight firms.  However, HHI data were not readily available and resource limita-
tions forced us to rely on the four- and eight-firm concentration ratios.  These
measures typically are highly correlated with the HHI.
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8
Insurance Arrangements and 
Workplace Safety
 
Thus far, we have examined two market outcomes potentially
affected by workers’ compensation insurance arrangements, i.e.,
employers costs and market structure.  Yet, the debate on private versus
public provision of insurance or rate regulation frequently centers on
another outcome: the quality of services provided to employers and
employees covered by workers’ compensation programs.  Service
quality has a number of dimensions, including the accuracy and timeli-
ness of policies issued by the carrier, loss prevention and safety engi-
neering, and carrier claims adjustment efforts.  In this chapter, we
examine one aspect of this outcome, workplace safety, as it is mea-
sured by the lost-time injury rate.  We are particularly interested in a
hypothesis advanced by Danzon and Harrington postulating that rate
suppression by insurance regulators reduces employer and insurer loss
control incentives and consequently results in a higher injury rate and
greater loss experience more generally.
 
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF WORK ACCIDENTS
 
There is a large theoretical and empirical literature examining the
determinants of the incidence of workplace injuries.  This literature
assumes that while the occurrence of a single work-related accident is,
by definition, a random event not within the control of either the
worker or the employer, both parties can influence the frequency and
severity of injuries in the aggregate: workers can take greater care on
the job, and employers can introduce equipment and worksite practices
to improve inherent safety in the work environment.  
The extent to which both parties adopt practices designed to reduce
the probability of a work accident depends on the associated costs and
benefits.  Accident costs for injured workers include lost income, pain
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and suffering, and the loss of enjoyment of leisure activities, among
other things.  The worker must weigh these costs against the burden
imposed by taking greater care on the job.  This burden may include,
for example, the discomfort associated with wearing personal protec-
tive equipment, or a potential productivity loss associated with taking
additional time to complete a job and the consequent loss of income.
For the employer, an accident can result in higher workers’ compensa-
tion insurance premiums, lost productivity, the associated costs of hir-
ing replacement workers, and damage to property and equipment.  The
employer must weigh these costs against, for example, the expense of
safer machinery and personal protective equipment.
The decision to report a work injury is subject to a similar cost–
benefit calculus.  Workers who file workers’ compensation claims may
be subject to sanctions by the employer, including discharge.  More-
over, once a claim is initiated, firms must decide whether to oppose it
(for example, deny that the injury is compensable) or to question the
determination of degree of disability.  However, by pursuing this
course of action, the employer incurs direct costs in the form of legal
expenses as well as indirect costs in the form of damaged labor rela-
tions.  
The market outcome in which we are ultimately interested is work-
place safety.  Typically, it is assessed by measures such as the injury
rate or the workers’ compensation claims rate.  However, economic
theory and empirical evidence predicts that injury rates will be affected
by employer and worker behavior and that their behavior will be influ-
enced by economic incentives.  To accurately determine the effect of
insurance arrangements on safety, it is necessary to control for these
incentives.  
 
INJURY RATE REGRESSION MODEL
 
There is substantial variation in the industrial and occupational
composition of employment among states.  Because some types of
employment are more hazardous than others, this sectoral variation
translates into heterogeneity with respect to the underlying risk of
injury among states.  To control for this variation, our analysis will use
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the lost-time injury rate measure that was introduced and used as an
independent variable in Chapter 4.  Here we use the lost-time injury
rate as the dependent variable in equations examining workplace
safety.  Our construction of the injury rate variable controls for inter-
state variation in employment composition and thus for the underlying
risk of injury by industrial sector.  Specifically, this measure is a
weighted average of industry-specific injury rates for each state, where
weights are the proportion of national employment in the sector.
As indicated in the previous section, we may expect that the lost-
time injury rate will be influenced by a number of factors affecting the
worker’s and employer’s cost–benefit calculus, including the level or
generosity of compensation benefits, the wage rate, the unemployment
rate, and whether or not the employer is self-insured.  Thus, it is impor-
tant to control for these variables in our empirical work.  In the remain-
der of this section, we discuss each of these factors in turn, indicating
how it is measured and the expected relationship with the lost-time
injury rate.
 
Workers’ Compensation Benefits
 
Higher workers’ compensation benefits reduce the expected costs
of work accidents for injured workers.  Economic theory predicts that
benefit increases will thus induce workers to be less careful on the job,
increase the probability that they will report a work-related injury, and
extend the period of disability if they are injured.  As a result, higher
statutory benefits should be associated with higher injury rates.  On the
other hand, more generous benefits will also increase the expected
accident costs of experience-rated employers.  These firms will
respond by improving workplace safety and by adopting more aggres-
sive claims management policies, which should in turn lead to a reduc-
tion in injury frequency.  Unfortunately, economic theory does not
predict which of these opposing effects will dominate.  Nevertheless,
an extensive empirical literature has found a positive relationship
between compensation benefits and injury or claims rates (see Thoma-
son and Burton 1993; Burton and Chelius 1997; or Durbin and Butler
1998 for a review of this literature).
The cash benefit index regarding the relative generosity of work-
ers’ compensation statutes, which we discussed earlier and used in the
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employer cost models, is also used as a regressor in the injury rates
model in order to control for interstate differences in benefit levels.  We
expect that this benefit variable will be positively related to injury rates.  
 
Wages
 
The higher the wage rate, the greater the cost of a work accident
for the injured worker, since the worker will not receive full replace-
ment of wages while on disability, the cost is particularly high for those
workers subject to the statutory maximum for weekly benefits.  In
addition, higher wages indicate higher-quality workers.  Since high-
quality employees typically embody greater human capital investment,
firms will be more highly motivated to protect these employees from
the risk of injury relative to low-wage, low-quality workers (Thomason
and Pozzebon 1999).  Thus, we expect the injury rate to be negatively
related to wages.  
Our wage measure is based on the statewide average wage of
employees covered by the unemployment insurance program, after
adjusting for interstate variation in industrial composition.  Details of
the methodology used to construct the wage measure are reported in
Appendix D.
 
Unemployment Rate
 
Economic theory predicts that injury rates will be negatively
related to unemployment levels for several reasons.
 
1
 
  First, as the level
of economic activity increases, firms will use the existing labor force
more intensively, requiring workers to work more overtime.  Increased
overtime induces fatigue, which increases the probability of injury.
Second, firms add new workers to the payroll as the economy expands,
so the proportion of younger workers in the workforce thus increases.
Because younger, inexperienced workers are more likely to suffer a
workplace injury, a greater incidence of accidents will be associated
with lower unemployment rates.  Finally, these additional workers will
initially be added to existing capital stock, which implies that work-
places will become more crowded and therefore more hazardous as the
unemployment rate declines.  For these reasons, we include a state-spe-
cific measure of the annual unemployment rate as a regressor in our
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model of the determination of injury rates.  Data for this variable were
obtained from various issues of the U.S. Department of Labor’s
 
Employment and Earnings
 
 series.  We expect this variable to be nega-
tively related to injury rates.
 
Self-Insurance
 
We also include as an independent variable in our injury-rate
regressions a proxy measure for the proportion of the state’s workforce
that is employed by self-insured firms.  This variable is a state-specific
measure of the benefits paid by self-insured employers as a proportion
of total benefits paid.  However, Danzon and Harrington (1998) have
demonstrated that these benefits data are highly correlated with
employment of self-insureds.  We obtained this variable from various
issues of the Social Security Administration’s 
 
Social Security Bulletin
 
and from Schmulowitz (1997).  
Since workers’ compensation costs are tied to the accident experi-
ence of experience-rated employers, the injury rate should be lower for
experience-rated firms than for comparable firms that are not experi-
ence-rated.  Because self-insured employers are, in effect, perfectly
experience-rated, we expect that the injury rate will be negatively
related to the proportion of self-insured employment.  However, this
negative relationship is somewhat attenuated due to the fact that those
firms that elect self-insurance will be large firms that are likely to be
close to perfectly experience-rated by private carriers.
 
Other Variables and Hypotheses
 
The empirical specification of the injury rate model also includes
the union density and coverage variables that we used in the cost
regressions.  There are competing hypotheses: union density could be
either positively or negatively related to the injury rate for reasons we
discussed previously, although existing empirical work suggests the
former rather than the latter.  We have no prior hypotheses regarding
the impact of workers’ compensation coverage on injury rates, but we
expect that it will have the same sign as in the cost regressions.  That is,
if an increase in covered employment includes more workers in high-
risk occupations, then we expect that both compensation costs and the
 254 Chapter 8
 
injury rate will be positively related to covered employment.  The
opposite effect is expected if covered employment increases the num-
ber of workers in low-risk jobs.  Lastly, all of our injury-rate regression
equations include state and year dummies to control for unobserved
state- and time-specific effects that could influence injury rates.
As with our cost and market structure regression equations, we
modeled annual statewide injury rates as a function of a vector of con-
trol variables (specifically, the level of compensation benefits, the aver-
age wage, the unemployment rate, and the proportion of the state’s
workforce employed by self-insured firms); a set of insurance arrange-
ment variables; and state and year dummies.  Once again, comparisons
of public versus private provision of workers’ compensation insurance
are made using dummy variables that indicate whether the state has a
monopolistic or competitive state insurance fund.
The means and standard deviations of the control variables used in
our injury rate analyses for 1975–1995, as well as predictions with
respect to these variables and the regulatory environment variables, are
presented in Table 8.1. 
 
REGRESSION RESULTS: PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE 
PROVISION 
 
As was the case with employer costs, it is difficult to establish 
 
a pri-
ori
 
 whether workplace safety should be better or worse where workers’
compensation insurance is provided by a public agency rather than by a
private insurance carrier.  On the one hand, due to the profit motive, pri-
vate carriers have an incentive to control losses and provide insureds
with safety management services toward that end.  Further, the lack of a
profit motive for exclusive state funds may mean that their provision of
safety management services is inefficient; that is, the profit motive
ensures that private carriers will carefully monitor the outcome of
safety management programs, whereas the state fund has no such incen-
tive.  As a result, we may expect that the improvement in workplace
safety obtained by the private carrier for each dollar spent on loss con-
trol will be more than that obtained by the exclusive state fund for
equivalent spending.
 Insurance Arrangements and Workplace Safety 255
 
Table 8.1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Predicted Signs 
of Injury Rate Regressors
 
On the other hand, private carriers should only provide these ser-
vices up to the point at which the additional dollar spent on loss control
is equal to the additional dollar of losses saved.  In contrast, motivated
by broader political concerns, the state fund may choose to invest more
than this profit-maximizing amount.  If so, this should reduce the acci-
dent rate for exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions below the private market
level.  In addition, since there is a trade-off between accident preven-
tion and claims adjustment efforts (Thomason and Pozzebon 1999),
private carriers may choose to invest more resources in claims manage-
ment and less in safety management than public state funds, increasing
the private carrier injury rate, 
 
ceteris paribus
 
.
Means and standard deviations of the injury rate variable, by insur-
ance arrangement, are presented in Table 8.2.  “Comparison A” pro-
vides injury rates in exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions versus injury
rates in states where private insurance carriers offer workers’ compen-
sation coverage.  “Comparison B” provides injury rates for states that
have a competitive state fund with states that only have private carriers.
Taken together, these comparisons suggest that injury rates are higher
in states that have a public funding agency.  They also suggest that
injury rates are highest in exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions.  However,
these comparisons do not control for other factors that affect injury
rates, such as the level of workers’ compensation benefits.
Table 8.3 reports the results of regressions predicting annual state-
wide injury rates per 100 workers for a regression that includes an
exclusive-state-fund dummy variable and for a regression that includes
 
Variable Mean Std. deviation Prediction
Expected cash benefits ($) 9,449.89 4,795.78 +
Weekly wages ($) 527.87 49.71
 
–
 
Unemployment rate (%) 6.85 1.94
 
–
 
Union density (%) 18.75 8.01 +
Covered employment (%) 89.38 3.83 ?
Proportion self-insured (%) 20.43 10.27
 
–
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a competitive state fund dummy.  The exclusive-state-fund regression
does not include state dummies due to identification problems.  Both
regressions were estimated using weighted least squares to control for
heteroscedasticity problems, with nonfarm employment serving as
weights.
The results from these regressions generally conform to our prior
expectations.  The injury rate is positively related to benefit generosity.
Specifically, a 10 percent increase in benefit levels appears to increase
injury rates about 6 percent.  This suggests that higher benefit levels
reduce the cost of injury for workers, which results in a reduced level
of care by workers or in a higher level of claims reporting.  These
results, including the elasticity estimates, are consistent with prior
research investigating the relationship between benefit levels and the
injury rate.  
Similarly, wages are negatively related to the injury rate in the
competitive-state-fund equation, as would be expected if higher wages
increase the cost of injury for workers, although they are positively
related to wages in the exclusive-state-fund equations.  This latter
result undoubtedly reflects omitted variable bias, since individual state
dummies are not included in this equation.  The negative relationship
between the level of unemployment and the lost-time injury rate indi-
cates that the injury rate is positively related to the state’s economic
activity.  This could be due to the effects of increased levels of over-
time; a higher labor-to-capital ratio; a younger, more inexperienced
workforce; or a combination of any or all of the above.  
Contrary to our expectations, the regression results indicate that
union density is negatively related to the injury rate, suggesting that
unions are successful in improving workplace safety.  However, this is
 
Table 8.2 Comparisons of Injury Rates by Insurance Type
 
Comparison A Comparison B
Variable
Exclusive 
state fund
Permits private 
insurance
Competitive 
state fund
Permits private 
insurance
Mean 9.1593 8.3079 8.3227 8.2973
Std. dev. 0.9834 1.3400 1.4955 1.2181
No. of observations 63 945 279 666
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inconsistent with prior research (Schurman et al. 1998).  The extent of
covered employment is positively related to the injury rate, suggesting
that increased coverage resulted in a greater proportion of workers
employed in high-risk (as opposed to low-risk) occupations during this
period.  While we made no predictions concerning this variable, it is
consistent with the cost equation results, i.e., insurance costs were also
positively related to covered employment.  
Self-insured employment, as a proportion of total employment, is
positively and unexpectedly related to the injury rate in the exclusive
 
Table 8.3 Regression Coefficients for Injury Rates as a Function 
of Insurance Arrangement
 
a
 
Variable
Exclusive 
state fund
Competitive 
state fund
ln(Cash benefits) 0.0526***
(4.46)
0.0666***
(4.06)
ln(Wages) 0.1304*
(1.87)
–0.2885***
(3.86)
Unemployment –0.0094***
(3.09)
–0.0107***
(5.75)
Union density –0.0084***
(9.22)
–0.0053***
(3.68)
Covered employment 0.0230***
(16.75)
0.0059**
(2.49)
Proportion self-insured 0.2698***
(5.77)
–0.0619
(1.31)
Exclusive state fund 0.0842***
(4.89)
—
 
b
 
Competitive state fund — –0.0461***
(3.35)
State dummies No Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted 
 
R
 
2
 
0.3958 0.8589
 
a
 
Coefficients are followed by 
 
t
 
-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
 
b
 
A dash (—) = coefficient not estimated.
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state fund regression but negatively related to injury frequency in the
competitive fund equation (although this latter relationship is not sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels).  This unexpected result is
possibly due to the fact that year dummies were not included in the
exclusive-state-fund regression.  As can be seen, omitting these dum-
mies had a profound effect on the fit of the regression, as measured by
the adjusted 
 
R
 
2
 
.  
The results for the exclusive- and competitive-state-fund dummies
are contradictory.  Exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions appear to have
higher injury rates than states where private carriers provide compensa-
tion insurance, while states with competitive state funds appear to have
lower injury rates than states with only private carriers.  Thus, it
appears that a competitive state fund may reduce the loss cost compo-
nent of the workers’ compensation premium at the same time that it
increases the loading.
 
2
 
  These results indicate, once again, that the
effects of these two types of public insurance funds are substantially
different.
 
THE DANZON–HARRINGTON HYPOTHESIS
 
The traditional economic theory of rate regulation (outlined in
Chapter 6, pp. 159–172) assumes that deregulation only leads to lower
costs if the regulatory agency had been captured by the insurance
industry in the pre-deregulation period.  Recently, Danzon and Har-
rington (1998) postulated that rate suppression by regulatory agencies
can lead to increased costs in the regulatory period and to a reduction
in costs following deregulation.  Their argument focuses on certain
institutional features in the insurance market and, in particular, on the
residual (assigned-risk) market mechanism that insures firms that can-
not obtain insurance directly from private carriers.
One of the consequences of rate suppression in the voluntary mar-
ket is that insurers withdraw coverage from high-risk employers, who
are then forced into the residual market.  Since deficits in residual mar-
ket accounts—which are common—are financed through a tax on
insurers that varies according to the insurer’s share of premiums in the
voluntary market, voluntary market insureds effectively subsidize firms
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in the residual market.  Danzon and Harrington argued that this subsi-
dization encourages high-risk firms in the residual market to expand
operations, which increases average losses experienced by all firms. 
Danzon and Harrington also claimed that rate suppression in the
voluntary market also results in cross-subsidies between high- and low-
risk firms within the residual market.  Specifically, they noted that:
 
With higher rates for a given class in the residual market than the
voluntary market . . . some employer with lower expected claim
costs than other firms insured in the residual market will end up
subsidizing these higher risk firms.  The voluntary market for
these employers is too low to induce voluntary supply; that is, it is
less than the expected costs of providing coverage including the
cost of the increased share of the expected residual market deficit
that the insurer must pay if it provides coverage voluntarily.  But
the higher rate for the residual market may exceed the actuarial or
expected cost, exclusive of any share of the deficit.  Thus, these
employers help subsidize the deficit caused by other residual mar-
ket risks with higher expected costs.   (P. 21)
 
Moreover, the extent of cross-subsidization within the residual market
increases as the residual market differential increases.  This within-
market subsidization also encourages high-risk firms to expand opera-
tions.
Furthermore, institutional features of the labor market reduce
insurer incentives for loss control.  Since insurers share deficits for
residual-market firms but solely bear the burden of loss control
expenses for these firms, there is little incentive for insurance carriers
to provide firms in the residual market with loss-control services,
which results in higher costs due to a deterioration in accident experi-
ence.  Additionally, state regulatory agencies are more likely to
approve rate request increases based on higher pure premiums than on
increased expense loadings, which further weakens insurer incentives
for loss control.
 
3
 
 
As the residual market expands, voluntary market costs increase to
cover the increased subsidy for residual market insureds.  Since volun-
tary market rates are suppressed by the regulatory agency according to
the Danzon–Harrington hypothesis, these cost increases take the form
of a reduction of experience rating or schedule rating credits and/or
lower dividend payments.  Consequently, employer loss control incen-
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tives in the voluntary market are reduced, resulting in lower levels of
workplace safety and a deterioration of the employer’s accident experi-
ence. 
Specifically, Danzon and Harrington indicated that rate regulation
constrains the incentive effects of experience rating in two ways.  First,
insurers can reduce experience-rating factors, i.e., credit modifiers (the
amount, in percentage terms, by which the base rate is reduced or
increased as a result of firm accident experience).  Second, they can
reduce the base rate to which the experience rating is applied.  In either
event, the credit or debit due to the employer’s accident experience is
reduced in absolute terms, which diminishes employer incentives for
safety.  Nevertheless, because the experience-rating program is uni-
form among most states and (until recently) has changed very little
over time, Danzon and Harrington argued that the effect of lower base
rates on experience-rating incentives is more significant than are
changes in experience modification factors.  
 
Prior Empirical Research
 
Danzon and Harrington (1998) used a three-pronged approach to
test their hypotheses.  First, they estimated a series of equations pre-
dicting loss-cost growth and the proportion of total payroll accounted
for by self-insured employers, using data for 24 states for the period
1984–1990.  Three measures of loss-cost growth were estimated:
growth in cash benefit losses, medical benefit losses, and total losses. 
They asserted that few states had truly deregulated their workers’
compensation insurance market during this period and that 
 
de facto
 
regulation could occur in a state that was nominally deregulated.  They
eschewed the dummy variable categorization of state statutes that is
typically used in rate regulation studies.  Instead, they used three con-
tinuous measures of regulatory stringency: the lagged value of the
residual market share, the lagged value of the ratio of filed to approved
rate increases, and the lagged statewide underwriting (profit) margin.  
Danzon and Harrington found the hypothesized positive relation-
ship between cost growth and residual market share in all equations,
although it was only statistically significant in the total and indemnity
loss growth regressions.  The results for the other two regulation mea-
sures were mixed.  Both the residual market share and the filed/
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approved variables were significantly and positively related to the pro-
portion of self-insured payroll, as expected, if rate regulation results in
rate suppression, which, in turn, increases the size of the residual mar-
ket.
In the second component of their analysis, they estimated equa-
tions predicting several different measures of claims experience—
losses/payroll, losses/claim, claims/payroll, and premium/payroll—for
150 of the largest individual rate classes from eight states for the period
1987–1991.  These data allowed them to distinguish between the expe-
rience of voluntary-market employers and that of their residual-market
counterparts.  They found that the lagged residual market share was
positively related to each of these measures of claims experience for
both voluntary- and residual-market employers, but the magnitude of
this relationship was significantly greater for residual-market firms.
They attributed this result to greater moral hazard effects in the residual
market due to weaker incentives for loss control.
In the third section of their study, Danzon and Harrington used
class-level data described in the previous paragraph to test for the exist-
ence of cross-subsidies between classes and industries within a state.
They hypothesized that if rate suppression resulted in cross-subsidies
between rate groups or industries, there should be greater cross-class
variability in states with high loss ratios than in states with low ratios.
They tested this hypothesis by comparing the interquartile range of the
distribution of class-specific loss ratios in states with high loss ratios
with those in states with low loss ratios.  They found evidence of
between-rate-group subsidies but not of between-industry subsidies.
This result was confirmed by their additional regression results, which
showed that both the extent of the subsidy (as measured by the residual
market share) and the loss ratio were related to variables measuring the
relative political influence of the beneficiaries of rate regulation.
Barkume and Ruser (1997) used workers’ compensation cost and
injury rate data from two sample surveys of private industry establish-
ments to test the Danzon–Harrington hypotheses.  The cost data came
from a survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistic (BLS)
for the Employment Cost Index program, with 115,709 observations on
private nonfarm jobs (of which 38,940 were distinct jobs) for the
period 1981–1996.  The injury rate data were obtained from a nation-
ally representative survey of 250,000 private establishments, which
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was also conducted by the BLS and was based on injury logs mandated
by the Occupational Safety and Health Act.  
Barkume and Ruser used workers’ compensation premiums as a
percentage of gross earnings,
 
4
 
 which they termed the 
 
net workers’ com-
pensation cost for each job
 
, as a firm-specific measure of workers’
compensation costs.  The premiums were net after adjusting for experi-
ence modifiers, premium discounts, and expense constants applicable
to the employer, but did not reflect dividends received by the employer.
Data from all states except exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions were
used.  Their regression analyses included two alternative sets of
dummy variables.  The first approach utilized categorical variables for
9 industry categories, 11 occupational groups, collective bargaining
status, and state; a set of year dummies was also included in order to
capture national trends over time in workers’ compensation costs.  The
second approach used only year dummies and dummy variables spe-
cific to distinct jobs (that is, 38,939 dummy variables) in order to con-
trol for cross-sectional variation in rates.  Both sets of regressions also
included a measure of benefits generosity (maximum benefit divided
by the state average weekly wage).  
State regulatory environments were categorized into three classes:
states that had abandoned price setting by a rating bureau and prior
approval of rates, states that had abandoned price setting by a rating
bureau but not prior approval of rates, and states that had not aban-
doned either form of regulation.  Different configurations of lagged
dummy variables based on this categorization scheme were used to
capture the effects of rate regulation.  
Barkume and Ruser found that, in general, the elimination of rate
bureau pricing resulted in a statistically significant reduction in work-
ers’ compensation premiums.  However, the reduction was substan-
tially larger when the state also eliminated the prior approval
requirement.  In addition, they failed to find these effects in some of
their equations that did not control for fixed effects in which occupa-
tional dummies were used.  With respect to the injury rate regressions,
the elimination of rate-bureau pricing and prior approval was nega-
tively related to their injury measures, but elimination of prior approval
alone had no effect on the injury rate.  In addition, elasticity estimates
suggested that the effects of deregulation on injury rates were quite
small, particularly when compared with its effect on compensation pre-
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miums.  Barkume and Ruser concluded that their results offered only
partial support for the Danzon–Harrington hypothesis that reduced
incentives for loss control lead to higher injuries and premiums.
In summary, the Danzon–Harrington hypothesis predicts that rate
suppression by regulatory agencies will result in higher employer costs
of workers’ compensation insurance.  In particular, this theory postu-
lates that rate regulation results in higher loss costs due to reduced
incentives for loss control and the subsidization of high-risk employers
by low-risk firms due to the nature of the residual market mechanisms
in place in most states until the late 1980s.  The Danzon–Harrington
hypothesis differs from the traditional theory of rate regulation outlined
in Chapter 6 in two ways.  First, it unambiguously predicts that insur-
ance deregulation will result in lower costs, while traditional theory
fails to make an unambiguous prediction.  Second, while Danzon and
Harrington predicted higher employer costs due to a shift in the loss
distribution, traditional rate regulation theory assumes that the loss dis-
tribution is unaffected by regulation; the impact of regulation on
employer costs is thought to only affect insurer profit margins.
There is some evidence supporting this hypothesis.  Danzon and
Harrington found a positive relationship between various measures of
regulatory rate suppression and workers’ compensation loss costs.
Notably, they did not examine the effect of the regulatory regime, as
defined by statute, and loss costs.  They also produced evidence of
cross-subsidies between insurer rate groups.  On the other hand, using
dummy variables to measure the impact of the statutory regime, Bar-
kume and Ruser only found partial support for the Danzon–Harrington
hypothesis of a relationship between loss costs and the regulatory envi-
ronment.
 
INJURY RATES AND RATE REGULATION
 
Danzon and Harrington (1998) predicted that if rates are sup-
pressed, insurers will reduce the extent of loss-control services pro-
vided to employers.  This occurs for two reasons.  First, insurers have
less incentive to offer loss-control services to employers in both the
voluntary and residual markets.  Second, rate suppression can lead to a
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reduction in experience-rating modification factors, schedule rating
credits, or dividends, which will reduce employers’ incentives to
engage in loss-control activities.  Consequently, they predict that rate
regulation will result in an increase in the frequency and severity of
occupational injuries.  If so, workers’ compensation insurance deregu-
lation should be associated with a reduction in the frequency and sever-
ity of these injuries.
However, a contrary theory of the impact of deregulation on injury
rates is also imaginable.  It is possible that the regulatory agency sets
rates at levels equal to or higher than those produced by a competitive
market.  If the underlying market structure is, in fact, competitive,
insurers in this regulatory environment with market or above-market
rates set by the regulatory agency will probably attempt to compete on
the basis of product quality.  Among other things, this could mean that
insurers should increase the provision of loss-control services follow-
ing deregulation.  There may also be more extensive use of schedule
rating credits, larger experience-rating modifications, and larger divi-
dend payments.  In any event, in this kind of an environment, regula-
tion should be associated with lower injury rates than are found under
deregulation.  To examine this issue, we used regression analyses to
determine the impact of rate regulation on statewide injury rates for the
period from 1975–1995.
Table 8.4 reports injury rate means and standard deviations under
different regulatory rules and regimes.  The data provide only slight
evidence that injury rates are higher under pure administered pricing
than they are in deregulated market environments.  However, there is
no apparent relationship between the injury rate and the degree to
which the insurance market has become deregulated.  The lowest
injury rates are found in states that allow variations from bureau rates
subject to prior approval, which is the least deregulated of the deregu-
lated regimes.
 
Injury Rates and Statutory Regimes
 
Of course, as we indicated earlier, a number of factors affect injury
rates, and it is important to control for their extraneous influence.  Once
again, we employ multiple regression to isolate the effects of the regu-
latory environment.  Table 8.5 reports the results of these analyses.
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The results reported in the model I column (which only include dummy
variables indicating the nature of the statutory regulatory environment)
suggest that there is little difference in injury rates between regulatory
environments after controlling for the effects of other variables.
 
5
 
  
The results of our previous analyses of employer costs imply that
regulatory strategies vary across state insurance commissions.  Failure
to account for these differences in regulatory strategy may lead to the
erroneous conclusion that rate regulation has no effect on injury rates.
As before, we investigate this possibility by reestimating our regression
equations, controlling for the degree to which the agency suppresses
rates using the previously described measure of regulatory stringency.
 The results of this regression analysis are reported in the model II
column of Table 8.5.  These results offer some evidence supporting the
Danzon–Harrington hypothesis.  While there is no apparent relation-
ship between the lost-time injury rate and both regulatory stringency
and the various partial deregulation dummies, injury rates are lower in
the most deregulated environment (loss-cost systems that do not
require prior approval) than in pure-administered-pricing jurisdictions
after controlling for stringency.  The interaction term for this regime is
positively and significantly related to the injury rate, suggesting that
the effects of deregulation are mitigated by the degree to which profit
margins were reduced in the previous year.   That is, the greater the
degree of rate suppression in the previous year, the greater the injury
rate in loss-cost regimes that do not require prior approval.  This sug-
gests that insurers may respond to declining profits by reducing loss-
control services to employers.  While this result is consistent with Dan-
zon–Harrington hypothesis, it stands in contrast with other results that
 
Table 8.4 Injury Rate Values by Regulatory Regime (per 100 workers)
 
Regulatory regime Mean
Standard 
deviation
 
N
 
Pure admin. pricing 8.5635 1.3619 140
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 8.1712 1.4272 635
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 8.3142 1.3761 903
Loss costs w/prior appr. 8.3118 1.1686 71
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 8.3084 1.3622 888
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Table 8.5 Regression Coefficients for Injury Rates as a Function of the 
Regulatory Environment
 
a
 
Model
Variable I II
ln(Cash benefits) 0.0658***
(3.89)
0.0737***
(4.29)
ln(Wages) –0.2871***
(3.78)
–0.2744***
(3.60)
Unemployment –0.0135***
(6.99)
–0.0124***
(6.01)
Union density –0.0048***
(3.17)
–0.0045***
(2.98)
Covered employment 0.0065**
(2.22)
0.0062**
(2.12)
Proportion self-insured –0.0557
(1.14)
–0.0711
(1.44)
Competitive state fund –0.0626***
(3.81)
–0.0737***
(4.23)
Regulatory stringency —
 
b
 
–0.0211
(0.65)
Admin. pricing w/dev. or sched. rating 0.0006
(0.05)
0.0153
(0.38)
Admin. pricing w/dev. or sched. rating 
 
×
 
 loss ratio
— –0.0141
(0.39)
Adv. rates 0.0293*
(1.73)
0.0755
(0.97)
Adv. rates 
 
×
 
 loss ratio — –0.0467
(0.62)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.0165
(0.95)
–0.0108
(0.17)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 
 
×
 
 loss ratio — –0.0013
(0.02)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 0.0224
(1.43)
–0.1670***
(2.82)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 
 
×
 
 loss ratio — 0.2052***
(3.30)
 Insurance Arrangements and Workplace Safety 267
 
Table 8.5 (continued)
 
Model
Variable I II
State dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted 
 
R
 
2
 
0.8652 0.8677
 
a
 
Coefficients are followed by 
 
t
 
-ratios in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1% level;
** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
 
b
 
A dash (—) means the variable was not included in the regression specification.
 
are not, such as the fact that the injury rate is apparently unrelated to
regulatory stringency in other regulatory environments.
Overall, these results provide little evidence for the Danzon–Har-
rington hypothesis that rate suppression in a regulated market results in
greater claims experience and, consequently, higher loss costs. Not
only is there little relationship between the statutory regulatory envi-
ronment and the frequency of lost-time injuries, but injury incidence is
apparently unrelated to the degree to which regulators suppress rates, a
variable that is similar to that employed by Danzon and Harrington.
Our findings indicate that workers’ compensation insurance rate regula-
tion has little, if any, effect on the injury rate.
 
THE EFFECT OF INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS ON 
INJURY RATES
 
Two somewhat contradictory findings emerge from our analysis of
the effect of insurance arrangements on injury rates.  First, it does not
appear that rate regulation has any substantial effect on the loss compo-
nent of employer costs.  On the other hand, results for state fund dum-
mies imply that the public provision of workers’ compensation
insurance significantly affects employer accident experience.  Specifi-
cally, the provision of insurance by an exclusive state fund appears to
increase injury rates relative to states that permit private insurance,
while the presence of a competitive state fund has the opposite effect.
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Notes
 
1. A counterargument may be made.  It is possible that recently unemployed work-
ers may be more likely to file a workers’ compensation claim in order to receive
benefits that are more generous that those available through the unemployment
insurance program.  However, Fortin and Lanoie (1992), using data from Quebec,
were unable to find evidence supporting this hypothesis.
2. Recall from Chapter 5 that the coefficient on the state fund dummies in the
employer cost (adjusted manual rates or net weekly costs) equations is a measure
of the loading factor.  Further recall that the competitive-state-fund coefficient
was positive and statistically significant, indicating that the loading factor was
greater for competitive-state-fund jurisdictions.
3. Danzon and Harrington noted that their analysis was increasingly less applicable
to workers’ compensation as regulators and the NCCI began to address the prob-
lem of the residual market burden in the late 1980s.  As noted in Chapter 2 and
Appendix C, mechanisms that fund residual market benefits have changed sub-
stantially in many jurisdictions since that time.  These reforms include two-tiered
rate systems, assigned-risk rating plans that increase rates for firms with poor loss
experience, and improved loss-control incentives for carriers.  They have poten-
tially increased employer and insurer incentives for loss control in the residual
market and consequently reduced the extent of cross-subsidization and the
adverse effects of rate regulation.
4. This was computed by multiplying, for each job, the workers’ compensation costs
per hour by the annual hours worked, and then dividing by annual gross earnings;
the mean (for their full data set of 115,709) was 0.028.
5. It may argued that the Danzon–Harrington hypothesis implies that the injury rate
response lags the change in the regulatory environment.  To examine this issue,
we also estimated the injury rate equation using lagged regulatory environment
dummies; however, we failed to find evidence of a lagged response.
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9
Conclusions
 
Workers’ compensation provides cash benefits, medical care, and
rehabilitation services to workers who experience work-related injuries
and diseases.  Workers’ compensation programs in the United States
were established by state statute and are modified by individual state’s
statutory revisions, workers’ compensation agency regulations and
decisions, and court opinions.  These distinct, state-specific workers’
compensation programs share some common features (such as similar
legal rules for determining the compensability of an injury or illness,
and similar types of medical and cash benefits).
 
1
 
  However, there are
also some significant differences among the states.  For example, the
level of cash benefits varies substantially among the state workers’
compensation programs, with wide differences in maximum weekly
benefits and, in some instances, the maximum durations of benefits.
One of the most important differences among state workers’ com-
pensation programs concerns the insurance arrangements for providing
workers’ compensation coverage.  State laws prescribe workers’ com-
pensation benefits, but these laws assign to employers the responsibil-
ity for providing benefits.  Employers in turn obtain workers’
compensation coverage for the provision of these benefits by one of
three mechanisms: they purchase insurance from 1) a private insurance
carrier, 2) a competitive state workers’ compensation fund, or 3) an
exclusive (monopolistic) state workers’ compensation fund.  In addi-
tion, the self-insurance is available in almost every state (upon satisfy-
ing the requisite criteria).
In some states, such as New York, an employer may self-insure or
may purchase insurance from either a private carrier or competitive
state fund.  Other states, such as Illinois or Wisconsin, restrict the
employer’s choice to private insurance carriers or self-insurance.  A
small number of jurisdictions, such as Ohio, restrict the employer’s
choice to an exclusive state fund or self-insurance.
 
2
 
  This commingling
of private (insurance carrier) and public (competitive or exclusive state
fund) approaches to providing workers’ compensation benefits is a dis-
tinctive feature of workers’ compensation in the United States.
 
3
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Another important difference among state workers’ compensation
programs is the degree to which workers’ compensation insurance
pricing has been deregulated.  The private provision of workers’ com-
pensation in the United States was highly regulated until recently.  Car-
riers were subject to pure administered pricing, whereby maximum
permissible rates were largely determined by state rating bureaus and
the rates charged by carriers were subject to prior approval by state
insurance commissions.  However, most states in recent years have dis-
mantled, in varying degrees, the system of rate regulation for workers’
compensation insurance pricing.  In fact, a deregulatory movement
begun by just a few states in the early 1980s has become so widespread
in recent years that only a few jurisdictions continue to use the pure-
administered-pricing approach. 
Increasingly, private carriers providing workers’ compensation
coverage are exposed to the vagaries of the competitive market (the
extent of exposure varies, depending upon whether states have partially
or largely deregulated workers’ compensation insurance pricing).  This
raises questions as to whether the rationale that initially led to rate reg-
ulation still applies.
 
4
 
  Alternatively stated, are different program out-
comes with respect to the provision of workers’ compensation
insurance, such as employers’ costs and program quality, affected by
rate regulation?
There is substantial debate about the relative merits of public ver-
sus private provision of workers’ compensation insurance and about
the regulation of private-carrier-provided workers’ compensation
insurance.  This debate has, for the most part, centered on questions
concerning the availability and affordability of compensation insur-
ance, since these two variables are relatively easy to measure.  How-
ever, questions have also been raised regarding the quality of services
provided to the parties to workers’ compensation.  Labor advocates, for
example, have been particularly concerned that the profit motive causes
insurers to unjustly deny claims or otherwise impede the delivery of
benefits to workers, thus exacerbating the adverse consequences of
workplace injuries or diseases.
Unfortunately, the existing theoretical and empirical literature on
these topics is limited, inconsistent, and inconclusive.  There are very
few studies that explicitly examine the relative costs of public versus
private provision of workers’ compensation.  Economic theory makes
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ambiguous predictions about insurance rate regulation’s impact on
most market outcomes, and the inconsistent findings of the little empir-
ical research on this topic reflects this imprecision.  These deficiencies
in the literature were an important impetus for our study, which
improves on previous research in a number of ways.  However, empiri-
cal study of this topic presents very difficult challenges for the
researcher, and it is likely that no empirical study will ever surmount
all of these problems and completely dispose of the issue once and for
all. 
We were particularly concerned with the potentially important
public policy implications of various insurance arrangements (the rela-
tive impact of public versus private provision of workers’ compensa-
tion insurance, and the effect of insurance pricing deregulation),
because the economic literature provides little guidance to public poli-
cymakers.  As social scientists, we were intrigued by the prospect of
being able to evaluate a social insurance program that varies, in least in
certain dimensions, from state to state.
For all these reasons, we decided to empirically investigate the
effect of insurance arrangements on interstate variations on system per-
formance relative to the four objectives of the workers’ compensation
program outlined in Chapter 1: benefit adequacy, affordability, delivery
system efficiency, and injury and disease prevention.  In this chapter,
we review evidence concerning system performance presented in pre-
ceding chapters.  We conclude with a discussion of the public policy
implications of our findings.
 
COST METHODOLOGY
 
Evaluation of system performance relative to two workers’ com-
pensation program objectives—affordability and delivery system effi-
ciency—requires an analysis of workers’ compensation costs.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure the employers’ costs of work-
ers’ compensation in multiple jurisdictions over extended periods
because of a variety of factors that differ among those jurisdictions or
that change over time.  We have developed a sophisticated methodol-
ogy that addresses many of these issues.  Because it is central to our
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analyses and conclusions, it is appropriate to briefly review that meth-
odology.
To calculate statewide average costs of workers’ compensation
insurance, we used 71 employer classification codes for insurance rates
and the national distribution of national payroll among these classes to
calculate the average cost in each state, which ensures that our mea-
sures of interstate cost differences represent a comparable set of
employers and are not due to interstate variations in industry mix.  We
have carefully matched the National Council on Compensation Insur-
ance classification codes for these employer classes to the unique
insurance classification systems used by the three exclusive-state-fund
jurisdictions in our study and to the classification systems used by
other non-NCCI states in our study.
Furthermore, we have developed six different models that take into
consideration myriad other factors in estimating the employers’ costs
of workers’ compensation.  Though only one model is used to compute
employers’ costs in a jurisdiction in a particular year, the appropriate
model used for that jurisdiction varies across time.  The choice of
which models to use to compute employers’ costs for a particular state
and a particular year depends upon the nature of the workers’ compen-
sation insurance market.  More specifically, it depends upon whether
for any particular state and year 1) the state rating bureau publishes
manual rates or pure premiums only, 2) rates in the assigned-risk
(residual) market differ from those in the voluntary market, and 3) the
state has an exclusive state fund or allows private carriers.
Our estimates of employers’ costs thus take into consideration such
things as premium discounts for quantity purchases, dividends received
from insurance (mutual and participating stock) companies, manual
rate modifications due to the employer’s own compensable experience,
and other variables.  Our cost estimates also incorporate new competi-
tive pricing arrangements that have become much more prevalent in
recent years.  Lastly, our estimates also reflect the provision of work-
ers’ compensation insurance to many employers in assigned-risk mar-
kets rather than in voluntary markets.
The end result of these cost computations is what we term adjusted
manual rates, which represent the percentage of payroll expended by
employers on workers’ compensation insurance.  Weekly insurance
premiums per employee, which are calculated by multiplying a state’s
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adjusted manual rate by the corresponding average weekly wage for
that state, constitute another measure of employers’ costs that is used
for our study.
We have thus developed estimates for workers’ compensation
insurance costs for the period 1975–1995 and for 48 U.S. jurisdictions
(because of data limitations, it was not possible to develop cost esti-
mates for all 48 jurisdictions for all of the years from 1975 to 1995).
Our data thus pertain to a relatively long period during which the insur-
ance industry underwent several substantial changes.  Since there is an
important cyclical component to insurance pricing, estimates of the
cost impact of deregulation or other public policies that use data from a
short time period may be contaminated by other contemporaneous
changes that also affect costs.  The 21-year-period of our study spans at
least one entire insurance cycle and thus avoids this problem.
 
BENEFIT ADEQUACY VERSUS AFFORDABILITY
 
As we noted in the first chapter, benefit adequacy was one of the
five objectives of the workers’ compensation program identified by the
National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws.  Fur-
thermore, the National Commission concluded that workers’ compen-
sation benefits in the vast majority of states were inadequate, in many
respects, at the time of its report in 1972.  The Commission made a
number of recommendations with respect to benefit adequacy, and,
under the threat of federal legislation, states initially responded by
improving benefits.  However, the political impetus for these reforms
soon faded, and by the 1990s most states were still not in compliance
with the National Commission’s recommendations. 
The reluctance of states to improve workers’ compensation bene-
fits can be explained by another objective of workers’ compensation
benefits: affordability.  Since workers’ compensation is a state rather
than a federal program, lawmakers are concerned that generous com-
pensation benefits will adversely affect employer costs, resulting in an
exodus of firms (and jobs) to low-cost jurisdictions.  Thus, there is a
tension between these objectives and a perception that in order to
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improve performance with respect to benefit adequacy, the state must
necessarily sacrifice the goal of affordability. 
We examined this tradeoff by estimating equations predicting
employer costs as a function of workers’ compensation benefit levels
while controlling for a number of other variables that are thought to
influence costs (such as the injury rate, the proportion of benefits paid
to permanent partial disability claims, union density, and the extent of
workers’ compensation coverage).  We also included year and state
dummy variables to control for unobserved time- and state-specific
variation in costs.  The results from these regressions were then used to
simulate the effect of raising benefit levels to the adequacy standards
contained in the Model Act of the Council of State Governments.  The
results of this simulation were compared with the results of a similar
exercise conducted by Krueger and Burton (1990), who estimated the
effect of the imposition of eight of the essential recommendations of
the National Commission on employer costs.  The most significant dif-
ference between the Model Act and the essential recommendations is
that the Model Act sets standards for permanent partial disability bene-
fits, while the National Commission does not.
Our regression results revealed that the measured effect of benefits
on employer costs was substantially dependent on the regression speci-
fication.  We also found evidence suggesting that our statutory benefit
variable was significantly affected by measurement error.  Conse-
quently, we suggest that readers approach our findings cautiously.
Our simulation results were used to examine the impact of benefit
adequacy on three measures of affordability: the average cost of work-
ers’ compensation nationally and two measures of cost dispersion,
namely, the standard deviation of costs and the coefficient of variation.
We found that higher benefit levels required by the Model Act
increased average costs by 60–75 percent.  Significantly, imposition of
the Model Act also increases the cost differences among states.  This
latter result is particularly troubling due to its implications for firm
location decisions.  In other words, as a result of imposing federal stan-
dards, the gap between high- and low-cost states will grow, with
adverse consequences for employment in those high-cost states.  While
the labor market may rectify these imbalances in the long run as unem-
ployed workers migrate geographically or occupationally, in the short
run the imposition of federal standards incorporating the Model Act
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could cause a severe economic dislocation of workers.  This dislocation
will particularly affect workers in high-risk industries that pay higher
than average workers’ compensation costs.
 
5
 
 
On the other hand, the impact of the essential recommendations on
employer costs estimated by Krueger and Burton was much smaller;
they found that these recommendations were associated with a 15–20
percent increase in average costs in 1983.  Significantly, they failed to
find consistent evidence indicating whether the essential recommenda-
tions increased or decreased cost dispersion among states.  This sug-
gests that modest reforms to achieve benefit adequacy would have a
much less substantial, although nontrivial, effect on affordability.
 
DELIVERY SYSTEM EFFICIENCY
 
Another objective of workers’ compensation programs is that
workers’ compensation should be delivered to injured workers for the
least possible administrative cost.  While many factors influence per-
formance on this objective, we are particularly interested in the effect
of different insurance arrangements.  Thus, a principal focus of our
study was an investigation of the cost impact of public versus private
provision of workers’ compensation insurance, as well as the impact of
deregulation.  In this section, we first review our hypotheses and empir-
ical findings regarding the public versus private comparison, which
examined the influence of exclusive state funds and competitive state
funds.  We then present comparable information with respect to the
cost impact of deregulation.
 
Public versus Private Provision
 
Advocates of public funding for workers’ compensation insurance
(that is, proponents of exclusive state funds) assert that employer costs
are lower where compensation is exclusively funded through a state
agency, because an exclusive state fund neither incurs marketing
expenses nor needs to make a profit.  Exclusive state funds are alleg-
edly more efficient than private carriers, since they are able to capture
economies of scale.  Lastly, although market fluctuations cause peri-
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odic crises with respect to the availability of affordable workers’ com-
pensation insurance from private carriers (or from assigned-risk
markets), this is not a problem in exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions.
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On the other hand, proponents of the private provision of workers’
compensation insurance assert that the lack of a profit motive on the
part of exclusive or competitive state funds creates administrative inef-
ficiencies that increase costs.  In addition, political factors allegedly
cause state funds to create subsidies for one group of employers at the
expense of another, either between different classes of employers at
one point in time or between employers of different generations.  In
addition to creating obvious inequities, these state-fund subsidies also
result in allocative inefficiencies that reduce social welfare.  For similar
reasons, it is also claimed that administrative determination by state
funds of a claimant’s benefit eligibility and duration of disability is less
stringent than private carriers’ determinations, thus exacerbating prob-
lems associated the worker’s benefit utilization in response to higher
benefits. 
There is very little empirical evidence to substantiate the hypothe-
ses concerning the relative merits of either the public or private provi-
sion of workers’ compensation insurance, since very little research has
been done in this area.  The only recent interjurisdictional cost study
involving exclusive state funds (Thomason and Burton 2000a) found
that costs were somewhat lower, on average, in two Canadian monopo-
listic-state-fund provinces than in U.S. states with private carriers.
However, several empirical analyses found that competitive-state-fund
jurisdictions had higher costs than did states that relied solely on pri-
vate carriers (Krueger and Burton 1990; Schmidle 1994).
Our study extends and improves upon this prior research in a num-
ber of ways.  First, we used identical cost measures in all states to
investigate the effects of public provision of insurance (by exclusive-
state-fund jurisdictions and by competitive-state-fund jurisdictions that
also allow private carriers) and the effects of private provision (in states
that allow private carriers).  Our examination of the cost impact of
exclusive state funds is, to our knowledge, the first in recent decades to
compare the relative cost of exclusive state funds in the United States
with private-carrier states. 
Second, we utilized a data set with a much longer time period (21
consecutive years) than that used in previous empirical studies of the
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cost impact of competitive state funds.  Among other things, the length
of this time series allowed us to examine relative costs at different
stages of the insurance cycle.  This is particularly important because
the insurance cycle may have a different impact on private and public
providers of workers’ compensation insurance.  In addition, data from
a 21-year period allow us to compare states both before and after they
adopted or abandoned a competitive state fund, so we were thus able to
control for unobservable state-specific factors that influence compensa-
tion costs.
 
Empirical results: exclusive state funds
 
There are several interesting results from our analysis of exclusive
state funds, although there are also several major caveats with respect
to these findings.  A simple comparison of average employer costs,
which does not use a regression model to statistically control for the
influence of other possible influences on costs (such as benefits or
injury rates), indicated that employer costs were lower in exclusive-
state-fund jurisdictions than in states where private carriers provide
workers’ compensation insurance.  This pattern persists throughout the
entire period of our analysis (1975–1995).  These data also suggest that
costs for exclusive state funds are much less cyclical than are costs for
private-insurance jurisdictions.  However, the cost differential between
exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions and states with private carriers sub-
stantially disappears when we use a weighted least squares regression
model that controls for other factors that influence costs.  
There are compelling reasons to be circumspect in interpreting
these results.  We have data from only three (out of six) exclusive-state-
fund jurisdictions, and data for two of these jurisdictions were limited
to a subset of years in our study.  Furthermore, controls for the differ-
ence between the statutory level of benefits and actual expenditures of
cash benefits is particularly problematic for exclusive-state-fund juris-
dictions.  
In addition, there are important differences between exclusive state
funds and private carriers that may not be fully reflected in our data.
For example, our cost comparisons use the average cost of workers’
compensation insurance paid by employers in a particular state and
year.  These employers’ costs estimates in exclusive-state-fund juris-
dictions and private-carrier states are not perfectly comparable.  For
 278 Chapter 9
 
example, private insurer costs incorporate both marketing expenses and
taxes, as well as other fees or license costs.  Exclusive state funds do
not incur marketing expenses, and while they do pay some taxes (such
as payroll taxes), they do not pay others such as income taxes, insur-
ance department license fees, and state and local insurance taxes.  As
well, the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insurance in pri-
vate-carrier jurisdictions include a profit markup, which is also missing
from exclusive-state-fund costs. 
Thus, the problem is that some costs that appear in the private
insurers’ income statements are “hidden” in state insurance fund
accounts.  That is, these costs are incurred by exclusive state funds but
are reflected neither in their accounts nor in the employers’ workers’
compensation premiums.   For example, income taxes paid by private
insurers necessarily relieve the tax burden of employers.  Where there
are no private workers’ compensation insurers to pay income taxes,
namely in exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions, the level of governmental
services is reduced or the tax burden is spread over the remainder of the
tax base, including employers who purchase insurance.
 
7
 
  
The preceding discussion suggests that the problem of hidden costs
is significant and that adjustments have to be made to ensure that the
costs of workers’ compensation insurance in exclusive-state-fund and
private-insurance jurisdictions are comparable.  Ideally, these adjust-
ments should be made so that costs in both jurisdictions represent the
real (including hidden) costs of compensation to employers.  However,
ascertaining the true extent of these hidden costs in the exclusive-fund
jurisdictions in our study, both at one point in time and over time, is
extremely problematic.  While we conclude that the existence of hid-
den costs means that exclusive-state-fund rates are probably under-
stated relative to private-carrier rates, we can not quantify the extent of
this underestimate.
Our cost estimates for exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions may be
understated for another reason: exclusive state funds are more likely
than private carriers to incur deficits in the short and medium terms.
Exclusive state funds can have artificially low rates because they can
accumulate deficits without fearing the loss of policyholders when they
ultimately have to raise rates.  However, we have not made an effort to
quantify the extent to which rates are artificially low, in part because of
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the difficulties in reconciling these underestimates through the use of
actuarial evaluations of the exclusive state funds.  
Nevertheless, despite (or perhaps because of) these data limita-
tions, it is probably prudent to conclude that there is no clear difference
in costs between exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions and private-carrier
states. 
 
Empirical results: competitive state funds
 
Our empirical results indicate that employers’ costs are higher in
jurisdictions with competitive state funds than in states with only pri-
vate carriers.  Specifically, we found that adjusted manual rates were
25 percent higher and net weekly costs were 24 percent higher in com-
petitive-state-fund jurisdictions even after controlling for benefits,
injury rates, and other factors that influence costs.   The relatively
higher costs associated with competitive state funds is consistent with
earlier findings (Krueger and Burton 1990; Schmidle 1994) of ineffi-
ciencies associated with state funds.
However, once again, we are confronted by our results with respect
to the costs in exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions relative to states with
private carriers.  If competitive state funds are inefficient due to the
lack of a profit motive, why do we not find similar results for exclusive
state funds?  There are a number of possible explanations for this
inconsistency.  The lack of extensive data on exclusive-state-fund pro-
grams or any of the other problems discussed in the previous section
could account for these results.  In addition, it is possible that our
results for competitive funds are due to uncontrolled endogeneity; that
is, the causal arrow is reversed.  Rather than competitive funds causing
workers’ compensation costs to soar, it is possible that high-cost states,
such as Rhode Island, are more likely to establish competitive funds.
 
Deregulation
 
Historically, insurance rates were regulated due to a fear that prop-
erty/casualty insurers would write policies at below-cost rates.  In fact,
the property/casualty insurance industry was subject to periodic waves
of insolvency.  This problem was in part due to a lack of accurate or
complete actuarial data. As ratemaking organizations emerged to
address this problem—in particular, the issue of inaccurate or incom-
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plete actuarial data—policymakers became concerned about oligopo-
listic pricing.  While other insurance lines were deregulated in response
to these concerns, workers’ compensation was treated as an exception
because of its distinctive characteristic as a mandated social insurance
program.  In particular, policymakers believed that it was important to
continue regulating workers’ compensation insurance rates in order to
ensure that workers’ compensation insurance was both affordable and
available.
Traditional economic theory of insurance rate regulation suggests
that the impact of deregulation of insurance markets largely depends on
the behavior or strategy of the regulatory agency.  If, prior to deregula-
tion, employers dominate the regulatory agency, then rate suppression
by the regulatory agency should result in higher compensation costs
following deregulation.  On the other hand, if rate regulation permitted
insurers to form a cartel, then deregulation could lead to lower prices,
as the market forces prices down to competitive levels.  Among other
things, these competing theories mean that the effect of rate regulation
can vary among jurisdictions and—if regulatory agency strategies
change—over time.
This theory of rate regulation also predicts that regulation can
affect other market outcomes, including the availability of insurance
and market structure.  Specifically, if regulatory agencies suppress
rates, marginal insurers will quit the market, resulting in a reduction in
the number of insurers underwriting policies and increased market
shares for the survivors.  In addition, the withdrawal of private carriers
from the market can eventually lead to a reduction in the availability of
insurance.  In the extreme case of rate suppression, the market may
eventually collapse, as occurred in Maine in the 1980s.
To determine the effects of insurance rate regulation on overall
delivery system efficiency, we investigated its impact on two market
outcomes: employer costs and market structure.  In the process, we
improved on the previous research of rate regulation in various prop-
erty/casualty lines, which in large part used relatively simple measures
of the regulatory environment.  Often, states in these studies were cate-
gorized solely as regulated or deregulated jurisdictions.  However, our
detailed examination of the relevant workers’ compensation legislation
and the state regulatory practices revealed that rate regulation is better
conceptualized along a continuum rather than as a simple dichotomy.
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We used a more complex characterization of the regulatory environ-
ment than has most previous research in order to capture the actual
practices of the state regulatory agency as well as interstate differences
in statutory regimes.
 
Empirical results: employer costs
 
Our initial set of model specifications, which were discussed in
Chapter 7, provided contradictory evidence concerning the impact of
rate regulation (or deregulation) on workers’ compensation costs.  Our
regression analyses, which control for interstate differences in benefits
and a variety of other factors, show that the impact of regulation on
compensation costs depends on the definition of the regulatory envi-
ronment that is used.  This may explain the lack of consistent results
among previous studies examining this issue.  In addition, our regres-
sion results suggest that insurance costs are higher under various forms
of partial deregulation than under the most strict form of rate regulation
(pure administered pricing).  On the other hand, more comprehensive
deregulation (where rating organizations file loss costs, rather than
fully developed rates, that are not subject to prior approval by the state
regulatory agency) results in a rate reduction of about 11 percent.
Other analyses, which controlled for the stage of the insurance
cycle or the degree to which the regulatory agency suppressed rates,
present an even more complicated picture of the effect of rate regula-
tion on insurance costs.  First, the data show a strong negative relation-
ship between regulatory stringency (an index of state-to-national
average loss ratios) and compensation costs under administered pric-
ing.  However, the relationship between regulatory stringency and
employer costs either is not statistically different from zero or is signif-
icantly positive under other regulatory regimes.  These findings are
consistent with the “regulatory agency behavior” theory of rate regula-
tion.
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  Second, our analyses of the cost effect of regulatory stringency
under the hard and soft portions of the insurance cycle found that under
administered pricing, rates fall during a hard market relative to their
levels in a soft market, indicating increased rate suppression during a
hard market, i.e., when insurance demand outstrips supply.
As indicated, the data show that partial deregulation of workers’
compensation insurance rate-making has an impact on costs that is
qualitatively different than the effect of more comprehensive deregula-
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tion.  That is, costs under partial deregulation are higher than costs
under administered pricing, while costs under more comprehensive
deregulation are lower.  Of all of the empirical findings in our study,
this result is probably the most difficult one to explain.
One possible answer is provided by our findings regarding the rela-
tionship between regulatory stringency and compensation costs under
partial versus comprehensive forms of deregulation.  Specifically, these
data suggest that under partial deregulation there is an asymmetric
response to regulatory stringency.  Under conditions of high stringency
(rate suppression), partial deregulation leads to higher insurance prices
as market forces push rates up to more competitive levels.  However,
partial deregulation under conditions of low stringency (where the rates
are not being held below market levels) does not induce comparable
rate reductions.
  It is possible that because insurers have less latitude to adjust
price under partially deregulated regimes relative to under complete
deregulation, they are more reluctant to lower prices when market con-
ditions become more favorable.  They may view favorable market con-
ditions as an opportunity to make up for losses incurred when the
market was more adverse.  Alternatively, it is possible that bureau rates
under partial deregulation act as a pricing point for insurers when mar-
ket conditions are more favorable for them; that is, the advisory bureau
rates become the market price, even when they are above competitive
market levels. 
The preceding discussion was complex because it reflected the
complexity in measuring the actual impact of deregulation.  A variety
of factors must be taken into consideration, such as 1) whether rates
prior to deregulation were at, above, or below market rates, a situation
that varies among jurisdictions and over time; 2) partially related to this
first point, whether deregulation occurred during the hard market or
soft market phase of the insurance cycle; and 3) the multiple forms of
deregulation (for example, administered pricing with deviations or
schedule ratings; advisory rates without prior approval; and loss costs
with prior approval).  Overall, after controlling for as many factors as
possible that affect rates (such as benefits levels, injury rates, etc., and
items 1 and 2 above), we find in general that partial deregulation
appears to result in higher costs on average than would be found in
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administered pricing, while more comprehensive deregulation results
in costs that are lower than those found in administered pricing.
 
Empirical results: market structure
 
For the most part, the results of our weighted least squares regres-
sion analyses concerning market structure support our interpretation of
the cost findings.  Concentration ratios are negatively related to all of
the deregulation dummy variables, suggesting that markets are less
concentrated in a deregulated environment relative to pure adminis-
tered pricing.  In addition, the regulatory stringency measure was asso-
ciated with greater concentration ratios in non–loss cost regulatory
environments but had no impact on concentration ratios in states that
had partially or completed deregulated.  All of these results are consis-
tent with the hypothesis that state regulatory agencies suppress rates
under pure administered pricing and that following deregulation, prices
rise to competitive levels, which encourages private carriers to enter the
market or otherwise compete for market share.  With respect to partial
deregulation, this explanation is also consistent with the cost findings. 
On the other hand, this explanation is inconsistent with the cost
results for more comprehensive regulation, which indicated that, if any-
thing, state regulators pushed prices above competitive market levels
under pure administered pricing.  An explanation that could reconcile
all of these disparate findings is that when states enact comprehensive
deregulation, insurers cut prices dramatically—perhaps to (or below)
pure premium levels—in order to gain market share. While this behav-
ior is inconsistent with the economic assumption of rationality, it is con-
sistent with anecdotal evidence from some states that have pursued
comprehensive deregulation, including, most recently, California. 
Taken together, these results lead us to conclude that the delivery
system under comprehensive deregulation is more efficient than the
delivery system either under partial deregulation or under pure admin-
istered pricing.
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INJURY PREVENTION
 
The fourth objective of workers’ compensation programs with
which we are concerned is the encouragement of safety.  As indicated
in Chapter 1, by linking employer workers’ compensation costs to the
firm’s claims experience, the compensation program strives to provide
employers with incentives to reduce claim frequency and severity.  In
addition, market forces similarly encourage insurers to provide
employers with safety management loss-control services as a part of
the insurance product.  We might expect that this is particularly likely
in those states where, due to the regulatory environment, insurers are
unable to compete on the basis of price.  Furthermore, while state com-
pensation funds lack a profit motive to improve their insurance “prod-
uct” by offering safety management services, political pressures to
provide such services could be equally, if not more, compelling.
Recently, Danzon and Harrington (1998) hypothesized that rate
suppression in regulated markets results in reduced loss-control incen-
tives for employers and insurers, which, in turn, increases the benefits
paid and the cost of insurance.  On the assumption that state regulatory
agencies suppress rates below market levels, Danzon and Harrington
argued that insurers respond to adverse market conditions by with-
drawing insurance coverage in the voluntary market from riskier
insureds, which are then forced into the residual market.  They further
claimed that there are substantial subsidies from the voluntary to the
residual market, which reduces the loss-control incentives of employ-
ers in the residual market.  In addition, when rates are suppressed,
insurers reduce or eliminate loss-control incentives for employers in
the voluntary market.  Finally, if in the rate approval process the insur-
ance commission is more likely to pass through loss costs than loss-
control expenses, then insurers will have reduced loss-control incen-
tives.  Since the loss-control incentives of both insureds and insurers
are thus reduced under rate regulation, Danzon and Harrington hypoth-
esized that deregulation will result in lower loss costs.  Among other
things, they predicted that workplaces will be safer and the injury rate
will be lower in an unregulated insurance market. 
To investigate the relationship between insurance arrangements
and performance on the prevention objective, we examined the effect
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of public provision of workers’ compensation insurance (by exclusive
and competitive state funds), as well as the effect of deregulation, on
statewide injury rates.   We found that injury rates were higher in exclu-
sive-state-fund jurisdictions than in states that permit private insurers
to underwrite workers’ compensation insurance policies.  There are at
least three possible explanations for this result: state funds have more
lenient eligibility criteria, lack incentives for loss control, and/or fail to
provide insured employers with such incentives.  Alternatively, private
insurers may be relatively more aggressive in claims management.
 
9
 
However, without further investigation into the claims management
issue, these data suggest that exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions have a
record inferior to that of private insurance with respect to workplace
health and safety.
Our findings also indicate that injury rates in jurisdictions with
competitive fund states are lower than injury rates in states that only
have private workers’ compensation insurers.  This result is difficult to
reconcile with our finding that employers’ costs are relatively higher in
competitive-state-fund jurisdictions, as well as with our previously
reported results concerning the relative costs and injury rates for exclu-
sive state funds.
Lastly, with respect to deregulation, the results for our injury rate
regressions provide only weak evidence supporting the Danzon–Har-
rington hypothesis that rate suppression increases the pure premium
component of the adjusted manual rate.  In this connection, it is impor-
tant to recall that our cost regressions controlled for interstate differ-
ence in loss costs, so that our cost results only pertain to the effect of
insurance arrangements on profit and expense loadings.  While these
cost components appear to be affected by rate regulation, the pure pre-
mium, as measured by work injury rates, does not. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
There are three sets of policy implications that flow from the data
that we have analyzed and discussed in preceding chapters of this
book.  These relate to 1) the effect of public versus private provision of
workers’ compensation insurance on delivery system efficiency and
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workplace safety; 2) the effect of deregulation of private insurance
markets on delivery system efficiency and safety; and 3) the effect of
federal standards with respect to benefit adequacy on the affordability
objective of workers’ compensation programs.
 
Public versus Private Provision of 
Workers’ Compensation Insurance
 
Our analyses of the employers’ cost of workers’ compensation pro-
vide little, if any, evidence that either type of insurance arrangement is
superior on the basis of delivery system efficiency.  There is no measur-
able difference in costs between exclusive state funds and states with
private insurance markets.  While states with competitive state funds
appear to be more costly than states without such funds, this result is
likely to be due to factors other than the relative efficiency of the two
types of insurance arrangements.  State funds may be well or poorly
administered; a well-run fund may be superior to a private insurance
market, particularly a regulated market, while a poorly run fund may
be inferior to the private market.  Based on the limited data available to
us, we have no reason to believe that either public or private provision
of compensation insurance is inherently more efficient.
However, we again caution that our empirical results regarding
state funds warrant a circumspect approach.  Policymakers should be
skeptical about claims that the “reform” of introducing private carriers
into a market, or of establishing exclusive or competitive state funds,
will reduce costs in a state.  This is an important lesson from our
research, especially since a number of states have introduced competi-
tive state funds in the last two decades, generally because they thought
that costs would be reduced.  Based on our findings, we conclude that
such a strategy is naive and misguided.
The results with respect to workplace safety are mixed.  The injury
rate is higher in exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions than in jurisdictions
that have private workers’ compensation insurance markets, but lower
in those states with competitive funds than in those with private carri-
ers only.  While both results are statistically significant, together they
are inexplicable, at least with respect to the question of the effective-
ness of public versus private provision of workers’ compensation insur-
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ance.  We are reluctant to recommend policy on the basis of these
contradictory findings.
 
Deregulation of Workers’ Compensation Insurance Markets
 
On the other hand, the results of our study provide relatively strong
evidence that comprehensive deregulation of the workers’ compensa-
tion insurance markets results in significant gains in delivery system
efficiency.  Moving from pure administered pricing to comprehensive
deregulation appears to be associated with an 11 percent reduction in
employer costs.  The cost reduction resulting from a move from some
forms of partial deregulation to complete deregulation is even more
impressive.  Since our results with respect to the injury prevention
objective do not show a clear advantage for regulation or deregulation,
we conclude that states should comprehensively deregulate their work-
ers’ compensation insurance markets.
The impact of comprehensive deregulation relative to other
changes in our regression model parameters is reported in Table 9.1 for
adjusted manual rates and net weekly costs.  This table shows that a
one-standard-deviation reduction in only two of the control variables in
our regression equation, medical benefits and the injury rate, has a cost
effect similar to that associated with comprehensive deregulation of the
workers’ compensation market.  Other policy changes, such as a reduc-
tion in cash benefits, have only a slight effect on costs.  However, we
note that more substantial changes in cash benefit generosity—such as
the imposition of the provisions of the Model Act or the essential rec-
ommendations of the National Commission—have much greater
effects on employer costs.  As noted earlier in this chapter, we estimate
that the essential recommendations would increase employer costs by
15–20 percent and that the Model Act would have increased costs by as
much as 70 percent.
Aside from our findings with respect to employer costs, we note
that there are several other compelling reasons to support a public pol-
icy of full deregulation.  First, it eliminates the need to allocate
resources to regulation rather than to other social purposes.  Second, it
avoids extreme distortions in the market, such as in Maine, where rate
suppression caused the virtual collapse of the voluntary market, with
enormous subsidies from carriers to employers in the residual market.
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Table 9.1 Predicted Effects of Selected Policy Changes on 
Employer Costs
 
Standard 
deviation Mean Change from actual 
($) ($) ($) (%)
Adjusted manual rates
Actual costs 2.249 1.114
Predicted costs following a 
one-standard-deviation 
reduction
 
a
 
 in
Cash benefits 2.140 1.015 –0.109 –4.85
Medical benefits 1.841 0.873 –0.408 –18.14
Injury rate 1.941 0.921 –0.308 –13.70
PPD proportion 2.030 0.963 –0.219 –9.73
Union density 2.220 1.053 –0.029 –1.29
Covered employment 2.186 1.037 –0.063 –2.79
Predicted costs following 
imposition of deregulation 1.924 0.937 –0.324 –14.42
Net weekly costs
Actual costs 11.885 6.141
Predicted costs following a 
one-standard-deviation 
reduction
 
a
 
 in
Cash benefits 11.172 5.619 –0.713 –6.00
Medical benefits 9.486 4.771 –2.400 –20.19
Injury rate 10.329 5.195 –1.556 –13.09
PPD proportion 10.758 5.411 –1.128 –9.49
Union density 11.441 5.755 –0.444 –3.74
Covered employment 11.447 5.758 –0.438 –3.69
Predicted costs following 
imposition of deregulation 10.199 5.306 –1.686 –14.19
 
a
 
A one-standard-deviation change was chosen because it represents a substantial, yet
plausible, departure from reality that is statistically identical for all control variables.
The effects of a one-standard-deviation change were estimated by first determining
the standard deviation of the variable.  The standard deviation was then subtracted
from the actual value of the variable for each observation in the sample.  The resulting
values for that variable, along with the actual values for every other variable in our
model, were then substituted into the regression equation to compute predicted
employer costs.  These predicted costs were then averaged across the entire sample.
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Third, it probably reduces the importance of residual markets in gen-
eral, where incentives to safety are more muted (although we find little
or no evidence for such an effect).  Lastly, the results of our regressions
predicting insurance market concentration indicate that deregulation
increases the number of carriers in the market, which, in turn, increases
options for employers and should ultimately hold down costs.
Importantly, while the evidence indicates that workers will pay for
higher workers’ compensation benefits (Moore and Viscusi 1990), it is
unlikely that workers will pay for inefficient administration.  Further, to
the extent that insurance rate regulation (or deregulation) increases
administrative costs without providing value in terms of greater equity
or more generous benefits, these increased costs represent a dead-
weight loss to society.  
There are several other reasons to exercise caution in interpreting
the policy implications of our results.  There were a number of major
changes affecting workers’ compensation between 1975 and 1995,
such as business and underwriting cycles, increasing or decreasing cash
and medical benefits in some states, and deregulation of private insur-
ance markets in most states (with a considerable variation among states
in the exact form of the deregulation).  Disentangling the effects of par-
ticular policy changes is complicated, and we may not have isolated
these effects, despite our best efforts and sophisticated methodology.  
Furthermore, our findings were subject to limitations on data com-
parability among states and over time (for example, some states with
private carriers do not have data on the share of benefits provided by
voluntary and assigned-risk markets).  Additionally, in an ideal situa-
tion, insurance premiums per $100 of payroll for a standardized set of
classifications would be explained by a set of variables including bene-
fits actually paid per $100 of payroll for the standardized set of classifi-
cations.  We do not have such a benefits measure because, 
 
inter alia
 
,
data are not available for all jurisdictions in our study, and existing data
do not control for variation in industrial composition (and therefore the
injury rate) among states.  Instead we use a benefits index, which is an
actuarial evaluation of cash benefits that the average workers’ compen-
sation claimant could expect to receive in a particular jurisdiction.
Since this benefit index does not account for administrative differences
among states, there are likely discrepancies between our index measure
of benefit generosity and actual benefits paid to injured workers.  We
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partially control for these administrative differences by including the
share of benefits accounted for by permanent partial disability cases
(typically the most expensive category of cash benefits, and the cate-
gory with the greatest opportunity for exercise of administrative discre-
tion).  Nonetheless, we may not completely control for all such
differences affecting benefits paid.  
Lastly, we only assessed the relative merits of public provision of
workers’ compensation insurance and of deregulation with respect to
employers’ costs, market structure, and injury rates.  Our examination
of market outcomes does not include all potential outcomes of regula-
tion or deregulation.  In particular, we ignore outcomes such as the
effect of rate regulation on the probability and cost of insurer insol-
vency, which provided the initial rationale for insurance rate regula-
tion.  However, we hope that our analysis will at least help contribute to
the ongoing discussion of the relative merits of deregulation and of
state funds.
 
Benefit Adequacy and Affordability
 
The results of our analysis show that there is indeed a trade-off
between benefit adequacy and affordability.  Increasing workers’ com-
pensation benefits to the level prescribed by the Model Act increases
the average cost of workers’ compensation nationally by 60–75 percent
and increases cost variation among states even more.  This latter result
was particularly troubling due to its implication for plant-location deci-
sions, indicating that such a substantial increase in costs could
adversely effect employment in high-cost states and have potentially
severe consequences on workers at the bottom of the economic ladder.
These results either support the advisability of a federal takeover of
state workers’ compensation programs or the abandonment of the ade-
quacy objective, at least as defined by the Model Act.
On the other hand, Krueger and Burton (1990) reported that more
modest reform, namely the essential recommendations of the National
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws, has a much less
dramatic impact on affordability.  They found that full implementation
of the National Commission’s essential recommendations are associ-
ated with a 10–15 percent cost increase and no evident change in cost
variation.  Recall that comprehensive deregulation of the private insur-
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ance market would reduce compensation costs by 11 percent, accord-
ing to our results.  Taken together, these two results suggest that state
workers’ compensation benefits could be improved to meet the
National Commission’s definition of adequacy without any overall cost
increase (and the concomitant economic disruption) if the states were
to simultaneously deregulate their workers’ compensation insurance
markets. 
In the beginning of this book, we noted how policymakers in
Rhode Island successfully repaired that state’s broken workers’ com-
pensation system in the early 1990s, resolving conflicting interests of
the different stakeholders in the system through compromise.  These
kinds of solutions are not always available to policymakers, but our
results, in conjunction with those of Krueger and Burton, offer hope
that the benefit adequacy objective can be realized, without sacrificing
affordability, by improving delivery system efficiency.
 
Notes
 
1. We include the District of Columbia when we refer to “states.”  The federal gov-
ernment’s involvement in workers’ compensation is limited, for the most part, to
administration of programs covering federal employees (per the Federal Employ-
ees’ Compensation Act) and certain maritime employees (per the Longshore and
Haborworkers’ Compensation Act).
2. There are six exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions; two of these (North Dakota and
Wyoming) do not permit self-insurance.
3. More specifically, workers’ compensation in the United States uses private insur-
ance carriers both as financial intermediaries and to administer claims (subject to
oversight by state workers’ compensation agencies) in all states, save for the
exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions.  Workers’ compensation in the United States is
distinctive among such programs worldwide because, with the exception of the
exclusive-state-fund jurisdictions, it uses private carriers both to bear risk and to
help administer the program. 
4. Several decades ago, the rationale was questioned by a workers’ compensation
expert, though his call for additional research was in large part ignored during the
intervening years (Williams 1969, p. 211): 
More research is needed on the feasibility and desirability of encour-
aging more price competition instead of the present, almost universal,
practice of having all [workers’ compensation] insurers use the same ini-
tial rates, these rates being subject to prior approval by the State insur-
ance department.  If this practice can be explained only in terms of
historical precedent, it should be abandoned.  However, the special char-
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acteristics of workmen’s compensation insurance may make uniform ini-
tial pricing and positive rate regulation appropriate in this line.
  5. We note that our estimate of the increasing gap between high- and low-cost states
due to the imposition of federal standards is based on the assumption that the
imposition of federal standards would not affect the behavior of the actors.  How-
ever, there is evidence indicating that workers’ compensation evaluations are
influenced by the generosity (or penuriousness) of statutory benefits (Durbin and
Kish 1997), so that adjudicators may evaluate claimants in states with low statu-
tory benefits as being more severely disabled than claimants with comparable
injuries in states with high statutory benefits.  If true, this would imply that the
gap between high and low costs may not increase as much as predicted by our
models if federal standards are imposed.
6. Competitive state funds are thought to offer some of the advantages of exclusive
state funds without the disadvantages.  They provide workers’ compensation
insurance coverage to employers who are not able to obtain it from a private car-
rier in the context of a competitive market environment. 
7. Profits may also represent another hidden cost for employers in exclusive-state-
fund jurisdictions.  Profits represent the private insurance carriers reward for risk;
i.e., the reward that the insurer receives for risking their equity if losses exceed
revenues.  Similar risks exist for exclusive state funds, but these risks are borne by
the employers themselves.  That is, if losses exceed revenues, the exclusive state
fund will replenish reserves by increasing premium rates in subsequent years.
Thus, in a private insurance system, the employer is able to shift more risk to the
carrier than is possible under an exclusive state fund.  Of course, the preceding
analysis assumes that competition causes insurer earnings to be limited to normal
profits in the long run.  
8. These results imply that regulators are able to suppress rates under pure adminis-
tered pricing, but not after the rate-setting process has been deregulated.
9. However, it is important to recognize that aggressive claims management may
increase costs.  Aggressive claims management can result in a litigious atmo-
sphere in which transaction costs are substantial and potentially overwhelm any
savings accrued from denying invalid claims or from reducing claimant malinger-
ing.
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Table A.1 Workers' Compensation Costs and Benefits, 1960–98
 
Col. 1 2 3
Year
Benefits
(as % of payroll)
Costs
(as % of payroll)
Statutory cash benefits
(average stated as %
 of Model Act)
1960 0.59 0.93
1961 0.61 0.95
1962 0.62 0.96
1963 0.62 0.99
1964 0.63 1.00
1965 0.61 1.00
1966 0.61 1.02
1967 0.63 1.07
1968 0.62 1.07
1969 0.62 1.08
1970 0.66 1.11
1971 0.67 1.11
1972 0.68 1.14 39.6
1973 0.70 1.17 44.3
1974 0.75 1.24 44.7
1975 0.83 1.32 45.4
1976 0.87 1.49 49.4
1977 0.92 1.71 49.6
1978 0.94 1.86 48.9
1979 1.01 1.95 50.4
1980 1.07 1.96 50.3
1981 1.08 1.85 49.3
1982 1.16 1.75 49.7
1983 1.17 1.67 50.7
1984 1.21 1.66 50.7
1985 1.30 1.82 50.5
1986 1.37 1.99 50.1
1987 1.43 2.07 50.6
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Table A.2 Workers’ Compensation Program Costs, 1960–98
Table A.1 (continued)
 
Col. 1 2 3
Year
Benefits
(as % of payroll)
Costs
(as % of payroll)
Statutory cash benefits
(average stated as %
 of Model Act)
1988 1.49 2.16 50.1
1989 1.43
 
a
 
2.04
 
a
 
51.0
1990 1.49 2.13 50.1
1991 1.64 2.16 49.9
1992 1.66 2.13 48.9
1993 1.58 2.17 50.0
1994 1.52 2.05 49.3
1995 1.39 1.83 49.1
1996 1.28 1.67 50.1
1997 1.14 1.46
1998 1.08 1.35
SOURCE:  Columns 1 and 2, 1960–88 data from Social Security Administration
(1995), Table 9.B1; 1989–98 data from Mont, Burton, and Reno (2000), Table 10,
col. 3.  Column 3 data from Thomason and Burton (2000b).
 
a
 
The drop in benefits and cash as a percentage of payroll between 1988 and 1989 is
due at least in part to a change in methodology that increased the estimated coverage
of the workers’ compensation program.
Year
Amount
($, millions)
Annual rate of increase 
from previous year 
shown (%)
1960  2,055 —
1971  5,191 8.79
1979  20,330 18.61
1984  25,122 4.32
1991  55,216 11.91
1998  52,108 –0.82
SOURCE:  1960–84 data from Nelson (1992b), Table 7, p. 51; 1991 and 1998 data
from  Mont, Burton, and Reno (2000), Table 9, p. 16.
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Table A.3 Benefit Payments by Regular Workers’ Compensation Programs, by Type of Payment, 1960–98
 
Total benefits Medical and hospitalization payments Cash benefits
Year
Amount 
($, millions)
Annual rate of 
increase from 
previous year 
shown (%)
Amount 
($, millions)
Annual rate of 
increase from 
previous year 
shown (%)
Share
 of total 
(%)
Amount 
($, millions)
Annual rate of 
increase from 
previous year 
shown (%)
Share
 of total 
(%)
1960  1,295 —  435 — 33.6  860 — 66.4
1971  3,184 8.5  1,130 9.1 35.5  2,054 8.2 64.5
1979  10,315 15.8  3,506 15.2 34.0  6,809 16.2 66.0
1984  18,044 11.8  6,315 12.5 35.0  11,728 11.5 65.0
1991  40,778 12.4  16,715 14.9 41.0  24,063 10.8 59.0
1998 40,657 0.0 15,802 –0.8 38.9 24,855 0.5 61.1
SOURCE:  1960 benefits data from Nelson (1992b), Table 2, p. 45; 1971–84 benefits data from Nelson (1992b), Table 3, p. 46; 1991 ben-
efits data from Nelson (1993), Table 1, p. 4; 1998 data from Mont, Burton, and Reno (2000), Table 6, p. 13.
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Table A.4 Workers’ Compensation Insurance Underwriting Experience, 1973–99
 
Col. 1
 
a
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Year
Losses 
incurred
 
b
 
Loss 
adjustment 
expenses
 
b
 
Losses and 
adjustment 
expenses 
incurred
 
b
 
Underwriting 
expenses 
incurred
 
c
 
Dividends to 
policyholders
 
b
 
Combined 
ratio after 
dividends
Net inv.
 gain/loss and 
other income
 
b
 
Overall 
operating 
ratio
1973 68.5 8.5 77.0 19.8
1974 71.6 8.7 80.3 19.6
1975 74.0 8.2 82.2 18.9 6.3 107.4
1976 78.2 8.4 86.6 17.6 5.4 109.6 6.9 102.6
1977 78.0 8.9 86.9 16.7 5.1 108.6 7.4 101.2
1978 74.4 8.7 83.0 16.4 5.6 105.0 7.8 97.2
1979 70.4 9.2 79.6 16.8 6.5 103.0 9.2 93.7
1980 67.6 8.4 76.1 17.4 8.0 101.4 10.8 90.7
1981 66.1 9.0 75.1 19.0 8.7 102.8 13.0 89.8
1982 64.3 9.1 73.4 20.6 9.9 103.9 15.0 88.9
1983 70.6 9.2 79.9 22.0 10.6 112.5 16.2 96.3
1984 81.0 9.8 90.8 21.2 9.9 121.9 16.7 105.2
1985 81.0 9.5 90.5 19.0 9.3 118.8 15.0 103.8
1986 85.4 10.2 95.5 18.0 7.6 121.1 13.7 107.4
1987 82.2 10.9 93.1 18.0 6.4 117.6 12.8 104.8
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1988 83.4 10.8 94.2 17.8 6.4 118.4 12.7 105.7
1989 83.3 11.4 94.7 17.4 6.1 118.2 13.4 104.8
1990 83.8 10.7 94.6 17.6 5.1 117.4 13.0 104.4
1991 87.8 11.5 99.3 18.5 4.9 122.6 14.0 108.7
1992
 
d
 
83.9 13.2 97.1 19.8 4.6 121.5 18.1 103.4
1993 71.6 12.4 84.0 20.4 4.7 109.1 16.7 92.4
1994 60.3 13.1 73.4 21.7 6.3 101.4 14.5 86.9
1995 55.2 12.5 67.7 23.3 6.0 97.0 16.8 80.2
1996 55.8 13.7 69.5 25.4 4.8 99.7 17.6 82.1
1997 55.6 13.8 69.4 25.9 5.4 100.7 20.4 80.3
1998 60.2 15.3 75.5 26.7 5.3 107.6 15.7 91.9
1999 65.9 15.8 81.7 28.0 5.6 115.3 20.5 94.8
SOURCE: From 
 
Best’s Aggregates and Averages, Property/Casualty
 
, 2000 edition and prior editions; copyright A.M. Best Company,
used with permission.
 
a
 
Losses incurred, also termed the pure less ratio, (Col. 1) plus loss adjustment expenses (Col. 2) equals losses and adjustment expenses
incurred (Col. 3).  Losses and adjustment expenses incurred (Col. 3) plus underwriting expenses incurred (Col. 4) plus dividends to pol-
icy holders (Col. 5) equals combined ratio after dividends (Col. 6).  Combined ratio after dividends (Col. 6) minus net investment gain/
loss and other income (Col. 7) equals overall operating ratio (Col. 8). 
 
b
 
As percentage of net premiums earned.
 
c
 
As percentage of net premiums written.
 
d
 
As of 1992, the methodology for allocating investment income changes slightly; as a result, 1992–99 numbers in the last two columns
are not directly comparable with those for earlier years.
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Table A.5 Nominal and Real Interest Rates, 1960–99 (%)
 
Six-month Treasury 
bill rate
Year-to-year 
change in CPI
Real interest rate
(Col. 1 – Col. 2)
1960 3.247 1.7 1.547
1961 2.605 1.0 1.605
1962 2.908 1.0 1.908
1963 3.253 1.3 1.953
1964 3.686 1.3 2.386
1965 4.055 1.6 2.455
1966 5.082 2.9 2.182
1967 4.630 3.1 1.530
1968 5.470 4.2 1.270
1969 6.853 5.5 1.353
1970 6.562 5.7 0.862
1971 4.511 4.4 0.111
1972 4.466 3.2 1.266
1973 7.178 6.2 0.978
1974 7.926 11.0 –3.074
1975 6.122 9.1 –2.978
1976 5.266 5.8 –0.534
1977 5.510 6.5 –0.990
1978 7.572 7.6 –0.028
1979 10.017 11.3 –1.283
1980 11.374 13.5 –2.126
1981 13.776 10.3 3.476
1982 11.084 6.2 4.884
1983 8.750 3.2 5.550
1984 9.800 4.3 5.500
1985 7.660 3.6 4.060
1986 6.030 1.9 4.130
1987 6.050 3.6 2.450
1988 6.920 4.1 2.820
1989 8.040 4.8 3.240
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Table A.5 (continued)
 
Six-month Treasury 
bill rate
Year-to-year 
change in CPI
Real interest rate
(Col. 1 – Col. 2)
1990 7.470 5.4 2.070
1991 5.490 4.2 1.290
1992 3.570 3.0 0.570
1993 3.140 3.0 0.140
1994 4.660 2.6 2.060
1995 5.590 2.8 2.790
1996 5.090 3.0 2.090
1997 5.180 2.3 2.880
1998 4.850 1.6 3.250
1999 4.760 2.2 2.560
SOURCE: Council of Economic Advisers (2000): T-bill rate from Table B-73, p. 412;
changes in CPI from Table B-62, p. 378.
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Table A.6 Work-Related Injury and Illness Incidence Rates, 1972–98
(per 100 full-time private sector workers)
 
Year Total cases Lost workday cases Lost workdays
1972 10.9 3.3 47.9
1973 11.0 3.4 53.3
1974 10.4 3.5 54.6
1975 9.1 3.3 56.1
1976 9.2 3.5 60.5
1977 9.3 3.8 61.6
1978 9.4 4.1 63.5
1979 9.5 4.3 67.7
1980 8.7 4.0 65.2
1981 8.3 3.8 61.7
1982 7.7 3.5 58.7
1983 7.6 3.4 58.5
1984 8.0 3.7 63.4
1985 7.9 3.6 64.9
1986 7.9 3.6 65.8
1987 8.3 3.8 69.9
1988 8.6 4.0 76.1
1989 8.6 4.0 78.7
1990 8.8 4.1 84.0
1991 8.4 3.9 86.5
1992 8.9 3.9 93.8
1993 8.5 3.8 ND
 
a
 
1994 8.4 3.8 ND
1995 8.1 3.6 ND
1996 7.4 3.4 ND
1997 7.1 3.3 ND
1998 6.7 3.1 ND
SOURCE: 1972–1993 data from Burton and Schmidle (1995), Table III.B.11, p. III-
25; 1994–1998 data from 
 
Monthly Labor Review
 
, Vol. 123, No. 3, March 2000, Table
46, p. 103.
 
a
 
ND = no data available.
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 Table A.7 Benefits Paid by Regular Workers’ Compensation Programs, by type of insurance, 1960–98
 
303
303
Private carriers State and federal funds Self-insuring employers
Year
Amount
 ($, millions)
Amount 
($, millions) %
Amount 
($, millions) %
Amount 
($, millions) %
1960  1,295   810 62.5  325 25.1  160 12.4
1970 2,921  1,843 63.1  645 22.1  432 14.8
1980 11,879  7,029 59.2 2,591 21.8 2,259 19.0
1990 36,803 22,222 60.4 7,332 19.9 7,249 19.7
1998 39,483 20,617 52.2 8,994 22.8 9,872 25.0
SOURCE: 1960 data from Nelson (1992b), Table 5, p. 48; 1970–80 data from Nelson (1992b), Table 3 for total and Table 5 for private
carriers and self-insuring employers, with state and federal funds (excluding the black-lung program) calculated by Schmidle; 1990 data
from Nelson (1993), Table 3, for all except state and federal funds (excluding the black-lung program), which were calculated by
Schmidle; 1998 data from Mont, Burton, and Reno (2000), Table 5, pp. 10–11, for all except state and federal funds (excluding the
black-lung program), which were calculated by Burton.
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Table A.8 State Workers’ Compensation Insurance Funds
 
a
 
Funds in operation as of 1960
Exclusive: Competitive:
Nevada Arizona New York
North Dakota California Oklahoma
Ohio Colorado Pennsylvania
Oregon Idaho Utah
Washington Maryland
West Virginia Michigan
Wyoming Montana
Developments since 1960
 
b
 
Competitive funds that were privatized: Michigan, December 28, 1994
Exclusive funds that became competitive: Nevada, July 1, 1999
New competitive funds:
Oregon
 
c
 
January 1, 1966
Minnesota April 1, 1984
New Mexico December 31, 1991
Texas January 1, 1992
Louisiana October 1, 1992
Rhode Island October 1, 1992
Maine January 1, 1993
Missouri March 1, 1995
Kentucky September 1, 1995
Hawaii July 20, 1997
 
a
 
Exclusive state funds are state-operated insurance funds that provide workers’ compensation
insurance policies to employers in the public and private sectors.  States with exclusive state
funds do not permit private insurance companies to provide workers’ compensation insurance
policies to employers in the state.  Some (but not all) of the states with exclusive state funds per-
mit employers who meet specified criteria to self-insure their workers’ compensation risks.
Competitive state funds are 1) state-operated insurance funds that provide workers’ compen-
sation insurance policies to employers in the public and private sector, and 2) private mutual
companies that provide workers’ compensation insurance policies to employers in the public
and private sectors and that are exempt from federal income taxes under the Internal Revenue
Code because, 
 
inter alia
 
, the state had a financial commitment during the organization of the
fund and the majority of the members of the board of directors or oversight body of the fund are
appointed by state officials.  States with competitive state funds permit private insurance compa-
nies to provide workers’ compensation insurance policies to employers in the state.  Also, as of
2000, all of the states with competitive state funds permit employers who meet specified criteria
to self-insure their workers’ compensation risks.
 
b
 
Dates indicate when funds began or ceased operation.
 
c
 
Converted from an exclusive state fund.
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Table A.9 States with Open Competition in the  
Workers’ Compensation Insurance Market
 
State Effective date
 
a
 
Arkansas July17, 1981
Oregon July 1, 1982
Kentucky July 15, 1982
Illinois August 18, 1982
Rhode Island September 1,1982
Michigan January 1, 1983
Georgia January 1, 1984
Minnesota January 1, 1984
Vermont July 1, 1984
Maine
 
b
 
January 1, 1986 – November 19, 1987
New Mexico October 1, 1987
Maryland January 1, 1988
Louisiana September 1, 1988
Indiana September 1, 1989
Connecticut October 1, 1989
Hawaii June 25, 1990
South Carolina July 1, 1990
District of Columbia January 1, 1991
Colorado March 1, 1991
Alabama November 1, 1991
Texas March 1, 1992
Utah May 20, 1992
Maine January 1, 1993
South Dakota July 1, 1993
Nebraska September 1, 1993
Pennsylvania December 1, 1993
Missouri January 1, 1994
New Hampshire January 1, 1994
Oklahoma January 1, 1994
Virginia January 1, 1994
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Table A.9 (continued)
 
State Effective date
 
a
 
Kansas July 1, 1994
Delaware August 1, 1994
California January 1, 1995
North Carolina July 28, 1995
Montana October 1, 1995
Mississippi January 1, 1996
Tennessee January 1, 1997
Alaska January 1, 1998
SOURCE: NCCI (1995, 2000), Exhibit II, “Premiums Level
Changes by State (“Competitive Rate Law Effective” entries).
Delaware and Pennsylvania dates are from rating bureaus for
those states.
 
a
 
Unless otherwise indicated, open competition is still in effect.
 
b
 
Almost all of the Maine premiums in 1986–87 were in the resid-
ual market, and so Maine may be treated as if the open competi-
tion law were not in effect.
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Table A.10 Workers’ Compensation Insurance 
Residual Market Share
 
a
 
Year Share (%)
1975 4.6
1976 7.7
1977 11.8 
1978 12.7
1979 12.7
1980 12.0
1981 10.2
1982 8.0
1983 6.2
1984 5.5
1985 9.7
1986 16.3
1987 19.0
1988 19.6
1989 22.0
1990 24.1
1991 25.8
1992 28.5
1993 27.8
1994 24.1
1995 17.3
1996 10.3 
1997 7.7
1998 3.9
SOURCE: NCCI (1993) for 1975–87 data; NCCI
 
 
 
(1993)
 
 
 
for 1988
data; NCCI (1995) for 1989–93 data; and NCCI (2000) for 1994–98
data.  The NCCI tables report data for 33 jurisdictions (including the
District of Columbia) for 1975–90, for 34 jurisdictions for 1991–92,
for 31 jurisdictions for 1993, for 29 jurisdictions for 1994–95, and for
27 jurisdictions for 1996–98.
 
a
 
National average for NCCI states.
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Appendix B
 
Insurance Terminology
 
This appendix reviews the terminology used in the workers’ compensation
insurance field.  These terms are adapted from the definitions in several publi-
cations of the National Council on Compensation Insurance, including 
 
Loss
Development Exhibits: Sample State Report Evaluated as of 12/94
 
 (NCCI
1996); 
 
Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2000 Edition
 
 (NCCI 2000); and 
 
Reporting
Guidebook for the Annual Calls for Experience
 
 (NCCI 1997).
 
MATRIX FOR TIME PERIODS AND MEASURES OF LOSSES
 
An understanding of workers’ compensation insurance terminology is fa-
cilitated by use of a two-by-four matrix (Table B.1).  There are four alterna-
tive time periods for reporting results and two particularly important
alternative measures of losses (or benefit costs), which means that conceptual-
ly there are eight different ways to measure losses.  Fortunately, only a subset
of these methods of measuring losses is typically used in practice.  Other im-
portant measures of workers’ compensation insurance performance, such as
premiums and expenses, can also be measured using the four alternative time
periods for presenting results, although again only a subset of these alterna-
tives is used in practice.
 
 
 
Table B.1 Insurance Terminology: Alternative Characterizations
ALTERNATIVE TIME PERIODS FOR REPORTING RESULTS
Calendar Year
 
A method of reporting or accounting for all financial transactions (e.g., pre-
miums and losses [benefit costs]) occurring during a specific year, regardless
of the years in which the accidents occur or policies are written.  (Dividends
are only reported on a calendar-year basis.)
 
Alternative time periods
Alternative measures of losses
Calendar 
year
Accident 
year
Policy 
year
Policy 
period
Paid losses X X X X
Incurred losses X X X X
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Accident Year (also known as calendar-accident year)
 
A method of reporting or accounting for losses for all accidents occurring
during a calendar year, regardless of the years in which the losses for those ac-
cidents are paid.  (The premium associated with accident-year losses is nor-
mally a calendar-year premium.)
 
Policy Year
 
A method of reporting or accounting for all financial transactions (e.g., pre-
miums and benefit costs) for all policies with coverage beginning during a
given calendar year.   The policy year always corresponds with the calendar
year.  For example, the 1994 policy year for Florida includes all policies with
initial effective dates between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994.  The
experience in a single policy year occurs over a 24-month time span because a
policy may be initially effective on any date during the calendar year and does
not expire until 12 months later.  Thus, the 1994 policy-year experience for
Florida includes those accidents that occurred between January 1, 1994, and
December 31, 1995, and that were covered by policies sold during policy year
1994.
 
Policy Period
 
A method of reporting or accounting for all financial transactions (e.g., pre-
miums and benefit costs) for all policies with coverage beginning during the
policy period used in a state.  The policy period typically is a 12-month peri-
od.  In many states, the policy period begins on January 1, and thus the policy
year and the policy period correspond.  (For example, the 1996 policy period
for Alabama began on January 1, 1996, and ended on December 31, 1996.)
However, the policy period in many states begins on a date other than January
1, and thus the policy year and the policy period do not correspond.  (For ex-
ample, the 1993–1994 policy period for Florida began on October 1, 1993,
and ended on September 30, 1994).  The experience in a single policy period
occurs over a 24-month time span because a policy may be effective on any
date during the policy period and does not expire until 12 months later.  Thus
the 1993–1994 policy-year experience for Florida includes those accidents
that occurred between October 1, 1993, and September 30, 1995, and that
were covered by policies sold during the 1993–1994 policy period.
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DATES FOR REPORTING RESULTS
Valuation Date
 
A specific time at which data are evaluated in order to determine the losses
(or benefits) paid and reserves as of that date.
 
Reports
 
A report contains the evaluation of a particular policy year or accident year
at a specific point in time (valuation date).  The valuation date for the first re-
port is the last date on which accidents can occur in the policy year or accident
year.  For example, accident year 1988 evaluated as of December 31, 1988, is
a first report and accident year 1988 evaluated as of December 31, 1995, is an
eighth report.  Likewise, policy year 1985 evaluated as of December 31, 1986,
is a 1st report and policy year 1985 evaluated as of December 31, 1995, is an
11th report.
 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF LOSSES (OR BENEFITS)
Paid Losses
 
The losses (or benefits) that an insurance company has paid as of a valua-
tion date.  The paid losses normally refer to the cumulative payments as of the
valuation date (e.g., accident year 1994 losses paid as of December 31, 1996).
Alternatively, the paid losses can refer to the incremental losses paid during a
specific time period (e.g., accident year 1995 losses paid during 1997).
 
Case Reserves
 
The reserves that an insurance company establishes to pay losses that are
anticipated subsequent to the valuation date for specific claims that are known
as of that date.
 
Bulk Reserves
 
Additional reserves that an insurance company establishes for an entire
state to pay losses that are anticipated subsequent to the valuation date.  The
NCCI definition is “those reserves for general case reserve inadequacy, sup-
plemental case reserves, cases that may reopen, or other reserves not associat-
ed to specific cases.”
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IBNR Reserves
 
The “pure” definition of IBNR (incurred but not reported) reserves in-
cludes those reserves that an insurance company establishes to pay losses that
(based on prior experience) are anticipated subsequent to the valuation date
for claims that have not yet been reported as of the valuation date, even
though the claims occurred in the specified period (i.e., during the specified
accident year).  The NCCI reporting guidelines permit carriers to include bulk
reserves with their IBNR reserves.
 
Incurred Excluding IBNR Losses
 
The sum of paid losses, case reserves, and bulk reserves.  (For those carri-
ers that include bulk reserves with their IBNR reserves, “incurred excluding
IBNR losses” is the sum of paid losses and case reserves.)
 
Incurred Including IBNR Losses
 
The sum of paid losses, case reserves, bulk reserves, and IBNR reserves.
This measure is what the NCCI refers to as “incurred losses.”
 
Loss Development Factor
 
The incurred loss development factor is the relation (or ratio) between 1)
incurred losses for a particular accident year (or policy year) at a particular
valuation date and 2) comparable estimates at a later valuation date.  An in-
curred loss development factor of 1.200 for first to second means that a 20
percent growth is expected in incurred losses between the first report and the
second report.  This definition assumes that the loss measure is “incurred in-
cluding IBNR losses.”  Loss development factors can be derived for other loss
measures, such as paid losses, paid losses plus case reserves, or incurred ex-
cluding IBNR losses.
 
N
 
th to Ultimate Loss Development Factor
 
A particularly important loss development factor is the 
 
N
 
th to ultimate loss
development factor, which is the ratio of 1) the eventual or ultimate cost of
claims to 2) the estimate of the cost of claims at an 
 
N
 
th report for a particular
accident year (or policy year).  For example, an eighth-to-ultimate factor ap-
plied to 1988 accident year losses valued as of December 31, 1995, (eighth re-
port) would represent the estimate of what the ultimate total losses will be for
accident year 1988.
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Ultimate Losses
 
Losses for a particular accident year (or policy year) developed to an ulti-
mate reporting basis.
 
OTHER FACTORS THAT AFFECT UNDERWRITING RESULTS
Loss Adjustment Expenses
 
Loss adjustment expenses include salaries for staff claims adjusters, fees to
independent adjusters, and other expenses involved in adjusting claims.
 
Underwriting Expenses
 
Underwriting expenses include commissions and brokerage expenses; oth-
er acquisition expenses; general expenses, including salaries and costs of of-
fice space; and taxes, licenses, and fees.
 
Dividends
 
Mutual insurers and participating stock insurers pay dividends to policy-
holders.  Data are available on a calendar year basis from the National Associ-
ation of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) or A.M. Best. 
 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF PREMIUMS
Standard Earned Premium at Designated Statistical
Reporting (DSR) Level
 
There are two possibilities for the voluntary market.  
1. In those states using manual rates that include expense allowances, the
premium is calculated by the multiplication of manual rates by the expo-
sure base (typically, total payroll of the insured enterprise).  In these
states, the standard earned premium at DSR level includes experience
rating plan adjustments, expenses constants, and loss constants.  
2. In those states using pure premiums that exclude expense allowances,
the premium is calculated by the multiplication of pure premiums by the
exposure base.  In these states, the standard earned premium at DSR
level includes experience-rating plan adjustments (except in Michigan),
but in the voluntary market excludes expense constants and loss con-
stants.
All assigned-risk policies must be written at approved assigned-risk rates.
For such policies, standard earned premium at DSR level (as well as the stan-
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dard earned premium at company level) will reflect those approved rates
along with approved experience-rating plan adjustments, expense constants,
and loss constants.
 
Standard Earned Premium at Company Level
 
In those states using manual rates that include expense allowances, the pre-
mium is calculated by adjusting the standard earned premium at DSR level for
the effect of deviations from manual rates.  In those states using pure premi-
ums that exclude expense allowances, the premium is calculated by adjusting
the standard earned premium at DSR level for the effects of deviations from
pure premiums, carrier-charged expense constants, and carrier-charged loss
constants.
 
Net Earned Premium
 
The premium is calculated by adjusting the standard earned premium at
company level for the effects of 1) deviations from NCCI experience rating
modification factors; 2) retrospective rating plan adjustments; 3) other indi-
vidual risk rating plan adjustments, such as schedule rating; 4) premium dis-
counts; 5) premium credits for small deductible coverage; and 6) adjustments
for certain assigned-risk market programs.
 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF UNDERWRITING EXPERIENCE
 
There are several ways to utilize the measures of losses, expenses, divi-
dends and premiums defined in the previous paragraphs in order to measure
underwriting experience in workers’ compensation.  Table 2.1 [p. 25] illus-
trates one use of the measurements: all of the entries are 1999 calendar year
data stated as a percentage of net premiums.  Losses incurred (line 1, also
known as the pure loss ratio) is incurred losses for cash and medical benefits.
The sum of losses incurred and loss adjustment expenses (line 2) equals line 3,
the losses and adjustment expenses incurred.   In turn, the sum of line 3 plus
line 4 (underwriting expenses incurred, including state and local insurance
taxes) plus line 5 (dividends to policyholders) is line 6, the combined ratio af-
ter dividends.  Subtracting net investment gain (loss) and other income (line 7)
from line 6 produces line 8, the overall operating ratio, which is prior to state
and federal income taxes.
When the combined ratio after dividends exceeds 100, insurers lose money
on their underwriting experience because premiums are not adequate to cover
losses and expenses.  When the overall operating ratio exceeds 100, insurers
lose money on the combination of their underwriting experience, taxes, and
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other income.  There are years when the combined ratio is in excess of 100,
which means that carriers lose money on their underwriting experience, but
the net tax gain plus earnings on reserves are large enough to produce an over-
all operating ratio that is less than 100, which means that the workers’ com-
pensation insurance line is profitable.  This happened, for example, in 1999,
when the combined ratio was 115.3 but the overall operating ratio was 94.8.
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Appendix C
 
Detailed Methodology for Measuring Employers’ 
Costs of Workers’ Compensation Insurance
 
Chapter 3 described several methods of measuring interstate differences in
workers’ compensation costs and provided a brief explanation of the method-
ology we used to measure interstate differences in the costs of workers’ com-
pensation insurance.  This appendix provides additional discussion of the
methodology, together with estimates of workers’ compensation costs based
on this procedure.
 
1
 
 
 
INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS
The Standard Set of Classifications
 
The cost methodology for this study utilized a standard set of 71 insurance
classes for all states and all years in our sample.  We selected these 71 classes
from among more than 500 active classifications in the National Council on
Compensation Insurance classification system.  These particular classes were
chosen because they are commonly used by state workers’ compensation pro-
grams; they account for a large proportion of total payroll nationally; and they
are representative of each of the five divisions of workers’ compensation in-
surance classifications: manufacturing, contracting, office and clerical, goods
and services, and “miscellaneous.”  
Table C.1 briefly describes these classifications and shows the aggregate
percentage of total payroll accounted for by each class in the 36 National
Council states for which payroll information was available for selected policy
years.  We used this aggregate payroll data to calculate a weighted average in-
surance rate for each state.  Specifically, the greater the proportion of payroll
associated with a particular classification, the greater the influence that classi-
fication had on the calculation of the statewide average rate.  The same distri-
bution of payroll was used for all states and for all years, so that interstate and
intertemporal differences in workers’ compensation costs are due to factors
other than differences in industry mix.
 
Modifications in the Standard Set of Classifications
 
The NCCI’s classification scheme is used in 42 of the states included in our
study.
 
2
 
   Insurance categories in states using other classification systems were
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Table C.1 Insurance Classification and Distribution of Payroll
 
Code no. and classification description
 
a
 
% of covered payroll
 
b
 
Manufacturing classes
2003 Bakeries 0.335
2039 Ice cream 0.026
2070 Creameries 0.189
2157 Bottling N.O.C.
 
c
 
0.186
2220 Yarn or thread-cotton 0.395
2361 Hosiery manufacturing 0.115
2501 Clothing 1.097
2585 Laundries N.O.C. 0.122
2586 Cleaning or dyeing 0.072
2660 Boot or shoe manufacturing N.O.C. 0.159
2802 Carpentry—shop only 0.195
2883 Wood furniture N.O.C. 0.280
3066 Sheet metal work-shop 0.196
3076 Fireproof equipment 0.319
3081 Foundries—iron N.O.C. 0.116
3082 Foundries—steel castings 0.037
3085 Foundries—nonferrous metals N.O.C. 0.055
3113 Tool N.O.C. 0.282
3179 Electrical apparatus N.O.C. 0.460
3400 Metal goods N.O.C. 0.228
3507 Agricultural machinery 0.394
3612 Pump and engine N.O.C. 0.159
3632 Machine shops N.O.C. 0.981
3643 Electrical power equipment 0.401
3681 Telephone apparatus 0.549
4034 Concrete products 0.117
4299 Printing 0.668
4304 Newspaper publishing 0.121
4484 Plastics—molded products manufacturing N.O.C. 0.358
          Percentage for 29 manufacturing classes 8.612
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Code no. and classification description
 
a
 
% of covered payroll
 
b
 
Contracting classes
3724 Millwright work N.O.C. 0.427
5022 Masonry N.O.C. 0.349
5183 Plumbing N.O.C. 0.879
5190 Electrical wiring—within building 0.742
5213 Concrete construction N.O.C. 0.457
5215 Concrete work 0.049
5221 Concrete work—floors, sidewalks, etc. 0.289
5403 Carpentry N.O.C. 0.500
5506 Street or road construction 0.389
5538 Sheet metal work erection N.O.C. 0.429
5606 Contractors—executive supervisors 0.433
5645 Carpentry—detached private residences 0.547
6217 Excavation N.O.C. 0.330
          Percentage for 13 contacting classes 5.820
Office and clerical classes
8742 Salesmen, collectors, or messengers–outside 6.418
8748 Automobile sales or service agencies 0.534
8810 Clerical office employees N.O.C. 25.425
8833 Hospitals—professional employees 2.765
8868 Colleges or schools—professional employees 6.361
          Percentage for 5 office and clerical classes 41.503
Goods and services classes
8006 Retail grocery stores—no fresh meats 0.240
8008 Retail clothing or dry goods stores 0.790
8010 Hardware stores—wholesale or retail 0.515
8017 Retail stores N.O.C. 1.402
8018 Wholesale or combined wholesale—retail N.O.C. 0.631
8033 Meat, grocery, and provision stores—retail 1.236
8039 Retail department stores 0.710
 
(continued)
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Table C.1 (continued)
 
Code no. and classification description
 
a
 
% of covered payroll
 
b
 
8044 Wholesale or retail furniture stores 0.329
8232 Lumber yards 0.444
8292 General merchandise warehouses N.O.C. 0.104
8293 Furniture storage warehouses 0.073
8350 Gasoline or oil dealers 0.217
8387 Gasoline stations—accessories stations 0.677
8391 Automobile garages 1.194
8829 Convalescent or nursing homes 0.849
9015 Buildings operation N.O.C. 0.544
9040 Hospitals—all other employees 0.565
9052 Hotels 0.468
9079 Restaurant N.O.C. 2.566
9101 Colleges or schools—all other employees 0.901
          Percentage for 20 goods and services classes 14.455
Miscellaneous classes
7219 Truckmen N.O.C. 1.278
7380 Chauffeurs, drivers, helpers N.O.C. 0.910
7539 Electric light or power companies N.O.C.—all 
operations
0.158
7720 Policemen 0.615
          Percentage for 4 miscellaneous classes 2.961
          Percentage for 71 classes 73.351
 
a
 
Code number and classification description taken from the classification code of the
National Council on Compensation Insurance.
 
b
 
The percentage of covered payroll in 36 selected states is based on 1978–79, 
1979–80, or 1980–81 policy year data.
 
c
 
N.O.C. means “not otherwise classified.”
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converted to NCCI classification by selecting the category in the state’s sys-
tem that was most nearly analogous to each of the 71 NCCI classes.
 
3
 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE SIX BASIC MODELS FOR 
CALCULATING COSTS
 
Table C.2 presents our six basic models for calculating adjusted manual
rates.  There are two variants of Models III, IV, and V (e.g., Models III and
IIIa), depending on the type of assigned-risk program used in the state on the
comparison date; thus, in effect, we used nine models to calculate adjusted
manual rates.  The models are mutually exclusive; that is, for each state, only
one of the nine models was applicable for any single year.
 
4
 
  
 
Three Categories of States
 
Three decision rules were used to assign the states to one of the six basic
models:  1) whether the state had an exclusive state fund or a private insurance
market; 2) whether the state’s rating bureau promulgated fully developed
manual rates or loss costs only; and 3) whether the state’s rating bureau pub-
lished different rates (or loss costs) for the voluntary and assigned-risk (resid-
ual) markets.  
 
Exclusive-fund states versus other states
 
Three states in our study have exclusive state insurance funds: Ohio, Wash-
ington, and West Virginia.  We used Model VI to calculate statewide employ-
 
Table C.2 Six Basic Models Used to Calculate Employers' Costs 
 
States using 
manual rates in the 
voluntary market
States using 
pure premiums in the 
voluntary market
States with private carriers
States with voluntary market only Model I Model II
States with identical rates in 
voluntary and residual market
Model III Note a
States with different rates in 
voluntary and residual market
Model IV Model V
States with exclusive state funds
States with voluntary market only Model VI Note a
 
a
 
There are no states in this category.
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er costs for these states; variations within Model VI are discussed later in this
appendix.
 
Manual rates versus pure premiums
 
In some states, the rating bureau publishes 
 
manual rates
 
 (rates per $100 of
payroll that represent expected losses plus an allowance for expenses and
profit).  In other states, the rating bureau publishes
 
 pure premiums
 
 (rates per
$100 of payroll that represent expected losses plus loss adjustment expenses,
but no other element of expense or profit).  In still other states, the rating bu-
reau may simultaneously publish both manual rates and pure premiums.
 
Voluntary markets versus assigned-risk markets
 
Most workers’ compensation insurance policies are purchased in the vol-
untary market, which means that the insurance carrier and employer are vol-
untary parties to the workers’ compensation insurance contract.  In some
instances, an employer is unable to find an insurer who is willing to provide
coverage.  This may occur for a number of reasons.  For example, a firm that
is too small to be experience-rated may have a record of loss experience that is
much worse than that of the average risk in the firm’s classification.  Alterna-
tively, the insurer may believe that the manual rate applicable to an employer
is so low that, even if the employer has average loss experience, losses plus
expenses will exceed premiums paid.
An employer who is unable to purchase an insurance policy in the volun-
tary market is nonetheless required, in most states, to obtain workers’ com-
pensation insurance coverage.  Most states have an assigned-risk plan or a
similar arrangement that provides policies to employers who cannot find in-
surance in the voluntary market; typically, those employers are assigned to the
carriers who participate in the voluntary workers’ compensation insurance
market in the state.
 
Five Basic Models in States with Private Carriers
 
Here we describe the five basic models that we used to calculate rates for
states that permit private carriers to provide workers’ compensation insurance
coverage.  Most states historically relied exclusively on the voluntary market
and published manual rates as opposed to pure premiums.  Also, until recently,
states with voluntary and assigned-risk (residual) markets used manual rates
that were identical in the two markets.  Employers assigned to the residual mar-
ket might not be eligible for certain discounts or dividends that are available in
the voluntary market, but the starting point for determining policy premiums—
the manual rate—was identical to the starting point in the voluntary market.  
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We used Model I to calculate rates for those states in which the rating bu-
reau published one set of manual rates for the both voluntary and residual
markets.  The “adjusted” manual rates charged employers in the two markets
may have differed because premium discounts or other modifying factors may
not have been applicable in the residual market.  However, the data we use on
the effect of modifying factors encompasses both markets, and so the adjusted
manual rates we calculate pertain to the entire market.  
Model III was used for those states in which the rating bureau published
separate manual rates for voluntary and residual markets, although the manual
rates were in fact identical.  The adjusted manual rates paid by residual market
employers may have been different than the rates paid by voluntary market
employers.  Again, the data on the effect of the modifying factors we used en-
compass all policies in the state, and so the adjusted manual rates we calculat-
ed pertain to the entire market.  In recent years, various states have authorized
carriers to charge different manual rates for the voluntary and assigned-risk
markets.  Model IV was used to calculate rates for these states.  
There are now some states that rely exclusively on the voluntary market
and utilize pure premiums, in which case we used Model II.  Model V was
used to calculate rates in states that use pure premiums in the voluntary market
and manual rates in the residual market.
There were additional variations of these models that depended on the pric-
ing mechanisms used in the residual market.  In some states, the effects of re-
sidual market programs are reflected in normal insurance industry data, but in
others it was necessary to further adjust rates using supplemental NCCI data
to account for the rate impact of these residual market programs.  Models IIIa,
IVa, and Va utilized this supplemental data to calculate statewide average
rates for these jurisdictions.
Table C.3 lists the model(s) used to calculate the employers’ costs of work-
ers’ compensation insurance for each state and year from 1975 to 1995.  The
next several sections illustrate the specific procedure used to calculate adjust-
ed manual rates.
The entries for the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South Dakota contain a notation that particular
manual rates or pure premiums were the Designated Statistical Reporting
(DSR) level for the Annual Calls for Experience for certain years.  This typi-
cally occurred when the states were in transition from administered pricing to
a more deregulated approach to insurance pricing.  Kentucky provides an ex-
ample.  The competitive law was effective July 15, 1982, and pure premiums
were issued with that effective date.  However, the Annual Calls for Experi-
ence from carriers for 1983 were based on the manual rates that were effective
July 15, 1981.  Thus, Model I was appropriate for the purposes of calculating
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Table C.3 The Basic Models Used for the 48 Jurisdictions, 1975–95
 
Jurisdiction Model and years applied
Alabama I (1975–91), V (1992–95)
Alaska I (1975–83), IV (1984–88), IIIa (1989–95)
Arizona I (1975–86), IV (1987–95)
Arkansas I (1975–90), IIIa (1991–92), IVa (1993–95)
California ND
 
a
 
 (1975–85), I (1986–94), II (1995)
Colorado I (1975–91), II (1992–95)
Connecticut I (1975–89), V (1990–92), Va (1993–95)
Delaware ND (1975–85), I (1986–94), V (1995)
District of Columbia I (1975–87), IV (1988–92), V (1993–95)  [4/1/91 manual rates 
were the DSR level in 1992]
Florida I (1975–87), III (1988–89), IIIa (1990–93), IVa (1994–95)
Georgia I (1975–81), IV (1982–95)
Hawaii I (1975–92), Va (1993–95)  [10/1/89 manual rates were the DSR 
level in 1992]
Idaho I (1975–91), IIIa (1992–95)
Illinois I (1975–82), IV (1983–93), IVa (1994–95)
Indiana I (1975–89), IIIa (1990–95)
Iowa I (1975–88), IV (1989–92), IVa (1993–95)
Kansas I (1975–90), IIIa (1991–95)
Kentucky I (1975–83), V (1984–95)  [7/15/81 manual rates were the DSR 
level in 1983]
Louisiana I (1975–88), V (1989), Va (1990–92), II (1993–95 [state fund 
data unavailable]) 
Maine I (1975–87), IV (1988–92), I (1993), II (1994–95 [Maine 
Employers Mutual Insurance Co. data unavailable])
Maryland I (1975–87), II (1988–95)
Massachusetts I (1975–95)
Michigan I (1975–82), V (1983–95)
Minnesota I (1975–83), V (1984–95)
Mississippi I (1975–90), IIIa (1991–92), IV (1993–95)
Missouri I (1975–89), III (1990), IIIa (1991–93), V (1994–95)
Montana I (1975–95)
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Jurisdiction Model and years applied
Nebraska I (1975–89), IV (1990), IVa (1991–94), Va (1995)  [9/1/93 
manual rates were the DSR level in 1994]
New Hampshire I (1975–90), III (1991–92), IIIa (1993), Va (1994–95)
New Jersey I (1975–95)
New Mexico I (1975–89), V (1990), Va (1991–95)
New York I (1975–95)
North Carolina IIIa (1975–95)
Ohio ND (1975–82, 1985–86), VI (1983–84, 1987–95)
Oklahoma I (1975–94), II (1995)  [7/1/93 manual rates were the DSR level 
in 1994]
Oregon I (1975–82), V (1983–92), Va (1993–95)
Pennsylvania ND (1975–85), I (1986–93), II (1994–95)
Rhode Island I (1975–82), III (1983–89), IV (1990–92, I (1993–95 [state fund 
data unavailable]) [6/22/89 manual rates were the DSR level 
in 1990–95]
South Carolina I (1975–90), Va (1991–95)
South Dakota I (1975–88), IIIa (1989–94), Va (1995)  [6/1/93 manual rates 
were the DSR level in 1994]
Tennessee I (1975–88), III (1989), IIIa (1990–95)
Texas I (1975–91), ND (1992–95)
Utah I (1975–92), II (1993–95 [state fund data unavailable])
Vermont I (1975–85), III (1986–92), IIIa (1993–94), Va (1995)
Virginia I (1975–91), IIIa (1992), IVa (1993), Va (1994–95)
Washington ND (1975–84), VI (1985–95)
West Virginia VI (1975–95)
Wisconsin I (1975–95)
 
a
 
ND = no data available.
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adjusted manual rates in Kentucky in 1983, even though in terms of public
policy the state no longer relied on administered pricing.  
Three states (Louisiana, Maine, and Rhode Island) recently established
state funds, which took over the function of the residual market and for which
we do not have data.  Thus, as shown in Table C.3, for Louisiana we used
Model V in 1989 and Model Va in 1990–1992 because the state used pure pre-
miums in the voluntary market and manual rates in the assigned-risk market.
The total market adjusted manual rates we calculated for Louisiana for these
years were a blend of the adjusted manual rates for the voluntary and as-
signed-risk markets, using the procedures described in the next two sections.
In 1993, a state fund took over the function of the assigned-risk market.  How-
ever, we only have data on the insurance policies in the voluntary market, and
so of necessity we relied on Model II for 1993–1995.  To the extent that the
policies sold in the voluntary market are not representative of the total insur-
ance market in Louisiana in 1993–1995, the adjusted manual rates we calcu-
lated for Louisiana for those years are biased.  A similar bias may exist for
Maine’s adjusted manual rates for 1994–1995 and for Rhode Island’s adjusted
manual rates for 1993–1995.  This means that eight of our observations may
be biased because we were not able to include data on state funds that took
over the residual market functions in these three states.
We have examined the sensitivity of our empirical results in subsequent
chapters by recalculating various regressions omitting the eight observations.
Fortunately, the effects on the regression results were trivial.
 
5
 
   As a result, we
treat the eight potentially biased observations as comparable to our other ob-
servations for purposes of all additional analyses.
 
6
 
CALCULATION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COSTS
IN STATES WITH PRIVATE CARRIERS
Types of Data Used to Produce Adjusted Manual Rates
 
We used 13 types of data as inputs to produce, as outputs, three variants of
the adjusted manual rates with the five basic models that pertain to states with
private carriers.  As shown in Table C.4, these include four types of insurance
rates (the starting point for the calculations), seven types of adjustment fac-
tors, and two measures of market shares for the voluntary and residual mar-
kets.  These 16 variables (13 types of data as inputs and 3 variants of adjusted
manual rates as outputs) were defined in Appendix B and this appendix, and
their uses are illustrated in this appendix.
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Table C.4 Compendium of Variables with Data for the Five Basic Models 
for States with Private Carriers
 
Insurance rates
IR1 Manual rates in voluntary market
IR2 Manual rates in residual market
IR3 Pure premiums in voluntary market
IR4 Manual rates for total market
Adjustment factors
 
a
 
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment (standard premium 
 
÷
 
 manual 
premium)
AF2 Expense-constant adjustment
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level 
 
÷
 
 standard earned 
premium at DSR
AF4 Net earned premium 
 
÷
 
 standard earned premium at 
company level
AF5 Dividend adjustment
AF6 RM impact (residual market impact)
AF7 Net earned premium 
 
÷
 
 standard premium at DSR 
[AF7 = AF3 – AF4]
Market shares
MS1 Voluntary market share
MS2 Residual market share
Adjusted manual rates
AMR1 Voluntary market adjusted manual rates
AMR2 Residual market adjusted manual rates
AMR3 Total market adjusted manual rates
 
a
 
Policy-year data for variables AF3, AF4, and AF7 were used whenever possible; oth-
erwise, calendar-year data were used.
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Calculation of Adjusted Manual Rates for Markets in Which the 
Starting Point Is Manual Rates
 
Manual rates have two components: pure premiums and an expense loading.
The pure premiums cover expected payments for cash benefits, medical care,
and (in most jurisdictions) loss-adjustment expenses.  The expense-loading fac-
tor provides an allowance for other insurance carrier expenses, such as general
administrative expenses, commissions, profits, and contingencies.  In most
states using manual rates, the loading factor historically has been 35–40 percent
of the manual rates.  The general procedure used to calculate adjusted manual
rates when the starting point is manual rates is summarized in Table C.5.
 
7
 
 
 
Manual rates
 
 (line 1) are stated as dollars per $100 of payroll.  The employ-
er’s total 
 
payroll
 
 (line 2) falling within the payroll limit
 
8
 
 multiplied by the ap-
propriate manual rate equals 
 
manual premium without constants
 
 (line 3).  In
practice, few employers pay such a premium because of several modifications.
The first modification arises from the experience rating that is permitted
for medium and large firms.  In simple terms, experience rating uses the em-
ployer’s own past record of benefit payments to modify published manual
rates that would otherwise apply.  If the employer’s record is worse than the
experience of the average employer in its classification, then its actual premi-
um for the current policy period is larger than its manual premium.
 
9
 
 
 
Table C.5 Calculation of Adjusted Manual Rates from Manual Rates
 
1. Manual rates (MR)
2.
 
×
 
Payroll
3. = Manual premium without constants
4.
 
×
 
Experience-rating modification
5. = Standard earned premium excluding constants
6.
 
÷
 
Adjustment for expense constants (and loss constants)
7. = Standard earned premium at bureau rates (DSR)
8.
 
×
 
Adjustment for deviations
9. = Standard earned premium at company level
10.
 
×
 
Adjustment for premium discounts, retrospective rating, and schedule rating
11. = Net earned premium
12.
 
×
 
Dividends adjustment
13. = Net cost to policyholders
14.
 
÷
 
Payroll
15. = Adjusted manual rates (AMR)
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The same experience-rating formula is used in all the NCCI states, but the
experience-rating modification differs among these states and therefore must
be taken into account in determining the actual costs of workers’ compensa-
tion insurance in each state.  Moreover, it is necessary to determine the effects
of experience rating in the NCCI jurisdictions in order to compare their insur-
ance costs with those in other states that have their own experience-rating
plans.
 
10 
 
  The product of the manual premium without constants (line 3) and
the
 
 experience-rating modification 
 
(line 4) is line 5
 
, the standard earned pre-
mium excluding constants
 
.
The standard earned premium excluding constants also is modified for
most employers, although the form of this modification depends on the size of
the employer’s premium.  Employers in almost every state are assessed a flat
charge, termed an “expense constant,” to cover the minimum costs of issuing
and servicing a policy.  In addition, employers in some states are assessed an-
other flat charge, termed a “loss constant,” because of the generally inferior
safety record of small businesses.  When the standard earned premium exclud-
ing constants (line 5) is divided by line 6, the 
 
adjustment for the expense con-
stants (and loss constants)
 
, the result is the 
 
standard earned premium at
bureau rates (DSR)
 
 (line 7), also termed the “standard earned premium at the
designated statistical reporting (DSR) level.”
The standard earned premium at bureau rates is further adjusted for many
employers.  Deviations are a competitive pricing device that have been avail-
able in over 30 states since 1975, but they have only been in active use in
many jurisdictions since approximately 1980.  In a state allowing deviations,
individual carriers may use the manual rates promulgated by the rating organi-
zation or may deviate from those rates.  The carrier might, for example, use
manual rates that are 10 percent less than those issued by the rating organiza-
tion.  The deviations offered by a particular carrier must be uniform for all
policyholders in the state in a particular insurance class (although different de-
viations for different classes are sometimes possible).  If the standard earned
premium at bureau rates (line 7) is multiplied by the 
 
adjustment for deviations
 
(line 8), the result is the 
 
standard earned premium at company level
 
 (line 9).
 
11
 
 
There are several additional factors that may reduce workers’ compensa-
tion insurance premiums.  Premium discounts apply to employers with annual
premiums in excess of $5,000, which basically reflect reductions in carrier ex-
penses for larger policies because of economies of scale.  The discounts based
on a specified schedule are compulsory in the NCCI states, unless both the in-
surance carrier and the employer agree to substitute “retrospective rating” for
the premium discounts.  Though these retrospective rating plans vary among
the NCCI states, they are basically similar in that they allow the employer to
increase the effect of its own claims experience on the published manual rates.
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The main difference between experience rating and retrospective rating is
that the former uses the employer’s experience from previous periods to mod-
ify the premium for the current policy period rate, whereas the retrospective
plan uses experience from the current policy period to determine the current
premium on an 
 
ex post facto
 
 basis.  The same expense retention (reduction in
premiums for the employer) provided by the premium discounts is built into
the retrospective rating plans.  Identical discount schedules and retrospective
plans are used in virtually all NCCI jurisdictions; however, because states dif-
fer in matters such as the distribution of the size of workers’ compensation in-
surance policies, the schedules and plans nonetheless have different effects on
rates in different states and therefore are measured with state-specific data.
Schedule-rating plans have also been actively used in many jurisdictions
since the 1980s.  Under these plans, insurers can change (usually decrease) the
insurance rate the employer would otherwise pay through debits or credits
based on a subjective evaluation of factors such as the employer’s loss-control
program.  There are two types of schedule rating.  In states with uniform
schedule-rating plans, regulators authorize all carriers to use identical sched-
ule-rating plans.  If all carriers are not given this permission, then individual
carriers can apply for approval of their own schedule-rating plans.
The result of multiplying the standard earned premium at company level
(line 9) by the 
 
adjustment for premium discounts, retrospective rating
 
, 
 
and
schedule rating
 
 (line 10) is the 
 
net earned premium
 
 (line 11).
One final adjustment factor, a 
 
dividends adjustment
 
 (line 12), needs to be
used to compute the premiums actually paid by employers.
 
12
 
   Mutual compa-
nies or stock companies with participating policies write a substantial portion
of the workers’ compensation insurance.  While these companies normally
use a quantity discount schedule less steeply graded than that of the nonpartic-
ipating stock companies, they pay dividends that usually decrease policyhold-
ers’ net costs to levels below that charged by nonparticipating stock
companies, especially for large employers.  The product of the net earned pre-
mium (line 11) and the dividends adjustment is the 
 
net cost to policyholders
 
(line 13), which is the premium actually paid by employers purchasing work-
ers’ compensation insurance.
The final modification shown in Table C.5 is to divide the net cost to poli-
cyholders by 
 
payroll
 
 (line 14) in order to produce 
 
adjusted manual rates
 
 (line
15) that can be used to provide meaningful comparisons among firms.  Ad-
justed manual rates are measured as dollars of premium per $100 of payroll,
which can be interpreted as the percentage of payroll actually expended by
employers on workers’ compensation insurance.
The astute reader will note that payroll is included at steps 2 and 14 in ad-
justments that are exactly offsetting.  This was done to facilitate understand-
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ing of insurance terminology and our procedure.  In our actual calculations,
discussed below, we skip steps 2 and 14 without affecting the relationship be-
tween manual rates and adjusted manual rates.
 
Use of State-Level Data for the Modification Factors
 
Our calculations involving the modifying factors shown in Table C.5 (and
the subsequent tables in this appendix) rely on state-level data (or separate
state-level data for the voluntary market and for the residual market), rather
than on data for each of the 71 insurance classes included in our study.  There
are three reasons we used aggregated data.  First, most of the adjustment fac-
tors are only available at an aggregate level, including the adjustments for de-
viations and dividends.  Second, the data for experience-rating modifications
at the individual classification level are available from the NCCI, but only at
considerable expense that exceeded our budget.  Third, because we are using
71 insurance classifications in this study, which accounted for more than 70
percent of all payroll covered by the workers’ compensation program nation-
ally (see Table C.1), we expect that our procedure of relying on state-level ex-
perience-rating modification factors will not produce results that would
significantly differ from using individual modification factors for the 71 class-
es and then averaging the results.
We recognize, of course, that comparisons of workers’ compensation in-
surance costs among states for individual insurance classes will be more accu-
rate if modifying factors (such as the experience-rating modification factor) at
the classification level are used.  However, we confine ourselves in this study
to interstate comparisons of the weighted averages of the adjusted manual
rates for 71 insurance classifications, and we therefore are confident that the
use of state-level data for adjustment factors is appropriate.  
 
Calculation of Adjusted Manual Rates for Markets in Which the Starting
Point Is Pure Premium Rates
 
The general procedure used to calculate adjusted manual rates in workers’
compensation markets in which the starting point is pure premium rates (or
loss costs) is summarized in Table C.6.
 
13
 
   The pure premiums cover expected
payments for cash benefits, medical care, and (in most jurisdictions) loss-ad-
justment expenses. 
The 
 
pure premium rates
 
 (line 1) are stated as dollars per $100 of payroll.
The employer’s total 
 
payroll
 
 (line 2) falling within the payroll limit multiplied
by the appropriate pure premium rates is 
 
pure premium
 
 (line 3).  In practice,
no employer pays such an amount.
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Table C.6 Calculation of Adjusted Manual Rates from Pure Premiums
 
The first modification in calculating employers’ premiums arises from ex-
perience rating.  The product of the pure premium and the 
 
experience-rating
modification
 
 (line 4) is line 5, the s
 
tandard earned premium at bureau rates
(DSR)
 
, or “standard earned premium at DSR.”
The standard earned premium at bureau rates (DSR) is modified for most
employers.  Carriers will add their own expense loadings to cover expenses
such as general administrative expenses and commissions.  Employers may
also be assessed a flat charge, termed an expense constant, to cover the mini-
mum costs of issuing and servicing a policy.  In addition, some employers are
assessed another flat charge, a loss constant, to compensate for the generally
inferior safety record of small businesses.
The standard earned premium at bureau rates is further adjusted for many
employers by the use of deviations.  Individual carriers may use the pure pre-
mium rates promulgated by the rating organization or may deviate from those
rates.  If the standard earned premium at bureau rates (DSR) is multiplied by
line 6, the
 
 adjustment for deviations
 
, 
 
expense constants
 
 
 
(and loss constants),
and
 
 
 
expense loadings
 
, the result is line 7, the 
 
standard earned premium at
company level
 
.
There are additional factors that reduce workers’ compensation insurance
premiums for many employers.  Premium discounts may apply to employers
with significant annual premiums (in excess of $5,000), reflecting the reduc-
 
1. Pure premium rates
2.
 
×
 
Payroll
3. = Pure premium
4.
 
×
 
Experience-rating modification
5. = Standard earned premium at bureau rates (DSR)
6.
 
×
 
Adjustment for deviations, expense constants (and loss constants), and 
expense loadings
7. = Standard earned premium at company level
8.
 
×
 
Adjustment for premium discounts, retrospective rating, and schedule rating
9. = Net earned premium
10.
 
×
 
Dividends adjustment
11. = Net cost to policyholders
12.
 
÷
 
Payroll
13. = Adjusted manual rates (AMR)
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tions in carrier expenses for larger policies because of economies of scale.  Al-
ternatively, the insurance carrier and the employer may agree to substitute
“retrospective rating” for the premium discounts
Schedule-rating plans have also been introduced in many jurisdictions in
recent years.  Under these plans, insurers can change (usually decrease) the in-
surance rate the employer would otherwise pay through debits or credits based
on a subjective evaluation of factors such as the employer’s loss-control pro-
gram.  
The result of multiplying the standard earned premium at company level by
line 8, the 
 
adjustment for premium discounts, retrospective rating, and sched-
ule rating
 
 is the 
 
net earned premium
 
 (line 9).
One final adjustment factor, a 
 
dividends adjustment
 
 (line 10), needs to be
used in the order to compute the premiums actually paid by employers.  The
product of the net earned premium and the dividends adjustment is the 
 
net cost
to policyholders
 
 (line 11), which is the premium actually paid by employers
purchasing workers’ compensation insurance.
The final modification shown in Table C.6 is to divide the net cost to poli-
cyholders by 
 
payroll
 
 (line 12) in order to produce 
 
adjusted manual rates
 
 (line
13) that can be used to provide meaningful comparisons among firms.  Ad-
justed manual rates are measured as dollars of premium per $100 of payroll,
which can be interpreted as the percentage of payroll actually expended by
employers on workers’ compensation insurance.
In our actual calculations, discussed below, we skip steps 2 and 12 without
affecting the relationship between manual rates and adjusted manual rates.
 
Calculation of Adjusted Manual Rates When There Is an 
Assigned-Risk Market
 
Most workers’ compensation insurance is provided in the voluntary insur-
ance market.  However, because the employers whose applications for insur-
ance are rejected in the voluntary market still must have insurance, all states that
do not have state funds that are obligated to accept all employers have estab-
lished assigned-risk plans.  The national average for this assigned-risk (residual)
market share in NCCI states ranged between 4.6 percent and 28.5 percent be-
tween 1975 and 1996 (see Figure 2.13 and Table A.8).  Residual market shares
for most of the states with private carriers are available for 1980–1995.  
The residual market share data in Table C.7 indicate that there are consid-
erable variations among states and years in the importance of residual mar-
kets.  Arkansas, for example, had only 2.8 percent of private insurance in the
residual market in 1983, but its share reached 51.4 percent in 1993.  And in
1992, for example, when the national average share peaked at 28.5 percent,
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Table C.7 State Residual Market Shares, 1980–95 (%)
 
Ala. Alaska Ariz. Ark. Calif. Colo. Conn. Del. D.C. Fla. Ga. Hawaii
1980 12.0 9.1 0.2 10.1 —
 
a
 
— 11.7 5.1 12.7 15.7 9.7 5.8
1981 10.4 8.6 0.1 6.7 — — 8.3 3.4 9.8 11.3 6.7 3.9
1982 8.1 6.1 0.2 4.0 — — 6.0 2.4 7.9 8.0 3.7 4.0
1983 5.5 4.9 0.4 2.8 — — 4.1 1.5 5.5 6.6 3.0 3.9
1984 5.9 4.0 0.3 3.4 — — 3.4 1.8 3.6 6.2 3.0 3.6
1985 10.8 8.0 0.7 11.6 — — 5.3 — 6.8 10.4 8.3 5.7
1986 18.4 15.9 2.2 24.4 — — 9.8 5.5 9.8 17.7 16.7 7.8
1987 21.6 13.9 2.4 26.5 — — 12.0 6.7 10.1 22.2 19.5 8.9
1988 22.5 15.1 1.7 34.7 — — 11.1 6.7 9.7 21.0 16.2 9.5
1989 23.5 13.3 2.2 34.7 — — 12.7 7.3 10.3 22.9 18.7 10.4
1990 30.6 15.0 3.1 35.7 — — 12.0 9.6 13.2 23.4 19.5 10.1
1991 36.3 13.1 3.3 41.8 — — 13.0 — 16.0 21.5 20.6 11.4
1992 42.1 17.0 3.3 50.9 — — 13.9 — 16.4 27.9 24.5 12.5
1993 40.9 16.3 3.3 51.4 — — 11.6 — 18.6 34.2 28.7 20.3
1994 39.4 16.4 1.3 39.2 — — 11.4 — 14.5 4.0 30.7 35.3
1995 30.7 15.0 0.5 26.2 — — 9.3 12.2 12.6 3.0 21.4 47.5
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Idaho Ill. Ind. Iowa Kans. Ky. La. Maine Md. Mass. Mich. Minn.
1980 — 16.2 8.8 6.3 10.0 22.3 17.8 25.7 — 21.7 7.0 —
1981 — 11.7 7.6 4.4 10.5 27.3 15.1 22.7 — 20.5 5.0 —
1982 — 7.1 5.6 2.8 8.4 22.8 11.0 20.1 — 17.2 3.7 —
1983 — 5.1 3.5 2.2 6.5 17.2 8.8 18.8 — 12.4 2.9 —
1984 — 5.3 4.8 2.7 7.1 8.1 8.0 20.4 — 10.4 3.5 4.8
1985 — 11.6 9.9 8.6 12.9 10.7 16.4 30.2 — 14.7 6.8 8.5
1986 — 17.4 20.0 14.5 21.7 15.4 33.2 54.6 — 20.4 10.5 14.1
1987 — 17.8 22.6 16.5 24.5 20.9 36.5 67.2 — 25.0 11.7 16.7
1988 — 15.2 20.3 17.2 21.7 21.1 43.9 82.3 — 29.5 10.6 16.9
1989 — 15.1 20.0 17.2 24.1 23.7 56.7 90.6 — 40.1 10.1 14.5
1990 — 14.9 20.5 17.0 27.7 25.3 65.8 87.8 — 46.3 10.7 15.1
1991 2.3 15.3 17.6 17.6 30.0 29.3 79.9 78.2 — 50.7 10.7 15.5
1992 2.9 13.5 17.3 17.4 35.2 42.1 78.5 82.4 — 64.7 13.1 18.3
1993 2.6 12.6 14.7 18.6 38.6 44.1 — — — 61.0 14.4 20.8
1994 2.6 10.8 11.6 13.9 35.4 49.1 — — — 47.0 10.4 20.5
1995 2.3 7.8 6.4 938 24.9 34.9 — — — 27.8 8.7 15.5
 
(continued)
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Table C.7 (continued)
 
Miss. Mo. Mont. Nebr. N.H. N.J. N.Mex. N.Y. N.C. Ohio Okla. Oreg.
1980 11.0 14.4 — 6.0 27.2 13.1 10.8 — 12.1 — — 0.1
1981 6.6 14.3 — 6.4 23.0 8.3 4.8 — 10.0 — — 0.2
1982 6.8 9.4 — 3.2 19.3 5.5 3.3 — 7.0 — — 0.3
1983 6.2 7.2 — 2.7 12.7 3.0 2.3 — 5.3 — — 0.2
1984 5.5 7.6 — 2.7 12.2 2.0 2.0 — 5.0 — — 0.5
1985 10.5 15.1 — 7.6 14.9 4.0 7.3 — 8.1 — — 2.0
1986 18.3 23.9 — 16.0 24.6 8.1 20.1 — 12.6 — — 3.6
1987 25.7 25.1 — 17.2 30.3 9.2 30.2 — 15.4 — — 3.4
1988 28.2 25.2 — 17.9 26.4 9.6 31.3 — 16.2 — — 3.3
1989 28.0 26.5 — 23.4 30.3 7.9 34.4 — 18.2 — — 4.2
1990 36.2 28.8 — 23.3 30.8 10.0 40.7 — 19.4 — — 9.8
1991 40.3 33.1 — 25.2 30.1 — 46.4 — 21.2 — — 11.4
1992 51.6 32.5 — 20.5 39.8 — 51.8 — 24.1 — — 7.7
1993 41.6 35.0 — 19.7 38.4 — 46.9 — 28.4 — — 8.0
1994 38.6 37.0 — 15.6 41.8 — 3.5 — 23.7 — — 8.7
1995 25.0 17.3 — 11.0 27.1 — 21.4 — 18.2 — — 7.9
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Pa. R.I. S.C. S.Dak. Tenn. Texas Utah Vt. Va. Wash. W.Va. Wisc.
1980 — 21.8 11.7 9.5 11.0 — — 24.6 16.5 — — —
1981 — 20.8 9.7 9.1 8.8 — — 20.5 13.4 — — —
1982 — 20.7 8.1 6.6 6.4 — — 20.0 13.1 — — —
1983 — 18.1 7.4 5.4 5.1 — — 19.3 8.9 — — —
1984 — 14.4 5.7 4.8 5.7 — — 14.8 3.7 — — —
1985 — 22.8 8.7 11.0 11.0 — — 17.3 4.8 — — —
1986 — 36.8 16.5 28.0 19.2 — — 26.8 9.6 — — —
1987 — 44.4 19.2 25.2 22.2 — — 29.8 11.6 — — —
1988 — 51.5 20.9 27.4 23.3 — — 27.2 12.4 — — —
1989 — 66.8 23.6 30.2 22.3 — — 34.0 14.3 — — —
1990 — 79.5 25.6 23.2 27.2 — — 35.8 17.8 — — —
1991 — 85.2 34.5 23.9 32.3 — — 32.4 19.2 — — —
1992 — 88.6 41.0 24.2 41.4 — — 40.7 26.9 — — —
1993 — — 46.2 23.5 55.0 — — 41.8 32.6 — — —
1994 — — 42.7 20.4 52.3 — — 36.4 29.1 — — —
1995 — — 26.3 15.4 42.7 — — 24.9 24.3 — — —
 
a
 
A dash (—) indicates either that the state has no residual market or that no data are available for that market.
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the shares in individual states ranged from 2.9 percent in Idaho to 88.6 percent
in Rhode Island.
Six models are used to calculate the employers’ costs of workers’ compen-
sation insurance, as previously discussed in conjunction with Table C.2.  The
first two models are used when the only data for a state pertain to the volun-
tary market.  Model III is used when the states use identical manual rates in
the voluntary and residual market.  Model IV is used when the state uses one
set of manual rates in the voluntary market and another set of manual rates in
the residual market.  Model V applies if the state uses pure premiums in the
voluntary market and manual rates in the residual market.  Model VI is appli-
cable if the state has an exclusive state fund which uses the same set of manual
rates for all employers.
A further distinction must be drawn for Models III, IV, and V, depending
on the type of residual market pricing program used in the state.  There are six
types of residual market programs, which we label RMP1 to RMP6:
RMP1: different manual rates (or loss costs) are used in the voluntary and
residual markets;
RMP2: premium discounts are eliminated or modified in the residual mar-
ket for large policyholders, who would qualify for the discounts in
the voluntary market;
RMP3: loss-sensitive rating plans (LSRP)—including the Assigned Risk
Rating Program (ARRP), which is a type of retrospective rating
plan—are used in the residual market, which increase the effect of
an employer’s own experience on the premiums paid by the em-
ployer;
RMP4: premium surcharges are added in the residual market to the premi-
ums the employer would otherwise pay;
RMP5: the Assigned Risk Adjustment Program (ARAP); and
RMP6: other experience-rating adjustment programs that are applicable to
firms in the residual market.
The calculations for the residual market adjusted manual rates depend on
which of these six residual market programs is used.  The crucial distinction is
whether the state relies solely on programs RMP1, RMP2, and RMP3.  If so,
then the standard adjustment factors (shown in Tables C.5 and C.6) used to
calculate adjusted manual rates will capture the effects of the residual market
programs as well as the effects of the various adjustment factors in the volun-
tary market.  Depending on the combination of manual rates and/or pure pre-
miums used in the voluntary and residual markets, Model III, IV, or V will
pertain to a state that uses only RMP1, RMP2, and RMP3.  
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If, however, the state relies on residual market programs RMP4, RMP5, or
RMP6, then the “normal” adjustment factors used to calculate adjusted manu-
al rates in Tables C.5 and C.6 will not capture the effects of these residual
market programs.  Rather, the adjusted manual rates in the residual market
have to be computed by using an additional factor measuring the residual mar-
ket program impact on rates.  These effects were calculated for us by the
NCCI and are shown in the “Impact” column of Table C.8.  Depending on the
combination of manual rates and/or pure premiums in the voluntary and resid-
ual markets, the state using RMP4, RMP5, or RMP6 will be classified as
Model IIIa, IVa, or Va.
Florida provides an illustration of the choice of model depending on the
type of residual market program used in the state.  Between 1975 and 1987,
Florida only used the voluntary market to provide workers’ compensation in-
surance, and thus Model I was applicable (see Table C.3).  In 1988, Florida es-
tablished a residual market, which used the same manual rates in the voluntary
and residual markets but eliminated the premium discount in the residual mar-
ket (RMP2), which made Model III applicable.  In 1989, the state continued to
use the same manual rates in the voluntary and residual markets and imple-
mented an ARRP program (RMP3), which meant that Florida was still a Mod-
el III jurisdiction in our classification scheme.  In 1990, Florida continued the
ARRP program (RMP3), but it also established a $267 flat charge plus a 15
percent surcharge for all policies in the residual market (RMP4); because
Florida continued to use the same manual rates in the voluntary and residual
markets in 1990, Model IIIa was applicable.  The latest change occurred in
1994, when Florida relied on manual rates in the residual market that were 26
percent higher than the manual rates in the voluntary market.  Florida also re-
lied on the ARAP program (RMP5) as well as surcharges (RMP4) in the resid-
ual market in 1994, which meant that Model IVa was applicable.  The next
section provides numerical examples of the calculation of adjusted manual
rates for all of the models used for states with private insurance carriers.
 
THE FIVE BASIC MODELS IN STATES 
WITH PRIVATE CARRIERS
Model I: Voluntary Market Only with Manual Rates
 
This model is used when 1) the voluntary market relies on manual rates and
2) there are no separate rates or data for the assigned-risk market.  The manual
rates for the voluntary market can be mandatory or advisory.  
A complete description of the procedure for moving from manual rates to
adjusted manual rates with this model was provided in the previous section
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Table C.8 Adjustments for Residual Market Pricing Programs
Residual program Rates used 
in vol. 
marketc
Comparison 
dates
Rates 
useda Adjustmentsb Impact Modeld
Alabama
1/1/92 AR PP V
1/1/93 AR PP V
1/1/94 AR PP V
1/1/95 AR PP V
Alaska
1/1/84 VM × 1.1 MR IV
1/1/85 VM × 1.1 MR IV
1/1/86 VM × 1.1 MR IV
1/1/87 VM × 1.2 MR IV
1/1/88 VM × 1.2 MR IV
1/1/89 VM 25% Surcharge 1.161 MR IIIa
1/1/90 VM 25% Surcharge 1.161 MR IIIa
1/1/91 VM 25% Surcharge 1.161 MR IIIa
1/1/92 VM 25% Surcharge 1.161 MR IIIa
1/1/93 VM 25% Surcharge 1.161 MR IIIa
1/1/94 VM 25% Surcharge 1.161 MR IIIa
1/1/95 VM 25% Surcharge 1.161 MR IIIa
Arizona
1/1/87 
(through 1/1/95)
VM × 1.2 MR IV
Arkansas
1/1/91 VM ARAP 1.120 MR IIIa
1/1/92 VM ARAP 1.120 MR IIIa
1/1/93 AR ARAP 1.088 MR IVa
1/1/94 AR ARAP 1.088 MR IVa
1/1/95 AR Merit rating, etc. 1.088 MR IVa
Connecticut
1/1/90 AR PP V
1/1/91 AR PP V
1/1/92 AR PP V
1/1/93 AR ARAP 1.099 PP Va
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Residual program Rates used 
in vol. 
marketc
Comparison 
dates
Rates 
useda Adjustmentsb Impact Modeld
1/1/94 AR ARAP 1.099 PP Va
1/1/95 AR ARAP 1.099 PP Va
District of Columbia
1/1/88 
(through 1/1/92)
AR MR IV
1/1/93 AR PP V
1/1/94 AR PP V
1/1/95 AR PP V
Florida
1/1/88 VM [Removal of discounts] MR III
1/1/89 VM [ARRP] MR III
1/1/90 VM ARRP (1.0) × $267 flat 
charge (1.067) × 15% 
surcharge (1.110) 
1.184 MR IIIa
1/1/91 VM ARRP (1.065) × $267 
flat charge (1.067) ×
15% surcharge (1.110)  
1.184 MR IIIa
1/1/92 VM ARRP (1.129) × $475 
flat charge (1.086) × 
26% surcharge (1.162) 
1.425 MR IIIa
1/1/93 VM ARRP (1.120) ×  $475 
flat charge (0.152) × 
26% surcharge (0.260) 
1.532 MR IIIa
1/1/94 VM 
× 1.26
ARRP (0.151) × $475
flat charge (0.117) × 
surcharge (0.826) 
2.354 × 
VM rates 
or 1.868 × 
AR rates
MR IVa
1/1/95 VM 
× 1.26
ARRP (0.151) × $475
flat charge (0.117) ×  
surcharge (1.826) 
2.354 × 
VM rates 
or 1.868 × 
AR rates
MR IVa
Georgia
1/1/82
(through 1/1/86)
VM × 1.2 MR IV
(continued)
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Table C.8 (continued)
Residual program Rates used 
in vol. 
marketc
Comparison 
dates
Rates 
useda Adjustmentsb Impact Modeld
Georgia (cont.)
1/1/87 VM × 
1.145
MR IV
1/1/88 
(through 1/1/91)
VM × 
1.221
MR IV
1/1/92 VM × 1.25 MR IV
1/1/93 VM × 1.25 MR IV
1/1/94 VM × 1.25 ARRP (= LSRP) MR IV
1/1/95 VM × 1.25 ARRP (= LSRP) MR IV
Hawaii
1/1/93 AR ARAP 1.115 PP Va
1/1/94 AR ARAP 1.115 PP Va
1/1/95 AR ARAP 1.115 PP Va
Idaho
1/1/92
(through 1/1/95)
VM 20% Surcharge 1.2 MR IIIa
Illinois
Pre 1/1/88 Not in 10/20/97 table
1/1/88 VM × 
1.038
MR IV
1/1/89 VM × 
1.038
MR IV
1/1/90
(through 1/1/93)
VM × 1.2 MR IV
1/1/94 VM × 1.2 ARAP 1.09 MR IVa
1/1/95 VM × 1.2 ARAP 1.09 MR IVa
Indiana
1/1/90
(through 1/1/94)
VM 25% Surcharge 1.224 MR IIIa
1/1/95 VM 25% Surcharge/offset 1.189 MR IIIa
Iowa
1/1/89 VM × 1.09 MR IV
1/1/90 VM × 1.2 MR IV
1/1/91 VM × 1.2 ARRP (= LSRP) MR IV
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Residual program Rates used 
in vol. 
marketc
Comparison 
dates
Rates 
useda Adjustmentsb Impact Modeld
1/1/92 VM × 1.2 ARRP (= LSRP) MR IV
1/1/93 VM × 1.2 ARAP 1.108 MR IVa
1/1/94 VM × 1.2 ARAP 1.098 MR IVa
1/1/95 VM × 1.2 ARAP 1.073 MR IVa
Kansas
1/1/91 VM ARAP 1.075 MR IIIa
1/1/92 VM ARAP 1.075 MR IIIa
1/1/93 VM ARAP 1.062 MR IIIa
1/1/94 VM ARAP (1.080) ×
surcharge (1.116) 
1.205 MR IIIa
1/1/95 VM ARAP (1.080) ×
surcharge (1.116) 
1.205 MR IIIa
Louisiana
1/1/90 AR 20% Surcharge 1.144 PP Va
1/1/91 AR 25% Surcharge 1.138 PP Va
1/1/92 AR 25% Surcharge 1.138 PP Va
Mississippi
1/1/91 VM 20% Surcharge 1.2 MR IIIa
1/1/92 VM 20% Surcharge 1.2 MR IIIa
1/1/93 AR MR IV
1/1/94 AR MR IV
1/1/95 AR MR IV
Missouri
1/1/90 VM [Removal of discounts] MR III
1/1/91 VM ARAP 1.086 MR IIIa
1/1/92 VM ARAP (1.087) × 
20% surcharge (1.2)
1.304 MR IIIa
1/1/93 VM ARAP (1.087) × 
20% surcharge (1.2)
1.304 MR IIIa
1/1/94 AR PP V
1/1/95 AR PP V
(continued)
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Table C.8 (continued)
Residual program Rates used 
in vol. 
marketc
Comparison 
dates
Rates 
useda Adjustmentsb Impact Modeld
Nebraska
1/1/90 AR MR IV
1/1/91 AR ARAP 1.067 MR IVa
1/1/92 AR ARAP 1.067 MR IVa
1/1/93 AR ARAP 1.107 MR IVa
1/1/94 AR ARAP 1.107 MR IVa
1/1/95 AR ARAP 1.107 PP Va
New Hampshire
1/1/91 VM [Removal of discounts] MR III
1/1/92 VM [Removal of discounts] MR III
1/1/93 VM 10% Surcharge 1.1 MR IIIa
1/1/94 AR 10% Surcharge 1.1 PP Va
1/1/95 AR 10% Surcharge 1.1 PP Va
New Mexico
1/1/90 AR PP V
1/1/91 AR 10% Surcharge 1.1 PP Va
1/1/92 AR 10% Surcharge (1.1) ×  
ARAP (1.103) 
1.213 PP Va
1/1/93 AR 10% Surcharge (1.1) × 
ARAP (1.103) 
1.213 PP Va
1/1/94 AR 10% Surcharge (1.1) × 
ARAP (1.103) 
1.213 PP Va
1/1/95 AR 10% Surcharge (1.1) × 
ARAP (1.074) 
1.181 PP Va
North Carolina
1/1/75 
(through 1/1/90)
VM 8% Surcharge 1.08 MR IIIa
1/1/91 VM 8% Surcharge (1.08) × 
ARAP (1.061) 
1.146 MR IIIa
1/1/92 VM 8% Surcharge (1.08) × 
ARAP (1.061) 
1.146 MR IIIa
1/1/93 VM 14% Surcharge (1.14) × 
ARAP (1.068) 
1.218 MR IIIa
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Residual program Rates used 
in vol. 
marketc
Comparison 
dates
Rates 
useda Adjustmentsb Impact Modeld
1/1/94 VM 14% Surcharge (1.14) × 
ARAP (1.062) 
1.211 MR IIIa
1/1/95 VM 14% Surcharge (1.14) × 
ARAP (1.062) 
1.211 MR IIIa
Oregon
1/1/83
(through 1/1/89)
AR [AR Rates = VM 1.1] PP V
1/1/90
(through 1/1/92)
AR [AR Rates = VM 1.15] PP V
1/1/93 AR ARAP 1.148 PP Va
1/1/94 AR ARAP 1.133 PP Va
1/1/95 AR ARAP 1.116 PP Va
South Carolina
1/1/91 AR ARAP 1.087 PP Va
1/1/92 AR ARAP 1.087 PP Va
1/1/93 AR ARAP 1.087 PP Va
1/1/94 AR ARAP 1.076 PP Va
1/1/95 AR ARAP 1.076 PP Va
South Dakota
1/1/89 VM 15% Surcharge to 
premium in excess 
of $500
1.079 MR IIIa
1/1/90 VM 15% Surcharge 1.079 MR IIIa
1/1/91 VM 15% Surcharge 1.079 MR IIIa
1/1/92 VM 15% Surcharge 1.079 MR IIIa
1/1/93 VM 15% Surcharge 1.079 MR IIIa
1/1/94 VM 15% Surcharge to 
premium in excess of 
$3750
1.122 MR IIIa
1/1/95 AR 15% Surcharge 1.122 PP Va
(continued)
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Table C.8 (continued)
Residual program Rates used 
in vol. 
marketc
Comparison 
dates
Rates 
useda Adjustmentsb Impact Modeld
Tennessee
1/1/89 VM MR III
1/1/90 VM 10% Surcharge, 
selective
1.0585 MR IIIa
1/1/91 VM 10% Surcharge, 
selective
1.0585 MR IIIa
1/1/92 VM Tabular surcharge 1.112 MR IIIa
1/1/93 VM Tabular surcharge 1.112 MR IIIa
1/1/94 VM Tabular surcharge 1.112 MR IIIa
1/1/95 VM Tabular surcharge 1.112 MR IIIa
Vermont
1/1/86
(through 1/1/92)
VM MR III
1/1/93 VM ARAP 1.082 MR IIIa
1/1/94 VM ARAP 1.076 MR IIIa
1/1/95 AR ARAP 1.076 PP Va
Virginia
1/1/92 VM ARAP 1.098 MR IIIa
1/1/93 AR ARAP 1.101 MR IVa
1/1/94 AR ARAP 1.094 PP Va
1/1/95 AR ARAP 1.094 PP Va
SOURCE: The information in this table was provided by Barry I. Llewellyn of the National Coun-
cil on Compensation Insurance.
a AR = assigned-risk market rates.
VM = aoluntary market rates.
b ARAP = Assigned Risk Adjustment Program.
ARRP = Assigned Risk Rating Program.
LSRP = Loss-sensitive rating plan.
c PP = pure premium.
MR = manual rate.
d
“Model” refers to those listed in Table C.3.
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(see Table C.5).  A simplified illustration of the procedure used to derive ad-
justed manual rates for Colorado for January 1, 1981, is shown in Table C.9;
this table uses the variables described in Table C.4.
The starting point for the calculations is the variable IR1, the average of the
71 manual rates, which was $1.416 per $100 of payroll in Colorado in 1981.14
This rate was multiplied by adjustment factor AF1, the experience-rating ad-
justment, which was 0.984, indicating that experience rating was reducing the
workers’ compensation premiums paid by Colorado employers.  The expense
constant was $35 in Colorado in 1981, which, based on actuarial data on the
effect of this constant on the amount of premium paid by employers, meant
that AF2, the expense constant adjustment factor, was 0.993.  The ratio of
standard earned premium at company level to standard earned premium at
DSB (AF3) was 0.779, which indicates that substantial deviations were being
offered by carriers in Colorado.  The ratio of net earned premium to standard
earned premium at company level (AF4) was 0.961, indicating that some ad-
ditional reductions in premiums were occurring due to factors such as retro-
spective rating.  The final adjustment factor, the dividend adjustment (AF5),
was 0.934, indicating that dividends were 6.6 percent of net premium in Colo-
rado in 1981.  
For Colorado, we thus started with the average manual rates of $1.416 and
computed an average adjusted manual rate (AMR3) of $0.982 per $100 of
payroll for the 71 types of Colorado employers in 1981 (Table C.9).  The aver-
age of adjusted manual rates was 30.6 percent less than the average of the
manual rates, indicating that the adjustment factors used by carriers in Colo-
rado in 1981 had a dramatic effect in lowering the premiums actually paid by
Table C.9 Sample Calculation of Adjusted Manual Rates for Model I, for 
Colorado on January 1, 1981
IR1 Manual rates (averages for 71 classes) $1.416
AF1 Experience rating adjustment × 0.984
AF2 Expense-constant adjustment ÷ 0.993
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ standard 
earned premium at DSR
× 0.779
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned premium at 
company level
× 0.961
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.934
AMR3 Total market adjusted manual rates = $0.982
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employers.  Similar calculations were performed for all of the states and years
for which Model I applies (as shown in Table C.3).
Model II: Voluntary Market Only with Pure Premium Rates
This model is used when 1) the rates for the voluntary market are pure pre-
mium rates (loss costs) and 2) there are no separate rates or calculations for
the assigned-risk market.
A complete description of the general procedure of moving from pure pre-
mium rates to adjusted manual rates was provided in the previous section (see
Table C.6).  A simplified illustration of the procedure used to derive adjusted
manual rates for Colorado for January 1, 1995, is shown in Table C.10, using
the variables included in Table C.4.
The average pure premium rate for the 71 insurance classes (IR3) was
$2.857 per $100 of payroll in Colorado in 1995.  The experience-rating adjust-
ment (AF1) is 0.969; the ratio of standard earned premium at the company
level to standard earned premium at the DSR level (AF3) is 1.341; the ratio of
net earned premium to standard earned premium at the company level (AF4)
is 0.797; and the dividend adjustment (AF5) is 0.942.  The result of multiply-
ing the average pure premium rate (for the 71 classes) by these adjustment
factors is a total market adjusted manual rate (AMR3) of $2.788 per $100 of
payroll.  It is of interest that the adjusted manual rates were actually less than
the pure premiums in Colorado in 1995 as a result of these adjustments.  As a
result, Colorado employers in 1995 expended, on average, 2.788 percent of
payroll on workers’ compensation insurance.
Table C.10 Sample Calculation of Adjusted Manual Rates for Model II, 
for Colorado on January 1, 1995
IR3 Pure premiums (loss costs) $2.857
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment × 0.969
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ 
standard earned premium at DSR
× 1.341
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned premium 
at company level
× 0.797
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.942
AMR3 Total market adjusted manual rates = $2.788
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Model III: Voluntary and Residual Markets 
with Identical Manual Rates 
This model is used when 1) the rates for the voluntary market contain ex-
pense loadings (and thus are manual rates) and 2) there are manual rates for
the assigned-risk market that are identical to the manual rates in the voluntary
market.  The manual rates for the voluntary market can be mandatory or advi-
sory.  There are two variants, Model III and Model IIIa, depending on the na-
ture of the adjustments to premiums in the residual markets.
Model III
Various adjustments are made to the manual rates in the assigned-risk mar-
ket that are not made in the voluntary market.  Specifically, the assigned-risk
market may 1) eliminate or modify premium discounts or 2) use loss-sensitive
rating plans.  The effect of these adjustments will be reflected in the adjust-
ment factors data that are applicable to the entire market (voluntary plus as-
signed-risk), such as the experience-rating adjustment, the net earned
premium/standard earned premium ratio, or the dividends adjustments.  As a
result, the calculation of adjusted manual rates for Model III is straightforward
and, in essence, is identical to the procedure used for Model I.
An illustration of the procedure used to derive adjusted manual rates for
Model III is provided in Table C.11 for Florida for January 1, 1988.  The illus-
tration uses the variables included in Table C.4.  The only difference from the
Model I calculation is that here the procedure starts with the IR4 manual rates. 
Table C.11 Sample Calculation of Adjusted Manual Rates for Model III, 
for Florida on January 1, 1988
IR4 Manual rates $3.484
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment × 0.988
AF2 Expense-constant adjustment ÷ 0.989
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ 
standard earned premium at DSR
× 0.989
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned premium 
at company level
× 1.015
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.964
AMR3 Total market adjusted manual rates = $3.366
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Model IIIa 
Model IIIa is applicable when the residual (assigned-risk) market 1) relies
on premium surcharges, or 2) uses an Assigned Risk Rating Program (ARRP),
or 3) uses some other type of experience rating adjustment program, or any
combination of the three.  The effect of these factors will not be reflected in the
adjustment factors applicable to the entire workers’ compensation market (vol-
untary plus residual markets), such as experience rating adjustment, the net
earned premium/standard earned premium ratio, and the dividends adjustment.
The effect of these factors will be reflected, however, in the residual market im-
pact (RM impact) figures that have been provided by the NCCI (see Table C.8).
Model IIIa involves three sets of calculations (Table C.12).  Adjusted man-
ual rates are calculated for the voluntary market, separate calculations are re-
quired for the adjusted manual rates in the residual market, and then the
adjusted manual rates from the voluntary and residual markets are blended as
the “total market.”
The voluntary market.  The starting point for the calculations is the vari-
able IR1, the average of the 71 manual rates in the voluntary market, which
was $5.875 per $100 of payroll in Florida in 1993.  This rate was multiplied
by the experience-rating adjustment (AF1), which was 0.991, indicating that
experience rating was reducing the workers’ compensation premiums paid by
Florida employers.  The expense constant was $140 in Florida in 1993, which
meant that the expense constant adjustment factor (AF2) was 0.989.  The ratio
of standard earned premium at company level to standard earned premium at
bureau rates (AF3) was 1.000, which indicates that Florida carriers were not
offering deviations.  The ratio of net earned premium to standard earned pre-
mium at company level (AF4) was 0.928, indicating that reductions in premi-
ums were occurring due to factors such as retrospective rating.  The final
adjustment factor, the dividend adjustment (AF5), was 0.980, indicating that
dividends were 2.0 percent of net premium in Florida in 1993.  
Starting with the average manual rates of $5.875, the calculations produced
an average adjusted manual rate in the voluntary market (AMR1) of $5.354 per
$100 of payroll for the 71 types of Florida employers in 1993.  Adjusted man-
ual rates were 8.9 percent less than manual rates, indicating the relatively mod-
est effect of the adjustment factors in the Florida voluntary market in 1993.
The residual market.  The calculations for the adjusted manual rates in
the residual market in Florida in 1993 start at the same point as those for the
voluntary market, with average manual rates of $5.875 per $100 of payroll.  In
addition, the first four steps of moving from manual rates to adjusted manual
rates are identical to those for the voluntary market.  Where the markets differ
is the final adjustment factor for the residual market.  The residual market im-
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Table C.12 Sample Calculations of Adjusted Manual Rates for Model 
IIIa, for Florida on January 1, 1993
The voluntary market
IR1 Manual rates for the voluntary market $5.875
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment × 0.991
AF2 Expense-constant adjustment ÷ 0.989
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ 
standard earned premium at DSR
× 1.000
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned premium 
at company level
× 0.928
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.980
AMR1 Adjusted manual rates for the voluntary market = $5.354
The residual market
IR2 Manual rates for the residual market 5.875
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment × 0.991
AF2 Expense-constant adjustment × 0.989
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ 
standard earned premium at DSR
× 1.000
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned premium 
at company level
× 0.928
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.980
AF6 RM impact × 1.532
AMR2 Adjusted manual rates for the residual market = $8.202
The total market
AMR1 Adjusted manual rates for the voluntary market 5.354
MS1 Share of total market accounted for by voluntary 
market
× 0.658
+
AMR2 Adjusted manual rates for the residual market 8.202
MS2 Share of total market accounted for by residual 
market
× 0.342
AMR3 Adjusted manual rates for the total market = $6.328
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pact (AF6) is 1.532, reflecting the combined effect shown in Table C.8 of the
use of the ARRP plus a $475 flat charge plus a 26 percent surcharge for poli-
cies sold in the residual market.  The result of these residual market programs
is that the average adjusted manual rates for the 71 insurance classes in the re-
sidual market were $8.202 per $100 of payroll, which is 53.2 percent higher
than the average adjusted manual rates in the voluntary market.
The total market.  The adjusted manual rates for the voluntary market
(AMR1) and the adjusted manual rates for the residual market (AMR2) are
multiplied by their respective shares of the total market to produce an adjusted
manual rate for the total market (AMR3) of $6.328 per $100 of payroll.  Simi-
lar calculations were performed for all of the states and years for which Model
IIIa applies (as shown in Table C.3).
Model IV:  Voluntary and Residual Markets with Different Manual Rates
This model is used when 1) the rates for the voluntary market contain ex-
pense loadings (and thus are manual rates) and 2) there are also manual rates
for the residual market, but the rates are different than the manual rates in the
voluntary market.  The manual rates for the voluntary market can be mandato-
ry or advisory.  There are two variants: Model IV and Model IVa, depending
on the nature of the adjustments to premiums in the residual markets.
Model IV  
Model IV is used in states when the residual market has different manual
rates than the voluntary market, and when it may also have various additional
adjustments made to the manual rates that are not made in the voluntary mar-
ket.  Specifically, Model IV is applicable if the adjustments in the residual
market 1) eliminate or modify premium discounts and/or 2) use loss-sensitive
rating plans.  The effects of these two factors are reflected in the adjustment
factors, such as the experience-rating adjustment (AF1) or the ratio of net
earned premium to standard earned premium at the company level (AF4),
which are applicable to the entire market (voluntary plus residual).
One way to compute total market manual rates in this situation is shown in
Table C.13.  First, adjusted manual rates are computed for the voluntary mar-
ket, then residual market adjusted manual rates are computed, and finally the
adjusted manual rates for the respective markets are blended together in order
to estimate adjusted manual rates for the total market.  The alternative calcula-
tion method presents a simplified way to actually compute the adjusted manu-
al rates for the total market.
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Table C.13 Sample Calculations of Adjusted Manual Rates for Model IV, 
for Arizona on January 1, 1995
The voluntary market
IR1 Manual rates for the voluntary market $3.992
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment × 0.948
AF2 Expense-constant adjustment ÷ 0.996
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ 
standard earned premium at DSR
× 0.964
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned 
premium at company level
× 0.786
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.912
AMR1 Adjusted manual rates for the voluntary market = $2.628
The residual market
IR2 Manual rates for the residual market 4.790
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment × 0.948
AF2 Expense-constant adjustment ÷ 0.996
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ 
standard earned premium at DSR
× 0.964
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned 
premium at company level
× 0.786
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.912
AMR2 Adjusted manual rates for the residual market = $3.153
The total market
AMR1 Adjusted manual rates for the voluntary market 2.628
MS1 Share of total market accounted for by 
voluntary market
× 0.995
+
AMR2 Adjusted manual rates for the residual market 3.153
MS2 Share of total market accounted for by residual 
market
× 0.005
AMR3 Adjusted manual rates for the total market = $2.630
(continued)
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Table C.13 (continued)
Alternative calculation 
method for the 
total market
AMR1 Manual rates for voluntary market 3.992
MS1 Share of total market accounted for by 
voluntary market
× 0.995
+
AMR2 Manual rates for the residual market 4.790
MS2 Share of total market accounted for by 
residual market
× 0.005
IR4 Average manual rates for the total market = $3.996
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment (standard 
premium ÷ manual premium)
× 0.948
AF2 Expense-constant adjustment ÷ 0.996
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ 
standard earned premium at DSR
× 0.964
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned 
premium at company level
× 0.786
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.912
AMR3 Adjusted manual rates for the entire market = $2.630
Model IVa
Model IVa applies when there are different manual rates in the voluntary
and residual markets and the residual market 1) relies on premium surcharges,
or 2) uses an Assigned Risk Adjustment Program (ARAP), or 3) uses some
other type of experience-rating adjustment program, or any combination of
the three.  The effect of these factors will not be reflected in the adjustments
factors such as the experience-rating adjustment (AF1) and the net earned pre-
mium/standard earned premium at company level ratio (AF4), which are ap-
plicable to the total market (voluntary plus residual).  The effect of these
factors is reflected in residual market impact (RM impact) data provided by
the NCCI.
The procedure for calculating adjusted manual rates for Model IVa (Table
C.14) is similar to the procedure used for Model IIIa (see Table C.12), except
that for Model IVa, the manual rates in the voluntary market (IR1) are differ-
ent from the manual rates in the residual market (IR2). 
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Table C.14 Sample Calculation of Adjusted Manual Rates for Model IVa, 
for Arkansas on January 1, 1995
The voluntary market
IR1 Manual rates for the voluntary market $3.217
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment × 0.945
AF2 Expense-constant adjustment ÷ 0.990
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷  
standard earned premium at DSR
× 1.006
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned premium 
at company level
× 0.911
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.971
AMR1 Adjusted manual rates for the voluntary market = $2.734
The residual market
IR2 Manual rates for the residual market 4.025
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment × 0.945
AF2 Expense-constant adjustment ÷ 0.990
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ 
standard earned premium at DSR
× 1.006
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned premium 
at company level
× 0.911
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.971
AF6 RM impact × 1.088
AMR2 Adjusted manual rates for the residual market = $3.722
The total market
AMR1 Adjusted manual rates for the voluntary market 2.734
MS1 Share of total market accounted for by voluntary 
market
× 0.738
+
AMR2 Adjusted manual rates for the residual market 3.722
MS2 Share of total market accounted for by 
residual market
× 0.262
AMR3 Adjusted manual rates for the total market = $2.993
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Model V: Voluntary Market with Pure Premiums and Residual Market
with Manual Rates
This model is used when 1) the rates for the voluntary market are pure pre-
miums (loss costs) and 2) there are separate rates for the residual market.
Model V 
This model is applicable when the residual market has manual rates.  The
residual market can also have various additional adjustments that are not made
in the voluntary market.  Specifically, Model V is applicable when the residu-
al market 1) eliminates or modifies premium discounts and/or 2) uses loss-
sensitive rating plans.  The effect of these two programs will be reflected in
adjustment factors such as the experience-rating adjustment (AF1) and the net
earned premium/standard earned premium at company level ratio (AF4),
which are applicable to the total market (voluntary plus residual).
The method used to calculate adjusted manual rates for Model V is illus-
trated in Table C.15.  The procedure for the Model V voluntary market is
identical to that used for the voluntary market in Model II (see Table C.10).
The procedure for the Model V residual market is identical to that for the re-
sidual market in Model IV (see Table C.13).  The procedure used to calculate
adjusted manual rates for the total market for Model V is identical to the pro-
cedure used for Model IV (see Table C.13).
Model Va 
This model is used when the residual market has various adjustments made
to the manual rates that are not made for the pure premiums in the voluntary
market.  Specifically, Model Va is applicable when there are pure premiums
in the voluntary market and manual rates in the residual markets, and the re-
sidual market 1) relies on premium surcharges, or 2) uses an Assigned Risk
Adjustment Program (ARAP), or 3) uses some other type of experience-rating
adjustment program, or any combination of the three.  The effect of these pro-
grams will not be reflected in adjustment factors applicable to the total market
such as the experience rating adjustment (AF1) or the net earned premium/
standard earned premium at company ratio (AF4).  The effect of these pro-
grams is reflected in the residual market impact (RM impact) data provided by
the NCCI.
The method used to calculate adjusted manual rates for Model Va is illus-
trated in Table C.16.  The procedure for the Model Va voluntary market is
identical to that used for the voluntary market in Model II (see Table C.10).
The procedure for the residual market is identical to that used for the residual
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Table C.15 Sample Calculation of Adjusted Manual Rates for Model V, 
for Alabama on January 1, 1995
The voluntary market
IR3 Pure premiums (loss costs) $2.714
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment × 0.924
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ 
standard earned premium at DSR
× 1.267
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned 
premium at company level
× 0.926
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.976
AMR1 Adjusted manual rates for the voluntary market = $2.869
The residual market
IR2 Manual rates for the residual market 4.866
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment × 0.924
AF2 Expense-constant adjustment ÷ 0.989
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ 
standard earned premium at DSR
× 1.267
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned 
premium at company level
× 0.926
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.976
AMR2 Adjusted manual rates for the residual market = $5.202
The total market
AMR1 Adjusted manual rates for the voluntary market 2.869
MS1 Share of total market accounted for by 
voluntary market
× 0.693
+
AMR2 Adjusted manual rates for the residual market 5.202
MS2 Share of total market accounted for by residual  
market
× 0.307
AMR3 Adjusted manual rates for the total market = $3.585
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Table C.16 Sample Calculation of Adjusted Manual Rates for Model Va, 
for Connecticut on January 1, 1995
The voluntary market
IR3 Pure premiums (loss costs) $3.275
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment × 0.959
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ 
standard earned premium at DSR
× 1.151
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned premium 
at company level
× 0.884
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.944
AMR1 Adjusted manual rates for the voluntary market = $3.018
The residual market
IR2 Manual rates for the residual market 4.505
AF1 Experience-rating adjustment × 0.959
AF2 Expense-constant adjustment ÷ 0.989
AF3 Standard earned premium at company level ÷ 
standard earned premium at DSR
× 1.151
AF4 Net earned premium ÷ standard earned premium 
at company level
× 0.884
AF5 Dividend adjustment × 0.944
AF6 RM impact × 1.099
AMR2 Adjusted manual rates for the residual market = $4.614
The total market
AMR1 Adjusted manual rates for the voluntary market 3.018
MS1 Share of total market accounted for by voluntary 
market
× 0.907
+
ADM2 Adjusted manual rates for the residual market 4.614
MS2 Share of total market accounted for by residual 
market
× 0.093
AMR3 Adjusted manual rates for the total market = $3.167
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market in Model IVa (see Table C.14).  The procedure used to calculate ad-
justed manual rates for the total market for Model Va is also identical to the
procedure used for Model IVa.
SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR SEVERAL STATES WITH 
PRIVATE CARRIERS 
Most states with private insurance carriers rely upon the National Council
on Compensation Insurance for the preparation of rate filings with proposed
manual rates or with pure premiums.  There are, however, 12 states with pri-
vate carriers that currently rely upon local rating organizations to prepare rate
filings.  Three of these states (Indiana, North Carolina, and Wisconsin) use
classifications similar to those in NCCI states, use modification factors that
correspond to those previously discussed in conjunction with Models I to V,
and provide data to the NCCI, which in turn we obtained and used to calculate
adjusted manual rates.  We therefore do not further discuss these states.  There
are also nine states with local rating organizations (California, Delaware, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Texas) from which we had to obtain data directly from the states.  We describe
in this section the nature of the data obtained and any special procedures that
were needed to use the data.  We also discuss the special procedures that were
necessary in Kentucky, Oregon, and South Dakota, which are NCCI states.
California
California uses a classification system that is significantly different than
the NCCI’s system.  We converted the NCCI classification codes shown in
Table C.1 to the equivalent California codes.
We were unable to obtain appropriate data to calculate adjusted manual
rates for 1975–1985.  From 1986 until 1994, California published manual
rates and did not have separate rates for the residual market, and so Model I
was applicable.  However, the general procedure shown in Table C.5 had to be
modified, because California did not rely on loss or expense constants, nor did
the state allow any form of premium discounts.  California made limited use
of retrospective-rating plans; however, we do not have data on the effect of
these plans on premiums.  California did have an experience-rating plan,
which was reflected in the off-balance factor included in the manual rates.
We divided the manual rates by the off-balance factor to capture the effect of
experience rating.  California also relied on dividends, which we measured by
using the dividends adjustment factor.
In 1995, California began to use pure premiums, and so Model II was ap-
plicable.  The Workers’ Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau has reported
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that for policy year 1995, the average “charged” rate was 104 percent of the
pure premium rates.  The differential reflects all individual pricing adjust-
ments exclusive of deductibles, retrospective rating adjustments, or dividends.
We reduced the charged rates by the dividends adjustment factor to obtain ad-
justed manual rates for California in 1995.
Delaware
Delaware uses a classification system that is significantly different than the
NCCI’s system.  We converted the NCCI classification codes shown in Table
C.1 to the equivalent Delaware codes with the assistance of the Delaware
Compensation Rating Bureau. 
We were unable to obtain appropriate data to calculate adjusted manual
rates for 1975–1985.  From 1986 until 1994, Delaware published manual rates
and did not have separate rates for the residual market, so Model I was appli-
cable.  In 1995, Delaware began to use pure premiums in the voluntary market
and manual rates in the residual market, so Model V was applicable.  The Rat-
ing Bureau provided us the data necessary to calculate adjusted manual rates
for 1986 through 1995, including the share of the total market accounted for
by the residual market in 1995.
Kentucky
Kentucky relies on the NCCI for rate-making assistance.  Kentucky used
the same manual rates for the voluntary and residual markets from 1975 to
1982, so Model I was applicable.  Kentucky adopted a competitive law that
was effective July 15, 1982, and thus it was not an administered-pricing state
in 1983.  However, the July 15, 1981, manual rates were the designated statis-
tical reporting (DSR) level of rates in 1983, and so for purposes of calculating
adjusted manual rates, Model I was also used for 1983.  For 1984 to 1995,
Kentucky used pure premiums in the voluntary market and manual rates in the
residual market, and so Model V was applicable.
The procedures used to calculate adjusted manual rates in Kentucky contain
an additional step not used in other Model I or Model V states.  There is an as-
sessment for the Kentucky special fund that is not included in the manual rates
or pure premiums (as in most states); it is a separate charge.  In 1987, for ex-
ample, the assessment was 41.5 percent of premium.  We have adjusted the
Kentucky rates to include this assessment for all years between 1975 and 1995. 
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Massachusetts
Massachusetts uses a classification system that is similar to the NCCI’s
system.  For a limited number of classes, we converted the NCCI classifica-
tion codes shown in Table C.1 into equivalent Massachusetts codes.  From
1975 to 1995, the same manual rates were used in the voluntary and residual
markets, so Model I was applicable.  The Workers’ Compensation Rating and
Inspection Bureau of Massachusetts provided most of the data necessary to
calculate adjusted manual rates for 1975 to 1995.  (Calendar-year premium
data provided by the NCCI were used for several steps of the calculations of
the 1975 to 1977 adjusted manual rates.)
Michigan
Michigan uses a classification system that is similar to the NCCI’s system.
For a limited number of classes, we converted the NCCI classification codes
shown in Table C.1 into equivalent Michigan codes.  From 1975 to 1982, the
same manual rates were used in the voluntary and residual markets, so Model
I was applicable.  
Open competition became effective in Michigan on January 1, 1983, and
thereafter pure premiums were used in the voluntary market and manual rates
were used in the assigned-risk market.  The Compensation Advisory Organiza-
tion of Michigan (CAOM) provided information used to calculate adjusted
manual rates since 1983.  Every carrier must file an “information page” with
the CAOM for each workers’ compensation policy sold to Michigan employ-
ers.  The information page contains data on the insurance classification(s)
used; the annual payroll; manual premiums; and total estimated annual premi-
um after application of premium discounts, experience rating, and other factors
affecting premiums actually paid.  Total estimated annual premium divided by
annual payroll is termed average charged rates in actual transactions (or av-
erage charged rates).  The only factors affecting costs that are not included in
average charged rates in actual transactions are retrospective rating and divi-
dends.  We assume that the overall impact of retrospective rating on the rates
that employers would otherwise pay is zero, and we adjust for dividends by
multiplying the average charged rates by the dividend adjustment factor.
For 1983 to 1987, average charged rates are available only for the volun-
tary market.  However, data are available for those years that permit us to cal-
culate the ratio of average charged rates in the residual market to average
charged rates in the voluntary market, and use of this ratio permitted us to es-
timate average charged rates for the total market.  These average charged rates
for the total market times the dividend adjustment factor produced average ad-
justed manual rates for the total market in Michigan for 1983 to 1987.
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For 1988 to 1995, average charged rates are available for both the volun-
tary market and the residual market, and we combined the data to determine
the average charged rates for the total market.  These average charged rates
for the total market times the dividend adjustment factor produced average ad-
justed manual rates for the total market for 1988 to 1995.  
Minnesota
Minnesota uses a classification system similar to the NCCI’s system.  For a
limited number of classes, we converted the NCCI classification codes shown
in Table C.1 into equivalent Minnesota codes.  From 1975 to 1983, the same
manual rates were used in the voluntary and residual markets, so Model I was
applicable.  From 1984 to 1995, pure premiums were used in the voluntary
market and manual rates were used in the residual market, so Model V was
used.  The Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Insurers Association, Inc., pro-
vided the data needed to calculate adjusted manual rates from 1975 to 1995,
including the share of the total market accounted for by the residual market
from 1984 to 1995.  
Minnesota warrants special consideration because its workers’ compensa-
tion program, unlike those in most other jurisdictions, excludes all payments
for vacations, holidays, and sick leave from the payroll base.  This exclusion-
ary rule has been in effect since June 1, 1981, and so the 1982 to 1995 Minne-
sota rates were affected by this adjustment.  Minnesota employers are
permitted to pay premiums based on the published manual rates times this
truncated version of the payroll base.  Alternatively, if Minnesota employers
select the option of multiplying manual rates times the full payroll base (com-
parable to the base used in other states), their premium is 90 percent of this
product.  In this study, we have reduced all average adjusted manual rates for
Minnesota between 1982 and 1995 by 10 percent in order to make their rates
comparable to those elsewhere.  
New Jersey
New Jersey uses a classification system that is similar to the NCCI’s system.
For a limited number of classes, we converted the NCCI classification codes
shown in Table C.1 into equivalent New Jersey codes.  From 1975 to 1995, the
same manual rates were used in the voluntary and residual markets,  so Model
I was applicable.  The Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau provided
most of the data necessary to calculate adjusted manual rates for 1975 to 1995.
(Calendar-year premium data provided by the NCCI were used for several steps
of the calculations of the adjusted manual rates from 1975 to 1985.)
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New York
New York uses a classification system that is similar to the NCCI’s system.
For a limited number of classes, we converted the NCCI classification codes
shown in Table C.1 into equivalent New York codes.  From 1975 to 1995, the
same manual rates were used in the voluntary and residual markets, so Model
I was applicable.  The New York Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau pro-
vided most of the data necessary to calculate adjusted manual rates for 1975 to
1995.  (Calendar-year premium data provided by the NCCI were used for sev-
eral steps of the calculations of the adjusted manual rates from 1975 to 1980.)
Oregon
The state of Oregon relies on the NCCI for rate-making assistance.  Oregon
Rule V B (3)-(e), which has been in effect since November 1, 1981, excludes
payments for vacations and for bonuses from the payroll base unless they are
part of a contract-for-hire.  In order to make the Oregon rates comparable to
those elsewhere, we have reduced the adjusted manual rates from 1982 to
1995 by 5.1 percent.  
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania uses a classification system that is significantly different than
the NCCI’s system.  We converted the NCCI classification codes shown in
Table C.1 to the equivalent Pennsylvania codes with the assistance of the
Pennsylvania Compensation Rating Bureau.
We were unable to obtain appropriate data to calculate adjusted manual
rates for 1975–1985.  From 1986 until 1993, Pennsylvania published manual
rates and did not have a residual market, and so Model I was applicable.  In
1994 and 1995, Pennsylvania used pure premiums in the voluntary market and
did not have a residual market, so Model II was applicable.  The Rating Bu-
reau provided us with the data necessary to calculate adjusted manual rates for
1986 to 1995.
South Dakota
South Dakota relies on the NCCI for rate-making assistance.  South Dakota
has a payroll limitation (in effect as of July 1, 1983) that is similar to Minne-
sota’s, and so all adjusted manual rates for South Dakota between 1984 and
1995 have been reduced by 10 percent.
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Texas
Data were available from the NCCI to calculate adjusted manual rates for
Texas from 1975 to 1991.  During these years, manual rates were published
that were applicable to the entire market, and so Model I was used.  Efforts to
obtain comparable data for 1992 to 1995 from the NCCI and the Texas De-
partment of Insurance have been unsuccessful, so Texas adjusted manual rates
are unavailable for those years.
ELABORATIONS OF BASIC MODEL VI IN STATES WITH 
EXCLUSIVE STATE FUNDS
Ohio
We discuss in this subsection the methodology used to estimate the adjust-
ed manual rates for Ohio employers for January 1 comparison dates for 1983
and 1984 and for 1987 to 1995.  Lack of data on the effects of experience rat-
ing precluded us from computing employer cost measures for 1975 to 1982
and for 1985 and 1986.
We initially matched the classification codes for Ohio with those for NCCI
states using an updated version of a conversion chart that Burton developed
for earlier interstate cost studies.15  We then calculated average manual rates
for the 71 Ohio classes comparable to those shown in Table C.1 using national
payroll weights to calculate the averages.  We then applied various adjustment
factors to compute adjusted manual rates. 
The experience-rating plan in Ohio is complex and as sophisticated as the
method used in NCCI states.  The influence of Ohio’s experience-rating plan
can be estimated with precision.  When an Ohio employer is experience-rated,
the employer’s actual losses and expected losses during the experience period
are compared (the experience period is the oldest four of the latest five calen-
dar years prior to the date when the employer’s current rate is determined).  
Thus, the experience-rating modification for the manual rates in effect as of
July 1, 1994 (that is, the rates used for the January 1, 1995, comparison date in
our study) is based on data on actual and expected losses during calendar years
1989 to 1992.  During that four-year period, the overall effect of experience
rating for all private employers in Ohio was to reduce the employers’ insurance
costs by 22.59 percent.16  In this study, we assume that the 22.59 percent influ-
ence of experience rating for 1989 to 1992 is applicable to all the manual rates
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that took effect on July 1, 1994.  A similar procedure was used to determine the
effect of experience rating on the manual rates in effect from 1987 to 1994.
Ohio’s workers’ compensation program also assesses employers for ad-
ministrative costs and for the Disabled Workers’ Relief Fund.  As of our Janu-
ary 1, 1995, comparison date (using rates that took effect on July 1, 1994),
these assessments for private employers were $0.411 per $100 of payroll for
administrative costs and $0.10 per $100 of payroll for the Disabled Workers’
Relief Fund.  There is yet another set of assessments, which are related to the
base rate.  An assessment of 0.1 percent for rates that took effect on July 1,
1994, provides additional funding for the Disabled Workers’ Relief Fund.  For
six of the comparison dates in our study (January 1, 1987, to January 1, 1992),
there was also an intentional tort assessment; this varied between 0.10 and
0.75 percent of the base rate.
Data from Ohio classification code 2501 (the clothing manufacturing in-
dustry) will be used to illustrate how, in computing Ohio workers’ compensa-
tion costs, we took into consideration these various assessments.  As of July 1,
1994, the published base rate for classification code 2501 was $5.610 per
$100 of payroll; after the assessments are added (0.1 percent of the base rate,
plus $0.511), the total becomes a manual rate of $6.127 per $100 of payroll.
Ohio’s manual rates were then modified by an adjustment factor for experi-
ence rating to compute adjusted manual rates.  For example, after the $6.127
manual rate we calculated for classification code 2501 was reduced by the ex-
perience-rating modification (0.2259 percent of the base rate), the resultant
adjusted manual rate for this classification code was $4.860 per $100 of pay-
roll.  This value was one of the adjusted manual rates used to calculate the av-
erage adjusted manual rates for Ohio.
Adjusted manual rates in Ohio (which has an exclusive state fund) may thus
be compared to workers’ compensation costs in states with private carriers, but
there is one major qualification.  Because of inadequate reserves in the Ohio
state fund during most or all of the years encompassed by our study, the Ohio
employers’ costs reported in our study are artificially low compared with those
in most states.  An example of the inadequate reserves was provided in the Ac-
tuarial Audit of the State Insurance Fund as of December 31, 1985 (completed
in January 1987), which reported that the state fund’s liabilities exceeded as-
sets by about one billion dollars.  The audit concluded, “. . . very substantial
rate increases are needed if the goal is to have current premiums cover present
and future costs of claims currently being incurred.  These increases are about
50% for private employers, and about 30% for public employers.”17   
A recent publication by the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC)
suggests that the deficit has been eliminated in recent years.  According to that
source, after legislative reforms supported by Governor Voinovich were passed
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by the Ohio Legislature in 1993 and 1995, the BWC turned a $2.4 billion deficit
into a $3.6 billion surplus and saved Ohio employers $4.6 billion.18  Obviously,
the impact of the legislative changes occurred in large part after the data period
used for our study.  As a result, the Ohio employers’ costs reported by us for
1987 to 1995 are probably artificially low for most of the period.
Washington
The calculation of average adjusted manual rates for Washington state that
are comparable to those used in other jurisdictions is complicated by two fac-
tors: 1) like Ohio and West Virginia, Washington uses a rate classification
scheme that is different from that used in NCCI states and 2) premiums in
Washington are based on hours worked rather than payroll.
The first step in the procedure used to calculate Washington manual rates
was to identify the Washington industrial insurance risk classifications that
most closely matched the 71 NCCI classes used to calculate average rates in
other jurisdictions.  The manual rate for each class was then obtained by cal-
culating two values: 1) the total number of hours worked and 2) the average
wage.19  Payroll was estimated by multiplying hours worked by the average
wage.  Total premiums were obtained by multiplying the manual rate (per
hour) for the class by the number of hours.  Finally, the manual rate (per $100
of payroll) for each class was estimated by dividing total premiums by pay-
roll, divided by $100.  Actuaries at the Department of Labor and Industries of
the state of Washington performed all of these tasks.  Once again, a weighted
average manual rate for each of the years for which we had data (1985–1995)
was calculated using national payroll for the 71 NCCI classes as weights.
Washington employers are subject to both retrospective and prospective
experience rating.  To account for these modifications to the manual rate, we
obtained data on two variables: the average retrospective rating refund dis-
count factor and the average experience-rating discount factor.20  The retro-
spective rating factor is equal to 1 minus (total net retrospective rating refund
÷ total standard premium), while the targeted average experience modification
was used for the experience-rating factor.21   The Department of Labor and In-
dustries supplied data for both factors.
Adjusted manual rates were obtained by multiplying the average manual
rate for each year by the applicable retrospective rating and experience modi-
fication discount factors.  For example, as of January 1, 1995, the weighted
average manual rate was equal to $2.74, the experience-rating modification
factor was 0.91, and the retrospective refund factor was 0.89.  Thus, the ad-
justed manual rate for 1995 is equal to $2.74 × 0.91 × 0.89, or $2.22.
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West Virginia
We estimated adjusted manual rates and net weekly costs for West Virginia
for comparison dates from January 1, 1975, to January 1, 1995.  We discuss in
this section the methodology used to compute employers’ costs in West Vir-
ginia.
We initially matched the classification codes for West Virginia rates with
those for NCCI states, using a conversion table developed by Burton for this
analysis.  We then calculated average manual rates for the 42 West Virginia
classifications corresponding to the 71 NCCI classes shown in Table C.1, us-
ing national payroll as weights.  In recent years, West Virginia has used an ex-
perience-rating plan that, like Ohio’s, is as sophisticated as the plan used in
NCCI states.  The influence of West Virginia’s experience-rating plan can
also be also be rather precisely determined.  Manual rates are promulgated
yearly on July 1 and remain in effect until the following June 30.  For the
same 12-month period, data arrayed by insurance classification are available
on payroll and the premiums actually collected after the application of any ex-
perience-rating modification.
For example, for West Virginia classification J-2 (textile and garment man-
ufacturing), the manual rate effective July 1, 1994—which is a rate was used
for our January 1, 1995, comparison date—was $2.55 per $100 of payroll.
Because the payroll between July 1994 and June 1995 for this class was
$49,241,852, the simulated manual premium (i.e., what employers in this
class would expect to pay if no further adjustments were made) was
$1,255,667.  (The simulated manual premium was computed by multiplying
payroll by the corresponding manual rate.)  The gross premium actually col-
lected for the class during this period was $1,148,499, which suggests that ex-
perience rating resulted in actual premiums for classification J-2 that were 8.5
percent less than what employers would have otherwise paid (i.e., less than
the simulated manual premium).
Simulated manual premiums for the 42 West Virginia classifications used
for the January 1, 1995, comparison date totaled $163,499,456.  Gross premi-
ums actually collected for these classifications totaled $166,103,183.  Thus, in
the July–June period for 1994–1995, the actual collected premium was greater
than the simulated manual premium, indicating that, in general, experience
rating increased the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation in West Vir-
ginia.  For the combined 1994–1995 experience, actual collected premiums
were 2.0 percent greater than simulated manual premiums, indicating that ex-
perience rating for this combination of classifications increased manual pre-
miums by 2.0 percent.
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In this study, we used the 2.0 percent influence of experience rating for
1994–1995 to adjust the manual rates used in this study that were in effect on
July 1, 1994, in West Virginia.  Thus, the average adjusted manual rates for
West Virginia as of January 1, 1995, are 2.0 percent higher than West Virgin-
ia’s average manual rates.
In West Virginia’s workers’ compensation program, assessments for ad-
ministrative expenses and for the catastrophe and second-injury accounts are
included in the base or manual rates.  Therefore, the rates as published in the
annual reports of the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Division were
used to calculate average manual rates.  Likewise, the simulated manual pre-
miums and premiums actually collected include the charges for these accounts
and for administrative expenses.  Thus, no additional adjustments were neces-
sary, and the experience-rating adjustment of 2.0 percent could be applied to
base rates (average manual rates) to compute West Virginia adjusted manual
rates for the January 1, 1995, comparison date.  
The funding status of West Virginia’s exclusive state fund, like that in
Ohio, warrants caution in making interstate comparisons of workers’ compen-
sation costs that include West Virginia.  For example, a newspaper article sug-
gested that the July 1, 1987, rates used in this study are artificially low because
of inadequate reserves of the state fund.22   In July 1985, Governor Arch Moore
cut rates by 30 percent in order to bring new business to the state.  According
to the press account,  “Moore said the rate cut was intended to put the fund on
a pay-as-you-go basis.  Under that arrangement, the fund would take in enough
money each year to cover the benefits and administrative expenses paid out
during that year.  But the fund would no longer set aside reserves to cover the
future costs of that year’s injuries, as required.”
Although the fund’s independent actuary had calculated that a 30 percent
increase would allow the fund to operate on a pay-as-you-go basis, even that
assumption was optimistic; the fund actually paid out $20 million more than it
took in during fiscal year 1987.  If the reserves necessary to cover future pay-
ments for the injuries that occurred during fiscal year 1987 were included, the
deficit for the fiscal year was more than $90 million.
There apparently was some underfunding even before 1985.  However, the
financial difficulties of the fund worsened between 1985 and 1988 because
rates were frozen at the 1985 level.  The total amount of underfunding by
1988 was more than $300 million.  According to the independent actuary for
the state fund, West Virginia “would have needed a 50 percent increase just to
operate soundly for 1987.”  Even an increase of that magnitude would not
have addressed the $300 million deficit; “it would merely keep the deficit
from growing.”  In order to temporarily cover the deficit, “fund officials took
369
the unprecedented step of raiding the $800 million in reserves that had been
set aside [prior to 1985] to cover future payments . . .”
As of 1995, West Virginia’s state fund had a deficit of $2.2 billion.  Em-
ployers who moved to West Virginia because of the attractive workers’ com-
pensation insurance rates presumably had a short time horizon or inadequate
information.  News coverage of West Virginia’s workers’ compensation pro-
gram can be found in Nyden (1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b).
ADJUSTED MANUAL RATES: 1975–1995
In the previous sections of this appendix, we have explained the procedures
for calculating the adjusted manual rates for the states in our study.  The pro-
cedures are obviously complex and vary among jurisdictions, depending on
matters such as the type of rates promulgated in the states (manual rates or
pure premiums), the use of special pricing programs in the residual market
that are not applicable to the voluntary market, and whether the state has pri-
vate carriers or relies on an exclusive state fund.  
Adjusted manual rates for the 48 jurisdictions in our study for as many years
for which we have data between 1975 and 1995 are presented in Table C.17.
The only missing jurisdictions are Nevada, North Dakota, and Wyoming,
which are states with exclusive state funds relying on insurance classifications
that are not comparable with those in the states with private carriers.  There are
also six states for which data are not available for all 21 years encompassed by
our study: these include two of the states with exclusive state funds (Ohio and
Washington), for which comparable data are only available since 1983, as well
as four states with independent rating bureaus (California, Delaware, Pennsyl-
vania, and Texas), for which data could not be obtained for all years.  
The rates in dollars shown in Table C.17 can also be interpreted as the per-
centage of payroll expended on workers’ compensation insurance by employ-
ers in 71 insurance classifications in each of the 48 jurisdictions as of January
1 for each of the years between 1975 and 1995.  The results indicate, for ex-
ample, that as of January 1, 1975, in Alabama, the employers in the 71 classes
expended, on average, $0.579 per $100 of payroll, which can be restated as
0.579 percent of payroll on workers’ compensation premiums.  By January 1,
1995, these same employers expended, on average, 3.585 per $100 of payroll
(i.e., 3.585 percent of payroll) on workers’ compensation premiums, which
means that workers’ compensation costs as a percentage of payroll had in-
creased for Alabama employers more than sixfold over the 21-year period in-
cluded in Table C.17.
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Ala. Alaska Ariz. Ark. Calif. Colo. Conn. Del. D.C. Fla. Ga. Hawaii
1975 0.579 1.030 1.594 1.025 NDb 0.535 0.835 ND 1.396 1.939 0.678 1.484
1976 0.767 1.586 1.758 1.103 ND 0.653 0.953 ND 1.797 2.027 0.879 1.849
1977 0.753 1.786 1.989 1.205 ND 0.919 1.025 ND 2.398 2.523 0.973 2.001
1978 0.927 1.668 2.189 1.264 ND 1.086 1.286 ND 3.356 2.853 1.070 2.094
1979 1.013 1.905 2.606 1.291 ND 1.106 1.465 ND 4.257 2.642 1.262 2.476
1980 1.022 1.996 2.426 1.486 ND 0.878 2.019 ND 4.931 2.208 1.201 2.569
1981 1.044 2.360 1.924 1.535 ND 0.982 1.966 ND 4.541 2.006 1.185 3.372
1982 1.048 2.475 1.443 1.402 ND 1.209 2.143 ND 3.968 1.483 1.165 3.715
1983 1.068 2.128 1.281 1.325 ND 1.366 2.019 ND 2.591 1.708 1.044 4.456
1984 1.039 2.100 1.265 1.338 ND 1.361 1.984 ND 2.214 1.721 1.049 4.179
1985 1.270 2.273 1.778 1.334 ND 1.770 2.080 ND 2.292 2.341 1.324 4.366
1986 1.482 2.584 2.118 1.511 3.017 1.881 2.265 1.885 2.783 2.786 1.576 4.748
1987 1.738 3.040 2.088 1.861 3.449 2.332 2.567 1.978 2.950 2.909 1.865 4.176
1988 1.961 3.289 2.122 1.904 3.836 2.682 2.896 2.119 2.737 3.366 1.978 3.448
1989 2.120 2.932 2.510 2.018 3.876 3.193 3.154 2.081 2.773 4.063 2.422 3.362
1990 2.246 3.147 2.634 2.051 3.954 3.166 3.383 2.096 2.754 5.329 2.636 3.395
1991 2.433 2.989 2.662 2.215 4.244 3.531 3.544 2.044 2.981 4.172 2.988 3.468
1992 3.382 2.807 2.899 2.648 4.744 3.342 3.582 2.192 3.159 5.480 3.478 3.557
1993 3.525 2.440 2.865 3.519 4.856 3.236 3.961 2.341 3.494 6.328 3.558 3.715
1994 3.436 2.567 2.744 3.249 3.805 3.107 3.336 2.423 3.234 4.330 3.555 3.610
1995 3.585 2.400 2.630 2.993 3.150 2.788 3.167 2.288 3.341 4.366 3.370 4.867
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Idaho Ill. Ind. Iowa Kans. Ky. La. Maine Md. Mass. Mich. Minn.
1975 1.122 0.664 0.398 0.603 0.788 1.077 1.487 0.914 0.864 1.073 1.174 1.141
1976 1.320 1.119 0.451 0.681 0.856 1.306 2.404 1.093 1.143 1.228 1.363 1.301
1977 1.373 1.513 0.449 0.820 1.015 1.296 1.710 1.138 1.430 1.278 1.627 1.538
1978 1.285 1.380 0.568 0.899 1.055 1.732 1.757 1.216 1.447 1.465 2.112 1.821
1979 1.413 1.430 0.533 1.172 0.941 1.698 1.698 1.588 1.819 1.691 2.126 1.955
1980 1.347 1.682 0.593 1.345 0.949 1.708 1.893 2.096 1.726 1.783 2.570 2.016
1981 1.606 1.606 0.486 1.280 0.968 1.263 1.928 2.172 2.047 1.831 2.472 1.931
1982 1.455 1.495 0.419 1.245 1.134 1.200 1.683 2.589 2.102 1.808 1.864 1.759
1983 1.452 1.341 0.430 1.063 1.049 1.173 1.845 2.579 2.029 2.059 1.770 1.614
1984 1.467 1.348 0.453 1.010 1.006 1.245 1.382 2.665 1.882 2.079 1.650 1.792
1985 1.551 1.623 0.517 1.072 1.109 1.571 1.463 2.681 2.002 2.043 1.938 2.415
1986 1.666 1.927 0.610 1.118 1.288 1.665 1.967 2.327 2.208 2.064 2.316 2.769
1987 2.064 1.989 0.684 1.472 1.342 2.075 1.925 2.295 2.020 2.138 2.639 2.793
1988 2.315 2.162 0.775 1.478 1.631 2.083 2.312 2.562 2.047 2.689 2.565 3.049
1989 2.198 2.451 1.025 1.839 1.680 2.472 2.586 3.324 1.932 3.008 2.581 3.207
1990 2.428 2.646 1.260 1.793 1.761 2.604 3.088 3.946 1.843 3.772 3.493 3.533
1991 2.409 2.806 1.374 1.990 1.985 2.636 3.188 4.552 1.830 4.516 3.649 3.563
1992 2.663 2.905 1.457 2.226 2.411 3.030 4.424 4.484 1.928 4.408 3.806 3.736
1993 2.838 2.949 1.519 2.393 2.873 3.610 4.220 4.275 1.835 4.486 3.135 3.079
1994 2.633 3.037 1.473 2.306 2.837 3.718 4.299 3.908 2.006 4.120 2.945 2.925
1995 2.394 2.803 1.397 1.946 2.673 3.650 4.059 3.373 1.891 3.207 2.689 2.782
(continued)
372Table C.17 (continued)
Miss. Mo. Mont. Nebr. N.H. N.J. N.Mex. N.Y. N.C. Ohio Okla. Oreg.
1975 0.887 0.755 1.410 0.678 0.702 1.035 1.030 0.914 0.432 ND 1.030 1.666
1976 0.874 0.803 1.489 0.866 1.029 1.128 1.145 1.123 0.459 ND 1.223 2.136
1977 0.894 0.863 1.678 0.733 1.117 1.223 1.235 1.318 0.486 ND 1.425 2.694
1978 0.929 0.839 2.234 0.739 1.449 1.398 1.286 1.683 0.508 ND 1.434 2.801
1979 0.866 0.897 1.477 0.754 1.513 1.422 1.524 2.119 0.614 ND 1.585 2.756
1980 0.937 0.882 1.642 0.845 1.731 1.781 1.678 2.129 0.701 ND 1.489 2.564
1981 0.917 0.822 1.611 0.870 1.519 1.859 2.010 1.844 0.838 ND 1.764 2.135
1982 1.016 0.865 1.899 0.876 1.584 1.758 2.050 1.500 0.878 ND 1.740 2.151
1983 0.999 0.759 2.150 0.983 1.693 1.506 2.211 1.355 0.811 1.602 1.691 1.544
1984 1.073 0.875 2.189 0.967 2.023 1.517 2.396 1.348 0.651 1.758 1.836 1.724
1985 1.137 1.027 2.672 1.048 2.092 1.197 2.706 1.620 0.721 ND 1.802 2.171
1986 1.296 1.238 2.918 1.068 2.273 1.242 2.843 1.777 0.920 ND 2.189 2.831
1987 1.589 1.415 3.825 1.195 2.344 1.391 2.804 1.771 1.025 1.960 2.246 3.034
1988 1.558 1.563 3.465 1.290 2.518 1.478 3.276 1.779 1.191 2.517 2.359 2.911
1989 1.966 1.626 4.084 1.437 2.710 1.386 3.382 1.903 1.262 2.855 2.760 2.924
1990 2.005 1.744 4.733 1.671 2.790 1.470 3.563 2.282 1.383 3.312 2.639 3.171
1991 2.472 2.028 4.109 1.932 3.089 1.535 3.552 2.832 1.709 3.318 2.666 3.023
1992 2.916 2.533 4.544 2.095 3.277 1.750 4.322 3.117 1.870 3.547 3.328 2.802
1993 3.309 2.856 4.578 2.409 3.870 1.918 4.488 3.788 2.441 3.618 3.893 2.497
1994 3.174 2.634 5.074 2.618 4.426 1.832 3.516 4.169 2.426 3.503 3.855 2.331
1995 2.750 2.463 4.937 2.338 3.757 1.777 3.713 3.883 2.316 3.358 3.456 2.275
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Pa. R.I. S.C. S.Dak. Tenn. Texas Utah Vt. Va. Wash. W.Va. Wisc.
1975 ND 0.838 0.542 0.509 0.714 1.424 0.585 0.608 0.489 ND 0.618 0.567
1976 ND 1.104 0.645 0.683 0.804 1.488 0.776 0.595 0.571 ND 0.686 0.665
1977 ND 1.370 0.684 0.619 0.820 1.806 0.767 0.738 0.722 ND 0.830 0.650
1978 ND 1.435 0.699 0.720 1.063 1.909 0.828 0.935 0.895 ND 0.925 0.769
1979 ND 1.543 0.954 0.915 1.038 1.896 0.956 0.935 1.122 ND 1.085 0.825
1980 ND 1.578 0.975 0.814 0.935 1.803 0.796 1.056 1.204 ND 1.113 0.907
1981 ND 1.847 1.010 0.847 0.956 1.884 0.822 1.076 1.340 ND 1.285 0.949
1982 ND 1.820 0.996 0.909 0.981 1.947 0.845 0.983 1.312 ND 1.454 1.008
1983 ND 1.936 1.051 0.938 0.949 2.204 0.871 0.946 1.206 1.652 1.465 1.001
1984 ND 1.906 1.123 0.885 0.966 2.321 0.916 0.974 0.994 1.958 1.855 1.142
1985 ND 2.045 1.146 1.038 1.023 1.765 0.915 1.153 1.109 1.652 1.737 1.072
1986 1.960 2.532 1.353 1.087 1.148 2.685 1.169 1.357 1.340 1.958 1.737 1.290
1987 2.222 2.649 1.529 1.328 1.318 3.072 1.189 1.465 1.272 1.879 1.380 1.439
1988 2.315 2.540 1.650 1.388 1.560 3.990 1.231 1.550 1.245 1.839 1.399 1.677
1989 2.624 2.977 1.883 1.661 1.735 4.675 1.542 1.754 1.350 1.838 1.642 1.836
1990 2.573 3.675 1.931 1.806 2.054 5.291 1.640 1.962 1.333 1.941 1.831 2.025
1991 3.387 3.888 2.085 2.054 2.116 5.089 1.738 2.142 1.472 2.001 2.016 1.951
1992 3.509 3.803 2.314 2.219 2.453 ND 1.826 2.160 1.540 2.031 2.300 2.115
1993 4.222 3.761 2.723 2.324 2.680 ND 2.069 2.656 1.765 2.053 2.389 2.289
1994 3.332 3.635 2.689 2.741 2.870 ND 1.931 3.083 2.009 2.086 2.562 2.305
1995 3.340 3.448 2.445 2.425 3.071 ND 2.186 3.171 1.907 1.981 2.540 2.044
a
“As of” date is January 1 of each year.
b ND = no data available.
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Table C.17 is valuable for tracing changes in workers’ compensation costs
over time in a particular state, but the volume of information makes it difficult
to identify general developments.  Table C.18 provides a more compact sum-
mary of these data, which more readily permits an evaluation of temporal
trends, showing unweighted observations for each state as well as observa-
tions weighted by each state’s employment.
The first two data columns in Table C.18 present the average (mean) and
standard deviation for all 48 states in our study, which is the most comprehen-
sive set of data for any year.  In some years, there are fewer than 48 observa-
tions and the statistics pertain to only those states with available data.  The
means of the weighted averages are consistently higher than the means of the
unweighted averages, indicating that larger states tend to have higher work-
ers’ compensation costs.  Both the weighted and unweighted means show a
significant increase in costs between 1975 (when the costs of workers’ com-
pensation insurance in all states averaged less than 1.0 percent of payroll) and
1993 (when costs averaged over 3.0 percent of payroll), followed by a decline
that brought both the weighted and unweighted averages below 3.0 percent of
payroll in 1995.
The data for all 48 states indicate that the variation in costs among jurisdic-
tions (as measured by the standard deviation) increased from 1975 until 1990.
During the 1990s, the variation among states has fluctuated from year to year,
but both the weighted and unweighted data show less variation among the
states in 1995 than in 1990.
There are data available for all years for 42 states, and the means and stan-
dard deviations for these states are shown in the third and fourth data columns
of Table C.18.  The results for the 42 states are very similar to the results for
all 48 states.  The mean costs were less than 1.0 percent of payroll in 1975,
peaked in 1993 in excess of 3.0 percent of payroll, and declined to less than
3.0 percent of payroll in 1995.  Likewise, the standard deviation increased
from 1975 to 1990 and then fluctuated during the 1990s; it ended up smaller in
1995 than in 1990.
Workers’ compensation costs in a third combination of states, those 45 with
private carriers, are shown in the right-most two columns of Table C.18.  (The
states with exclusive state funds—for which we have data that are omitted
from these two columns—are Ohio, Washington, and West Virginia).  Again
the pattern is the same for the 45 states as for the full set of 48.  The mean costs
were less than 1.0 percent of payroll in 1975, peaked in 1993 in excess of 3.0
percent of payroll, and declined to less than 3.0 percent of payroll in 1995.
Likewise, the standard deviation increased from 1975 to 1990 and then fluctu-
ated during the 1990s; it ended up smaller in 1995 than in 1990.
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Table C.18 Adjusted Manual Rates, Means and Standard Deviations, 
1975–95 ($)
All 48 states in study
42 States with no 
missing data
45 States with private 
carriers
Year Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Unweighted 
observations
1975 0.926 0.372 0.915 0.368 0.934 0.373
1976 1.115 0.463 1.106 0.465 1.125 0.463
1977 1.243 0.540 1.229 0.540 1.252 0.543
1978 1.396 0.634 1.383 0.637 1.407 0.637
1979 1.509 0.697 1.500 0.703 1.519 0.702
1980 1.582 0.763 1.576 0.771 1.593 0.768
1981 1.598 0.737 1.591 0.744 1.605 0.744
1982 1.567 0.699 1.558 0.705 1.570 0.707
1983 1.531 0.672 1.511 0.687 1.528 0.696
1984 1.510 0.685 1.474 0.693 1.485 0.703
1985 1.674 0.691 1.673 0.707 1.673 0.707
1986 1.882 0.770 1.833 0.785 1.884 0.787
1987 2.078 0.747 2.028 0.751 2.100 0.763
1988 2.214 0.758 2.135 0.711 2.234 0.770
1989 2.430 0.822 2.349 0.760 2.451 0.834
1990 2.662 0.986 2.586 0.932 2.682 1.001
1991 2.791 0.913 2.712 0.851 2.814 0.925
1992 3.002 0.938 2.978 0.927 3.028 0.948
1993 3.184 0.960 3.156 0.942 3.218 0.968
1994 3.072 0.778 3.077 0.791 3.097 0.784
1995 2.923 0.784 2.935 0.805 2.943 0.793
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Table C.18 (continued)
All 48 states in study
42 States with no 
missing data
45 States with private 
carriers
Year Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Weighted 
observations
1975 0.949 0.387 0.910 0.377 0.952 0.388
1976 1.130 0.441 1.100 0.446 1.134 0.441
1977 1.294 0.528 1.251 0.527 1.299 0.529
1978 1.466 0.608 1.428 0.618 1.471 0.608
1979 1.582 0.628 1.554 0.648 1.587 0.630
1980 1.645 0.640 1.631 0.667 1.650 0.641
1981 1.613 0.584 1.587 0.605 1.616 0.586
1982 1.511 0.511 1.467 0.516 1.511 0.514
1983 1.490 0.510 1.408 0.500 1.480 0.532
1984 1.466 0.561 1.351 0.524 1.434 0.574
1985 1.599 0.529 1.581 0.558 1.596 0.538
1986 1.977 0.718 1.744 0.645 1.979 0.727
1987 2.189 0.756 1.924 0.630 2.211 0.779
1988 2.420 0.901 2.067 0.674 2.433 0.927
1989 2.653 0.997 2.286 0.790 2.666 1.023
1990 2.951 1.181 2.604 1.061 2.962 1.211
1991 3.096 1.054 2.721 0.886 3.116 1.078
1992 3.267 1.091 3.037 1.053 3.289 1.115
1993 3.478 1.166 3.252 1.157 3.512 1.189
1994 3.188 0.791 3.100 0.842 3.202 0.800
1995 2.973 0.747 2.929 0.823 2.979 0.756
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NET WEEKLY COSTS: 1975–1995
Adjusted manual rates, which represent the percentage of payroll expended
on workers’ compensation premiums, do not represent the only way to mea-
sure the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation.  An alternative measure
of workers’ compensation costs is the weekly premium per worker in constant
dollars.  The rationale for developing this measure of workers’ compensation
costs is presented in the “Cost Methodology” section of Chapter 3 (pp. 58–
64).
The weekly workers’ compensation premium per worker is the product of
the adjusted manual rates per $100 of payroll (shown in Table C.17) multi-
plied by the U.S. average weekly wage in 1995 dollars for the appropriate year
(Table C.19), multiplied by the state weekly earnings index (Table C.20), and
divided by 100 to convert the result to a weekly dollar amount of premium per
worker, which is shown in Table C.21.  An example using Alabama for 1975
is an adjusted manual rate of $0.579 per $100 of payroll, multiplied by the
U.S. average real wage of $538.66, multiplied by the Alabama weekly earn-
ings index of 0.8708, divided by 100, which results in a weekly premium of
$2.72 per employee in constant 1995 dollars (Table C.21).  By January 1,
1995, these same employers expended, on average, $17.19 per employee per
week on workers’ compensation premiums, which means that workers’ com-
pensation weekly premiums in real terms had increased in Alabama more than
sixfold over the 21-year period.
Table C.21 is valuable for tracing changes in workers’ compensation week-
ly premiums over time in a particular state, but the volume of information
makes it difficult to identify general developments.  Table C.22 provides a
more compact summary of these data, more readily permitting evaluation of
temporal trends; it shows unweighted observations for each state as well as
observations weighted by each state’s employment.
The first two data columns in Table C.22 present the means and standard
deviations for all 48 states in our study, which is the most comprehensive set
of data for any one year.  For some years, there are fewer than 48 observations
and the statistics pertain to only those states with available data.  The un-
weighted means show a significant increase in costs between 1975 (when the
weekly costs of workers’ compensation insurance in all states measured in
1995 dollars averaged less than $5.00 per employee) and 1993 (when weekly
costs averaged over $16.00 per worker), followed by a decline that brought
the unweighted average weekly premiums below $16.00 per worker in 1995.
The means of the weighted averages are higher in most years than the means
of the unweighted averages, indicating that larger states tend to have higher
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Table C.19 U.S. Average Weekly Wages, 1975–95
Year Nominal wage ($)
Real wage 
(1995 $)
1975 190.28 538.66
1976 203.88 545.71
1977 217.63 546.95
1978 232.90 544.03
1979 252.82 530.36
1980 276.89 511.78
1981 301.89 505.81
1982 321.95 508.11
1983 335.68 513.29
1984 350.04 513.59
1985 365.38 517.17
1986 380.00 527.57
1987 396.77 531.47
1988 416.47 535.71
1989 428.03 525.72
1990 446.68 520.90
1991 464.08 519.32
1992 489.97 532.26
1993 497.21 524.78
1994 507.77 522.17
1995 525.91 525.91
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Table C.20 State Weekly Earnings Indexes, 1975–95
Ala. Alaska Ariz. Ark. Calif. Colo. Conn. Del. D.C. Fla. Ga. Hawaii
1975 0.8708 1.7777 1.0344 0.7710 1.0905 1.0029 0.9799 0.9923 1.2170 0.8763 0.8737 0.9855
1976 0.8853 1.7781 1.0151 0.7790 1.0793 1.0063 0.9716 1.0023 1.1061 0.8624 0.8431 0.9886
1977 0.8761 1.8728 1.0109 0.7816 1.0825 1.0070 0.9784 0.9412 1.0543 0.8524 0.8613 0.9655
1978 0.8805 1.5828 1.0160 0.7768 1.0742 0.9888 0.9812 0.9669 1.2813 0.8577 0.8606 0.9641
1979 0.9020 1.5478 1.0206 0.7913 1.0814 1.0249 0.9800 0.9490 1.3123 0.8456 0.8630 0.9530
1980 0.9423 1.5808 1.0248 0.8017 1.0921 1.0563 0.9831 0.9506 1.2720 0.8561 0.8621 0.9431
1981 0.9257 1.5481 1.0199 0.8072 1.0967 1.0373 0.9613 0.9302 1.3071 0.8472 0.8829 0.9577
1982 0.9139 1.4914 1.0374 0.8105 1.1163 1.0443 0.9631 0.9341 1.2824 0.8591 0.8498 0.9614
1983 0.9166 1.4154 1.0280 0.8191 1.1055 1.0362 0.9769 0.9190 1.3161 0.8566 0.8854 0.9626
1984 0.9282 1.4332 0.9896 0.8152 1.0919 1.0300 1.0020 0.9000 1.3127 0.8537 0.8888 0.9319
1985 0.9526 1.4503 0.9982 0.8197 1.0956 0.9941 1.0025 0.9136 1.3489 0.8516 0.8995 0.9274
1986 0.9613 1.3853 1.0161 0.8265 1.1443 0.9838 1.0118 0.9811 1.2076 0.8514 0.9223 0.9610
1987 0.9618 1.3487 0.9900 0.8298 1.1249 0.9882 1.0273 0.9948 1.1944 0.8520 0.9210 0.9867
1988 0.9475 1.3322 0.9591 0.8255 1.1126 0.9873 1.0222 0.9278 1.2485 0.8529 0.9094 1.0134
1989 0.9302 1.3687 0.9317 0.8154 1.1123 0.9703 1.0303 0.9817 1.2492 0.8596 0.8970 1.0393
1990 0.9280 1.4389 0.9245 0.8236 1.1157 1.0059 1.0267 0.9623 1.2505 0.8716 0.8919 1.0678
1991 0.9259 1.3753 0.9367 0.8385 1.1171 0.9978 1.0294 0.9976 1.2524 0.8824 0.9016 0.9927
1992 0.9335 1.3161 0.9262 0.8344 1.1091 0.9816 1.0363 0.9499 1.2550 0.8843 0.9099 1.0497
1993 0.9394 1.3246 0.9006 0.8331 1.1087 1.0103 1.0595 1.0198 1.2585 0.8761 0.9010 1.0656
1994 0.9565 1.3327 0.9125 0.8355 1.1026 0.9947 1.0831 1.0376 1.2628 0.8691 0.9016 1.0445
1995 0.9119 1.4730 0.9726 0.7998 1.0906 0.9954 1.0240 0.9813 1.2682 0.8489 0.8743 0.9761
(continued)
380Table C.20 (continued)
Idaho Ill. Ind. Iowa Kans. Ky. La. Maine Md. Mass. Mich. Minn.
1975 0.8979 1.1147 1.0330 1.0083 0.8940 0.9861 0.9663 0.8657 0.9816 0.9500 1.1270 0.9797
1976 0.9229 1.1361 1.0387 1.0011 0.8971 0.9935 0.9533 0.8787 0.9860 0.9306 1.1652 0.9911
1977 0.9487 1.1107 1.0574 1.0107 0.8995 1.0058 0.9464 0.8809 0.9926 0.9252 1.1914 0.9823
1978 0.9676 1.0879 1.0554 1.0159 0.9012 1.0140 0.9682 0.8917 0.9782 0.9171 1.1831 0.9825
1979 0.9602 1.0902 1.0549 1.0382 0.9304 1.0020 0.9615 0.9099 0.9962 0.9331 1.1584 0.9845
1980 0.9602 1.0673 1.0512 1.0572 0.9545 0.9986 0.9889 0.9121 0.9848 0.9248 1.1426 0.9915
1981 0.9890 1.0636 1.0523 1.0692 0.9423 0.9804 0.9918 0.9329 0.9930 0.9079 1.1534 0.9874
1982 0.9868 1.0712 1.0483 1.0710 0.9587 0.9759 0.9796 0.9369 0.9880 0.9239 1.1616 1.0121
1983 0.9895 1.0830 1.0496 1.0601 0.9007 0.9666 0.9562 0.9110 0.9819 0.9273 1.1717 1.0172
1984 1.0008 1.0696 1.0564 1.0319 0.8887 0.9782 0.9635 0.9139 1.0138 0.9245 1.1854 1.0148
1985 0.9931 1.0869 1.0252 1.0053 0.8463 0.9801 0.9878 0.9268 0.9869 0.9666 1.1799 1.0202
1986 0.9874 1.0896 1.0350 1.0050 0.8627 0.9959 0.9651 0.9268 0.9917 0.9824 1.1658 1.0293
1987 0.9691 1.0915 1.0454 1.0209 0.8903 1.0125 0.9540 0.9386 1.0023 0.9946 1.1593 1.0214
1988 0.9648 1.0872 1.0435 0.9939 0.8793 0.9840 0.9838 0.8958 1.0321 1.0302 1.1182 0.9958
1989 0.9561 1.0704 1.0411 0.9771 0.8746 0.9685 0.9776 0.9335 1.0384 1.0460 1.0928 1.0141
1990 0.9652 1.0556 1.0403 0.9861 0.8951 0.9726 1.0160 0.9545 1.0331 1.0677 1.0697 1.0129
1991 0.9588 1.0559 1.0486 0.9947 0.8962 0.9753 1.0019 0.9315 1.0426 1.0799 1.0761 1.0319
1992 0.9666 1.0320 0.9724 1.0003 0.9180 0.9661 0.9935 0.9495 1.0618 1.0748 1.0678 1.0546
1993 0.9785 1.0259 0.9960 1.0039 0.9297 0.9561 1.0078 0.9611 1.0671 1.0615 1.0715 1.0596
1994 0.9537 1.0300 0.9960 1.0058 0.9112 0.9531 1.0440 0.9373 1.0543 1.0515 1.0894 1.0634
1995 0.9538 1.0947 1.0557 1.0365 0.9222 0.9713 0.9683 0.9382 1.0290 0.9997 1.1552 1.0310
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Miss. Mo. Mont. Nebr. N.H. N.J. N.Mex. N.Y. N.C. Ohio Okla. Oreg.
1975 0.7755 0.9947 1.1229 1.0089 0.8938 1.0420 0.7747 1.0517 0.7939 1.0655 0.8874 1.0580
1976 0.7747 0.9936 1.1365 0.9950 0.8952 1.0348 0.8022 1.0460 0.7982 1.0787 0.8893 1.0413
1977 0.7653 1.0020 1.1930 0.9755 0.8765 1.0450 0.7829 1.0431 0.8004 1.0900 0.8904 1.0390
1978 0.7663 0.9872 1.3552 0.9991 0.8761 1.0245 0.7854 1.0249 0.8052 1.0912 0.8947 1.0320
1979 0.7689 0.9889 1.3473 1.0238 0.8783 1.0366 0.8011 1.0234 0.8089 1.0953 0.9092 1.0395
1980 0.7862 1.0003 1.3064 1.0475 0.8794 1.0400 0.8119 1.0282 0.8203 1.0903 0.9493 1.0474
1981 0.7963 0.9963 1.1770 1.0121 0.8741 1.0386 0.8184 1.0207 0.8232 1.0959 0.9526 1.0498
1982 0.7957 0.9844 1.1660 1.0203 0.9192 1.0419 0.8422 1.0305 0.8153 1.0861 0.9577 1.0792
1983 0.8058 1.0027 1.1317 0.9841 0.9268 1.0413 0.8397 1.0349 0.8330 1.0877 0.9506 1.0553
1984 0.8186 1.0035 1.0846 0.9302 0.9169 1.0469 0.8428 1.0425 0.8342 1.0801 0.9684 1.0383
1985 0.8143 0.9864 1.0881 0.9203 0.9221 1.0459 0.9612 1.0505 0.8402 1.0722 0.9656 1.0106
1986 0.8120 0.9995 1.0819 0.9248 0.9548 1.0484 0.9639 1.0493 0.8529 1.0771 0.9388 1.0062
1987 0.8054 1.0028 1.0162 0.8899 0.9996 1.0496 0.9506 1.0375 0.8695 1.0838 0.9439 1.0014
1988 0.8288 0.9902 1.0006 0.8190 1.0273 1.0692 0.9183 1.0783 0.8713 1.0725 0.9627 0.9741
1989 0.8097 0.9823 1.0281 0.7998 1.0509 1.0598 0.8962 1.0615 0.8735 1.0199 0.9750 0.9837
1990 0.8053 0.9714 1.0224 0.8019 1.0427 1.0926 0.8893 1.0705 0.8865 1.0253 0.9569 0.9955
1991 0.8201 0.9550 1.0017 0.8221 1.0233 1.0994 0.8806 1.0787 0.9011 1.0257 0.9530 1.0093
1992 0.8315 0.9540 1.0195 0.8390 1.0275 1.1102 0.8763 1.0679 0.9063 1.0234 0.9329 1.0102
1993 0.8369 0.9650 0.9942 0.8519 1.0423 1.1125 0.8746 1.0684 0.9010 1.0325 0.9460 0.9887
1994 0.8375 0.9560 0.9864 0.8640 1.0305 1.1082 0.8618 1.0582 0.9062 1.0359 0.9270 0.8593
1995 0.7907 1.0045 1.1010 0.9452 0.9716 1.0781 0.8467 1.0670 0.8350 1.0851 0.9256 1.0103
(continued)
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Pa. R.I. S.C. S.Dak. Tenn. Texas Utah Vt. Va. Wash. W.Va. Wisc.
1975 1.0105 0.8891 0.8116 0.8825 0.9133 0.9616 0.9205 0.9027 0.8508 1.1187 0.9027 1.0522
1976 0.9942 0.8809 0.8205 0.8567 0.9057 0.9327 0.9374 0.8866 0.8563 1.1196 0.8866 1.0481
1977 1.0039 0.8615 0.8201 0.8261 0.9234 0.9378 0.9453 0.9021 0.8626 1.1202 0.9021 1.0456
1978 1.0050 0.8628 0.8211 0.8708 0.9161 0.9378 0.9300 0.9190 0.8570 1.1191 0.9190 1.0509
1979 1.0074 0.8503 0.8338 0.8843 0.9170 0.9465 0.9503 0.9352 0.8743 1.1045 0.9352 1.0550
1980 0.9978 0.8610 0.8421 0.9170 0.9329 0.9767 0.9725 0.9467 0.8811 1.1289 0.9467 1.0674
1981 1.0011 0.8392 0.8398 0.9295 0.9327 0.9781 0.9867 0.9369 0.8878 1.1471 0.9369 1.0619
1982 0.9968 0.8583 0.8263 0.9090 0.9326 0.9794 0.9767 0.9414 0.8817 1.1855 0.9414 1.0813
1983 1.0027 0.8370 0.8597 0.8495 0.9387 0.9753 0.9792 0.9722 0.8906 1.1447 0.9722 1.0848
1984 1.0214 0.8778 0.8692 0.8106 0.9466 0.9683 0.9681 0.9717 0.8903 1.1139 0.9717 1.0655
1985 1.0136 0.8784 0.8667 0.8093 0.9546 0.9717 1.0149 0.8705 0.8990 1.0935 0.9733 1.0575
1986 1.0140 0.8944 0.8785 0.7716 0.9567 0.9816 1.0353 0.8782 0.9233 1.0792 0.9783 1.0433
1987 1.0233 0.9059 0.8837 0.7712 0.9647 0.9778 1.0229 0.8800 0.9388 1.0835 0.9638 1.0304
1988 1.0313 0.9031 0.8683 0.7616 0.9619 0.9696 0.9326 0.8905 0.9229 1.0615 0.8747 1.0187
1989 1.0300 0.9139 0.8722 0.7574 0.9566 0.9776 0.8511 0.9058 0.9278 1.0306 0.8697 1.0051
1990 1.0324 0.9294 0.8632 0.7535 0.9278 0.9737 0.8430 0.9366 0.9238 1.0696 0.8880 1.0075
1991 1.0341 0.9232 0.8658 0.7648 0.9404 0.9827 0.8818 0.9769 0.9263 1.0514 0.9153 1.0163
1992 1.0365 0.9111 0.8761 0.9031 0.9075 0.9778 0.9031 0.9954 0.9253 1.0525 0.9201 1.0277
1993 1.0358 0.9096 0.8723 0.8822 0.9018 0.9635 0.8822 0.9901 0.9254 1.0474 0.9155 1.0290
1994 0.7507 0.8860 0.9509 0.9546 0.9707 0.9277 1.0164 0.9023 1.0292 0.9303 0.9023 1.0292
1995 1.0351 0.9028 0.8405 0.9324 0.9188 0.9540 0.9324 0.9114 0.9173 1.0824 0.9138 1.0626
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Table C.21 Net Weekly Costs, 1975–95a ($)
Ala. Alaska Ariz. Ark. Calif. Colo. Conn. Del. D.C. Fla. Ga. Hawaii
1975 2.717 9.864 8.879 4.255 NDb 2.889 4.408 ND 9.149 9.154 3.192 7.880
1976 3.703 15.391 9.739 4.689 ND 3.584 5.054 ND 10.847 9.541 4.044 9.976
1977 3.606 18.298 10.999 5.151 ND 5.060 5.487 ND 13.827 11.763 4.585 10.567
1978 4.439 14.366 12.101 5.342 ND 5.845 6.864 ND 23.395 13.315 5.007 10.981
1979 4.845 15.637 14.108 5.416 ND 6.013 7.615 ND 29.632 11.849 5.775 12.513
1980 4.929 16.145 12.721 6.095 ND 4.747 10.159 ND 32.102 9.675 5.300 12.402
1981 4.888 18.481 9.924 6.267 ND 5.150 9.558 ND 30.024 8.596 5.291 16.333
1982 4.869 18.758 7.609 5.773 ND 6.415 10.488 ND 25.854 6.472 5.031 18.147
1983 5.023 15.457 6.761 5.569 ND 7.263 10.125 ND 17.503 7.509 4.744 22.017
1984 4.952 15.457 6.428 5.601 ND 7.202 10.211 ND 14.924 7.545 4.786 20.004
1985 6.257 17.053 9.181 5.657 ND 9.099 10.786 ND 15.987 10.311 6.162 20.941
1986 7.516 18.886 11.352 6.589 18.215 9.763 12.092 9.756 17.730 12.514 7.670 24.073
1987 8.884 21.794 10.985 8.205 20.620 12.246 14.015 10.456 18.725 13.173 9.129 21.900
1988 9.952 23.475 10.902 8.420 22.861 14.187 15.856 10.531 18.303 15.378 9.634 18.720
1989 10.367 21.099 12.292 8.649 22.665 16.286 17.082 10.741 18.210 18.362 11.423 18.369
1990 10.855 23.592 12.685 8.801 22.980 16.589 18.094 10.505 17.939 24.193 12.249 18.884
1991 11.702 21.346 12.951 9.647 24.620 18.295 18.945 10.591 19.390 19.117 13.990 17.881
1992 16.803 19.665 14.293 11.759 28.005 17.459 19.755 11.083 21.100 25.793 16.843 19.871
1993 17.379 16.957 13.543 15.384 28.256 17.155 22.022 12.529 23.075 29.095 16.825 20.777
1994 17.160 17.863 13.075 14.172 21.905 16.139 18.867 13.126 21.323 19.652 16.736 19.687
1995 17.195 18.591 13.455 12.589 18.067 14.596 17.055 11.808 22.283 19.490 15.494 24.981
(continued)
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Idaho Ill. Ind. Iowa Kans. Ky. La. Maine Md. Mass. Mich. Minn.
1975 5.428 3.986 2.216 3.278 3.793 5.723 7.738 4.263 4.570 5.491 7.126 6.022
1976 6.647 6.939 2.558 3.722 4.190 7.080 12.505 5.243 6.150 6.237 8.668 7.036
1977 7.125 9.191 2.597 4.534 4.995 7.128 8.853 5.485 7.766 6.466 10.603 8.263
1978 6.765 8.168 3.262 4.966 5.173 9.556 9.256 5.899 7.703 7.310 13.591 9.736
1979 7.198 8.269 2.979 6.455 4.643 9.022 8.657 7.662 9.613 8.368 13.064 10.206
1980 6.619 9.187 3.187 7.278 4.638 8.728 9.580 9.785 8.697 8.440 15.027 10.229
1981 8.035 8.640 2.584 6.920 4.614 6.261 9.670 10.251 10.279 8.409 14.424 9.646
1982 7.294 8.140 2.234 6.775 5.525 5.951 8.379 12.326 10.552 8.490 11.000 9.045
1983 7.376 7.455 2.315 5.784 4.850 5.818 9.057 12.059 10.226 9.800 10.647 8.427
1984 7.542 7.407 2.455 5.354 4.590 6.254 6.838 12.509 9.799 9.870 10.048 9.132
1985 7.966 9.122 2.739 5.572 4.855 7.964 7.472 12.853 10.215 10.211 11.827 12.741
1986 8.676 11.080 3.333 5.926 5.863 8.746 10.015 11.377 11.550 10.696 14.247 15.014
1987 10.630 11.540 3.803 7.987 6.347 11.164 9.763 11.446 10.761 11.300 16.262 15.162
1988 11.967 12.590 4.333 7.870 7.683 10.981 12.187 12.297 11.320 14.840 15.366 16.266
1989 11.049 13.793 5.612 9.449 7.726 12.588 13.290 16.312 10.545 16.543 14.829 17.099
1990 12.210 14.552 6.826 9.210 8.211 13.192 16.344 19.618 9.917 20.976 19.463 18.642
1991 11.996 15.387 7.484 10.279 9.238 13.354 16.588 22.020 9.907 25.329 20.389 19.091
1992 13.699 15.954 7.543 11.851 11.778 15.582 23.396 22.660 10.896 25.216 21.633 20.969
1993 14.576 15.874 7.939 12.609 14.020 18.112 22.320 21.560 10.274 24.991 17.627 17.123
1994 13.111 16.334 7.662 12.111 13.500 18.505 23.434 19.126 11.044 22.623 16.751 16.243
1995 12.008 16.137 7.759 10.607 12.962 18.645 20.672 16.640 10.235 16.860 16.335 15.084
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Miss. Mo. Mont. Nebr. N.H. N.J. N.Mex. N.Y. N.C. Ohio Okla. Oreg.
1975 3.706 4.045 8.527 3.686 3.381 5.809 4.297 5.175 1.847 ND 4.924 9.496
1976 3.695 4.352 9.234 4.700 5.025 6.367 5.012 6.411 2.001 ND 5.935 12.138
1977 3.742 4.730 10.951 3.909 5.353 6.993 5.290 7.517 2.125 ND 6.941 15.311
1978 3.871 4.508 16.470 4.017 6.905 7.792 5.494 9.382 2.227 ND 6.982 15.725
1979 3.530 4.707 10.554 4.095 7.047 7.818 6.475 11.503 2.632 ND 7.644 15.195
1980 3.770 4.517 10.979 4.531 7.790 9.479 6.972 11.206 2.943 ND 7.232 13.745
1981 3.692 4.141 9.589 4.452 6.717 9.764 8.319 9.521 3.490 ND 8.501 11.336
1982 4.108 4.326 11.251 4.543 7.399 9.308 8.773 7.852 3.637 ND 8.467 11.796
1983 4.131 3.908 12.491 4.964 8.053 8.047 9.531 7.197 3.466 8.944 8.249 8.364
1984 4.511 4.511 12.196 4.621 9.527 8.156 10.371 7.217 2.788 9.752 9.134 9.191
1985 4.790 5.239 15.037 4.987 9.978 6.475 13.451 8.803 3.134 ND 9.001 11.349
1986 5.551 6.529 16.657 5.210 11.451 6.870 14.459 9.837 4.138 ND 10.842 15.028
1987 6.801 7.542 20.658 5.653 12.451 7.762 14.166 9.768 4.736 11.286 11.266 16.149
1988 6.915 8.289 18.575 5.661 13.857 8.468 16.115 10.277 5.557 14.464 12.168 15.190
1989 8.368 8.399 22.076 6.044 14.973 7.723 15.936 10.619 5.797 15.307 14.148 15.122
1990 8.409 8.827 25.209 6.982 15.155 8.365 16.506 12.724 6.385 17.688 13.156 16.442
1991 10.528 10.058 21.377 8.247 16.414 8.764 16.246 15.863 7.997 17.674 13.195 15.844
1992 12.907 12.863 24.656 9.354 17.924 10.339 20.159 17.718 9.018 19.319 16.525 15.067
1993 14.533 14.464 23.885 10.770 21.170 11.196 20.599 21.238 11.540 19.602 19.326 12.955
1994 13.880 13.148 26.133 11.812 23.815 10.601 15.820 23.035 11.480 18.947 18.660 12.021
1995 11.434 13.011 28.587 11.622 19.194 10.076 16.535 21.790 10.173 19.166 16.823 12.086
(continued)
386Pa. R.I. S.C. S.Dak. Tenn. Texas Utah Vt. Va. Wash. W.Va. Wisc.
1975 ND 4.011 2.371 2.419 3.514 7.376 2.899 2.859 2.243 ND 3.006 3.212
1976 ND 5.309 2.889 3.192 3.976 7.572 3.969 2.819 2.667 ND 3.320 3.805
1977 ND 6.453 3.067 2.795 4.139 9.265 3.963 3.439 3.405 ND 4.098 3.717
1978 ND 6.736 3.124 3.411 5.298 9.737 4.188 4.386 4.172 ND 4.623 4.399
1979 ND 6.960 4.220 4.291 5.047 9.517 4.817 4.279 5.205 ND 5.380 4.615
1980 ND 6.952 4.203 3.821 4.465 9.010 3.962 4.622 5.427 ND 5.393 4.956
1981 ND 7.838 4.291 3.984 4.510 9.319 4.102 4.616 6.017 ND 6.088 5.096
1982 ND 7.939 4.182 4.199 4.650 9.690 4.194 4.247 5.877 ND 6.955 5.536
1983 ND 8.317 4.637 4.092 4.572 11.034 4.375 4.095 5.514 9.704 7.313 5.576
1984 ND 8.591 5.014 3.683 4.699 11.541 4.554 4.223 4.545 11.203 9.258 6.248
1985 ND 9.292 5.139 4.344 5.051 8.871 4.804 5.191 5.158 9.340 8.745 5.861
1986 10.485 11.946 6.269 4.425 5.792 13.904 6.384 6.285 6.526 11.149 8.967 7.098
1987 12.084 12.756 7.180 5.442 6.756 15.966 6.463 6.854 6.348 10.820 7.066 7.880
1988 12.788 12.287 7.676 5.662 8.039 20.726 6.148 7.397 6.155 10.457 6.555 9.149
1989 14.210 14.304 8.634 6.616 8.727 24.026 6.902 8.351 6.582 9.958 7.506 9.704
1990 13.838 17.792 8.684 7.089 9.928 26.836 7.200 9.572 6.413 10.814 8.470 10.627
1991 18.189 18.640 9.375 8.159 10.332 25.969 7.959 10.869 7.082 10.927 9.584 10.298
1992 19.358 18.440 10.792 8.880 11.846 ND 8.779 11.444 7.583 11.376 11.266 11.571
1993 22.950 17.953 12.464 9.034 12.685 ND 9.580 13.797 8.570 11.285 11.479 12.363
1994 18.024 16.980 12.064 10.744 13.276 ND 9.627 15.626 9.733 11.071 12.072 12.386
1995 18.179 16.370 10.807 10.676 14.837 ND 10.718 15.196 9.198 11.278 12.205 11.425
a Weekly premium per worker in constant 1995 dollars for employers in 71 classes in each of the 48 jurisdictions in the study.  “As of” date is January 1 of
each year.
b ND = no data available.
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Table C.22 Net Weekly Costs, 1975–95 ($)
All 48 states in study
43 States with no 
missing data
45 States with private 
carriers
Year Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev
Unweighted 
observations
1975 4.903 2.287 4.844 2.282 4.948 2.296
1976 5.998 3.022 5.961 3.048 6.062 3.029
1977 6.734 3.604 6.674 3.625 6.797 3.623
1978 7.593 4.329 7.542 4.368 7.663 4.356
1979 8.025 4.726 7.989 4.777 8.088 4.765
1980 8.178 4.991 8.158 5.049 8.244 5.032
1981 8.131 4.818 8.103 4.872 8.180 4.865
1982 8.001 4.430 7.961 4.476 8.026 4.481
1983 7.830 3.802 7.683 3.889 7.771 3.923
1984 7.688 3.742 7.463 3.769 7.517 3.812
1985 8.614 3.902 8.590 3.994 8.593 3.994
1986 9.916 4.481 9.584 4.505 9.909 4.575
1987 11.045 4.537 10.689 4.539 11.133 4.649
1988 11.760 4.660 11.254 4.403 11.845 4.730
1989 12.592 4.798 12.083 4.468 12.703 4.865
1990 13.742 5.565 13.261 5.306 13.837 5.647
1991 14.357 5.214 13.837 4.875 14.465 5.290
1992 15.761 5.332 15.515 5.153 15.882 5.403
1993 16.457 5.206 16.163 4.962 16.616 5.247
1994 15.768 4.359 15.667 4.395 15.887 4.387
1995 15.126 4.361 15.058 4.457 15.188 4.406
(continued)
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Table C.22 (continued)
All 48 states in study
43 States with no 
missing data
45 States with private 
carriers
Year Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev
Weighted 
observations
1975 5.029 2.079 4.837 2.045 5.049 2.080
1976 6.073 2.484 5.948 2.545 6.100 2.481
1977 6.986 3.006 6.794 3.052 7.014 3.007
1978 7.875 3.618 7.715 3.727 7.906 3.622
1979 8.306 3.782 8.199 3.929 8.334 3.790
1980 8.409 3.898 8.354 4.071 8.438 3.906
1981 8.109 3.562 7.992 3.711 8.128 3.574
1982 7.631 3.076 7.425 3.152 7.637 3.089
1983 7.634 2.789 7.164 2.765 7.511 2.877
1984 7.504 2.988 6.872 2.809 7.272 3.007
1985 8.222 2.880 8.131 3.040 8.192 2.920
1986 10.655 4.310 9.143 3.520 10.667 4.365
1987 11.901 4.590 10.171 3.547 11.983 4.470
1988 13.184 5.265 10.970 3.635 13.218 5.414
1989 14.058 5.527 11.799 4.004 14.122 5.673
1990 15.500 6.230 13.353 5.267 15.538 6.387
1991 16.339 5.956 14.036 4.826 16.436 6.099
1992 17.602 6.259 15.922 5.442 17.706 6.410
1993 18.401 6.328 16.730 5.610 18.556 6.461
1994 16.741 4.502 15.914 4.517 16.793 4.559
1995 15.691 3.980 15.095 4.215 15.636 3.997
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workers’ compensation costs.  However, the patterns over time are similar;
weekly premiums increased yearly with minor exceptions from 1975 to 1993
and then declined by 1995.  The data for all 48 states indicate that the varia-
tion in costs (as measured by the standard deviation) among jurisdictions in-
creased from 1975 until 1990.  However, both the weighted and unweighted
data show less variation among the states in 1995 than in 1990.
There are data available for all years for 42 states, and the means and stan-
dard deviations for these states are shown in the third and fourth data columns
of Table C.22.  The results for the 42 states are very similar to the results for
the 48 states.  For example, the unweighted mean weekly premiums were less
than $5.00 per worker in 1975, peaked in 1993 in excess of $16.00 per worker,
and declined to less than $16.00 per worker in 1995.  Likewise, the standard
deviation increased from 1975 to 1990 and then declined between 1990 and
1995.
Workers’ compensation costs in a third combination of states, those 45
with private carriers, is shown in the right-most two columns of Table C.22.
Again the pattern is the same as for the full set of 48 states: average weekly
premiums were less than $5.00 per worker in 1975, peaked in 1993 in excess
of $16.00 per worker, and declined to less than $16.00 per worker per week in
1995.  Likewise, the standard deviation increased from 1975 to 1990, but end-
ed up smaller in 1995 than in 1990.
Notes
1. We attempt to thoroughly explain our methodology and to provide comprehensive
state-level data on the outcome of methodology in this appendix.  We do not
include all the data we have used, such as manual rates or pure premiums for indi-
vidual workers’ compensation insurance classes.  The data set of 71 classes times
21 years times 42 to 48 states (depending on the year) plus, for some years, sepa-
rate rates for both the voluntary and assigned-risk markets, is too large to include
as an appendix.  We will share our data with researchers and will post additional
data on a Web site as soon as the Upjohn Institute publishes the study.
2. Three of the jurisdictions included in our study (Ohio, Washington, and West Vir-
ginia) have exclusive state funds; each uses its own classification system.  Though
13 of the remaining states in our study (as of 1995) had their own rate-making
organizations, the NCCI’s classification codes were usually applicable.  We used a
substantial number of non-NCCI classification codes only for California, Dela-
ware, and Pennsylvania.  
3. Most of the conversions were fairly obvious from the classification descriptions in
the NCCI’s classification codes and the “deviant” state’s classification manual.
When ambiguities existed, the NCCI class descriptions were sent to the appropri-
ate official in the non-Council state and he or she chose the most nearly analogous
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class in that state, or the staff of the National Council selected the most nearly
analogous class.
4. The rate-setting regime in effect on January 1 was used to categorize the model
for the year. 
5. Examples of the regression coefficients predicting adjusted manual rates with our
basic model of explanatory variables and our preferred characterization of the reg-
ulatory environment, with the eight observations included and then with the eight
observations deleted, are as follows: ln benefits, 0.066273 and 0.068766; adminis-
tered pricing with deviations, 0.051339 and 0.051962; advisory rates, 0.126207
and 0.128325; loss costs with prior approval, 0.027508 and 0.024408; and loss
costs without prior approval, –0.019338 and –0.187916.  The differences in these
coefficients do not pass the heuristic “wow” test.
6. Maryland has relied on a residual market for many years, but data on the shares
accounted for by the voluntary and residual markets are unavailable.  As a result,
we use Model I for 1975–1987 and Model II for 1988–1995 for Maryland.
7. This procedure pertains to Models I, III, and IV, which are listed in Table C.2.
8. One factor that formerly hindered interstate workers’ compensation cost compari-
sons was the use of different payroll limitations among the states.  A payroll limi-
tation is a figure that determines the maximum amount of an employee’s weekly
earnings that will be used in calculating insurance premiums.  For many years, the
normal payroll limitation was $100, which meant that the manual rate was multi-
plied by an employee’s weekly earning or $100, whichever was less, to determine
the weekly benefit.
Most state workers’ compensation programs affiliated with the NCCI con-
verted from a $100 payroll limitation to a $300 limitation circa 1957, and to no
limit (which means that the manual rates were charged against the whole payroll)
during 1974–1975.  However, four states (Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, and
Texas) still had weekly payroll limits of $200 or less as of July 1, 1975.   By July
1, 1978, these four states either had payroll limits of $300 or had eliminated the
payroll limitation.  As late as January 1, 1984, only Texas still had a payroll limit
($300), which was subsequently removed.
Although payroll limitations have been eliminated, their operation is important
to explain because they mean that the historical record for these four states is
somewhat misleading.  To illustrate the significance of the payroll limitation,
assume that the insurance premium for a worker earning $300 per week was iden-
tical in two states, one of which had a $3.00 manual rate and a $100 payroll limi-
tation, and the other of which had a $1.00 manual rate and a $300 per week
payroll limit.  Obviously, it is incorrect to say that the state with the $3.00 manual
rate (and resultant higher adjusted manual rate) had a higher cost of workers’
compensation than the other jurisdiction.
Fortunately, the problem of the payroll limits is confined to only four states in
our study, and then only for a limited number of years before the payroll limits
reached at least $300 per week.  However, for those four states there are several
years in which the costs of workers’ compensation as we measure those costs are
overstated, because we ignore the effects of the payroll limits.
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9. Because the firm’s workers’ compensation insurance premium is adjusted based
on its loss experience relative to the experience of the average firm in its insurance
classification, one might expect that these firm adjustments would sum to zero
over all firms in the state.  If so, there should be no need to adjust state-wide aver-
age manual rates.  However, in practice, the predominant effect of experience rat-
ing is to reduce the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insurance.
10. For the experience rating adjustment, we used manual premium and standard
earned premium data from the NCCI and comparable data from non-NCCI states
that have their own rate-making organizations (including California, Delaware,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania).
11. In states that do not permit deviations, standard earned premium at bureau rates
and standard earned premium at the company level are identical.
12. The dividend adjustment factor was computed from data published by A.M. Best
and was calculated by subtracting from 1 the ratio of direct dividends to direct
premium earned for the same calendar year.
13. This procedure applies to Models II and V, which are listed in Table C.2.
14. In Model I (and also in Model III), the manual rates for the total market (IR4) are
the same as the manual rates in the voluntary market (IR1).
15. The Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation is converting its classification codes
to those used by the NCCI over a four-year phase-in period starting July 1, 1998.
The Bureau will discontinue its classification code system upon completion of the
conversion.  See Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, Understanding Con-
version of Industry Classifications, BWC Fact Sheet (FactSheets Online) v. 1.1
(no date).  This document was accessed by the authors in July 1999 at the web site
http://www.bwc.state.oh.us/resource/library/brochure/convind.pdf. 
16. The “base rate calculation” for rate date July 1, 1994, which is based on data from
January 1, 1989, to January 1, 1992, for private employers, shows an adjustment
for the off-balance factor due to experience rating of 1.2259.  This indicates that
experience rating was reducing insurance premiums by 22.59 percent during the
base period.  This information was provided in correspondence from the Actuarial
Section of the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (William E. Darlage to
John F. Burton, Jr., July 15, 1997).
17. The quotation is from the January 20, 1987, cover letter by Frederick W. Kil-
bourne that constitutes part of the Actuarial Audit of the State Insurance Fund As
of December 31, 1985.  Future Cost Analysts of Ohio prepared the audit for the
Ohio Industrial Commission.
18. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, BWC online: “Mail doesn’t get any bet-
ter than this.”  Accessed by the authors in July 1999 at the Web site http://
www.bwc.state.oh.us/FEATURE/rebate/rebate.htm
19. Data for these two variables were available only for the years 1985, 1990, and
1995.  Values for other years were interpolated.
20. The factors were averaged over all rate classes.
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21. Actuaries in the Washington Department of Labor and Industry indicated that the
actual experience modification factor tends to vary only slightly from the targeted
modification.
22. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations and data in the balance of the discussion of
West Virginia are from Geiger (1988). 
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Appendix D
 
Benefit Index Methodology
 
Workers’ compensation programs provide workers who have experienced
a work-related injury or illness with a variety of benefits.  These include reim-
bursement for medical and other expenses related to the rehabilitation of the
claimant.  They also include two types of cash benefits: disability compensa-
tion, which is paid to injured workers to compensate for lost wage income re-
sulting from disability, and death (fatality) compensation, which is paid to
surviving dependents of workers who have died as the result of an occupation-
ally related injury or disease.
While all states pay some form of both types of cash benefits, there are
substantial differences among states with respect to their structure and form as
well as generosity.  Within jurisdictions, benefits can vary significantly
among claimants, depending on factors such as the claimant’s wage, age, ex-
tent and type of disability, and family status.  These complexities in benefit
structure among states make interjurisdictional comparisons difficult.
In this appendix, we describe a cash benefits index used in the regression
analyses reported in Chapters 4 through 8.  The remainder of the appendix is
divided into seven sections.  The first section describes the calculation of a
state-specific wage index that is independent of the state’s industrial composi-
tion.  The next outlines a fourfold classification scheme that characterizes the
workers’ compensation benefit structure.  In the following four sections, the
methodology used to calculate benefits for each of these categories is de-
scribed.
 
1
 
   In the final section, we describe the calculation of the overall cash
benefit index.
 
WAGE INDEX
 
With few exceptions, compensation benefits for all benefit categories are
paid in the form of weekly or monthly payments made to claimants.  The
amount of these periodic payments is typically based on the claimant’s pre-in-
jury weekly or monthly wage.  As a result, to calculate the benefit index, it
was first necessary to estimate the average weekly or monthly wage for each
jurisdiction.  While statewide average wage measures are readily available
from a number of sources, these are problematic.  Since states are heteroge-
neous with respect to industrial mix and since wages vary substantially across
industries, the statewide average wage reflects differences in sectoral compo-
sition.
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To control for these differences in industrial mix, we used average wages
for one- and two-digit industries from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) to calculate a weighted statewide wage index for each year and state in
the sample.  Specifically, this index, designated as 
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Two indices are calculated for each state and year, a one-digit index and a
two-digit index.  Unfortunately, data for the same set of one- or two-digit in-
dustries were unavailable for every state for every year.  As a result, differ-
ent sets of industries were used to calculate the average wage for different
states.  
The wage adjusted for industrial mix was obtained by multiplying the state
average weekly wage in employment covered by the unemployment insurance
program by either the one-or two-digit wage index described in the previous
paragraph.  If the number of one-digit industries for which data are available
for a particular state and year exceed the number of two-digit industries for
which data are available for that state and year, then the one-digit index was
employed; otherwise, the two-digit index was used.
 
BENEFIT STRUCTURE
 
As previously indicated, cash benefits paid by workers’ compensation pro-
grams fall into two primary types: 
 
fatality benefits
 
, which are paid to the sur-
viving dependents of workers who have been killed as the result of an
occupational injury or disease, and 
 
disability benefits
 
, which are paid to work-
ers who are unable to work as the result of a workplace injury or disease.  Dis-
ability benefits may be further categorized, according to a threefold scheme
based on the severity and permanency of the compensation claimant’s injury.  
Workers who experience disabling injuries will, if they satisfy eligibility
criteria, receive temporary total disability (TTD) benefits until they return to
work or until the date of maximum medical improvement (MMI), that is, the
date at which their condition is not expected to further improve.
 
2
 
   At this
point, the overwhelming majority of workers will have recovered and returned
to work with no further lost wages.  However, some workers will continue to
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experience permanent consequences of the injury, e.g., a worker whose arm
has been amputated.  If so, the severity of these consequences is evaluated at
this point.  Those workers who are judged to be totally unable to work will re-
ceive permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. Workers who continue to ex-
perience permanent consequences but retain some wage-earning capacity are
considered to be partially disabled and receive permanent partial disability
(PPD) benefits.
With few exceptions, compensation benefits for all benefit categories are
paid in the form of weekly or monthly payments made to claimants for a peri-
od that varies according to the duration or severity of disability (in the case of
disability benefits) or according to the duration of dependency (in the case of
fatality benefits).  Consequently, we calculate the expected award for each
benefit category by separately estimating the weekly payment and benefit du-
ration for the average claimant in each benefit category in a particular jurisdic-
tion and in a particular year. 
 
TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS
Weekly Benefits
 
Typically, weekly benefits for TTD claims are equal to a proportion of the
injured worker’s pre-injury wages, subject to a maximum and minimum.  For
example, in 1995, TTD claimants in Alabama received benefits equal to 66.67
percent of preinjury wages up to a maximum weekly benefit of $427.  In addi-
tion, Alabama TTD claimants in 1995 did not receive less than $118 unless
their actual wages were less than $118, in which case they received their actu-
al preinjury wages as benefits.  However, in other jurisdictions the minimum
is absolute, so claimants may not receive less than the statutory minimum
even if their pre-injury wage was less than the minimum.
To compute average weekly benefits, it is necessary to construct a repre-
sentative wage distribution for each jurisdiction to account for the proportion
of workers who are earning wages above the maximum and below the mini-
mum, as well as the average wage paid to workers between these two points.
We use a national wage distribution supplied by the National Council of Com-
pensation Insurance and centered on the state average weekly wage, the calcu-
lation of which was described in the previous section.
 
3
 
  It is important to note
that since the average wage varies among states, the wage distribution will
similarly vary, so that the average weekly benefit will differ from state to state
even though statutory benefit parameters are identical.  This distribution per-
mits us to compute benefits for each claimant in this distribution and use this
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benefit distribution to obtain a representative average weekly benefit for all
workers’ compensation claimants in the state.  
In several jurisdictions, weekly benefits vary according to the claimant’s
family status.  For example, both the replacement rate and the benefit mini-
mum vary according to the claimant’s marital status and the number of depen-
dent children in Washington.  In other jurisdictions, claimants receive an
additional flat rate amount for a dependent spouse or child, so that claimants
with dependents in Arizona receive an additional $25 per month per depen-
dent.  Unfortunately, we lack information concerning the distribution of TTD
claimants by family status, so we are forced to rely on a fatal injury distribu-
tion that provides such data.  For those states in which benefits vary by family
status, we first calculated an average benefit for each household type and then
computed a single average weekly benefit for all TTD claimants using the
family status proportions as weights.
 
4 
 
In a handful of states, benefits are computed as a proportion of spendable
earnings (as opposed to gross earnings), so that it was necessary to calculate
after-tax wages.  This was done by determining the amount of state and feder-
al income tax withholding as well as FICA for each claimant in our wage dis-
tribution and then subtracting this amount from the gross wage.  Since income
tax withholding varies by the number of claimed exemptions, it was necessary
to derive a distribution of compensation claims that vary by the number of in-
come tax exemptions.  Once again, we used the family status distribution for
fatal injuries and assumed that the number of dependent exemptions was equal
to the number of minor children in the household.  Based on these assump-
tions, we calculated spendable earnings and the weekly benefit amount for
each claimant in the wage distribution for each family status category.  An
overall average weekly TTD benefit was computed using frequencies from the
family status and wage distributions as weights.
 
Benefit Duration
 
The principal parameters affecting TTD benefit duration are the waiting
and retroactive periods.  In all jurisdictions, the claimant must experience a
minimum duration of lost-time disability before he or she becomes eligible for
benefits.  This eligibility criterion is known as a 
 
waiting period
 
.  Furthermore,
in most jurisdictions, the claimant then receives benefits for the waiting period
if his or her disability exceeds the 
 
retroactive period
 
, at which time these ben-
efits are paid retroactively.  In addition, a few states limit the duration of TTD,
in the form of a maximum number of weeks (or months) of benefit payments,
an aggregate dollar award, or a maximum age.
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To account for differences in limits across jurisdictions, we employ a dis-
tribution of the duration of TTD, in days, obtained from the NCCI.  However,
since a very few TTD claims have a duration in excess of 100 weeks, we ig-
nore TTD limits greater than this.
 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS
Weekly Benefits
 
In most states, the weekly permanent total disability benefit is identical to
that paid to TTD claims.  In only a few jurisdictions (California, Illinois, Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming) are there any differ-
ences between the TTD and PTD weekly benefit formulae.  However, in those
states, the method used to compute the weekly PTD benefit is substantially the
same as that used to calculate TTD claim benefits described previously.
There are two differences between the weekly benefit calculations for TTD
and PTD benefits.  Both relate to the nature and size of the claimant’s house-
hold and both require the use of the family status distribution for fatal injuries,
which was described previously.  As noted earlier, a few jurisdictions pay dif-
ferential benefits to claimants with dependents; that is, claimants with depen-
dent children receive higher weekly benefits than claimants without children.
Once the children reach the age of majority, as defined in the statute, benefits
are reduced.  Since PTD claimants in some jurisdictions can receive benefits
for life, it is necessary to compute two weekly benefit amounts, one that is a
measure of the benefit the claimant receives while his or her children are still
minors (as defined by the workers’ compensation statute) and a second that is
a measure of the weekly benefits due after the children have reached the age
of majority.
 
5
 
 
Additionally, in several jurisdictions, PTD benefits are offset by Social Se-
curity disability or retirement benefits.
 
6
 
   To calculate these benefits, we make
a number of simplifying assumptions.  First, we assumed that all claimants
had earned a sufficient number of quarters of coverage to satisfy Social Secu-
rity eligibility requirements.  We further assume that the claimant’s wages on
the date of injury are an accurate reflection of his or her earnings over the
course of the working life (adjusted for inflation), so that the weekly wage rate
in the wage distribution can act as a proxy for the Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings (AIME).  Because Social Security benefits vary by family status, we
made separate calculations for each family status category, using the house-
hold distribution described previously.  Using this information, we calculated
the Social Security benefits received by each claimant in our sample.  These
benefits were subtracted from the weekly workers’ compensation PTD benefit
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according to the particular offset provisions in effect in the state.
 
7
 
   Because
the timing of Social Security benefits typically differs from the workers’ com-
pensation PTD benefit, it was necessary to compute two or more weekly ben-
efit amounts, including a weekly PTD benefit offset by Social Security
benefits and a monthly amount that is not offset.
 
8
 
 
 
Benefit Duration
 
In most states, permanent total disability benefits are paid for the duration
of disability or for the remainder of the claimant’s life.  To simplify calcula-
tions, we are assuming that these two periods are identical.  Since the payment
period is over the course of the claimant’s life, it is necessary to incorporate
assumptions about claimant life expectancy, which requires an age distribu-
tion for PTD claims.  An age distribution, supplied by the NCCI, was used to
compute the average PTD duration.  Because money has a time value, it was
also necessary to discount future benefit payments in order to obtain an appro-
priate present value for a PTD claim.  To calculate PTD duration, we used
standard actuarial techniques to calculate the present value of a one-dollar an-
nuity paid for life, using the 1979–1981 Decennial Census Life Table for the
Total Population (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1985) and
assuming a 3.5 percent discount rate.  Where statutory limitations on the dura-
tion or total amount of PTD benefits apply, these were incorporated into our
annuity calculations.  
Where more than one weekly benefit applies to a claimant, either due to
Social Security offsets or differential benefits for dependents, we calculated a
different duration for each weekly amount using actuarial techniques.
 
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY BENEFITS
Weekly Benefits
 
There is considerably greater interstate variation in the structure of weekly
benefits for permanent partial disability claims than in the structure of PTD or
TTD weekly benefits.  In some states, the PPD benefit formula is substantially
the same as the PTD and TTD formula, although specifics such as the replace-
ment rate, the benefit minimum, or the maximum may be different.  In other
states, the replacement rate may vary according to the extent of the claimant’s
functional impairment, while in still others, benefits are expressed as a propor-
tion of the claimant’s wage loss or loss of earning capacity.  Some states do
not pay PPD claimants a weekly or monthly benefit but instead provide com-
pensation in the form of a lump-sum payment. 
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Where weekly benefits vary by functional impairment, it is necessary to ac-
count for this by using a national distribution of PPD claim severity supplied
by the NCCI.  This distribution contains information on a set of PPD claims
that vary by body part.
 
9
 
   For each type of PPD, these data indicate the average
extent of functional impairment, the average claimant age, the average dura-
tion of temporary total disability that preceded the attainment of maximum
medical improvement, and the relative frequency of occurrence.
 
10
 
  Where
benefits vary by lost earning capacity, we assume that lost wage-earning ca-
pacity is equivalent to functional impairment, so that the same distribution
was used for these jurisdictions.  In a handful of states (such as California,
Montana, and New Mexico), the functional impairment rating is translated
into a disability rating using modifying factors like claimant age, occupation,
etc.  For these states, data from distributions with respect to each modifying
factor were combined, based on the statutory formula, to produce a disability
rating distribution.
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  Finally, an actual wage-loss distribution was constructed
combining actual wage-loss data from Florida, California, and Wisconsin with
the NCCI PPD distribution.
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In all cases, information from the appropriate impairment, disability, or
wage-loss distribution was combined with the wage distribution data so that
an average benefit was first calculated for each category of PPD claim.  These
individual claim averages were then combined, based on the relative frequen-
cy of the PPD claim category, to produce a single PPD weekly benefit for
each state and year.  Once again, benefits in some states may vary due to the
family status of the claimant, either because benefits are computed as a pro-
portion of spendable earnings, or because there is a Social Security retirement
offset, or because differential benefits are paid to claimants with a dependent
spouse or children.  In these instances, an algorithm similar to that described
for TTD and PTD claims was used; i.e., an average weekly benefit is deter-
mined for each type of household, and the results are aggregated using the fa-
tal injury family status distribution.
 
Benefit Duration
 
In general, the rules applying to PPD duration differ for what are termed
“scheduled” and “nonscheduled” injuries.  Most state statutes provide a
schedule of injuries, which lists various members or sensory organs (i.e., arm,
leg, hand, foot, fingers, toes, eye, ears) with a corresponding maximum bene-
fit duration (in weeks or months) for each.
 
13
 
  Benefit duration for a particular
injury to one of these members or sensory organs is obtained by multiplying
the scheduled maximum duration by the extent of functional impairment for
that member or organ.  For example, a claimant who experienced a 50 percent
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loss of the arm in New York would receive benefits for 50% 
 
×
 
 312 = 156
weeks.  The duration of PPD benefits for injuries that are not on this schedule
(“nonscheduled injuries”) is usually determined in one of two ways.  In many
states, there is a specified duration for injuries that are not included in the
schedule, in which case the determination of benefit duration is identical to
that used for scheduled claims.  In other jurisdictions, PPD benefits are paid
for the duration of wage loss, the duration of lost earning capacity, or the dura-
tion of disability.  In these instances, we assumed lifetime benefits unless
there was a statutory age limit.
Since PPD benefits may extend over a lengthy period, we made an actuari-
al determination of PPD duration similar to that for PTD claims, assuming
that benefits cease upon the death of the claimant.  In other words, we estimate
the present discounted value of an annuity paid for the statutory duration or
until death, whichever comes first, assuming a 3.5 percent discount rate and
life expectancies as estimated from the 1979–1981 U.S.  Decennial Census.
As indicated, the PPD distribution contains information on average age for
each PPD type, which was used in these calculations.
Because TTD benefits are paid to PPD claims, it was necessary to calculate
the average healing period as well.  Healing-period data from the PPD distri-
bution of the NCCI were used to compute a weighted average for the state and
year, where the relative frequency of the PPD claim types served as weights.
Some states limit healing-period duration, so that it was necessary to recalcu-
late the average healing period.  That is, if the average healing period for a
particular type of PPD claim when there are no restrictions on the duration of
the healing period is, for example, 52 weeks, and if the healing period for a
particular state is limited to 52 weeks, then we may expect that the average
healing period in this state will be less than 52 weeks.
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To obtain an estimate of the total benefits paid to PPD claims, we added 1)
the product of the average PPD duration and the average weekly PPD benefit
and 2) the product of the average healing period and the average weekly TTD
benefit.  In some states, benefits are paid in the form of a lump sum; for these
jurisdictions, the NCCI PPD distribution was used to obtain estimates of the
average lump-sum amount.  Finally, some states pay more than one benefit,
sometimes concurrently and sometimes consecutively.  In these instances, we
calculate each benefit separately and combine the results to obtain an overall
average benefit for PPD claims.
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FATALITY BENEFITS
Weekly Benefits
 
In general, the fatal-injury weekly benefit is calculated in a manner similar
to that used to calculate the TTD or PTD weekly benefit: that is, weekly bene-
fits are equal to a proportion of the deceased worker’s pre-injury wage, sub-
ject to a minimum and maximum.  Weekly fatality benefits depend on the
characteristics of the deceased worker’s family situation to a greater extent
than was the case for TTD, PTD, and PPD claims.  As before, we account for
these differences among states by calculating average benefits for each house-
hold type in the fatal-injury family status distribution and then taking a
weighted average.  Similarly, we also account for variation due to Social Se-
curity survivor benefit offsets and taxes in states that use spendable earnings
as a basis for benefits.  The fact that the weekly benefit could change as chil-
dren reach the age of majority required the computation of two or more week-
ly benefit figures.
 
Benefit Duration
 
In most jurisdictions, benefits are paid for the period of dependency, which
is assumed to be until death or remarriage.
 
15
 
  Thus, our duration calculation is
similar to that used to calculate PTD or PPD duration; that is, we use actuarial
techniques to account for life expectancy and the probability of remarriage.
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Where applicable, statutory limitations with respect to benefit duration were
factored into our calculations.  
Since many states provide claimants who remarry with a lump-sum pay-
ment—typically 104 weeks of benefits—it was also necessary to compute this
amount.  In addition, all states with the exception of Oklahoma pay funeral ex-
penses up to a maximum.  To account for this we assumed that the maximum
amount was paid in every case.  Finally, a few states pay a lump sum in addi-
tion to other benefits.  To obtain an average benefit for the state, we take the
sum of each, including the periodic pension.
 
TOTAL BENEFITS
 
To obtain an overall measure of benefit generosity, the separate compo-
nents described above were combined using the relative frequency of each
type of benefit as weights.  A national injury distribution was used for this
purpose.  The results of this exercise for the jurisdictions used in this study for
the years 1975 to 1995 are reported in Table D.1
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Table D.1 Real Expected Benefits, 1975–95 ($)
 
Ala. Alaska Ariz. Ark. Calif. Colo. Conn. Del. D.C. Fla. Ga. Hawaii
1975 1,817 5,217 5,451 2,060 1,997 1,598 4,050 3,003 7,400 2,214 1,909 3,462
1976 2,418 13,106 5,632 2,099 2,026 2,054 4,302 3,750 8,051 2,435 2,343 3,689
1977 2,598 12,873 5,853 2,404 2,255 2,129 4,620 3,907 8,558 2,568 2,406 3,905
1978 2,822 8,917 6,639 2,589 2,300 2,213 5,415 4,049 9,184 2,682 2,464 4,175
1979 3,038 8,950 7,050 2,752 2,354 2,346 6,591 5,736 9,865 2,796 3,735 4,472
1980 3,265 9,426 7,453 3,384 2,407 2,657 7,669 6,217 10,784 2,669 3,913 4,833
1981 3,543 9,877 8,023 3,776 2,600 2,853 8,363 6,624 11,821 3,670 4,062 5,216
1982 3,801 10,395 8,199 4,128 2,641 3,061 9,043 7,274 12,928 3,907 4,273 5,518
1983 4,046 10,484 8,350 4,468 3,531 3,116 9,566 7,678 12,943 4,636 4,825 5,801
1984 4,247 10,436 8,492 4,530 3,871 3,206 10,133 8,061 13,550 4,793 4,922 6,065
1985 4,447 10,309 8,617 4,577 3,917 3,325 10,853 8,328 14,061 5,349 5,013 6,289
1986 5,391 10,162 8,767 4,632 3,980 3,442 11,460 8,481 14,790 5,549 5,544 6,512
1987 5,631 10,177 8,887 4,884 4,000 3,526 12,195 8,853 16,218 5,807 6,055 6,933
1988 5,851 10,222 10,284 5,021 4,032 3,600 14,257 9,176 17,558 6,043 6,174 7,411
1989 6,032 9,671 10,369 5,196 4,053 4,240 14,829 9,718 18,610 6,211 6,246 7,967
1990 6,280 9,694 11,019 5,495 4,382 4,366 15,631 10,246 19,511 6,090 6,363 8,482
1991 6,499 9,765 11,235 5,642 4,922 4,479 16,445 10,825 20,532 4,185 7,460 8,947
1992 6,823 9,853 12,409 5,893 5,071 6,663 15,480 11,374 21,936 4,388 7,675 11,729
1993 6,224 9,918 12,536 6,040 5,105 6,829 15,851 11,699 23,534 4,438 8,183 13,010
1994 6,386 9,941 12,750 6,290 5,105 6,974 11,297 12,090 24,129 5,464 8,247 13,503
1995 6,527 9,950 12,995 6,413 5,589 7,303 11,636 12,442 25,157 5,630 8,806 13,750
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Idaho Ill. Ind. Iowa Kans. Ky. La. Maine Md. Mass. Mich. Minn.
1975 2,957 3,007 1,494 2,580 3,875 6,329 1,324 19,329 2,123 6,201 2,884 2,697
1976 3,385 4,517 1,499 3,382 4,054 6,795 1,943 21,145 3,004 6,315 3,357 3,245
1977 3,708 4,928 1,597 3,729 4,262 7,843 2,180 22,176 3,362 7,539 3,701 3,271
1978 4,086 5,275 1,908 4,233 4,677 8,425 2,666 23,977 3,600 7,992 4,120 4,580
1979 4,298 5,583 1,918 4,614 4,863 9,135 2,856 25,900 3,898 9,020 4,521 4,965
1980 4,533 6,116 2,096 5,046 5,647 9,952 3,122 28,886 4,268 9,478 4,951 5,340
1981 4,939 6,472 2,181 5,348 6,209 4,862 3,452 31,152 4,479 9,943 5,288 5,758
1982 5,387 6,821 2,193 5,557 6,585 5,188 3,770 33,365 4,848 11,757 5,765 6,139
1983 5,850 7,086 2,199 5,758 6,860 5,442 3,970 35,020 5,143 12,521 6,028 6,423
1984 6,103 7,370 2,325 5,982 5,568 5,682 2,755 36,733 5,450 13,775 6,325 7,852
1985 6,373 7,405 2,403 6,120 5,746 5,802 2,799 38,042 5,717 14,561 6,634 8,072
1986 6,553 7,636 2,490 6,289 5,954 5,971 3,141 20,186 6,017 15,090 6,909 8,283
1987 6,764 7,892 2,579 6,678 6,107 6,147 3,206 21,270 6,385 16,100 7,224 8,524
1988 6,898 8,297 2,595 6,900 5,916 6,313 3,293 10,097 6,526 17,177 7,558 8,827
1989 7,094 8,546 3,369 7,065 6,020 6,482 3,344 10,506 6,843 17,920 7,724 8,996
1990 7,348 8,938 3,621 7,336 6,166 6,758 3,481 11,017 7,197 18,868 7,907 9,260
1991 7,569 9,213 3,874 7,546 6,297 6,970 3,595 11,360 7,481 19,637 8,085 9,479
1992 7,978 9,728 4,752 7,995 6,487 7,348 3,729 10,691 7,829 12,524 8,450 9,848
1993 8,254 9,950 5,412 8,270 6,372 7,503 3,796 10,721 8,129 12,835 8,755 9,844
1994 8,618 10,237 5,969 8,558 11,536 7,765 3,901 10,910 8,316 13,197 9,136 10,079
1995 8,889 10,582 6,118 8,811 11,689 7,978 4,008 11,193 8,522 13,731 9,535 10,350
 
(continued)
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Table D.1 (continued)
 
Miss. Mo. Mont. N.H. N.J. N.Mex. N.Y. N.C. N. Dak. Ohio Okla. Oreg.
1975 2,441 2,164 1,816 3,958 2,203 2,675 4,859 1,548 3,303 2,153 1,526 2,199
1976 2,489 2,198 2,094 4,530 2,292 3,228 5,070 2,195 3,509 2,808 1,535 2,398
1977 3,202 2,226 2,306 4,834 2,389 3,838 5,285 2,339 3,608 2,993 1,543 2,493
1978 3,448 2,252 2,458 5,206 2,478 4,427 5,694 2,506 3,542 3,225 1,549 2,700
1979 3,545 2,656 2,671 5,667 2,593 5,066 6,466 2,692 3,743 3,636 2,733 2,929
1980 3,825 2,756 2,830 6,216 3,349 5,576 6,928 2,932 3,795 3,940 3,081 3,211
1981 3,926 3,009 3,122 6,767 3,520 6,135 7,393 3,175 3,946 4,228 3,495 3,344
1982 4,399 3,421 3,385 7,406 4,000 6,606 7,852 3,444 4,053 4,525 4,409 3,549
1983 4,437 3,643 3,619 7,931 4,311 6,921 8,187 3,678 4,206 4,817 4,821 3,635
1984 4,468 4,530 3,764 8,828 4,629 7,203 8,879 3,855 5,360 5,030 5,120 3,715
1985 4,913 4,748 3,866 9,167 4,898 7,437 9,443 4,045 5,392 5,261 5,256 3,769
1986 5,144 4,952 3,935 9,754 5,172 7,587 10,095 4,224 5,569 5,405 5,255 4,124
1987 5,383 5,237 4,016 10,393 5,481 7,659 10,561 4,422 5,617 6,942 5,221 4,199
1988 5,429 5,413 7,271 11,124 5,848 6,945 11,128 4,721 5,696 7,177 5,489 4,477
1989 6,932 5,590 7,342 11,512 6,205 7,108 11,349 4,897 5,740 7,912 5,524 4,576
1990 7,172 5,791 7,499 12,081 6,734 7,330 11,796 5,085 8,343 8,262 5,588 4,719
1991 7,407 6,587 7,671 12,623 6,989 10,112 13,414 5,288 8,571 8,461 5,899 6,261
1992 7,731 7,004 4,441 13,258 7,441 10,478 14,798 5,580 8,890 8,765 5,959 6,459
1993 7,962 7,343 4,592 13,401 7,758 10,871 15,444 5,723 9,122 9,087 6,212 6,656
1994 8,222 7,619 4,708 13,754 8,193 11,200 15,554 5,923 9,484 9,479 6,678 7,049
1995 8,501 7,844 4,818 11,919 8,367 11,496 16,108 6,148 9,722 9,711 6,504 7,269
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Pa. R.I. S.C. S.Dak. Tenn. Texas Utah Vt. Va. Wash. W.Va. Wisc.
1975 5,592 7,050 2,038 1,740 1,681 2,224 2,810 1,765 3,414 2,607 2,852 2,895
1976 7,241 7,727 2,210 2,067 1,978 2,274 3,379 1,883 4,495 3,547 3,364 3,428
1977 7,724 8,023 2,712 2,370 2,012 2,491 3,556 2,335 4,830 3,717 3,711 3,539
1978 6,603 8,547 2,968 2,650 2,309 2,884 3,525 4,295 5,121 3,879 3,958 3,925
1979 8,867 9,249 3,301 3,070 2,362 3,284 4,069 4,639 5,598 4,092 4,424 4,078
1980 9,602 10,081 3,592 3,394 2,542 3,703 4,213 4,986 6,068 5,650 4,731 4,343
1981 10,423 10,838 3,913 3,696 2,813 4,232 4,560 5,381 6,586 5,921 5,181 4,539
1982 11,047 11,563 4,160 3,922 2,981 4,778 4,865 5,853 7,089 6,126 5,477 5,407
1983 11,611 12,868 4,494 4,146 3,201 5,380 5,132 6,277 7,609 6,259 5,746 5,448
1984 12,137 13,421 4,693 4,275 3,233 5,579 5,335 6,612 8,106 6,334 6,030 5,871
1985 12,650 13,933 4,901 4,412 3,261 5,907 5,447 6,961 8,503 6,389 6,106 6,224
1986 13,128 14,643 5,075 4,555 3,862 6,181 5,545 7,322 8,963 6,495 6,274 6,451
1987 13,746 15,806 5,291 4,690 4,251 6,364 5,657 8,261 9,432 7,972 6,433 6,709
1988 14,463 16,863 5,497 4,856 4,607 6,570 5,805 8,658 9,966 8,117 6,603 6,957
1989 15,062 17,641 5,831 5,270 4,935 6,763 5,850 9,050 10,369 8,766 6,747 7,158
1990 15,797 18,482 6,111 5,450 5,278 6,897 6,024 9,517 10,793 9,076 6,967 7,481
1991 16,382 20,015 6,337 5,630 5,634 6,760 6,199 9,827 11,313 9,333 7,121 7,767
1992 17,245 21,006 6,662 5,896 6,038 7,033 6,471 10,367 11,869 9,540 7,416 8,264
1993 17,656 9,208 6,832 5,657 6,507 7,224 6,641 10,453 12,145 9,617 7,516 8,578
1994 18,104 9,391 7,048 5,892 6,964 7,341 6,795 10,694 12,473 11,197 7,655 8,886
1995 18,750 9,619 7,836 6,664 7,353 7,553 6,955 12,482 12,915 11,659 7,755 9,198
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 Notes
 
1. States also pay cash benefits for temporary partial disability and for disfigure-
ment, as well as benefits to claimants who are undergoing a vocational rehabilita-
tion program.  We do not consider these types of benefits in our analysis.
2. Workers’ compensation programs also pay temporary partial benefits to workers
who retain some earning capacity prior to the point of MMI.  However, these ben-
efits represent a tiny fraction of total benefits paid.
3. This is done by normalizing the wage distribution (which is, as indicated, a
national wage distribution) by dividing each wage in the distribution by the mean.
This normalized distribution is then multiplied by the average weekly wage for
the state to obtain an appropriate wage distribution for each state.
4. We assume that the wage distribution is identical for each family type.
5. Several simplifying assumptions are relied upon in these calculations.  First, we
assume that the only change in family status occurs when dependent children
reach the age of majority.  In other words, we do not attempt to account for
divorce, widowhood, remarriage, etc.  Second, based on NCCI data, we assume
that all children were 10 years of age on the date of injury.  Third, in most states,
children who are deemed to be mentally or physically incapacitated are consid-
ered to be dependent children for the purpose of compensation past the age of
majority for the period of their incapacity.  Similarly, in many states the period of
dependency for students enrolled in an approved educational program is extended
beyond the normal majority age.  We ignore these provisions and assume that for
all children, benefits terminate on the age of majority.
6. It is also possible that Social Security offsets apply to TTD or PPD benefits.  How-
ever, to simplify calculations, we arbitrarily assume that no Social Security offsets
apply to TTD benefits and that PPD benefits are only offset by retirement benefits.
7. In addition to Social Security benefits, several states offset workers’ compensa-
tion payments by benefit payments from other social insurance programs, includ-
ing unemployment insurance, as well as employer-provided disability or pension
benefits.  Because we lack data on the size or distribution of these other types of
offsets, we ignore them in our calculations.
8. For example, Social Security disability benefits do not begin until at least five
months after the onset of disability and terminate at age 62.  Normal retirement
benefits begin at age 65.  (We assume that all claimants opt for normal-age retire-
ment benefits.)
9. In addition to data on a set of specific body parts, such as the arm, leg, eye, etc.,
the distribution contained two unspecified or “nonscheduled” categories designed
to capture variation in PPD severity that is not attributable to the specific or
“scheduled” types of injuries.
10. Except for nonscheduled injuries, the PPD distribution from the NCCI provided
data on the average extent of impairment for the specific body part.  It was some-
times necessary to translate this into “whole-person” impairment.  This was done
using the AMA 
 
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment
 
 (American
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Medical Association 1984), which provide data relating the loss of the entire body
part to “whole-person” impairment.  
11. An age distribution was obtained by centering the NCCI’s age distribution for
PTDs on the age according to the PPD distribution.  An occupation distribution
was constructed from Current Population Survey (CPS) data.  Occupationally
related information—the amount of general education, specific vocational train-
ing, or physical effort required by the job—was obtained from the 
 
Dictionary of
Occupational Titles
 
 (U.S. Department of Labor 1991) based on CPS three-digit
occupation codes.
12. These wage-loss data were taken from a study by Berkowitz, Burton, and Vroman
(1979), as reported in Berkowitz and Burton (1987), that examined the extent of
actual wage loss among workers suffering permanent partial disability due to an
occupational industry in these three states (California, Florida, and Wisconsin).
This study tracked workers who had suffered injuries in 1968 for a period of six
years after the injury.  The authors reported post-injury wage-earnings relative to
pre-injury earnings for claimant with different degrees of functional impairment.
We collapsed the data into five functional impairment categories: 1) claimants
who suffered an impairment between 1 and 5 percent of the whole person, 2)
between 6 and 10 percent, 3) between 11 and 15 percent, 4) between 16 and 50
percent, and 5) between 51 and 100 percent.  Based on functional impairment rat-
ings, these wage-loss data were matched with the PPD distribution from the
NCCI, to establish a wage-loss distribution comparable to the functional impair-
ment or disability distributions used in other states.
13. Some schedules go beyond these members or organs and list other body parts,
e.g., testicles.  Since these parts are not included in the NCCI PPD distribution,
they were ignored, as were scheduled amounts for injuries to multiple body parts
(such as two fingers) and distinctions between left and right members.
14. This recalculation of the average healing period was done by assuming that the
healing period distribution had the same shape as the distribution of TTD duration
except that it is centered on the healing-period average.  In other words, first the
TTD distribution was first normalized on the mean.  This distribution was then
converted to a healing-period distribution for a particular PPD type by multiply-
ing the normalized scores by the average healing period for that type.  Any dura-
tion greater than the maximum was then assigned the maximum value, and a new
average healing period was calculated.
15. Dependent beneficiaries under most state statutes include a surviving spouse and
children, but also other family relationships (such as parents, siblings, grandpar-
ents, and grandchildren) where a demonstrable dependency existed upon the
deceased worker.  Our calculations ignore benefits to persons (including orphan
children) other than the surviving spouse and his or her minor children.  Accord-
ing to NCCI data, the beneficiaries we include in our calculations account for
nearly 93 percent of actual fatality benefit recipients.
16. Once again, we assume a 3.5 percent discount rate.  Remarriage probabilities
were derived from a 1979 NCCI study.
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Appendix E
 
The Insurance Cycle
 
Historical data show that various measures of prices, profitability, and
availability of policies for property and liability insurance (such as premium
growth and the combined ratio) exhibit a distinct and fairly regular cycle that
is approximately six years in length (Venezian 1985).  Butler and Worrall
(1990) found state-specific cycles in premiums and losses for workers’ com-
pensation insurance over the period 1954–1983; these varied substantially
among states, from about 4 to 40 years for losses and from about 7 to 124
years for premiums.
 
1
 
   Evidence regarding the existence and length of work-
ers’ compensation insurance cycles is also provided by data from our study
period (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.5, and Chapter 3, Figures 3.2 and 3.4, which
depict movement in the cost of workers’ compensation and underwriting re-
sults).  
An understanding of the dynamic nature of insurance pricing is important
for two reasons.  First, it points out the need to control for cycle effects in em-
pirical research.  If deregulation occurs concurrent with a cyclical decline in
prices, an investigator could misinterpret this price change as the effect of de-
regulation.  Alternatively, a cyclical increase in insurance prices could mask
the impact of deregulation on costs.  Fortunately, the data set employed in our
analysis is sufficiently long to permit us to control for the effects of the insur-
ance cycle.  Second, an understanding of the dynamic of insurance pricing can
shed light on the market effects of various insurance arrangements.
In this appendix, we briefly examine theories of the insurance cycle. As
will be seen, several of these theories postulate a relationship between interest
rates and insurer pricing decisions. 
 
INSURANCE CYCLE THEORIES
 
There are several explanations for the existence and length of insurance cy-
cles; these explanations fall into two categories.  Theories in the first category
are based on the assumption of irrationality on the part of insurers; theories in
the second category attribute the cycle to rational responses to external shocks
such as interest-rate changes or changes in the loss or injury distribution, or to
institutional interventions such as the actions of the regulatory agency or other
aspects of the rate-setting process.  In this section, we summarize both theo-
ries and discuss their implications for our empirical analyses.
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Models that Assume Irrationality
Cash-flow underwriting
 
One of the earliest hypotheses explaining the existence of insurance cycles
assumes that insurers’ underwriting decisions are based on interest-rate fluctu-
ations.  Since interest income represents a substantial portion of the insurers’
total income, insurers’ profit expectations are partially based on the interest
rate.  According to this theory, higher interest rates cause insurers to unduly
revise upward their profit expectations for new business, leading to lower pre-
mium rates and increased insurance coverage.  In other words, insurers lower
premiums (to below the point at which costs may be recovered) in order to in-
crease premiums and thereby take advantage of higher investment income on
loss reserves.  
Some versions of the cash-flow underwriting theory assert that insurers de-
liberately underestimate loss reserves when interest rates are high in order to
circumvent regulatory concerns that the insurers are risking insolvency by
pricing below cost.  Then, as interest rates drop, insurers revise their reserves
upward, resulting in lower profit expectations and constrained supply, leading
to higher premium rates and reduced availability of workers’ compensation
coverage.  (The threat of financial insolvency due to inadequate loss reserves
also causes insurers to constrain supply in order to restore the surplus.)
The cost-flow underwriting hypothesis regarding the existence of insur-
ance cycles is criticized by many economists as an unsatisfactory explanation
because it postulates that insurers irrationally write policies at below-cost
rates.  However, Harrington and Danzon (1994) revived this model, postulat-
ing that insurers are heterogeneous in two respects.  First, insurers have differ-
ent incentives for solvency.  A moral hazard to risk insolvency by
underpricing exists due to limited-liability, risk-insensitive guaranty programs
and uninformed or unconcerned consumers who cannot or do not bother to in-
vestigate the financial solvency of insurers.  Second, insurers are heteroge-
neous with respect to their information on the nature of the loss distribution.
Variation among insurers with respect to this information results in differenc-
es in loss forecasts.  In either event, some insurers set rates at levels that are
profitable when real interest rate are high but that cannot be sustained when
interest rates fall.  Competition induces excessive price-cutting that affects the
entire industry.
 
Moral hazard
 
Harrington and Danzon speculated that some insurers have a weak incen-
tive to avoid the risk of insolvency, so they set prices too low (i.e., below ex-
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pected costs).  This heterogeneity among insurers is due to differences among
carriers with respect to the value of intangible assets (including reputation and
quasi-rents on renewal business attributable to private information on in-
sureds) and with respect to the value of nontransferable tangible assets (in-
cluding the costs of attracting and screening new policyholders).  Private
carriers with substantial nontransferable assets have more to lose from insol-
vency, and they will be reluctant to risk those assets by engaging in below-
cost pricing.  However, firms without substantial nontransferable assets have
incentives to engage in aggressive marketing efforts if there are limits on
downside risks.  Harrington and Danzon suggest that a number of institutional
features of the property/casualty insurance market (including government-
mandated guarantees of insurer obligations, long-tailed payout lags, losses
that fall on third-party claimants if the insurer defaults, and regulatory detec-
tion problems) make liability insurers particularly susceptible to these moral
hazard problems.  
 
Heterogeneous information 
 
Insurance carriers base loss-cost forecasts on both public and private infor-
mation, so forecasts vary among insurers.  Firms whose forecasts are low may
be subject to the “winner’s curse”; that is, by underbidding, low-price insurers
are able to increase market share.  Harrington and Danzon hypothesized that
new carriers are more likely to underbid than more-experienced, established
firms that have “learned to adjust their forecasts to avoid the curse.”  
Harrington and Danzon examined insurers’ revisions of claim-cost fore-
casts and premium growth rates to determine the relative contribution of 1)
moral hazard and 2) information heterogeneity to underpricing in general lia-
bility insurance in 1980–1982 (the period immediately prior to the liability
crisis of the mid 1980s).  If insurers underprice, then forecast revisions and
premium growth are both expected to be inversely related to price; that is,
lower insurance prices should result in larger subsequent revisions to initial
loss forecasts, since insurers are more likely to underprice when prices are
low.  In addition, underpricing will induce increased demand and, consequent-
ly, greater premium growth.  Furthermore, forecast revisions and premium
growth should be positively related to one another, indicating that insurers ex-
pand business by underpricing
Harrington and Danzon found, consistent with the moral hazard hypothe-
sis, that premium growth and forecast revisions were positively and signifi-
cantly related to the amount of liabilities ceded to reinsurers.  This result is
expected if reinsurance induces carriers to take greater insolvency risks.  Fur-
thermore, they found that mutual companies had smaller forecast revisions
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and lower premium growth than stock companies, a result that is also expect-
ed if mutual insurance policyholders have less incentive to risk insolvency.
On the other hand, they failed to find a relationship between insurer under-
pricing and measures of insurer experience, contrary to the heterogeneous in-
formation hypothesis.  
 
Models that Assume Rational Behavior in the Face of External Shocks
Institutional lags
 
Another theory attributes insurance cycles to lags inherent in the rate-mak-
ing and regulatory process.  Unlike the cash-flow underwriting hypothesis,
this theory (or, more accurately, set of theories) assumes that insurers do not
deliberately underprice, but are induced to do so by inherent delays in the rate-
making process or delays associated with the institutional “stickiness” of rate
regulation.  For example, Venezian (1985) argued that insurance bureaus fore-
cast future loss costs on the basis of past experience and these forecasts are er-
roneous to the extent that they do not reflect changed conditions.  Venezian’s
model assumed irrationality on the part of insurers who routinely fail to adjust
their loss-cost predictions to account for systematic forecast error.
 
2
 
   
However, Cummins and Outreville (1987) hypothesized that several insti-
tutional features—data collection lags, regulatory lags, policy renewal lags,
and statutory accounting rules—are responsible for the profit cycles in insurer
markets in spite of rational expectations by insurers.  First, ratemaking is
based on incurred loss data, although in many insurance lines (including
workers’ compensation), policyholder claims do not fully mature until years
after the policy has expired, so that the data may not reflect all of the losses on
claims occurring in a particular year.  This means that cost forecasts are neces-
sarily based on data that are incomplete and therefore inaccurate, so that these
forecasts are likewise inaccurate.  
Second, the administrative process involved in rate regulation creates de-
lays between the experience and forecast periods; in other words, current rates
are based on loss-cost information that is older than would be used by insurers
in an unregulated market.  In addition, due to administrative costs associated
with the regulatory process, rates are revised less often than would be the case
in an unregulated, competitive market.  Third, insurance policies typically
have a term of one year; instantaneous price adjustments are thus not possible
because prices are “locked in” for a year at a time.  Cummins and Outreville
provided evidence suggesting that these lags introduce systematic error into
the rate-making process. 
 
3
 
Other studies have examined the relationship between institutional lags and
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the variability (rather than the existence) of insurance cycles.  These studies
have hypothesized that regulatory lag exacerbates cycles (as measured by in-
surer loss ratios) by delaying rate increases in hard markets and delaying rate
reductions in soft markets.  As we noted in Chapter 6, some empirical research
suggests that regulation increases price volatility, as measured by the loss ra-
tio.  In addition, the insurance cycle appears to have a longer period in a regu-
lated market environment.
 
 Capacity constraints
 
The capacity constraint models hypothesize that insurer underwriting ca-
pacity is constrained by information deficiencies and other imperfections in
capital markets.  There are several parts to this argument.  
First, regulatory financial requirements, as well as consumers’ desires for
security and fears of insurer insolvency, limit insurers’ discretion as to how
extensively they may deplete surplus relative to loss reserves.  Second, the
cost of internal equity is less than the cost of external equity due to agency
costs and dividend taxation.  Agency costs in this context are the costs associ-
ated with investor (or potential investor) monitoring of insurer behavior. They
arise due to informational asymmetries between insurers and potential inves-
tors (investors interpret the willingness to share profits as a signal that profits
are low).  Corporate taxes trap equity because the transfer of wealth from
stockholders to the firm is not taxed, although dividends, which represent the
transfer of wealth from firm to shareholders, are taxed.
These characteristics imply that the supply price for insurance is perfectly
elastic up to the point at which insurers can no longer replace surplus from in-
ternal equity (retained earnings).  (In addition, since raising new equity inter-
nally is less costly than raising it externally, insurers will prefer to keep excess
capital on hand in a "soft" market to ameliorate the consequences of a future
"hard" market.)  However, at some point the "limited liability" constraint—
where 
 
limited liability
 
 refers to the fact that under bankruptcy law, an incorpo-
rated insurer’s liability to policyholders is limited to the corporation’s net
worth—becomes binding on the insurers’ ability to supply coverage.  That is,
the maximum possible payout by the insurer is reached and the supply curve
assumes an upward sloping shape, reflecting the additional cost of raising new
equity in financial markets.  The capacity constraint theory hypothesizes that a
shock that depletes insurer surplus, such as a catastrophic loss or a change in
the loss distribution, creates the insurance cycle.  When capital is depleted be-
yond the limited liability constraint, the price of insurance rises and availabili-
ty (relative to demand) declines.  As the surplus is replenished and capacity
restored, the price declines once again.
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Cummins and Danzon (1997) extended the capacity constraint model by
hypothesizing that insurers are heterogeneous with respect to insolvency risk
and that insureds and insurers sort themselves according to risk and price pref-
erences.  More specifically, they postulated that insurers have different target
leverage ratios (or safety levels; i.e., the ratio of equity or surplus to debt or li-
ability) and that carriers with high surplus relative to reserves are able to
charge higher prices than highly leveraged firms.  Insurance carriers attempt
to maintain these ratios at all times, so an external shock that depletes surplus
will require the insurer to raise new equity in order to remain in its preferred
quality classification.  However, because new capital is used to pay old liabil-
ities, the insurer must raise prices above the competitive equilibrium that ex-
isted before the shock in order to attract investment.
 
4
 
   Individual insurers are
able to do this because they possess private information about their policy-
holders (i.e., information about risk) that is not shared by other insurers.  
Cummins and Danzon (1997) asserted that there are two reasons why pric-
es may not immediately and fully respond to a shock that depletes surplus.
First, raising prices may exacerbate adverse selection by policyholders; that is,
good risks will drop insurance coverage (e.g., by self-insuring) following a
price hike, while bad risks will continue to insure.  As a result, price increases
could cause a decline in net revenue.  In response to this potential problem, in-
surers will ration supply by implementing (or reducing) the upper limit of cov-
erage.
 
5
 
   Availability may thus become a problem.  
Cummins and Danzon offered another reason why prices may not rise im-
mediately following a shock that depletes surplus.  They claim that the entry
of new carriers into the insurance market will also prevent market prices from
rising to market-clearing levels, because these new firms have not incurred a
shock to surplus.  Since new carriers do not bear the burden of old liabilities
that have increased in value for old carriers (i.e., prior reserves that were inad-
equate are now restated), they can charge prices that are below those charged
by existing insurers.  However, the ability of new entrants to attract customers
is also limited by information asymmetries.  New entrants are more likely than
existing insurers to be uncertain about the prospective loss distribution and
may face relatively greater adverse selection.  Greater adverse selection is due
to the risk-reduction strategies of existing carriers, who may be expected to
impose or lower upper limits on coverage rather than raising prices, thus re-
taining low-risk insureds and losing high-risk insureds.
 
6
 
 
 
Interest rate changes
 
Doherty and Kang (1988) noted that the insurance contract is a contingent
promise to pay over a period of time, where insurers hold policyholder assets
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for a period equal, on average, to one-half the policy period.  Since prices
should reflect the interest earnings on the funds held by the insurer during this
period, insurance prices should be expected to fall as interest rates rise and
vice versa.  (A corollary of this hypothesis is that long-tailed lines [that is,
those with long payout periods for individual policies] should be more sensi-
tive to interest rate changes than shorter-tailed lines.)
Doherty and Garven (1995) combined the capacity constraint model and
the Doherty and Kang interest rate model.  They provided evidence that rising
interest rates lead to a drop in the value of the insurer’s equity and thus de-
crease the leverage ratio.  As the value of surplus declines, insurers attempt to
restore the surplus/liability ratio for reasons explained by the capacity con-
straint model.  (In other words, an interest rate increase is tantamount to a
shock in the capacity constraint model.)  Doherty and Garven further postulat-
ed that insurers respond to interest-rate changes by adjusting capital structure,
increasing equity when interest rates fall and decreasing equity when interest
rates increase.  However, the response to falling or rising interest rates is
asymmetrical because it is easier to pay dividends when equity is too great
than to raise new capital when the surplus has been depleted.  
Doherty and Garven presented evidence of capacity constraints in insur-
ance markets.  Among other things, they showed that there is an asymmetrical
response to falling and rising interest rates; as predicted, underwriting profits
are more responsive to falling than to rising interest rates.  They also showed
that firms with more costly access to new capital are more sensitive to interest
rate changes.  As was noted by Cummins, Harrington, and Klein (1991, p. 70)
“. . . the Doherty-Garven results imply that interest rates changes may be the
triggering mechanism shifting the market between hard and soft periods.”
 
CONCLUSIONS
 
Insurance pricing has a dynamic quality.  Specifically, time-series data
show a cyclical regularity for various insurance market outcomes, including
prices.  The explanations offered to account for this regularity can be grouped
into two categories: theories assuming insurer irrationality and theories as-
suming rational behavior in the face of external shocks.  One “irrationality”
hypothesis posits that insurers cut prices excessively when real interest rates
are high.  Another suggests that imperfections in financial markets, such as
agency costs and dividend taxation, prevent funds from freely flowing into in-
surance markets, so that an external shock that depletes capital (such as falling
interest rates) results in a price increase.  Yet another theory postulates that in-
stitutional delays (and, in particular, delays in the regulatory process) are re-
sponsible for price fluctuations.  It is important to note that these different
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theories are not mutually exclusive and that each explanation may have some
validity.
Among other things, these hypotheses all suggest the importance of con-
trolling for these cyclical changes in our empirical work.  They also provide
some clues that will aid our understanding of the results of our analyses,
which are discussed in Chapters 5 through 8.
 
 NOTES
 
1. However, Butler and Worrall (1990) were unable to detect a cycle using a data set
that pooled observations for and imposed an identical autoregressive structure on
all states in their sample.
2. Venezian hypothesized that this systematic error is due to autocorrelation in the
time-series data used to predict loss costs, i.e., the fact that the error term in the
current period is systematically related to past error.
3. Specifically, Cummins and Outreville concluded that these lags introduced first-
or second-order autocorrelation into insurance forecasts.
4. Cummins and Danzon hypothesized that there are three sources of risk for the
potential investor: 1) inadequacy of prior loss reserves, 2) parameter uncertainty
for the prospective loss distribution and nonindependence of risks, and 3) sam-
pling or selection risk.  Risk-averse potential investors will be reluctant to invest
when prices are at competitive levels because "normal" profits do not compensate
these new investors for their increased risk.
5. Cummins and Danzon claimed that lowering coverage limits—as opposed to
increasing deductibles—is an optimal strategy if policyholders are heterogeneous
and this heterogeneity takes the form of a “mean-preserving” spread.  That is,
expected loss is identical across policyholders but varies with respect to the dis-
persion: high-risk insureds have a loss distribution with a greater variance than
low-risk insureds, although the means of these two distributions are equal.  In
such a world, deductibles create an adverse selection for insurers, as low-risk
insureds will choose to decline coverage and high-risk insureds will choose to
accept coverage; upper limits on coverage would create a positive selection, i.e.,
upper coverage limits would induce low-risk insureds to seek coverage and high-
risk insureds to decline it.  In fact, Danzon and Cummins predicted that in the face
of heterogeneous risks of this type, insurers are likely to offer two types of poli-
cies that force high-risk insureds to reveal themselves: high premium coverage
without an upper limit and a low premium coverage with an upper limit.
6. By imposing or lowering coverage, the insurer increases the expected losses for
all insureds.  High-risk insureds exit the market when coverage limits are imposed
or lowered, because their expected losses if insured are now greater than their
expected losses if uninsured.
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Appendix F
 
Insurance Commission Survey
 
The regulatory environment for workers’ compensation insurance is com-
plex.  Unfortunately, there is no single source that authoritatively defines the
dimensions of compensation insurance rate regulation or comprehensively
identifies the regulatory rules in effect in specific states.  Consequently, spe-
cific indices of the regulatory environment were developed for this study after
a review of the rate regulation literature.
State-specific values for these indices were determined through a survey of
state insurance commissioners.  The following survey instrument and accom-
panying cover letter were sent to insurance commissioners in all 45 jurisdic-
tions that regulate private workers’ compensation insurance.  Responses were
received from 41 of these state insurance commissions.  In some instances,
follow-up phone calls were made to survey respondents for clarification.
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Exhibit F.1 Cover Letter
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Exhibit F.2 Survey Instrument
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Appendix G
 
Supplemental Regression Results
 
The following tables contain the full set of coefficients for some of the re-
gression equations predicting costs reported in Chapter 7.  Unlike the data re-
ported in that chapter, which are elasticity estimates, the coefficients
contained in these tables have not been transformed into elasticities and repre-
sent the unit change in log costs (adjusted manual rates or net weekly costs)
given a unit change in the corresponding independent variable.
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Table G.1 Regression Equations Predicting Adjusted Manual Rates
 
Model Model
Variable 1 2 3 4 Variable 5 6 7 8
ln(Cash benefits) 0.1165***
(2.77)
0.1079**
(2.56)
0.1057**
(2.54)
0.1071**
(2.53)
ln(Cash benefits) 0.1145***
(2.73)
0.1032**
(2.48)
0.1098***
(2.58)
0.1041**
(2.44)
Medical benefits 0.0001***
(4.91)
0.0001***
(5.06)
0.0001***
(4.82)
0.0001***
(4.83)
Medical benefits 0.0001***
(5.11)
0.0001***
(5.04)
0.0001***
(4.76)
0.0001***
(4.79)
ln(Injury) 0.8369***
(8.82)
0.9140***
(9.58)
0.9087***
(9.77)
0.8870***
(9.40)
ln(Injury) 0.8580***
(9.03)
0.9222***
(9.96)
0.8996***
(9.38)
0.8612***
(8.89)
Union density 0.0013
(0.32)
–0.0009
(0.21)
–0.0020
(0.49)
0.0017
(0.41)
Union density 0.0009
(0.22)
–0.0013
(0.31)
0.0021
(0.50)
0.0012
(0.29)
PPD percentage 0.0096***
(5.85)
0.0096***
(5.90)
0.0097***
(5.96)
0.0103***
(6.23)
PPD percentage 0.0101***
(6.20)
0.0097***
(6.00)
0.0104***
(6.31)
0.0105***
(6.35)
Covered 
employment
0.0198***
(2.86)
0.0129*
(1.85)
0.0140**
(2.16)
0.0146**
(2.15)
Covered 
employment
0.0160**
(2.33)
0.0114*
(1.71)
0.0159**
(2.29)
0.0148**
(2.10)
Competitive state 
fund
0.1883***
(3.71)
0.2123***
(4.24)
0.2252***
(4.53)
0.1761***
(3.50)
Competitive state 
fund
0.1958***
(3.89)
0.2133***
(4.30)
0.1636***
(3.23)
0.1709***
(3.38)
Without prior 
appr.
–0.0535*
(1.71)
— — — Var. from 
bureau rates
 w/prior appr.
0.0402
(1.38)
— — —
Adv. rates 0.0351
(1.18)
— — — Admin. pricing w/
dev. or sched.
— 0.0690**
(2.44)
0.0422
(1.43)
—
Loss costs –0.1179***
(3.83)
— — — Admin. pricing w/
dev.
— — — 0.0461
(1.48)
 425
Deviations –0.0022
(0.11)
— — — Admin. pricing w/
sched. rating
— — — 0.0101
(0.27)
Schedule rating 0.0760***
(2.89)
— — — Adv. rates or loss 
costs
— — 0.0231
(0.71)
—
Admin. pricing 
w/dev.
— 0.0590***
(1.90)
— — Adv. rates — 0.1533***
(3.25)
— —
Admin. pricing 
w/sched. rating
— 0.0794**
(2.05)
— — Adv. rates 
w/prior app.
— — — 0.0657*
(1.74)
Adv. rates 
w/prior appr.
— 0.0825**
(2.22)
— — Adv. rates 
w/o prior appr.
0.0975***
(2.74)
— — —
Adv. rates w/o 
prior appr.
— 0.1676***
(3.23)
— — Loss costs/adv. 
rates w/o prior 
appr.
— — — –0.0088
(0.25)
Loss costs 
w/prior appr.
— 0.0537
(1.26)
–0.0195
(0.59)
— Loss costs –0.0463
(1.32)
— — —
Loss costs w/o 
prior appr.
— –0.1099***
(2.82)
–0.1796***
(5.75)
— Loss costs 
w/prior appr.
— 0.0541
(1.27))
— —
Partial competition — — — –0.0070
(0.20)
Loss costs w/o 
prior appr.
— –0.1144***
(2.98)
— —
Open competition — — — 0.0432
(1.51)
Adj. 
 
R
 
2
 
0.9161 0.9179 0.9137 0.9144
Adj. 
 
R
 
2
 
0.9167 0.9180 0.9168 0.9142
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Table G.2 Regression Equations Predicting Net Weekly Costs
 
Model Model
Variable 1 2 3 4 Variable 5 6 7 8
ln(Cash benefits) 0.1450***
(3.40)
0.1375***
(3.22)
0.1370***
(3.25)
0.1363***
(3.18)
ln(Cash benefits) 0.1424***
(3.34)
0.1317***
(3.12)
0.1380***
(3.20)
0.1342***
(3.10)
Medical benefits 0.0001***
(5.30)
0.0001***
(5.49)
0.0001***
(5.18)
0.0001***
(5.24)
Medical benefits 0.0001***
(5.50)
0.0001***
(5.44)
0.0001***
(5.17)
0.0001***
(5.21)
ln(Injury) 0.7963***
(8.29)
0.8826***
(9.14)
0.8625***
(9.15)
0.8423***
(8.82)
ln(Injury) 0.8227***
(8.54)
0.8779***
(9.36)
0.8620***
(8.88)
0.8284***
(8.45)
Union density 0.0042
(1.01)
0.0022
(0.53)
0.0008
(0.19)
0.0047
(1.12)
Union density 0.0039
(0.93)
0.0018
(0.42)
0.0050
(1.19)
0.0044
(1.04)
PPD percentage 0.0094***
(5.63)
0.0093***
(5.68)
0.0096***
(5.82)
0.0101***
(6.08)
PPD percentage 0.0100***
(6.03)
0.0096***
(5.85)
0.0103***
(6.15)
0.0103***
(6.14)
Covered 
employment
0.0232***
(3.31)
0.0158**
(2.24)
0.0184***
(2.80)
0.0179***
(2.60)
Covered 
employment
0.0186***
(2.67)
0.0146**
(2.15)
0.0185***
(2.64)
0.0178**
(2.51)
Competitive state 
fund
0.1931***
(3.76)
0.2205***
(4.35)
0.2322***
(4.61)
0.1814***
(3.56)
Competitive state 
fund
0.2024***
(3.97)
0.2178***
(4.33)
0.1720***
(3.36)
0.1786***
(3.49)
Without prior 
appr.
–0.0573*
(1.81)
— — — Variation from 
bureau rates 
w/prior appr.
0.0605**
(2.05)
— — —
Adv. rates 0.0194
(0.65)
— — — Admin. pricing 
w/dev. or 
sched.
— 0.0860***
(3.01)
0.0624**
(2.08)
—
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Loss costs –0.1053***
(3.38)
— — — Admin. pricing
w/dev.
— — — 0.0628**
(1.99)
Deviations 0.0093
(0.45)
— — — Admin. pricing 
w/sched. rating
— — — 0.0405
(1.08)
Sched. rating 0.0864***
(3.25)
— — — Adv. rates or 
loss costs
— — 0.0324
(0.99)
—
Admin. pricing 
w/dev.
— 0.0766**
(2.44)
— — Adv. rates — 0.1610***
(3.37)
— —
Admim. pricing 
w/sched. rating
— 0.1102***
(2.81)
— — Adv. rates 
w/prior appr.
— — — 0.0718*
(1.88)
Adv. rates 
w/prior appr.
— 0.0886**
(2.36)
— — Advisory rates 
w/o prior appr.
0.1028***
(2.85)
— — —
Adv. rates 
w/o prior appr.
— 0.1816***
(3.46)
— — Loss costs/adv. 
rates w/o prior
— — — 0.0049
(0.14)
Loss costs 
w/prior appr.
— 0.0713*
(1.65)
–0.0169
(0.51)
— Loss costs –0.0331
(0.93)
— — —
Loss costs 
w/o prior appr.
— –0.0990**
(2.51)
–0.1790***
(5.66)
— Loss costs 
w/prior appr.
— 0.0725*
(1.68)
— —
Open competition — — — 0.0065
(0.19)
Loss costs 
w/o prior appr.
— –0.1017***
(2.61)
— —
Partial 
competition
— — — 0.0602
(2.09)
Adj. 
 
R
 
2
 
0.9220 0.9238 0.9201 0.9206
Adj. 
 
R
 
2
 
0.9227 0.9239 0.9226 0.9205
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Table G.3 Regression Equations Predicting Costs as a Function
of the Regulatory Regime, Regulatory Stringency, and the 
Insurance Cycle
 
Variable
Adjusted manual 
rates
Net weekly 
costs
ln(Cash benefits) 0.2381***
(5.06)
0.2678***
(5.67)
Medical benefits 0.0003***
(17.72)
0.0003***
(18.62)
ln(Injury) 0.8379***
(10.27)
0.8733***
(10.67)
Union density –0.0392***
(11.83)
–0.0358***
(10.74)
PPD percentage 0.0118***
(6.88)
0.0113***
(6.59)
Covered employment 0.0129*
(1.71)
0.0178**
(2.35)
Competitive state fund 0.1490**
(2.44)
0.1639***
(2.68)
Regul. stringency –0.4789***
(3.96)
–0.4756***
(3.92)
Hard market –0.2493
(1.57)
–0.2866*
(1.80)
Regul. stringency 
 
×
 
 hard market 0.1749
(1.10)
0.2417
(1.52)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. –0.2168
(1.43)
–0.2059
(1.36)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr.
 
 
×
 
 hard market
–0.0160
(0.08)
0.0305
(0.16)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 
 
×
 
 regul. stringency
0.3688***
(2.64)
0.3747***
(2.67)
Var. from bureau rates w/prior appr. 
 
×
 
 hard market 
 
×
 
 regul. stringency
–0.1032
(0.54)
–0.1566
(0.82)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. –0.1916
(0.36)
–0.4513
(0.84)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 
 
×
 
 hard market 0.8238
(1.38)
1.1204*
(1.87)
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Table G.3 (continued)
 
Variable
Adjusted manual 
rates
Net weekly 
costs
Adv. rates w/o prior appr. 
 
×
 
 regul. stringency
0.3674
(0.67)
0.6435
(1.16)
Adv. rates w/o prior appr.
 
×
 
 hard market 
 
×
 
 regul. stringency
–0.7562
(1.23)
–1.0597*
(1.72)
Loss costs w/prior appr. –0.2076
(0.93)
–0.1784
(0.80)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 
 
×
 
 hard market
0.1959
(0.56)
0.2059
(0.59)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 
 
×
 
 regul. stringency
0.2368
(1.17)
0.2365
(1.16)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 
 
×
 
 hard market 
 
×
 
 regul. stringency
–0.1103
(0.34)
–0.1456
(0.44)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. –1.1623***
(4.56)
–1.1827***
(4.63)
Loss costs w/o prior appr. 
 
×
 
 hard market
0.8016**
(2.35)
0.9571***
(2.79)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 
 
×
 
 regul. stringency
0.9796***
(4.08)
1.0179***
(4.22)
Loss costs w/prior appr. 
 
×
 
 hard market 
 
× 
 
regul. stringency
–0.5925*
(1.80)
–0.7651**
(2.31)
State dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies No No
Adj. 
 
R
 
2
 
0.8939 0.9033
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